List of Abbreviations

CPI

Corruption Perceptions Index

EU

European Union

FBIC

Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity Index

GDELT

Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

GPD

Global Populism Database

GPI

Global Peace Index

GSS

General Social Survey

GWP

Gross World Product

HCSS

The Hague Center for Strategic Studies

HDI

Human Development Index

ICBM

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICEWS

Integrated Crisis Early Warning System

ICT

Information and Communications Technology

IDEA

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

IMC

Interstate Military Competition

IMF

International Monetary Fund

MENA

Middle East and North Africa

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO

Non-Governmental Organization

R&D

Research and Development

SIPRI

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

TAPI

Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index

UAE

United Arab Emirates

UCDP

Uppsala Conflict Data Program

UK

United Kingdom

UNDP

United Nations Development Program

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly

US

United States

V-DEM

Varieties of Democracy

WIL

World Inequality Lab

WVS

Word Values Survey

Executive summary

The notion that interstate competition is back is a dominant theme in recent American, Chinese, and Russian national security strategies, among others. Even in Europe, the new incoming European Commission led by a German President has called itself unabashedly ‘geopolitical’.

Geodynamics aims to answer the question “what is the state of the world today?” through the provision of a dispassionate, empirically grounded, multi-dimensional overview of international developments. It substitutes a monoperspectivist for a multiperspectivist approach and analyzes dynamics within the socioeconomic, identitary, connectedness, judicial, political, and security domains to capture dynamics in a world in a state of flux.

The socioeconomic domain considers indicators related to human welfare, centered around the question whether the world has become more equitable and more prosperous. It asks the question “has the world become more equitable and prosperous?”

The identitary domain looks at whether the world is becoming more inclusionary, or whether it instead increasingly evolves around exclusionary identities. It asks the question “has the world become more inclusionary?”

The connectedness domain assesses whether the world is becoming more or less connected. It asks the question “has the world become more connected?”

The political domain examines whether the world has become more free and more democratic. It asks the question “has the world become more free and democratic?”

The judicial domain evaluates whether the world is becoming more or less just. It asks the question “has the world become more just?”

The security domain looks at whether the world has become more peaceful since the turn of the century. It asks the question “has the world become more peaceful?”

For each domain the central question is assessed at the level of the individual, at the state, and at the system levels, on the basis of two indicators: whenever possible, one of these indicators is objective in nature and enquires into the actual state (of equality, freedom, security), while the other is subjective in nature and examines how this state is experienced or perceived by individuals. This makes for a total of 36 indicators for which data has been collected from academic, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and public institutions’ data sources.

Progress is measured as a general trend and for the last two years that data is available. Trends for the included measurements over the two time periods are presented with an upward trend being indicated with , a downward trend with , and a stable trend with . Trends are further qualified as being positive () or negative () based on their likely impact on human welfare, (international) security and stability, etc. The research team sought to update, corroborate and triangulate the trends that are discussed based on contemporary complementary literature in cases where available datasets fell short in terms of their temporal and/or geographical coverage. These triangulation efforts are reflected in in-text observations but have not been incorporated into Table 1 below.

Table 1
The state of the world in 36 indicators
The state of the world in 36 indicators

An analysis of geodynamic trends provides a mixed view at the aggregate level. Over the entire available time series, high-level trends exhibit a positive (14) to negative (17) ratio of 0.82. Trends over the course of the last two available years are, at the aggregate level, only slightly more positive, and exhibit a positive (14) to negative (16) ratio of 0.88. Indicators which show positive disconnects between these two observations periods are international inequality, trust in peers, trust in outgroups, negative military rhetorical assertiveness, and the GPI. Financial satisfaction, informational connectedness, the volume of international exchanges, and conflict fatalities show negative disconnects.

An in-depth analysis of domain-level trends allows for formulation of the following conclusions:

Socioeconomic. The overall answer to the central question whether has the world become more prosperous and equitable is mixed. Trends in human development are decidedly positive, and have been accompanied by an attendant increase in perceived financial satisfaction over the long term. More people believe that that working hard gets them ahead. Governments have been investing a growing share of their annual budgets into social protection and human development. Income levels have increased at the global level. Simultaneously, inequality in income and wealth has increased by various metrics. Inequality between states as measured in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita has decreased. The world has, in other words, become more prosperous as a whole – but inequality within states has worsened by a variety of measures, and while inequality between states has decreased, overall levels of global inequality leave ample room for improvement.

Connectedness. The level of connectedness between states, societies and individuals is increasing according to various metrics, though these increases have not necessarily translated into increasing levels of interpersonal trust. The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) revolution of the past twenty-five years is a principal driver behind increased connectedness, and can be credited with the fact that today, over 50% of the world population has access to the internet. Simultaneously, several aspects of the ICT revolution can be understood as reinforcing the “bowling alone” effect. As an example, though individuals on average accessed twice as many information sources today as they did in 2004, political polarization as a result of online “echo chambers” is on the uptick. Connectedness also marches on at the international level, where the volume of globalization has seen an increase of just under 20% between 2000-2017. States are also investing more in their diplomatic reach worldwide, resulting in an increase the international level of diplomatic representation and in the expansion of the scope of interstate relations.

Identitary. The answer to the question whether the world has become more inclusionary boils down to a qualified no. Identity politics are on the uptick in Western Europe, North America and Latin America, with populist parties having received a larger share of the vote in national elections and political leaders having deployed populist rhetoric more frequently. At the state level, states have implemented a greater number of religious restrictions. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) emerges as the world’s most repressive region vis-à-vis religious restrictions. Social hostilities have increased most prominently in North and South America, Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe. Individual-level measures of inclusiveness, trust in outgroups, and trust in peers all register negative trends. Even in cases where inclusiveness has increased, caution remains justified. This study shows that awareness of social issues has not always translated into increases in inclusiveness in the wider society and has, in some cases, even co-occurred with decreases in outgroup trust.

Political. Overall, to the question whether the world has become more democratic, the answer is negative on balance – though it appears positive at first sight. A great number of countries have transitioned to democracies, which now constitute a majority of nations worldwide. The proportion of the global population living under democracy has increased in both absolute and relative terms from 3.4 billion (57%) at the turn of the century to 4.3 billion (58%) in 2018. These positive macro-level trends notwithstanding, this study finds evidence to suggest that the foundational liberal norms of democratic regimes are under significant strain. Democracy is being hollowed out. The share of people expressing a desire to live in a democracy has decreased between 2005-2014, and global average voter turnout has decreased from 68% to 61% (2000-2018). Individuals who live under it are also increasingly perceiving it as dysfunctional, with data from a 2018 Pew Research survey showing that 51% of the respondents are not satisfied with the way democracy works in their countries.

Judicial. Overall, to the question whether the world has become more just and free, developments are mixed and on balance positive. At the individual level, political rights and civil liberties declined for the thirteenth consecutive year. On the civil liberties index, 15 countries improved their scores between 2005 and 2018, while 48 worsened. The degree to which individuals perceive their peers as acting fairly in daily life remains more or less stable. At the state level, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) shows a slight but positive increase. The transparency and independence of the rule of law exercised at the state level has also seen moderate improvements over the past decades. Governments’ records in respecting and protecting human rights have been improving in almost all regions except the MENA over the past two decades. At the system level, illiberal states continue to increase their international influence, thus threatening the integrity of the current rules-based international order.

Security. Generally speaking, the world has not become more secure. The past few decades have seen an overall worrying increase in insecurity across a range of dimensions and at multiple levels within the security domain. There has been an increase in the number of intrastate and internationalized intrastate conflicts has tripled between 2008 and 2018. Though the past two years have witnessed a 27% decrease in global death tolls with 106.557 in 2016, 95.500 in 2017, and 77.392 in 2018, the 2018 level nevertheless remains far (150%) above pre-2010 levels. These increases were mainly caused by a few flashpoints in the Middle East (notably Syrian, Yemen and Afghanistan). Meanwhile, willingness to fight has remained stable, with approximately 70% of the respondents answering affirmatively when asked whether they would be willing to fight for their country if war broke out. At the interstate level, the volume of military threats did not increase significantly, though some high-level profile threats by political leaders offer cause for concern. Military spending increased 13.2% in absolute terms, and amounted to $1,78 trillion in 2018. The relative value hovered around 2-3% at the aggregate level.

Domain-level trends paint a bleak picture of the state of the world, though some silver linings occur. On the one hand, financial satisfaction has dropped in the past two years and inequality is up by all metrics. Informational connectedness and individual-level trust in peers have both decreased. Trends are almost universally negative across the identitary domain. Democracy is being “hollowed out,” with individuals perceiving it less positively, caring less whether they live beneath it, and voting less in elections. Illiberal states’ share of international influence has increased. Conflict fatalities, negative military rhetoric assertiveness, and global peace, and the number of active conflicts all display negative trends. On the other hand, the world has gotten better in many ways. Human welfare has improved significantly. By most metrics, the world is more interconnected today than at any point in the past. On average, democracy is on the uptick. The international rule of law, though it remains low in absolute terms, has shown encouraging trends. Short-term trends within the security show that the world is becoming more peaceful.

Taken together, an aggregate analysis of domain-level trends outlined in the previous paragraphs allows for the formulation of two high-level findings. First, discrepancies between trends at the individual, state, and system levels outline the utility of a multi-level analysis of global trends. Second, there remains an overarching problem with data availability across domains and observation level.

Starting with the utility of a multi-level analysis of global trends, this derives from the fact that observations within domains often differ significantly between observation levels (individual, state, and system). The political domain’s state and system-level observations paint a rosy picture which does not recur at the individual level. Between increases in the number of democratic states, a low degree of disagreement within the UNGA, and an uptick in the world’s average Polity IV score, democracy appears to be on the right track. Conversely, the view at the individual level speaks to democracy’s erosion from within. Individuals are less interested in living under democracy, vote less in elections, and perceive democracy less favorably. Despite the fact that human welfare registers increases across the board and international inequality has decreased, subjective measurements within the socioeconomic domain emerge as overwhelmingly negative. Individual-level financial satisfaction has stagnated and even decreased, and the perception that working hard gets one ahead exhibits signs of decline within the “Western Europe and Others” region. Though it falls without this study’s scope to explain disconnects such as these, their occurrence allows for the formulation of various follow-up questions vis-à-vis causality within domain-level trends. They also serve to reaffirm the shortcomings of observing global events through a monoperspectivist lens and validate the utility of geodynamics’ multiperspectivist approach.

