Contrary to widely-held views, Iraqi security and Hashd forces did not bring about a complete takeover of all disputed territories in the aftermath of the Kurdish referendum of September 2017. Significant parts of these territories have remained under control of the Kurdish Peshmerga and continue to be governed as they have been since 2014 (see Figure 2). Some of these areas are directly adjacent to Dohuk governorate. What did change after September 2017, however, was that control over the disputed areas fragmented even further due to various Hashd groups, the ISF and new alliances between Hashd and local armed groups staking claims over particular bits of territory that already featured a range of local self-defence groups. Today, the disputed areas feature a myriad of armed organisations, including state forces.‍[16] This creates appreciable risks of local violent incidents escalating and triggering wider conflict. It also makes the local situation susceptible to igniting due to the tense relations between Erbil and Baghdad. Figure 2 below illustrates the broad lines of control, but one should note that the yellow and purple areas obscure the presence of a great many groups and organisations.

Source: Reproduced by courtesy of Stratfor.com, a geopolitical intelligence firm

The elements required for working towards a durable and mutually acceptable solution of the administrative affiliation, revenue distribution and governance of the disputed territories are not in place. Mostly, this is because all eyes are on the question of how the definitive results of the recent national Iraqi elections will be established and what governing coalition will be agreed upon. The nature of that governing coalition, especially its inclusion/exclusion of the PUK and/or KDP, will influence the parameters of a possible solution for the disputed territories. Given the high level of fragmentation of the Iraqi parliament, the process of forming a government is bound to take an appreciable amount of time and subsequent governance is unlikely to produce radical policy changes.‍[17] Another factor influencing the resolution of the disputed territories is the speed and extent with which Kurdish unity will recover after its implosion following the September 2017 referendum. As the election results were much more favourable to Iraqi Kurdistan’s ruling parties than many had expected, they may soften KDP–PUK acrimony in the short term and facilitate the re-emergence of a joint political front. Yet, irrespective of how both factors pan out, for several reasons the disputed territories will remain a ‘wicked problem’ in the search for an innovative solution:

Prime Minister Al-Abadi’s relatively tough stance towards the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) since the referendum may soften now that the elections are over, but it has not exactly contributed to a climate of confidence. As well as the presence of many armed organisations in a context of multiple and interacting tensions – strained relations between Erbil and Baghdad, between Turkey and Iraq, between the PKK and the KDP, and between the Hashd and KDP Peshmerga forces – the risk of the disputed areas acting as a flashpoint for further violent clashes is elevated by two further factors. First, inter-group trust between local communities has descended to a new low since the defeat of the IS. The social fabric of these areas was already under pressure due to Saddam Hussein’s politics of sectarianism before the regime change of 2003 – a process that continued under Al-Maliki’s divisive tenure – but the bloody rule of IS shifted its unravelling from the edges to the centre.‍[21] Second, the communities of the Nineveh plain, in particular, face poor livelihood prospects because its agricultural productivity was hit hard by the fight against the IS, destroying the primary income source for many of its inhabitants. This situation is already causing more and more young men to join militias to generate income. It also increases levels of crime and prostitution.