Achieving development results through the provision of aid is challenging in any situation, but is challenging to the extreme in situations of conflict. Aid organisations have come up with innovative and pragmatic ways to carry out and monitor their activities nonetheless. The purpose of this short study is to map key practices of how donors monitor the implementation of activities funded by their aid in conditions of conflict. Combining a literature review, in-house expertise and key informant interviews focusing on Afghanistan, Syria and Somalia as case studies, the study develops a basic yardstick that donors can use to assess the monitoring designs of projects to be implemented in situations of conflict when they are making funding decisions. Specifically, the study explores how monitoring can help ensure that aid funds are correctly spent, that is, how monitoring takes account of the fiduciary and accountability risks of programme engagement in conflict settings, and identifies response mechanisms for when such risks arise.
Modern conflict has characteristics with serious implications for aid implementation, and that render the type of monitoring typically used for aid interventions in more stable developmental contexts either inadequate or unfeasible. Among other things, informal political systems of rule with significant levels of exclusion are the norm; dispute resolution takes place via the rule by law or (under the threat of) the rule of the gun; there can be extreme fluidity in terms of allegiances and support for activities; and competing conflict narratives and misinformation are elements of the fog of war. Development interventions in conflict settings are subsequently faced with problems of polarised narratives, mutually exclusive identity images, reduced access, security threats, and nepotistic and corrupt practices that arise out of years of rule by the gun and warfighting.
As most of these issues are beyond the control of aid interventions, and cannot be directly influenced by programming, most aid organisations focus their risk management and mitigation strategies on programmatic fiduciary and accountability risks, as these can be most directly addressed in programme design. There is no standard framework or checklist for programmatic risk, as the main risks encountered in conflict settings will depend on the nature of the activities being implemented. However, the most common programmatic risk categories are: diversion of funds (e.g. informal taxes); diversion of equipment (e.g. appropriation by armed groups); diversion of activity (e.g. corrupt selection processes for event and training invites); co-optation of counterpart (e.g. using aid activity as a front for other activities); non-delivery of outputs but funds claimed nonetheless (e.g. forged paperwork proving delivery); partner is unknowingly affiliated with reputationally damaging groups (e.g. affiliation with a blacklisted group); and misalignment of programme and local needs (e.g. procurement influenced by contractors seeking profit rather than based on a needs assessment).
In addition to these programmatic risks, there are challenges to monitoring in situations of conflict that need to be taken into account, such as remote management and lack of physical access due to security risks, low capacity of implementing partners to monitor, low trust in implementing partners to truthfully monitor, lack of trustworthy existing data, and intangible variables that activities try to change (such as legitimacy and security) but which are hard to measure. Aid organisations will rely on third-party monitors and on remote monitoring with technology, which creates challenges of a technical nature (e.g. does the partner organisation have adequate (financial) capacity, is the technology used the appropriate one, has data been gathered?), as well as issues of trust (e.g. is the partner organisation trustworthy, is the data accurate, does the third-party monitor have a conflict of interest?).
For donors, there are, roughly speaking, three options for monitoring the progress of programme implementation in conflict situations where they do not have a (semi-)permanent presence themselves: (1) (self)-monitoring conducted by (local) implementing partners; (2) third-party monitoring; and (3) monitoring via modern technology. In practice, donors can choose any one of these options, or a combination of them, as they are not mutually exclusive. This study identifies good practices for all of the options.
The study also identifies general good practices for gathering monitoring information, which should be considered by donors and their implementing partners. An important caveat in this regard is that donors need to reflect on what information would be useful to them, to ensure they do not unnecessarily burden those responsible for monitoring and in order to receive relevant and digestible monitoring reports. With this in mind, two groups of general good practices can be distinguished. The first group includes ensuring that basic monitoring housekeeping is in order at donor headquarter level, enabling donors to engage meaningfully in discussions about programme and monitoring design in conflict situations:
There must be a procedure for ensuring that monitoring strategies and practices are incorporated into the planning phase of aid programmes and kept both alive and useful during implementation. This includes clarity of purpose of the proposed monitoring (what will be done with it), options for the appropriate frequency of monitoring (including resource requirements) and the creation of a decision-making body that will meet frequently to review monitoring results and decide on programme adjustment when needed.
A minimum set of clear, simple and pre-determined indicators and data collection procedures is required for effective monitoring of aid activity in conflict contexts. Such indicators should include links to key donor policies and/or theories of change. A good monitoring system also requires several layers of checks and filters for continuous verification.
Monitoring must be made relevant to learning and continuous improvement in addition to its programme accountability purposes. In other words, the inevitable trade-off that will occur between monitoring-for-improvement, monitoring-for-accountability and monitoring-for-learning needs to be mapped, discussed and mitigated as much as possible.
Long-term partnerships need to be built for both political-economy analysis in the service of programme design and implementation, and for third-party monitoring in the service of programme monitoring.
A second group of general good practices is intended to put key heuristics and practices in place at field level, as this will strengthen the ability to monitor programmes operationally:
Develop on-the-ground networks to provide greater local insight, better monitoring and higher levels of accountability. Well-maintained networks and relationships with key stakeholders are essential for effective monitoring and triangulation. This requires a mix of analytical and diplomatic resources and will be a time-intensive endeavour.
Ensure that aid activity contracts contain sufficient incentives to enable and encourage implementing organisations to be transparent regarding the progress of their work to both donors and beneficiaries.
Where modern technology is applied as a monitoring tool, ensure there is adequate investment and research into the pitfalls and challenges of local data collection and analysis software.
Ensure that monitoring work is conducted with the full knowledge of implementing partners; share reports to validate work and justify monitoring activities; and ensure there is a feedback loop between implementing partners and monitoring partners that is mediated by the funder.
On the basis of these insights, this study has developed a basic assessment framework that outlines analytical, organisational and procedural elements that donors need to have in place for adequate monitoring in situations of conflict. The limited evidence gathered for this study suggests that more consistent use of such a framework in funding decisions for aid activities in conflict settings – as well as in subsequent implementation where a positive decision is made – could play a significant role in upgrading the quality and utility of monitoring efforts, reducing risks in the process.