This research also finds that there continues to be a lack of granular and/or comprehensive datasets available for gauging geodynamic trends. Subjective measurements, particularly at the state and individual level, are almost universally measured through data derived from the World Value Survey (WVS), meaning that values are difficult to compare on a year-by-year basis. Several indicators – notably those utilized within the identitary domain – are only available for two to three years. Not all data is available at the regional level, complicating the process of placing trends (whether positive or negative) within the context of dynamics specific to their respective locales. Perhaps most importantly, in many cases, the data necessary for gauging geodynamic trends through an “ideal” measurement simply did not exist. Perceived fairness (identitary: individual-subjective), CPI (identitary, state-subjective), and the GPI (security: system-subjective) are all examples of measurements which imperfectly capture the observation level-dimension combination they are intended to operationalize. The challenges associated with monitoring geo-dynamic trends in a systematic, comprehensive way relate almost universally to lack of data availability. To this end, HCSS aims to continue refining the datasets and approaches utilized to monitor global developments in future iterations of geodynamics.

Introduction

The notion that interstate competition is back is a dominant theme in recent American and Chinese,[1] among others. Even in Europe, the new incoming European Commission led by a German President has called itself unabashedly ‘geopolitical’.[2] This notion is validated by incontrovertible real-life developments such as the United States (US)’ ongoing trade war with China, and its crackdown on Huawei in particular;[3] China’s militarization of islands in the South China sea, particularly when combined with its aggressive investments into modern technologies and meteoric economic rise; and Russian and American investments into new and sophisticated Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and nuclear delivery technologies, among others.

Yet even as the aforementioned trends paint a decidedly negative picture, there is no arguing that the postwar period has been characterized by significant increases in human welfare.[4] In 2017, only 10% of the world’s population lived under extreme poverty, compared to 75% in 1950. Literacy has increased significantly; today, 8 out of 10 people can read and write, compared to a rough 50/50 split in 1950.[5] World health and freedom have similarly made major strides, with the average global life expectancy having increased from 46 in 1950 to 70 in 2012,[6] and the share of the world population living under democracy having increased significantly in the same time period.[7] These gains have coincided with substantial improvements in life satisfaction at the individual level. The 2003 Eurobarometer found that 73% of Germans found themselves very or fairly satisfied with life, a number which increased to 93% in 2017.[8]

In addition, a wide range of macro-level trends are manifesting themselves which do not neatly relate to either of the aforementioned notions. Human activities have been repeatedly linked to climate change, a phenomenon which is associated with a ream of negative externalities, including an increase in the frequency and intensity of heatwaves and large-scale desertification.[9] International migration flows are spurred on as much by vicious civil wars as they are by increases in the availability of transport and information, and have increased from comprising 160 million individuals in 1995 to comprising close to 270 million in 2019.[10] Technology is still advancing by leaps and bounds in profoundly unpredictable ways.

The complexity of today’s world makes it difficult to answer the question “what is the state of the world today?” Geodynamics aims to answer this question by providing a dispassionate, empirically grounded, multi-dimensional overview of international developments.[11] The geo- in geodynamics does not stand for ‘geographical’ – as in geopolitics – but for the Greek word γῆ (gê), or Earth. Geodynamics substitutes a monoperspectivist for a multiperspectivist approach and analyzes dynamics within the socioeconomic, identitary, connectedness, judicial, political, and security domains to capture dynamics in a world in a state of flux (see Figure 1).

The socioeconomic domain considers indicators related to human welfare, centered around the question whether the world has become more equitable and more prosperous. It asks the question “has the world become more equitable and prosperous?”

The identitary domain looks at whether the world is becoming more inclusionary, or whether it instead increasingly evolves around exclusionary identities. It asks the question “has the world become more inclusionary?”

The connectedness domain assesses whether the world is becoming more or less connected. It asks the question “has the world become more connected?”

The political domain examines whether the world has become more free and more democratic. It asks the question “has the world become more free and democratic?”

The judicial domain evaluates whether the world is becoming more or less just. It asks the question “has the world become more just?”

The security domain looks at whether the world has become more peaceful since the turn of the century. It asks the question “has the world become more peaceful?”

Figure 1
Geodynamics: Six domains, three levels
Geodynamics: Six domains, three levels

For each domain the central question is assessed at the level of the individual, at the state, and at the system levels, on the basis of two indicators: whenever possible, one of these indicators is objective in nature and enquires into the actual state (of equality, freedom, security), while the other is subjective in nature and examines how this state is experienced/perceived by individuals. This makes for a total of 36 indicators for which data has been collected from academic, NGO or public institutions’ data sources. Wherever possible the period of measurement stretches from the beginning of this century to the most recent data point available. Progress is measured as a general trend and for the last two years that data is available. Trends for the included measurements over the two time periods are presented with an upward trend being indicated with , a downward trend with , and a stable trend with . Trends are further qualified as being positive () or negative () based on their likely impact on human welfare, (international) security and stability, etc.

Geodynamics’ ‘layered’ approach to measuring global trends is endemic of a wider effort on The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies’ (HCSS) part to ground decision making in empirical observations. While policymakers have access to a wealth of reasonably validated socioeconomic metrics, including metrics pertaining to stock markets, currency exchanges, commodity prices, national accounts, trade, capital and labor flows,[12] similar resources are far and few-between within the political, security domains, connectedness, identitary, and judicial domains.

Geodynamics thus aims not only to expand upon HCSS’ previous work in strategic foresight, but also to draw attention to the relative lack of data availability which continues to characterize the field. Though several pioneering non-traditional (event-based) data sources facilitate the process of operationalizing global trends at a more granular level, we find that is it still in its infancy. This report strives to garner attention for the fact there remains extensive room for progress when it comes to the measurement of global trends.

The report proceeds as follows: the next section offers an explanation of the applied research methods, followed by an in-depth analysis of trends within the socioeconomic, identitary, connectedness, political, judicial, and security domains. These trends are reported at the system, state, and individual observation levels; where possible, a distinction is also made between the subjective and objective dimensions within each of these observation levels. The concluding chapter provides an overview of the most striking disconnects and lessons learned.

Methodology and Challenges

This study sets out to measure geodynamic trends on the basis of 36 unique indicators, spanning the socioeconomic, identitary, connectedness, political, judicial, and security domains, the system, state, and individual observation levels, and the subjective and objective dimensions. The applied methodology consisted of indicator selection and data collection and preparation phases. These, along with several challenges pertaining to the nature and availability of the consulted data, are outlined in further detail below.

Indicator Selection

This iteration of the geodynamics project incorporates 36 individual indicators, some of which required consultation of multiple datasets to synthesize. Indicators were selected on the basis of four (4) criteria; namely:

Aligns with best practices in the field. Many of the indicators within this study (see battle-related deaths, number of conflicts, etc.) are commonly cited within their respective fields, where “industry standard” measurements have been established. In other cases, discussions regarding the “best” indicator through which to measure the phenomena are still ongoing.[13] The indicators incorporated within this study have universally been “vetted” to ensure that they reflect either a.) existing industry standards, or b.) the most recent thinking vis-à-vis best practices on the basis of an extensive, indicator-specific literature review. In the case of indicators for which no viable direct measurement and/or industry “best practice” could be identified, literature review methods were utilized to identify niche practices and datasets which could help in synthesizing of a meaningful indicator. Aligning geodynamic measurements with best practices within the field is one example of ways in which the research team has taken steps to ensure the integrity and actionability of the observations presented within the geodynamics study.[14]

Time-series availability. As a general rule, the indicators selected for inclusion within this study are derived from datasets which have datapoints for several years. This rule was applied because one of the geodynamics project’s overarching goals is to provide empirical footing to ongoing discussions regarding contemporary developments. The availability of time-series data allows for the placing of current trends within a historical context, thus providing empirical footing through relativization.

Wide geographical coverage. The indicators included in this study generally boast wide geographical coverage. This requirement was considered especially pertinent for state-level measurements, but was (where possible) also applied to system and individual-level measurements. In the case that granular, country-level data was not available for system and individual-level measurements, the research team verified that any “aggregate” measurements were representative of world-level trends by reviewing relevant codebooks and methodologies. This rule was applied because one of the geodynamics project’s overarching goals is to provide empirical footing to ongoing discussions regarding contemporary developments. Data with wide geographical coverage helps to lend context because it allows for the zooming in on and evaluation of individual countries’ or regions’ impact on larger trends.

Methodological appropriateness. Given geodynamics’ reliance on open-source datasets, the research team reviewed the methodologies underlying included indicators’ collection or synthesis prior to including them in the study. The goal of this exercise was to ensure that indicators were not compiled on the basis of methods which impacted their validity within the context of the study.

For a methodological overview, please follow this link.

Data Collection and Preparation

Unique collection and preparation methods apply to each of this study’s 36 indicators. For an indicator-by-indicator overview of this study’s applied methodology, please refer to the “Indicator preparation” section. In general, the report does not include countries with very low populations[15] and borrows classifications of regions and national income levels from the UN and the World Bank,[16] respectively, to discern clustering patterns.

Challenges

The research team encountered various challenges, almost all of which pertain to shortcoming in the available data. These are shortly outlined in the bullets below:

Difficulties pertaining to subjective measurements. Subjective measurements emerged as exceedingly difficult to measure within the context of this study. As a result of this measurements utilized for the subjective indicators at the socioeconomic-state, identitary-state, identitary-system, connectedness-state, connectedness­-system, political-system, judicial-state, judicial-system, security-state, and security-system levels are not perfectly subjective in nature. Many of the subjective measurements included within this study are furthermore derived from the WVS. Due to methodological shortcomings, data derived from the WVS performs poorly vis-à-vis the “geographical coverage” and “time series availability” requirements outlined below, and is not ideally suited for over-time analysis. A consecrated effort was made to replace WVS data wherever possible, but it nonetheless remains key to the operationalizing of subjective variables within the context of this study.

Sporadic time-series availability. The research team’s thoroughness during the study’s indicator selection phase notwithstanding, some of the included indicators are not available as extended time series. In some cases, as with the “religious restrictions” measurement within the identitary domain’s state-subjective dimension, data is only available from 2007 onwards. This limits some measurement’s ability to relativize and/or provide context to ongoing discussions on the basis of historic trends.

Sporadic geographical coverage. The research team’s thoroughness during the study’s indicator selection phase notwithstanding, a large number of variables within this study rely on measurements which cover a limited number of countries, or which do not allow for regional comparisons. In some cases, as with the “populist votership” measurement within the identitary domain’s system-subjective dimension, data is only representative of European countries. This limits some measurement’s ability to relativize and/or provide context to ongoing discussions on the basis of geographic trends.[17]

In cases where the aforementioned caveats were found to apply, the research team sought to update, corroborate and triangulate the trends that are discussed based on contemporary complementary literature.

Geodynamic domain analyses

Socioeconomic: Has the World Become More Equitable and Prosperous?

Developments within the socioeconomic domain are mixed. Human development has seen an upward trend, with more than one billion people having been lifted out of extreme poverty since 1990.[18] Policy debates about the retrenching role of the state notwithstanding, governments have been investing a growing share of their annual budgets into social protection and human development.[19] At the same time, the global middle class is shrinking and the wealth gap between rich and poor is becoming more pronounced.[20] On this, prominent scholars such as Thomas Piketty have alerted that return on wealth always grows faster than the income of working people, paving the way for social and political instability.[21]

The socioeconomic domain focuses on two different but both fundamental aspects of ‘economics’; namely: prosperity (“is the world becoming more prosperous”) and distribution (“is the world becoming more equitable?”). Prosperity is assessed at the individual and state level based on human development, financial satisfaction and government’s spending on healthcare and education. Whereas, distribution is measured through objective estimates of internal and international inequality as well as through the subjective perception that working hard can get one ahead (Table 2).

