There has been much speculation in the past that Tajikistan will fail as a state. Repeatedly, this speculation has been proved premature. Enduring economic problems and persistent political tension have not threatened the foundations of stability in the country. True, a worrying number of armed clashes, most recently in Khorugh and the Rumit Gorge, have put observers on edge. But these conflicts, too, have been brief and strictly local.

Heartened by international backing and its control over patronage, the regime has stridden ahead to consolidate its position. Few of its excesses have met with serious push-back. The IRP caved in to government pressure, its leadership was imprisoned or forced into exile. There have been rumblings in some places, including Khorugh where anti-Dushanbe sentiment remains rife since the botched 2012 military operation. But it is difficult to see it translating into a broader challenge to the government as long as the would-be opposition remains leaderless, repressed and divided.

Still, it is no time for complacency. The situation in Tajikistan has patently taken a recent turn for the worse. The international community should remain unperturbed by the prospect of a possible blow-up yet take steps to ease pressures stemming from declining remittances, joblessness and political repression. In so doing, it should side-step government claims that the country is facing an existential threat from militant Islamists. Indeed, calming the waters in Tajikistan requires more assertive engagement with the Tajik regime and includes the following steps.

Challenge the Rahmon regime’s scare-mongering

Rahmon’s fear-mongering rhetoric about Islamist militancy is obscuring the real drivers of tension. It has allowed the Tajik regime to: 1) crack down on the opposition, including by banning the last remaining opposition party of any stature in Tajikistan, the Islamic Revival Party; 2) negotiate increased military and economic support from Russia and China; and 3) persuade Western actors and inter-governmental organisations such as the OSCE and the EU to turn a blind eye to political repression and other human rights abuses.

As a result, Rahmon’s excesses have met with little push-back from foreign actors. The banning of the IRP on legalistic grounds last year was met mostly by silence or hedged statements from Western diplomats. Earlier moves to manipulate elections earned the Tajik government only mild slaps on the wrist from international organisations such as the OSCE. Western actors are in a double bind. They have some strategic interests in this country that borders Afghanistan yet limited influence to shape the actions of the regime. This has allowed the tail to wag the dog as the Tajik regime has pushed on down the road of authoritarian consolidation, leaving Western actors privately appalled but publicly silent.

Where possible, Western actors should voice greater scepticism about official claims that Tajikistan is facing a militant Islamist threat. This would undercut one of the government’s attempts to justify its political repression and security build-up. Ironically, while there is little threat of large-scale insurgent violence, there is a real threat of government overreach.

Joint action with Russia and China

There may be little risk of imminent conflict in Tajikistan, but tensions are on the rise. To de-escalate them, Western countries should try to join with other international stakeholders. Russia, China and the West have conflicting goals elsewhere but share an interest in ensuring stability in Tajikistan. Indeed, working together in Tajikistan may provide some common ground between Russia and the West, whose relationship has been dominated recently by the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria. Together, foreign powers may press for the reversal of some of the most heavy-handed measures of the Rahmon government. One objective could be the release of civil-society activists and opposition politicians who have been imprisoned on trumped-up charges – including 13 top IRP members who were recently given lengthy prison spells.‍[49] Another could be the lifting of restrictions on religious freedoms, which are needlessly causing frustration among observant Muslims.

Western actors have little independent influence in Tajikistan. But they do wield some power through their control of international aid and their ability to censure Tajikistan publicly and privately. Some of the private wealth of the Tajik political elite has been placed in offshore funds in the West, which may offer another source of leverage. Through these different avenues, it may be possible to temper the Tajik government’s repressive policies. European countries like the Netherlands can also offer technical incentives to Dushanbe, including expertise in water management, so important in this country where hydropower is one of the largest economic resources.

Stimulate job generation

In general, more needs to be done to generate jobs in Tajikistan, expanding employment for returning migrants. This should be high on the priority lists of everyone with an interest in a stable Tajikistan, in order to stave off a possible social backlash when migrants return after finding themselves jobless in Russia, or others choose not to travel there in the first place. To contribute to job generation, the international community could step up economic investment, supporting small and medium-sized enterprises that operate relatively autonomously from the regime. The growing Chinese investments in Tajikistan constitute another entry point for stimulating job creation for Tajiks. Encouraging the Chinese, for example, to incorporate local employment quotas of the type proposed in Kyrgyzstan,‍[50] might provide more jobs locally and allay fears that Chinese investment is creating employment mainly for ex-patriate Chinese. Finally, Western actors need to tighten controls on economic assistance, limiting opportunities for graft and increasing the likelihood that money is effectively spent. Audits that expose graft should prompt appropriate sanctions. In the past, independent audits of the Tajik national bank revealed serious cases of misappropriation of funds yet brought only weak reprimands.‍[51] A 2009 audit by Ernst & Young found that the bank chairman Muradali Alimardon had diverted 550 million USD in undeclared loans. Despite this, Alimardon was promoted to deputy prime minister and the International Monetary Fund approved new loans to the Tajik financial sector.‍[52] In 2015, The Economist reported that Alimardon again seemed to have siphoned off unapproved loans.‍[53] Such misuse can and should lead to the imposition of sanctions.