The years 2015–2018 witnessed a crescendo of demonstrations by ordinary Kurds against their KDP-PUK duopoly government. Throughout this period, the protests grew in both volume and geographic scope. Although originally largely confined to Sulaymaniyyah, they have expanded beyond that city to include places like Dohuk and Erbil, which used to be tightly controlled, politically reliable and placid sites of KDP rule. What these demonstrations have in common is that they have been consistently met with repressive, even violent, force by either KDP- or PUK-associated forces.‍[22]

Many commentators have ascribed the increase in these demonstrations to the end of the fight against the IS as it also meant that the KRG was no longer able to use its call for wartime sacrifices as an excuse for poor governance.‍[23] Meanwhile, corruption and nepotism in Iraqi Kurdistan are perceived to have grown unabated. In this context, the KRG’s announcement of further belt-tightening measures after the botched referendum of September 2017 (due to punitive measures taken by the Baghdad government) proved to be a proverbial straw.‍[24] In the absence of reliable survey data, these are all plausible causes of popular dissatisfaction.

In addition to these demonstrations, the period around the referendum also saw an appreciable increase in political activism across Iraqi Kurdistan. For example, the Coalition for Democracy and Justice and the New Generation Movement – both political parties – were established in the second half of 2017. It is worth noting that all Kurdish opposition parties operate from Sulaymaniyyah, reflecting the fact that the PUK has been more tolerant than the KDP in allowing political competition/opposition. Political activity in the Dohuk area by parties other than the KDP, for example, is strongly discouraged and remains largely off-limits.

In democratic systems, the combination of widespread political dissatisfaction and political activism tends to lead to political change. Yet, remarkably, the provisional Iraqi electoral results suggest business as usual in favour of the KDP-PUK duopoly that has informally and formally run Iraqi Kurdistan since the Kurdish civil war of the 1990s (see Table 3 below). In addition to the fact that the results of the Iraqi elections quickly became contested, the level of intimidation and force used in Iraqi Kurdistan just before and after the elections makes it doubtful that a free and fair vote took place. For instance, just after 10pm on 12 May, PUK-affiliated Peshmerga attacked the headquarters of the Goran (Movement for Change) in Sulaymaniyyah in response to its public allegations of fraud, raking it with heavy machine gun fire for 15–30 minutes.‍[25] Examples from before the elections include incidents of opposition party representatives – such as Kamiran Berwari (New Generation Movement) or Ali Hama Salih (Goran) – being beaten bloody in Zakho (Dohuk governorate) in broad daylight without intervention from KDP-linked security forces.‍[26] It is difficult to imagine such incidents taking place without at least implicit KDP consent.

On this basis, it becomes plausible to entertain a deeper analysis of the causes of popular dissatisfaction with KDP-PUK government performance. Namely, that the machinery and resources of governance in the KRG have been used for a mix of party/personal and ‘nationalist’ interests since the end of the Kurdish civil war. The alliance of convenience created in the late 1990s has proved durable. The KDP and PUK have gradually expanded their control over the KRI’s economy – aided by the centralised logic of pipeline politics and bilateral relations with respectively Turkey and Iran – transforming their guerrilla bands into today’s ‘state security agencies’ (including the Peshmerga) and restricting political competition as much as possible.‍[27] In effect, both parties have relentlessly pursued a common objective – to keep themselves and each other in power.

The insidious aspect of these developments is that they have been justified as serving the cause of Kurdish nationalism and were enabled with appeals to solidarity and sacrifice in the face of threats posed by ‘external enemies’.‍[28] These included, successively, Iraq’s Sunni under Hussein, the country’s Shi’a after 2003 (Al-Maliki in particular; although this did not stop pragmatic engagement), the IS after 2014 and ‘Bagdhad’ today. Indeed, on many dimensions the KDP-PUK duopoly has been good for Iraqi Kurds by establishing, building and expanding a Kurdish proto-statelet in a country that has a long track record of problematic Arab-Kurdish relations and whose central government has marginalised and orchestrated mass killings of its Kurdish inhabitants on more than one occasion.‍[29]

However, instead of creating the economic, popular and administrative basis that Iraq’s Kurds need in order to come to an understanding with the Iraqi state that fits the realities of the 21^st century, the KDP-PUK duopoly continued the Kurdish struggle in a classic, top-down and sometimes confrontational manner. The referendum finally brought home the insight that Kurdish elite strategies towards independence had failed, while elite governance responsibilities were not being adequately discharged.‍[30]

In this context, the most troubling aspect of the outcome of the Iraqi elections for Kurdistan is that it suggests the KDP and PUK have firmly entrenched themselves without much intention of making space for political competition in a peaceful manner. Depending on what the final election results look like and whether the Iraqi government will continue its strong-arm tactics towards Iraqi Kurdistan – which would enable KDP and PUK Kurdish elites to shore up their ‘us-versus-them’ narrative – political contestation and violent repression could clash much more forcefully on the streets of Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniyyah in the medium term.