Table 2
Socioeconomic trend table
Socioeconomic trend table

Positive developments within the socioeconomic domain are most pronounced at the individual level. Human development as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) shows a steady increase over time (Figure 2). Since 1990, average HDI levels increased by 22% globally.[22] By and large, people live longer, are better educated, and earn higher incomes than they did 10, or even 20, years ago.[23] Increases in HDI are not limited to developed countries. As shown in Table 3, all top improvers are developing nations that have undergone significant economic growth. This finding is corroborated by the Human Development Report’s finding that the average HDI growth in least developed countries has amounted to 51% since the 1990s.[24]

Figure 2
Global HDI per year
Global HDI per year

Source: United Nations Development Program (UNDP)[25]

Table 3
HDI top improvers (1999-2018) per year

Country

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Angola

0,387

0,401

0,418

0,429

0,442

0,455

0,471

0,492

0,502

0,522

0,52

0,534

0,543

0,554

0,564

0,572

0,577

0,581

Rwanda

0,335

0,345

0,361

0,374

0,391

0,408

0,429

0,445

0,455

0,47

0,485

0,493

0,5

0,503

0,509

0,51

0,52

0,524

Ethiopia

0,283

0,298

0,306

0,31

0,325

0,346

0,362

0,378

0,393

0,401

0,412

0,423

0,43

0,438

0,445

0,451

0,457

0,463

Cambodia

0,42

0,434

0,453

0,466

0,478

0,49

0,502

0,513

0,521

0,521

0,537

0,546

0,553

0,56

0,566

0,571

0,576

0,582

China

0,594

0,602

0,611

0,623

0,635

0,647

0,661

0,675

0,685

0,694

0,706

0,714

0,722

0,729

0,738

0,743

0,748

0,752

Zambia

0,432

0,44

0,449

0,46

0,469

0,48

0,492

0,503

0,517

0,533

0,544

0,556

0,569

0,574

0,58

0,583

0,586

0,588

Mongolia

0,589

0,6

0,609

0,622

0,637

0,65

0,66

0,672

0,683

0,689

0,697

0,711

0,72

0,729

0,734

0,737

0,743

0,741

Botswana

0,565

0,567

0,566

0,575

0,584

0,596

0,611

0,625

0,639

0,648

0,66

0,673

0,683

0,693

0,701

0,706

0,712

0,717

India

0,493

0,498

0,504

0,517

0,526

0,535

0,545

0,556

0,564

0,57

0,581

0,591

0,6

0,607

0,618

0,627

0,636

0,64

Myanmar

0,431

0,44

0,449

0,459

0,468

0,477

0,487

0,498

0,509

0,519

0,53

0,54

0,549

0,558

0,564

0,569

0,574

0,578

Afghanistan

0,373

0,383

0,398

0,408

0,417

0,429

0,437

0,453

0,463

0,471

0,482

0,487

0,491

0,493

0,494

0,498

Iraq

0,607

0,614

0,616

0,603

0,628

0,631

0,636

0,638

0,643

0,646

0,649

0,656

0,659

0,666

0,666

0,668

0,672

0,685

Source: UNDP[26]

The aforementioned increases in human development have been accompanied with a slight increase in individual-level financial satisfaction (see Figure 3). The WVS reports that responses to the question of whether individuals are satisfied with their financial situations or not have remained predominantly positive, though this trend has stagnated post-2014. The observed stagnation in financial satisfaction by-and-large aligns with the stagnation of the world economy as a whole.[27]

Figure 3
Financial satisfaction over time
Financial satisfaction over time

Source: WVS Key Aggregates[28]

Turning to government spending on healthcare on education, this indicator has seen a steady increase since 2000 (see Figure 4). Following a slump after the 2007 Financial Crisis, governments exhibit a marked increase in the degree to which they invest in healthcare and education, both of which are known drivers of human welfare.[29] Global spending on healthcare increased by an average 6% in low and middle income countries and 4% in high income countries between 2000 and 2016.[30]

Figure 4
Average world spending on health and education over time (% of government spending)
Average world spending on health and education over time (% of government spending)

Source: The World Bank Data[31]

The post-2014 spike is particularly interesting when viewed from within the context of the previously explored stagnation of individual-level financial satisfaction. An analysis of trends at the regional level (Figure 5) shows that state expenditure on healthcare and education differs greatly by region, with Western Europe, the US and Latin America spending relatively much more and at a steeper rate of increase than their counterparts in Africa and Asia.

Figure 5
Government spending on healthcare and education as percentage of government spending by region
Government spending on healthcare and education as percentage of government spending by region

Source: The World Bank Data[32]

This study registers inequality as being on the uptick.[33] Income and wealth inequality at the state level have increased according to various measurements, most importantly on measurements that look at the degree of wealth held by the top one percent. Though the global average of national GINI income inequality coefficients exhibited a slight decrease over the course of the last two decades, various measurements suggest that inequality is increasing.[34] The famous “elephant curve” shows that “the top 1 percent has captured twice as much total growth than the global bottom 50 percent between 1980 and 2016,”[35] a finding which is corroborated by data made available by Oxfam and the World Inequality Lab (WIL) – both of which report income and wealth inequality as deepening. As shown in Figure 6, all regions register slight increases in the top 10%’s share of national income, with Russia exhibiting the steepest incline. The recorded percentage values speak to a high degree of income inequality. Even Europe – a relative beacon of inequality – registered the top 10%’s share of national income as being 37% in 2016.[36]

Figure 6
Share of income owned by the wealthiest ten percent by region
Share of income owned by the wealthiest ten percent by region

Source: World Inequality Lab[37]

Data pertaining to the degree of global wealth inequality further corroborates the notion that countries are becoming more inequal internally. Figure 7 shows that whereas 380 billionaires held as much wealth as the poorest 50% of society in 2009, as few as 48 billionaires held this by 2017. The world’s wealthiest individuals – those holding over $100,000 in assets – total less than 10% of the world’s population, but possess 84% of global wealth. Individuals worth more than $30 million – a group which represents a mere 0.003% of the world population – command a staggering 11.3% of global wealth.[38] This points to another trend which is not visible in traditional GINI income measures: the income share of the middle four deciles – particularly in the developed world – has fallen by two percentage points on average.[39]

Figure 7
Number of billionaires holding equal absolute wealth as societies bottom 50%, international
Number of billionaires holding equal absolute wealth as societies bottom 50%, international

Source: Oxfam[40]

At the system level, slightly more people believe that working hard gets one ahead today than they did in 2000 (Figure 8). This variable experienced major fluctuations during the 2007 Financial Crisis. Economic downturn, unexpected loss of jobs and stagnating wages are all factors which help to explain this observation.[41] The years following the Financial Crisis register stagnation, hinting at a relative lack of hopefulness in the international financial system’s ability to reproduce conditions for continued growth and financial satisfaction. The perception that working hard gets one ahead is almost 15% higher among people from low and lower-income countries than it is in upper and high-income countries (Figure 9).

Figure 8
World average perception that working hard gets one ahead
World average perception that working hard gets one ahead

Source: Gallup World Poll,[42] adapted from United Arab Emirates (UAE) Numbers[43]

Figure 9
World average perception that working hard gets one ahead by income (2007-2018) and region
World average perception that working hard gets one ahead by income (2007-2018) and region

Source: Gallup World Poll,[44] adapted from UAE Numbers[45]

In 2018, eleven years after the Financial Crisis, Eastern Europeans still emerge as outliers when it comes to the perception that working hard gets one ahead (Figure 9). The number of “Western Europeans and Others” which agreed that working hard got them ahead far surpassed the number of Eastern Europeans harboring the same sentiment in 2018. Though this discrepancy can likely be explained by the region’s ongoing struggle with corruption, the formulation of a comprehensive explanation for the observed difference between Eastern Europe and the rest of the world falls without the scope of this study.

Inequality between states as measured in GDP per capita has decreased, indicating that the gap between “rich” and “poor” states has narrowed (Figure 10). At the same time, the recorded GINI score of 0.64 out of 1 (with 1 being complete inequality: all resources are held by one actor) speaks to the persistence of high levels of inequality at the system level.[46] For comparison, the most inegalitarian countries in the world, South Africa and Namibia, boast lower GINI scores (with 0.63 and 0.59 respectively) than the international level.[47]

Figure 10
World level of international inequality between states
World level of international inequality between states

Source: The World Bank Data[48]

Subconclusion: Has the World Become More Equitable and Prosperous?

The overall answer to the central question whether the world became more prosperous and equitable is mixed. The world has become more prosperous, with all metrics indicating that people are far better off today than they have been at any point in the past.[49] Governments have also universally increased their commitments to securing their populations’ welfare.[50] Though the majority of the world still lags far behind the West in terms of human developments, all signs point towards a continuation of current positive trend. Simultaneously, several metrics indicate that all is not well. Financial satisfaction registers a net increase over the available time period, but exhibits stagnation – and even an outright reduction – between 2000 and 2014.[51] Inequality is also on the uptick. Perceptions that working hard gets one ahead have remained largely constant,[52] indicating that increases in individual-level welfare have not transposed into significantly more hopeful populations. Billionaires hold a higher share of the world’s wealth today than at any point in the past,[53] and the share of income going to the world’s top 10% has risen considerably. Though the deepening of inequality has not been equally pronounced in all regions, increases have manifested universally. Europe emerged as the best performer in 2016, registering a value of just over 37%.[54] Though significantly lower than the Middle East’s 60%, this value speaks to a high degree of domestic inequality, and may help to explain why financial dissatisfaction is on the uptick in the developed world. Inequality between states decreased slightly over the available time period, though the 2018 value of 0.64 still speaks to a significant degree of inequality between states.

Connectedness: Has the World Become More Connected?

In the last decades the share of the world population using the internet has increased dramatically. Half of the world population was connected to the internet in 2017.[55] What might seem self-evident to people who use the internet every day actually represents a remarkable development in light of the short time since the first websites went online in the 1990s.[56] The invention, spread and impact of the internet marks a milestone in the history of technology because connection to the internet not only increases the exchange of information across borders, but also the flow of goods, services, people, and ideas. Trends within the connectedness domain speak to stagnation in the pace of globalization and record a decrease in trust between individuals. Although the world has become more connected, increases in macro-level connectivity therefore do not necessarily translate into a world which has come “closer together.”

The connectedness domain aims to do justice to this complex duality (on the one hand increases in connectedness “on paper”, but on the other also growing resistance) by measuring trust in peers and informational connectedness at the individual level, diplomatic representation and globalization at the state level, and diplomatic interaction volume and interstate bandwidth at the system level (Table 4).

Table 4
Connectedness trend table
Connectedness trend table

On the individual level, people have access to more – and more varied – sources of information, with the amount of information sources accessed on average nearly doubling between 2005 and 2014 according to the WVS (Figure 11).[57] Informational connectedness is accelerating the spread of news and is facilitating new forms of knowledge production and collaboration.

Figure 11
World average informational connectedness per year
World average informational connectedness per year

Source: WVS Key Aggregates[58]

At the same time, the ICT technologies that have facilitated the observed increases in informational connectedness also contribute to dislodging individuals from their physical environment, thus reinforcing the “bowling alone” effect.[59] In addition, recent insights into the practices of major social media platforms help to explain the development of online media/information “echo chambers” which can contribute to “social bubbles” structured around narrow preferences in norms and values, thus driving societal isolation and polarization.[60] Increasing levels of individual isolationism are further corroborated by the reduction in trust in peers,[61] which has experienced a 7% decrease between 2005 and 2014 (see Figure 12).

Figure 12
World average trust in peers per year
World average trust in peers per year

Source: WVS Key Aggregates[62]

Figure 13 demonstrates that rich countries generally exhibit the highest degree of trust in peers. Unfortunately, the nature of the WVS data precludes over-time analysis of which countries are contributing the most to the downward trend identified in Figure 12. However, populist successes and ever-increasing inequality within Western societies provides circumstantial evidence that these countries are, at the very least, playing a role in the reduction of trust observed in Figure 12.

Figure 13
World average trust in peers per country and region
World average trust in peers per country and region

Source: WVS Key Aggregates[63]

Objective measures at the state and system level show connectedness increasing since the beginning of the century. The KOF Globalization Index from the Swiss Economic Institute, which measures globalization along a wide range of economic, social and political dimensions, registers a growth in globalization of just under 20% between 2000 and 2017 (Figure 15). This increase in the level of globalization is clearly reflected in the level of international trade, with the international value of trade in goods having risen from $10 trillion to $17.5 trillion in 2017.[64] The rapid increase in globalization following the 1990s and the end of the Cold War and integration of the Communist bloc into the global community has slowed down somewhat following the Financial Crisis in 2007. Even more noteworthy, over the last few years (2014-2016), globalization has stagnated somewhat: the rate of growth has decreased significantly post-2013. This is remarkable, as even the economic downturn following the 2007-2008 recession arguably produced less of a stagnating effect than what is observed in the post-2013 period.

Figure 14
World average globalization level per year
World average globalization level per year

Source: KOF Swiss Economic Institute[65]

Moving on to trends at the state and system levels, these diverge significantly from those at the individual level. At the state level, the level of diplomatic representation has been growing consistently (Figure 15), meaning that states have actively invested in the construction of new and more numerous embassies and utilized more senior staff in their diplomatic efforts. The aforementioned trend is noteworthy because increases in diplomatic interconnectedness continue to manifest even despite the economic recessions that marked the early 2000s.[66]

Figure 15
Average level of diplomatic representation by year
Average level of diplomatic representation by year

Source: The Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures[67]

Increases in the perceived importance of diplomatic interactions (Figure 15) have been accompanied by considerable increases in the scope and size of interstate relations, as measured by The Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures’ Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity Index (FBIC).[68] International bandwidth exhibits a steady rise between 2000 and 2013 (Figure 16). The increase is driven in no small part by increases in the volume of international trade, with the deepening of military and political ties playing a less pronounced role. As was also the case with the level of diplomatic representation at the state level, the volume of international exchanges shows no signs of slowing down during the 2007-2008 recession, and only begins to show stagnation post-2013.

Figure 16
Total volume of interstate exchanges over time
Total volume of interstate exchanges over time

Source: The Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures[69]

Meanwhile, the volume of interactions between states is, somewhat paradoxically, declining in relative terms (Figure 17). Although we admit that the measurement is far from perfect,[70] calculations based on Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) and corroborated by Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) display a decline in the number of international diplomatic events relative to the total number of international events of roughly 9%.[71]

Figure 17
GDELT diplomatic interactions[72] as percentage of total events over time
GDELT diplomatic interactions as percentage of total events over time

Source: HCSS calculation based on GDELT (English)[73]

Subconclusion: Has the World Become More Connected?

By and large, the world has become more connected, though it is unclear whether people are necessarily closer together as a result. States have invested more actively in strengthening and expanding their diplomatic footprints,[74] implying a deepening appreciation and prioritization of interaction at the state level. These investments are justified by (among others) increases in level of globalization and in the volume of bilateral interactions.[75] The KOF Globalization Index and the Parsee Centre for International Futures’ FBIC index both speak to a significant increase in the degree to which actors interact internationally,[76] implying that increases in connectedness between states have resulted in an ever-more-interdependent international community when viewed through economic, military, and political lenses. The only metric of state interactions which shows slight decline is the volume of diplomatic interactions, as measured through the GDELT dataset.[77] These positive trends notwithstanding, trends within the connectedness domain offer plenty of cause for concern. Particularly at the individual level, signs point towards all not being well, with trust in peers and informational connectedness both showing negative trends,[78] albeit over different time periods. Trust with peers decreases over the entirety of the available time series while informational connectedness registers a net increase, but begins to decrease form 2010 onwards. Negative developments within the political and identitary domains indicate that these trends have likely persisted into the present, with populist successes in the Western world suggesting that high-income countries are set to experience the impact of these trends most negatively in the short term.

Identitary: Has the World Become More Inclusionary?

Trends within the identitary domain are largely negative with some exceptions. They reveal an increase in identity-driven politics in Western Europe, North America, and Latin America, alongside diminishing levels of inclusiveness internationally. These trends register even despite recent increases in awareness for gender and racial issues. States are responding to or exacerbating these trends by strengthening their grip on religious freedom and identity politics. Influential scholars such as Francis Fukuyama caution that identity politics threatens the functioning of liberal democracy if individuals vote by their (national) identities instead of their values (e.g. liberty).[79]

The identitary domain tries to capture some key identity-based developments at the individual, state and system levels to track how prevalent identity has become at the three levels. The individual level tracks two indicators: outgroup trust – which speaks to how societal groups perceive ‘the other,’ and the inclusivity index which gauges institutionalized acceptance (e.g. level of racism, level of inclusivity in politics) of different societal groups. At the state level, intrareligious group violence and institutionalized religious restrictions are used as two proxies for shared identity. At the systems level, we use the populist discourse of state leaders and the actual percentage of votes for populist party to determine how states base their existence on shared identity (Table 5).

Table 5
Identitary trend table
Identitary trend table

At the individual level, both the level of inclusiveness and trust in outgroups declined since the turn of the century.[80] The Inclusiveness Index measures acceptance of outgroups and levels of discrimination in both official/institutional and unofficial contexts (Figure 18),[81] taking into account race, gender, religion and disability, and including an analysis of discriminatory laws, representation of minorities in parliament, the number of refugees a country has accepted, etc.[82] Inclusivity is represented as a z-score, i.e. the number of standard deviations a country diverges from the mean, meaning that its scores are relative and its use is mainly comparative. The data derived from this index is of particular interest when broken down by region. While Western countries continue to lead in overall inclusiveness, slight drops in inclusiveness can be observed in Europe and Asia. Latin America and the Caribbean have become more inclusive – although they admittedly come from lower baseline scores. Awareness of gender and racial inequalities has contributed to positive changes in several countries.[83] For example, the MeToo movement continues to galvanize international attention and is effecting real changes in norms regarding gender relations.[84]

Figure 18
World inclusiveness score per region per year
World inclusiveness score per region per year

Source: Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society[85]

Trust in strangers decreased between 2006 and the latest available data from 2014 (Figure 19). Data made available by the General Social Survey (GSS) project implies that this trend has not abated. In 2018, only 21% of people surveyed agreed that people can generally be trusted, as opposed to 42% who disagreed.[86] Although this study cannot draw causal assumptions as to why trust in outgroups declined, it is noteworthy that increases in cultural integration, informational connectedness and modernization have coincided with decreases in trust and acceptance. The “Western Europe and Others” region registers significantly higher outgroup trust than does the rest of the world. This is also reflected in Figure 20, where countries from the “Western Europe and Others” region make up nine of the ten countries with most outgroup trust.

Figure 19
Trust in outgroups per year
Trust in outgroups per year

Source: WVS Key Aggregates[87]

Figure 20
Average trust in outgroups between 2005-2014 per country and region
Average trust in outgroups between 2005-2014 per country and region

Source: WVS Key Aggregates[88]

Individual, state, and system observation levels within the identitary domain exhibit a high degree of interrelation. Decreases in tolerance of others and social trust at the individual level manifest in growing populist success at the system level. This study shows populist parties receiving a larger share of the vote in national elections. It also shows political leaders deploying increasingly populist rhetoric more frequently. The magnitude of populist discourse is captured in the Global Populism Database (GPD) and ranges from 0 (not populist) to 2 (very populist) (Figure 21). The macro-level trend registers a bulge between 2006 and 2011, and another minor bulge in 2015. The 2006 bulge, although influenced by the rise of a few highly populist leaders before the Financial Crisis itself occurred (particularly in Bolivia and Czechia) is partially explained by the 2007 Financial Crisis within all available regions.

Figure 21
Global average populist rhetoric score (lower is better)
Global average populist rhetoric score (lower is better)

Source: GPD[89]

The second (2015) rise is not uniform across regions (Figure 22), and only results in a sustained increase in the “Western Europe and Others” region. Since 2000, the average score for Western European populist discourse increased from 0.06 to 0.45. This can be attributed to the European migrant crisis and is caused predominately by Turkey, Italy, Poland and the US. Although soon to be overtaken by Western Europe, the world’s most populist region up until now was Latin America. Countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia continue to rank among the most populist governments in the world.[90]

Figure 22
World average populist discourse by region
World average populist discourse by region

Source: GPD[91]

Zooming in on this data further allows for the drawing of two conclusions (Table 6). Firstly, the values change rather abruptly in several countries due to changes in government. Bolivia and Czechia in 2006, as well as Ecuador in 2008, are all examples of countries in which a change in government resulted in a significant shift in the level of populist discourse. Simultaneously, some changes also register in countries where incumbent governments have changed their policies over time. Turkey constitutes a standout example. Despite having been under the leadership of Erdogan almost for the entirety of the available period, the level of populist discourse in the country increased from 0.13 in 2003 to 1.47 in 2018. Secondly, a number of dramatic risers around the time of the 2006 spike register in Latin America – and in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua in particular. Venezuela emerges as by far the most populist country in this dataset, contributing significantly to Latin America’s high averages in Figure 22.

Table 6
World populist discourse by leaders; worst performing per year

Country

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Venezuela

1,92

1,92

1,92

1,92

1,92

1,92

1,92

1,83

1,75

1,75

1,75

1,75

1,75

1,68

1,64

1,64

1,64

1,64

1,64

Ecuador

0,23

0,97

0,97

0,68

0,39

0,82

1,25

1,49

1,73

1,73

1,73

1,63

1,53

1,53

1,53

0,86

0,19

Bolivia

0,23

0,18

0,13

0,13

1,50

1,50

1,50

1,50

1,25

1,00

1,00

1,00

1,00

1,23

1,46

1,46

1,46

Nicaragua

0,63

1,25

1,25

1,25

1,25

1,13

1,00

1,00

0,93

0,85

0,85

0,85

Turkey

0,13

0,13

0,13

0,13

0,50

0,88

0,88

0,88

0,88

0,88

0,88

1,17

1,47

1,47

1,47

1,47

Hungary

0,38

0,38

0,38

0,88

0,88

0,88

0,88

0,85

0,83

0,83

0,83

0,83

El Salvador

0,29

0,58

0,58

0,58

0,58

0,60

0,63

0,63

0,63

0,63

0,63

0,63

0,63

0,63

0,63

Italy

0,75

0,75

0,75

0,75

0,75

0,41

0,08

0,48

0,88

0,88

0,88

0,04

0,04

0,04

1,00

Peru

0,33

0,33

0,33

0,33

0,33

0,67

1,00

1,00

1,00

1,00

0,82

0,63

0,63

0,63

0,63

0,34

0,04

0,04

Slovakia

0,25

0,25

0,31

0,38

0,38

0,38

0,56

0,75

0,75

0,75

0,75

0,10

0,10

0,10

0,10

0,08

0,06

0,06

Source: GPD[92]

Average European populist votership has increased from 14% in 2000 to 24% in 2019, an increase of nearly 70%.[93] The data on this indicator is compiled by the Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index (TAPI).[94] It should also be noted that the report only includes countries in the European Union, as well as Switzerland and Serbia. The data is somewhat distorted by Greece, Italy, Poland and Hungary, which rank among the TAPI’s top performers. When these are removed from the dataset (Figure 23), a different image emerges. While a rise still registers, particularly in the last few years, it is far less dramatic. It is also notable that there is no major bulge surrounding the 2007 Financial Crisis. Both with and without the outliers, the most notable increase manifests after the European migrant crisis in 2015.

Figure 23
Average European populist votership per year
Average European populist votership per year

Source: TAPI[95]

Another interesting pattern emerges in the difference between Eastern and Western European countries (Figure 24).[96] The split shows that the initial rise in populism can be almost exclusively attributed to Eastern European countries. Populist votership in Eastern European countries reached an initial peak in 2004 and rose further after the European migrant crisis in 2015. The West registered a steady rise since 2004. In recent years, Eastern and Western European countries are at roughly equal levels when it comes to populist votership. The upward slopes registered in both figures (Figure 21 & Figure 24) reflect a broader trend of ingroup, outgroup dynamics becoming more prevalent in politics. This phenomenon is not limited to the Western world but is also occurring in other parts of the world including South Asia (e.g., India) and South East Asia (e.g., the Philippines).[97]

Figure 24
Average populist votership per year East vs. West
Average populist votership per year East vs. West

Source: TAPI[98]

Identitarian developments at the individual and system levels have direct impact on developments at the state level as well. States have implemented a greater number of religious restrictions since the beginning of the observation period (2007). The steep increase of restrictions in 2009 coincides with the Financial Crisis, a period during which the world was struggling with economic downturn and rising unemployment.[99] Our measurement relies on data from the WVS reaching only as far as 2014 (Figure 25). However, data from the PEW Research Center indicates an increase in the period since, with their latest data showing that 52 governments impose “high “or “very high” levels of religious restrictions on their population – a figure which went up from 40 countries in 2007.[100]

Figure 25
World average government religious restrictions per year
World average government religious restrictions per year

Source: Pew Research Center[101]

Trends in the magnitude of social hostilities involving religion reveal a more nuanced picture, but have nonetheless risen on balance. Substantial increases are reported in hostilities related to religious norms, with less marked increases in harassment by individuals and social groups and religious violence by organized groups.[102] The number of governments imposing “high” or “very high” religious restrictions on their populations went up from 40 governments in 2007 to 52 in 2017. Figure 26 displays the increase in restrictions over all regions. After a slight relaxation between 2013 and 2014, religious restrictions are once again on the uptick across all regions.

Figure 26
World average government religious restrictions per region
World average government religious restrictions per region

Source: Pew Research Center[103]

Figure 27 shows the countries that score the worst on the Government Restrictions Index. 17 of those countries fall within the MENA region; 16 fall within the Asia and the Pacific region. The only “Western Europe and Others” country to appear on this list is Turkey. This is due to the country’s treatment of its Kurdish minority,[104] as well as due to its increased favoritism of Islam over the last decade under president Erdogan’s ruling AKP party.

Figure 27
Average government religious restrictions worst performing states
Average government religious restrictions worst performing states

Source: Pew Research Center[105]

Expanding religious restrictions are mirrored in the recorded growth in the number and extent of social hostilities (Figure 28). The massive rise in social hostilities between 2009 and 2012 can be largely attributed to the Arab Spring in the MENA region and to the Financial Crisis in other regions.

Figure 28
World average social hostilities index per year
World average social hostilities index per year

Source: Pew Research Center[106]

Figure 29 displays a breakdown of social hostilities by region. While high in the MENA region over the time period spanning 2007 to 2017, social hostilities related to religious norms registered the most significant increases in Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe. The latter underwent the steepest increase in religious social hostilities, mainly as a result of countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Italy, and France ranking among the top increasers on violence related to religious norms in 2017.[107] The table also features Uganda and Libya, which initiated, continued, or regressed into domestic conflict during the observation period.

Figure 29
Average social hostilities index per region and year
Average social hostilities index per region and year

Source: Pew Research Center[108]

Table 7
Social hostilities index top negative change per country (2007-2016)

Country

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Uganda

0,4

2,1

0,3

5,8

6,5

6,3

4,1

4,2

5,6

6,3

Libya

1,4

3,1

1,5

0,2

1,9

5,4

6,9

7,1

7,1

6,7

Malaysia

1

1,9

1,3

2,2

3,9

3,9

2,9

6

5,4

6,2

United Kingdom

1,6

3,4

3,8

6,2

6,3

6

5,4

4,4

6

6,6

Ukraine

1,9

3,3

2,1

4

3,5

4,1

2,9

4,7

4,7

6,8

Germany

2,1

2,9

3,7

5,3

5

5,6

4,3

2,5

5,3

6,8

Nigeria

4,4

7,1

8

7,8

8,3

8,5

8,7

7,4

9,1

8,9

Burkina Faso

1,5

2,4

1,3

1,5

2

2

3,1

2,6

4,9

6

Kenya

2,4

6,9

3

6,7

7,2

8,3

7,3

7,1

6,7

6,8

Bolivia

0

1,3

0,4

0,3

0,8

0

0

0,3

2,1

4

Source: Pew Research Center[109]

Subconclusion: Has the World Become More Inclusionary?

Overall, developments in the identitary domain indicate worrying trends at the individual, state and system levels. The world has not become more inclusionary. Despite the galvanizing effects of international initiatives such as the MeToo movement, the vast majority of identitary indicators register negative trends. Trust in outgroups has reduced at the individual level,[110] as has inclusiveness.[111] States are taking increasingly active and draconian steps to repress religious freedoms,[112] with the result being an increase in the number of social hostilities across the board.[113] These trends are most pronounced in the MENA region, but recur worldwide, including in Western Europe. They also recur at the system level, where votership for populist parties and leaders’ use of populist rhetoric both register significant increases.[114] Though data on populism is only available for Western Europe and Latin America, the uptick observed within these trendlines offers cause for concern. Combined with populism’s increased attractiveness to European voters, Western European governments’ registered embracing of increasingly restrictive religious policies indicate a democratically sanctioned shift away from institutionalized inclusiveness. This means that the religious restrictions and social hostilities which this monitor observes at the state level represent more than simply an effort on states’ behalf to silence internal dissent.

Political: Has the World Become More Free and Democratic?

Despite an overall growth in both the number of democracies and the absolute number of citizens living in democracies, democracy as an institution is under attack. This study shows that democracy’s attractiveness as a governance model has decreased at the state and individual levels, seemingly validating statements made by pundits warning of the system’s decline. Simultaneously, some positive observations remain. Pro-democracy movements from Bolivia to Algeria and from Russia to Hong Kong show that democracy continues to enamor many.

The political domain gauges trends in international polity. At the individual level, democracy’s ability to capture people’s attention is measured both in theory and in practice by measuring the desire to live in a democracy in the subjective dimension and by global voter turnout in the objective dimension. Despite overlaps between civil and human rights and polity, the political domain does not measure civil and human rights. Polity within the political domain is conceptualized as deriving solely from governance system, rather than from the (lack) of human rights abuses, which are covered in the judicial domain. Levels of democracy at the state level are similarly assessed both objectively by looking at the absolute number of democracies and subjectively how democratic people perceive their countries to be. At the system level, the objective measurement is the number of people living under democracy, and the subjective dimension looks at the level of (dis)agreement in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (Table 8).

Table 8
Political trend table
Political trend table

According to the Polity IV regime dataset, and contrary to conventional wisdom,[115] the rising tide of democratization that started after the end of the Cold War has not ground to a halt in the new century. The average level of democracy worldwide is rising (Figure 30). In fact, the world average Polity IV score in 2018 was roughly 4, up from approximately 2.9 in 2000. A score of 4 falls just two points short of the 6 necessary to qualify for the “democratic” moniker on that index’s -10 to 10 scale. This growth has stagnated since 2013, although the most recent years once again display growth.

Figure 30
World average Polity IV score over time
World average Polity IV score over time

Source: The Center for Systemic Peace[116]

Democracies continue to account for the majority of nations worldwide. In 2000, 75 (52%) countries were governed democratically, 84 (57%) in 2010, and 90 (60%) in 2018 (Figure 31).[117] The number of states stuck in the middle, also referred to as anocracies, shows virtually no change. The number of anocracies decreased by one between 2000 and 2018, from 40 (28%) to 39 (26%). Autocracy experiences a steady slide in the same time period, with the number of countries decreasing from 29 (20%) in 2000 to 21 (14%) in 2018 – although the number has stayed stable since 2011.

Figure 31
Percentage of countries per Polity IV category per year[118]
Percentage of countries per Polity IV category per year

Source: The Center for Systemic Peace[119]

Additionally, the proportion of the global population living under democracy increased in absolute terms, from 3.4 billion (57%) at the turn of the century to 4.3 billion (58%) in 2018.[120] Simultaneously, share of people living under anocratic systems of governance has increased from 715 million (12%) in 2000 to 1.3 billion (17%) in 2018. [121] Autocratic states, meanwhile have stayed roughly stable at 1.8 billion in 2000 to 1.9 billion in 2018,[122] meaning that their share of the world population fell from 31% to 26% (Figure 32).

Figure 32
Percentage of the world population per Polity IV category
Percentage of the world population per Polity IV category

Source: The Center for Systemic Peace[123] and the World Bank[124]

Democratic countries are not equally distributed across the world (Figure 33). Western states, despite experiencing a slight decrease after 2013, caused mainly by Turkey, emerge as being by far the most democratic. Meanwhile, Asian and African countries average out as being closer to autocracy, although these nations are also the main drivers of the overall improved average throughout this period. MENA states remain bastions of autocracy, though the region experienced minor improvements after the Arab Spring as a result of developments in Tunisia and Yemen.[125]

Figure 33
Average Polity IV score per region
Average Polity IV score per region

Source: The Center for Systemic Peace[126]

This research shows that frequently cited concerns regarding democracy’s decline apply, as measured by Polity IV, only to wealthy countries rather than to the West as a whole (Figure 34).[127] While the poorest two categories show steady improvement, wealthier nations are stable, and in fact decrease slightly. It should also be noted, however, that the poorest countries are generally not the most autocratic. The high number of anocracies cause the low-income group to score poorly in overall Polity IV score. As noted in the list of largest increasers, full autocracies are less likely to rise in Polity IV score. This is because autocratic consolidation allows autocrats to exercise a high degree of control over the state’s coercive institutions (military, secret police, etc.), thus reducing the chance of a revolution significantly.[128]

Figure 34
Average Polity IV score per World Bank income group (2018) over time
Average Polity IV score per World Bank income group (2018) over time

Source: The Center for Systemic Peace[129]

The usual suspects of autocratic transition and backsliding emerge in Table 9 below. Turkey emerges among a list of countries which decreased the most in democratic governance. Individual state-level events such as Thailand’s (2006, 2014) and Turkey’s (2016) coup d’états are also clearly reflected in these scores.[130] Also represented are the events in Ukraine after the Russian annexation of Crimea, the start of the insurgency in the Donbass region and Poroshenko presidency in 2014,[131] and the onset of the Syrian civil war. Notably, the US and the UK emerge as significant backsliders. Though these countries’ slide is caused mostly by a reduction in media freedoms, this trend’s coinciding with the success of populist movements speaks to the identitary domain’s impact on political indicators.[132]

Table 9
Polity IV scores for the countries with the most negative change between 2000 and 2018

Country

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Thailand

9

9

9

9

9

9

-5

-1

4

4

4

7

7

7

-3

-3

-3

-3

-3

Bangladesh

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

-6

-6

5

5

5

5

4

1

1

1

1

-6

Turkey

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

9

9

9

3

3

-4

-4

-4

Venezuela

7

6

6

6

6

6

5

5

5

-3

-3

-3

-3

4

4

4

4

-3

-3

Iran

3

3

3

3

-6

-6

-6

-6

-6

-7

-7

-7

-7

-7

-7

-7

-7

-7

-7

Cambodia

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

-4

-4

Congo, DRC

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

-3

-3

-3

United States

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

8

8

8

United Kingdom

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

8

8

8

Ukraine

6

6

6

6

6

6

7

7

7

7

6

6

6

6

4

4

4

4

4

Tajikistan

-1

-1

-1

-3

-3

-3

-3

-3

-3

-3

-3

-3

-3

-3

-3

-3

-3

-3

-3

Syria

-7

-7

-7

-7

-7

-7

-7

-7

-7

-7

-7

-7

-9

-9

-9

-9

-9

-9

-9

Russian Federation

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

Nicaragua

8

8

8

8

8

8

8

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

6

6

6

Kazakhstan

-4

-4

-6

-6

-6

-6

-6

-6

-6

-6

-6

-6

-6

-6

-6

-6

-6

-6

-6

Bolivia

9

9

9

8

8

8

8

8

8

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

Belgium

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

8

8

8

8

8

8

8

8

8

8

8

8

Source: The Center for Systemic Peace[133]

The top improvers are comprised mainly of African countries (Table 10). Typing into a previously outlined trend, all but three of these twelve top improvers were anocracies (not autocracies) before their improvement in Polity IV score occurred. Additionally, most of the top improvers experienced sudden jumps upwards in Polity IV-score rather than gradual changes. This indicates that the primary means of democratization (at least on this 20-year scale) is through war, revolution, or radical reform.

Table 10
Polity IV top improvers between 2000 and 2018

Country

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Iraq

-9

-9

-9

3

3

3

3

6

6

6

6

6

Myanmar

-7

-7

-7

-7

-8

-8

-8

-8

-6

-6

-6

-3

-3

-3

-3

8

8

8

Pakistan

-6

-6

-5

-5

-5

-5

-5

2

5

5

6

6

6

7

7

7

7

7

7

Kyrgyzstan

-3

-3

-3

-3

-3

3

4

3

3

1

7

7

7

7

7

7

8

8

Kenya

-2

-2

8

8

8

8

8

7

7

7

8

8

8

9

9

9

9

9

9

Tunisia

-3

-3

-4

-4

-4

-4

-4

-4

-4

-4

-4

7

7

7

7

7

Gambia

-5

-5

-5

-5

-5

-5

-5

-5

-5

-5

-5

-5

-5

-5

-5

-5

-5

4

4

Burkina Faso

-3

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

6

6

6

6

Zimbabwe

-3

-4

-4

-4

-4

-4

-4

-4

-4

1

1

1

1

4

4

4

4

4

4

Haiti

-2

-2

-2

-2

5

5

5

5

5

5

Gabon

-4

-4

-4

-4

-4

-4

-4

-4

-4

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

Liberia

0

0

0

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

7

Source: The Center for Systemic Peace[134]

The foundational liberal norms of democratic governance are under significant strain, with global levels of freedom declining (see the Judicial: Has the World Become More Just? section).[135] Meanwhile, political scientists speak of a “liberal democracy’s crisis of confidence,” reporting an increasing openness to non-democratic forms of governance (alongside still considerable levels of support for democracy).[136] Others even warn of a global ‘democratic deconsolidation’ with falling support for important democratic norms.[137] Our measurements of individual-level support for democracies certainly lend some credence to these dire predictions. WVS data allows for the observation of a significant decline in desire to live in a democracy (2005-2014) at the individual level (Figure 35).[138] The global average declined by roughly 8%.

Figure 35
World average desire to live in democracy over time
World average desire to live in democracy over time

Source: WVS Key Aggregates[139]

Not only are individuals generally perceiving democracy less positively as a system; many of those which live under it are increasingly perceiving it as dysfunctional. According to the WVS, global averages of the level of democracy perceived by citizens have declined by more than 15% (Figure 36). This is made more worrying by the fact that the average level of democracy in those countries (as measured by Polity IV) registered a 2.5% increase over the same time period. Data from a 2018 Pew Research survey shows that more than half (51%) of the respondents are not satisfied with the way democracy works in their countries.[140] This worrying trend reflects commonly cited concerns regarding the “hollowing out” of democracy at the state level.[141]

Figure 36
World average perceived democracy contrasted with Polity IV over time
World average perceived democracy contrasted with Polity IV over time

Source: WVS Key Aggregates[142] and the Center for Systemic Peace[143]

Regional differences in perceived democracy persist, and again do not necessarily correlate with actual levels of democracy. Eastern European citizens not only score much lower in perceived democracy and desire to live in democracy than their Western counterparts (Figure 37), but also perceive their governments to be significantly less democratic than they often are (Figure 38). By contrast, several Asian nations (Kazakhstan, Vietnam and China, specifically) perceive their governments as being far more democratic than warranted.

Figure 37
Average perceived democracy and desire to live in democracy per region, 2005-2014
Average perceived democracy and desire to live in democracy per region, 2005-2014

Source: WVS Key Aggregates[144]

Figure 38
Perceived democracy contrasted by Polity IV per country-year
Perceived democracy contrasted by Polity IV per country-year

Source: WVS Key Aggregates[145] and the Center for Systemic Peace[146]

The decline in democratic engagement is also reflected in the global average voter turnout, which has decreased from roughly 68% in 2000 to 64% in 2018 (Figure 39). Eastern Europe once again emerges as an outlier in this category (Figure 40). Counterintuitively, The Asia and Pacific region’s high performance can be attributed to the presence of a high number of autocratic states hosting unfree elections. Autocracies’ turnout rose from roughly 72% to nearly 80% in this twenty-year period, while those in democracies fell from 65% to 62% and anocracies fell even farther from 70% down to 62%.

Figure 39
Global average voter turnout
Global average voter turnout

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)[147]

Figure 40
Regional average voter turnout, 2000-2019
Regional average voter turnout, 2000-2019

Source: IDEA[148]

The negative nature of subjective measurements at the individual and state levels is partially tempered by the emergence of a (relatively) large number of pro-democracy movements in (among others) Algeria,[149] Bolivia,[150] Lebanon,[151] Chile,[152] Ecuador,[153] Hong Kong,[154] Iraq,[155] Spain,[156] Sudan,[157] and Russia,[158] but emerges from the data nonetheless.

Finally, while an imperfect measurement at best, voting patterns in the UNGA display a slight decline in disagreement between 2000 and 2018 of about 3%,[159] using the standard deviation in Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten’s ‘idealpoint’ scale. This represents the average distance between all states’ voting behavior as represented by the idealpoint score. This result implies that states’ voting behavior is increasingly uniform at the system level, although a change of 3% does not amount to a significant shift.

Figure 41
UNGA voting disagreement[160]
UNGA voting disagreement

Source: Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten, 2017[161]

Subconclusion: Has the World Become More Free and Democratic?

Overall, to the question whether the world has become more democratic, the answer is mixed and on balance negative. The number of democracies and the number of people living under democracy have both increased over the available time series.[162] Hungary, Turkey, the US, and the UK all emerge as outliers vis-à-vis this trend. As a result of (among others) crackdowns on media freedoms, these countries register a decrease in polity over the available time period. Developments in these countries offer some reason for optimism. Erdogan’s defeat in the Istanbul elections speaks to the continued existence, if not the strength, of the country’s democratic systems, and the US’ Congress’ determination to limit Presidential overreach further attests to the resilient nature of democracy. Simultaneously, this monitor registers trends which speak to democracy’s decline as a governance system. Individual-level desire to live in democracy has declined over all available time series,[163] and voter turnout is at an all-time low.[164] People living under democracy also perceive the system less positively than they have at any point in the past.[165] Taken together, these trends speak to the “hollowing out” of democracy as a governance system and indicate that it is being eroded at its foundations. Illiberal states’ increasing share of international influence within the judicial domain calls the longevity of positive developments within the political domain into question somewhat.[166]

Judicial: Has the World Become More Just?

In the closely associated realm of justice and freedom, the picture is multilayered because of a multitude of sometimes contradictory developments. Freedom understood in terms of civil rights has been declining for over a decade now, both in free and unfree countries. Human rights are under pressure, with horrific human rights violations taking place in a wide range of countries. Yet, recent research suggests that human rights protections have also steadily improved over time. The rule of law has strengthened over the past decades, although many states low baseline scores. A disquieting development is the fact that illiberal states have been gaining in political, economic and military influence, which is likely to translate into a growing ability to shape international norms and rules.

The judicial domain assesses the extent to which law, both pertaining to human rights and governance, is applied impartially and justly. Despite overlaps between polity and the aforementioned variables, the judicial domain does not measure polity. Freedom within the judicial domain is conceptualized as a normative and rules-based construct, rather than one which derives from the system of governance. System of governance is covered by the political domain. At the individual level this is gauged subjectively through the perceived fairness in interpersonal relations, as well as objectively through the actual protection of civil liberties. At the state level, we looked at the proxies of corruption and the rule of law. At the system level, the judicial domain is operationalized through media reported human rights transgressions and accusations, as well as the level of geopolitical influence held by unfree states (Table 11).

Table 11
Judicial trend table
Judicial trend table

Results within the judicial domain are relatively positive at the state level, though less-so at the individual and system levels. Freedom House reported declines in political rights and civil liberties for the thirteenth consecutive year in not only free, partly free and free countries, but also in consolidated democracies.[167] Initially improving steadily, a turning point occurred in 2005. On the civil liberties index (Figure 42), 66 countries improved their scores between 2000 and 2005, while 10 worsened, as the world average in the civil liberties index improved by 15%. In 2005-2018, this ratio reversed, with 48 worsening and only 15 improving. The global average, meanwhile, steadily worsened by 12.5%.

Figure 42
World average civil liberties score over time (lower is better)
World average civil liberties score over time (lower is better)

Source: Freedom House[168]

This finding is corroborated by the number of free states in the world (Figure 43). Whereas the beginning of this period was marked by a rather rapid increase in the number of free states,[169] from 43 (28%) in 2000 to 54 (35%) in 2005, the post-2005 period has remained more or less stable and has even declining to 48 (31%) in 2018. In that same period, the number of partly free states – by far the most numerous category – saw a reduction from 80 (53%) in 2000 to 78 (52%) in 2010 and 71 (46%) in 2018.[170] This was caused by a marked increase in ‘not free’ states.[171] This number increased from 21 (14%) in 2007 to 35 (23%) in 2018. This increase of 67% indicates a worrying worldwide trend of autocratic expansion.

Figure 43
Percentage of countries per freedom house civil liberties category
Percentage of countries per freedom house civil liberties category

Source: Freedom House[172]

This negative trend is less pronounced in the Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia-Pacific regions (Figure 44). The West stands out as a generally positive exception, although it also experienced a decline in recent years. Human rights protections also decreased significantly in the Middle East following the Arab Spring, showing that the aforementioned revolutions largely failed to produce less autocratic regimes, while countries that did not experience revolutions further clamped down on resistance in response. The distinct exception to this rule has been Tunisia, which experienced a quick and successful revolution, widely supported by civil society, leading to successful democratic reform.[173]

Figure 44
Average civil liberties per region
Average civil liberties per region

Source: Freedom House[174]

These developments certainly provide greater context, and offer additional cause for concern, to the positive democratic trends discussed earlier. Even nominally democratic countries often still underperform when it comes to the protection of civil liberties. In recent years, these weaknesses have become more prevalent. In fact, as can be seen in Figure 45, human rights protection in autocratic and anocratic countries has been worsening since 2005 and 2008. Even in democratic countries, civil liberties have come under increasing pressure in recent years. In fact, democracies’ average score in 2018 falls just under 2.5 threshold above which a country is classified as ‘partly free,’ rather than ‘free.’

Figure 45
Average civil liberties score per Polity IV category (lower is better)
Average civil liberties score per Polity IV category (lower is better)

Source: Freedom House[175] and the Center for Systemic Peace[176]

Alongside these developments, the degree to which individuals perceive their peers as acting fair in daily life has remained more or less stable over time (Figure 46). More corrupt countries score significantly lower in perceived fairness than countries where corruption is less prevalent.[177]

Figure 46
World average perceived fairness score
World average perceived fairness score

Source: WVS Key Aggregates[178]

At the state level, the CPI shows a positive increase in the levels of confidence in the repression of corruption as expressed in expert assessments and business opinion surveys (Figure 47).[179] This improvement is occurring at a glacial pace (only 0.7% between 2012 and 2018), and levels of corruption remain quite high overall, meaning that corruption remains a major problem worldwide.

Figure 47
World average Corruption Perceptions Index over time (higher is better)
World average Corruption Perceptions Index over time (higher is better)

Source: Transparency International[180]

Regionally (Figure 48), particularly positive developments are reported in certain countries in Eastern Europe, of which the overall average rises 5% (again with Hungary and Poland as an example of the opposite trend) and in the Asia-Pacific (a 6.9% increase).

Figure 48
Average Corruption Perceptions Index per region (higher is better)
Average Corruption Perceptions Index per region (higher is better)

Source: Transparency International[181]

Eastern European post-Communist countries are overrepresented among countries showing the most significant improvements in their CPI scores between 2012 and 2018 (Table 12). The list of largest decreasers is populated by European nations which have gone through economic hardship (see Spain and Cyprus), ‘backsliding’ democracies such as Hungary and Turkey, and countries which have descended into war, specifically Syria and Yemen (Table 13). Greece, which was particularly hard-hit by the 2008 economic crisis, and Afghanistan, which has been in conflict throughout this period, emerge as the greatest improvers in perceived corruption. Both nations went through externally administered reforms. The Greek economy underwent close scrutiny and much-lamented reforms to reduce its inefficiencies and lacks in transparency after it received expansive EU and International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailouts.[182] Afghanistan’s government has similarly received extensive foreign aid and direct involvement in its weak democratic government since the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 and its subsequent resurgence.[183]

Table 12
Highest improvers in the CPI between 2012 and 2018 (higher is better)

Country

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Myanmar

15

21

21

22

28

30

29

Belarus

31

29

31

32

40

44

44

Italy

42

43

43

44

47

50

52

Czechia

49

48

51

56

55

57

59

Senegal

36

41

43

44

45

45

45

Latvia

49

53

55

56

57

58

58

Greece

36

40

43

46

44

48

45

Estonia

64

68

69

70

70

71

73

Laos

21

26

25

25

30

29

29

Afghanistan

8

8

12

11

15

15

16

Source: Transparency International[184]

Table 13
Highest negative change in the CPI between 2012 and 2018 (higher is better)

Country

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Bahrain

51

48

49

51

43

36

36

Syria

26

17

20

18

13

14

13

Hungary

55

54

54

51

48

45

46

Liberia

41

38

37

37

37

31

32

Yemen

23

18

19

18

14

16

14

Australia

85

81

80

79

79

77

77

Brazil

43

42

43

38

40

37

35

Mozambique

31

30

31

31

27

25

23

Turkey

49

50

45

42

41

40

41

Congo

26

22

23

23

20

21

19

Cyprus

66

63

63

61

55

57

59

Madagascar

32

28

28

28

26

24

25

Spain

65

59

60

58

58

57

58

Source: Transparency International[185]

Transparency and independence of the rule of law exercised at the state level has also seen a moderate 5.8% improvement over the past decades, based on data from the Varieties of Democracy’s (V-DEM) Rule of Law Index (Figure 49).[186]

Figure 49
World average rule of law
World average rule of law

Source: V-DEM Project[187]

Most Western states tend to have strong rule of law records which have remained more or less stable in the upper ranges, although Turkey’s plummet causes a slight decline from 2016 onwards. Other regions trail far behind the West, with Africa and the MENA scoring particularly low, and Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific falling in the mid ranges. Eastern Europe also lags behind, boasting average rule of law scores which are closer to those observed in Latin America than to those of Western European states. Rule of law correlates significantly with both democratic regime type (as measured by Polity IV) and with civil liberties (as measured by Freedom House).[188] There are a number of important exceptions to this rule, with the rule of law being rigorously enforced in a small number of illiberal authoritarian states such as the UAE, Oman and Kuwait, as well as the anocratic Singapore, all of which are wealthy and/or highly integrated into global markets.

Figure 50
Average rule of law per region
Average rule of law per region

Source: V-DEM Project[189]

There is no authoritative dataset that systematically measures human right violations. According to a composite index measurement which combines several human rights indicators,[190] particularly focusing on physical violations (e.g. state violence, torture), governments’ records in respecting and protecting human rights have improved on average by 9.5% over the past two decades (Figure 51).

Figure 51
World average normalized human rights score over time. The long-term (1947-2017) average of all countries equals zero (higher is better)
World average normalized human rights score over time. The long-term (1947-2017) average of all countries equals zero (higher is better)

Source: Farris, 2019[191]

While the overall trend is positive, a clear exception emerges in the MENA region, where human rights scores dropped by 8.2% between 2009 and 2011 as a consequence of the violent crackdowns that followed the Arab Spring (Figure 52).[192] This observation aligns with human rights protection organizations reporting violations of physical integrity in (civil) wars, such as Syria, Yemen and Egypt, which speak to this trend’s continuation in the present.[193] The disconnect between the findings on civil liberties and human rights can be explained by the normalized nature of the human rights dataset. By observing a consistent definition of human rights and by normalizing the data over time, the index accounts for evolving and expanding definitions of human rights. The disconnect indicates, therefore, human rights protections have improved over time.[194]

Figure 52
Average normalized human rights score per region over time
Average normalized human rights score per region over time

Source: Farris, 2019[195]

The improvements in overall human rights score can be mainly attributed to democratic states, which averaged a 7% increase in human rights protections. Averages among other systems of governance remained roughly stable (Figure 53). Notably, the average human rights scores for anocratic states register as being consistently lower than those of autocratic states, possibly as a result of authoritarian consolidation.[196]

Figure 53
Average normalized human rights score per system of government over time
Average normalized human rights score per system of government over time

Source: Farris, 2019[197] and Polity IV[198]

A final worrying trend to report manifests at the system level, where illiberal states continue to increase their international influence (Figure 54). Data from Freedom House and The Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures show a decrease in the influence wielded by states marked as ‘not free’ or ‘partly free’ in civil liberties until 2005 (from 26% down to 23%).[199] Since 2005, this percentage has risen to 30%, while the total number of free states has hardly changed (Figure 55). This reflects the fact that illiberal states are gaining in political, economic and military influence. The new international reality that is shaped by this process is part of an integral strategy of China in particular to offer an alternative to the Western liberal democratic model. China extends its geopolitical influence through projects such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit,[200] the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and of course the Belt and Road Initiative.[201] Other autocratic leaders are eager to emphasize the conclusions of this ‘Beijing Consensus’,[202] as exemplified by Putin’s statement in the summer of 2019 that liberalism is ‘obsolete’.[203] Under Putin, Russia itself has projected its power for example through its meddling with the US elections in 2016 and its support for coup plots in Montenegro in 2016.[204] While the rise in illiberal states’ influence stagnates towards the end of the data in 2016, the trend reflects the centrality of illiberal ideals within the international system and their growing ability to shape international norms and rules.

Figure 54
International influence of ‘Not Free’ and ‘Partly Free’ states in term of civil liberties
International influence of ‘Not Free’ and ‘Partly Free’ states in term of civil liberties

Source: Freedom House[205] and the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures[206]

Figure 55
Percentage of international influence per freedom house civil liberties category
Percentage of international influence per freedom house civil liberties category

Source: Freedom House[207] and the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures[208]

Subconclusion: Has the World Become More Just?

The picture within the judicial domain emerges as being multi-layered. Freedom as measured through the lens of civil rights shows a decrease over the course of the past decade, with negative developments registering in both free and unfree countries.[209] Only 15 countries increased their scores between 2004 and 2018, compared to 48 which decreased. Corruption perception shows a slight positive increase, indicating that the level of confidence in the functioning of national legal systems as expressed in expert assessments and business opinion surveys is on the uptick.[210] Positive trends were particularly pronounced in the Eastern Europe. The Middle East registered negative trends in corruption perception, an observation which is unsurprising given the region’s performance on inequality-related indicators within the socioeconomic domain.[211] The transparency and independence of the rule of law exercised at the state level has also seen moderate improvements over the past decade, though absolute values indicate that there is a long way yet to go. Data derived from V-DEM’s Rule of Law Index indicates that most Western states have strong rule of law records, and also that they have maintained them despite developments within the political and identitary domains.[212] Africa and MENA emerge as the poorest performers vis-à-vis rule of law, though several notable exceptions apply. The UAE, Oman and Kuwait all scored high on V-DEM’s Rule of Law index, indicating that the presence of illiberal governance systems is not mutually exclusive with a well-functioning rule of law. Respect for human rights also increased over the course of the past decade, with all regions save the MENA registering positive trends.[213] At the system level, illiberal states’ increasing share of international influence calls the persistence of several of the previously outlined trends into question.[214]

Security: Has the World Become More Peaceful?

Overall, when measured over the past two decades, the world has not become more peaceful and secure. The world has seen a growing number of conflicts and conflict fatalities, in combination with declining levels of peace. Far from representing universal developments, a few flashpoints and highly violent conflicts significantly drove up global averages, skewing aggregate results. Particularly the MENA region as a whole and the conflicts in Libya, Yemen and Syria in particular, contributed to this trend. On a positive note, the past two years saw a reduction in the number of conflict fatalities, yet the medium-term outlook for conflict zones does not provide solid grounds for excessive optimism.

The security domain addresses trends relating to war and peace, militarization, and violence. These are the more high-level events which often dominate the news cycle and are favorite topics of policymakers, historians, political scientists, and alike. However, especially because of this dubious fame, this domain’s developments are easily overrepresented. Paradoxically, an excess of attention can lead to diminished focus and clarity. The objective state of security is assessed through a number of quantitative indicators which aim to assess the prevalence of war and militarism at each of our three levels. Subjective security is operationalized through several different metrics, namely the eagerness to engage in warfare or bellicose language on the individual and state levels, and the general level of peacefulness worldwide according to the GPI (Table 14).

Table 14
Security trend table
Security trend table

The past few decades have seen an overall worrying increase in insecurity across a range of dimensions and at multiple levels. Far from representing a global trend, however, a few highly violent areas and flashpoints significantly drove up global fatality and in numbers of conflicts, according data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (Figure 56).[215] Since the lowest point in 2010, the number of violent state-based conflicts has risen from 30 to 52.[216] Similarly, the number of one-sided conflicts steadily increased over the past decade, reaching a record of 35 conflicts last year – a substantial increase from 21 conflicts ten years ago. Although fluctuating between years, the number of non-state conflicts increased most significantly from 28 conflicts in 2010 to 78 violent incidents in 2018.[217] The past two years have witnessed a 27% decrease in global death tolls with 106.557 in 2016, 95.500 in 2017, and 77.392 in 2018. This value represents a 150% increase relative to pre-2010 levels.[218]

The spike in conflict fatalities does not align with the rise in the total number of conflicts. Fatalities decline after the aforementioned increase of the number of conflicts post-2014. This is because the particularly violent initial years of the Syrian Civil War were the primary cause for this brief, but drastic, increase in conflict fatalities. While occurrence of conflict increased afterwards due to IS’ international expansion, these wars were far less violent than the Syrian Civil War.

Figure 56
Total number of conflicts involving at least one state actor divided by the number of countries in the world & conflict fatalities as a proportion of global population over time
Total number of conflicts involving at least one state actor divided by the number of countries in the world & conflict fatalities as a proportion of global population over time

Source: UCDP[219] & the World Bank[220]

The MENA region as a whole, and the conflicts in Libya, Yemen and Syria in particular, constituted major contributors to this trend. Recent years have seen a reduction in absolute levels of violence in the region, though the humanitarian situation in Yemen remains abhorrent, fighting between warring factions persists in Libya, and the war in Syria has not fully ended. Renewed popular unrest in this unstable region,[221] and the looming threat of the conflict trap (sixty percent of the conflicts from the early 2000s relapsed in the following five years),[222] does not necessarily bode well for future trends in conflict fatalities.

Meanwhile, willingness to fight as registered by WVS data has remained stable at an overall level (Figure 57). Approximately 70% of respondents answered affirmatively when asked whether they would be willing to fight for their country if war broke out.

Figure 57
World average willingness to fight per year
World average willingness to fight per year

Source: WVS Key Aggregates [223]

Over the entire timeseries, citizens of high-income countries emerge as being decidedly less willing to fight than those residing in countries with lower income (Figure 58). 62% of respondents in high-income countries answered affirmatively when asked whether they would be willing to fight for their country if war broke out, compared to 80% in lower income countries. A WIN/Gallup poll from 2014 reported similar findings, noting that Western Europe remains extremely war averse, while the MENA region was most prepared to fight (83%).[224]

Figure 58
Average willingness to fight by income group, 2000-2014
Average willingness to fight by income group, 2000-2014

Source: WVS Key Aggregates[225]

At the system level, our analysis of use of military rhetoric assertiveness as reported in English media registers an increase over the past twenty years (Figure 59). Certain spikes reflect moments of international conflict such as the 2003 Iraq War, the (reaction to) Syrian chemical weapons use in the summer of 2013, and heightened US-North Korean and US-Syrian tensions in 2017. A slight decrease occurs in recent years at the global level, but a number of high-level profile threats by political leaders of the dominant military powers are a cause of concern. The results in GDELT are corroborated by the same analysis in the ICEWS and the translingual version of GDELT.[226] In recent years, spikes in this form of aggression have been more frequent and intense than usual. Aside from the incidence of internationalized conflicts and scandals in Yemen and Syria, the bellicose outings of President Trump no doubt contributed to this increase in rhetorical aggression.[227]

Figure 59
Negative military rhetorical assertiveness[228]
Negative military rhetorical assertiveness

Source: HCSS calculations based on GDELT (English)[229]

While global military spending remained roughly stable at around 2.3% of Gross World Product (GWP) since the 2000s, absolute levels of military spending increased over the past decade by 13.2%, amounting to $1.78 trillion in 2018 (Figure 60).[230] 

Figure 60
Global average military expenditure as a percentage of GWP per year
Global average military expenditure as a percentage of GWP per year

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) as aggregated by the World Bank[231]

The Middle East emerges as an outlier as far as average military expenditure as percentage of national GDP is concerned (Figure 61). No other region in the world comes as close to prioritizing warfare and military preparedness.[232]

Figure 61
Average military expenditure as a percentage of GDP per region
Average military expenditure as a percentage of GDP per region

Source: SIPRI as aggregated by the World Bank[233]

The world’s major powers generally do not display an upward trend in prioritization of military expenditure over the last decades (Figure 62). Spending in most of these countries remains higher than the global average, which hovers around 2.2%.[234] Nonetheless, with the exception of Russia and Saudi Arabia, the available data does not imply that these countries have come to prioritize militarization significantly more in recent years. Although the peaks in Saudi Arabia’s spending in 2009 and 2015 largely reflect its falling GDP due to the global recession and the fall in oil prices,[235] respectively.[236] It should be noted that this metric – spending as a percentage of GDP – might belie actual trends in military strength. For example, China’s very stable 2% expenditure on its military amounts to a growth of over 1000% in current USD between 2000 and 2018, due to its rising GDP.[237] Another factor to consider is the changing nature of military expenditure. With the end of the Cold War, many countries reduced the sizes of their armies while increasing their professionalism and effectiveness in order to adapt it to the changing nature of conflict in the era of hybrid warfare.[238] More recently, Research and Development (R&D) aimed at developing new technologies and modernizing armies has become a key priority for major military powers such as NATO, Russia and China.[239]

Figure 62
Military spending as a percentage of GDP for selected powers
Military spending as a percentage of GDP for selected powers

Source: SIPRI as aggregated by the World Bank[240]

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries’ prioritization of military spending has been falling for decades, staying well below the agreed-upon 2% (Figure 63). A steady upward trend can be observed in this group’s spending since 2014, especially by Eastern European countries such as Romania, Estonia and Lithuania – all of which are now rapidly approaching the 2% mark. Other nations, such as the Netherlands,[241] are also increasing their spending.

Figure 63
Average military spending as a percentage of GDP for NATO countries
Average military spending as a percentage of GDP for NATO countries

Source: SIPRI as aggregated by the World Bank[242] and NATO[243]

With the number of active conflicts increasing at the system level, the global level of peacefulness has decreased by 3.8% since 2008 according to the GPI (Figure 64). The level of peacefulness in the world has declined in eight of the last twelve years.

Figure 64
Average GPI over time (lower is better)
Average GPI over time (lower is better)

Source: Institute for Economics & Peace[244]

Europe continues to be the most peaceful region in the world, with twenty-two out of thirty-six European countries ranking higher on the GPI index this year than they did previously (Figure 65).[245] Due to its numerous intra- and interstate conflicts, the MENA region ranks as the least peaceful region globally.

Figure 65
Average global peace score by region over time
Average global peace score by region over time

Source: Institute for Economics & Peace[246]

Subconclusion: Has the World Become More Peaceful?

Overall, when measured over the entire period, the world has not become more secure. Insecurity is on the uptick across a variety of indicators and at several observation levels. The global fatality rate saw a small decrease between 2016 and the present, but still registers as being approximately 150% higher than at any point during the pre-2010 period. The number of active conflicts has increased significantly, driven primarily by an uptick in the number of intrastate and internationalized intrastate conflicts. Though these negative trends’ epicenter is the MENA region, their impact on the macro-level picture is pronounced. The GPI registered a 3.8% reduction in global peacefulness between 2008 and the present.[247] The world has also become more insecure when observed through several more intangible metrics. The volume of military threats registered a minor increase, and several high-profile threats by political leaders offered cause for concern. Global military spending also increased in absolute terms, amounting to $1,78 trillion in 2018 – an increase of 13.2% since 2008.[248] Though military spending did not increase significantly in relative terms (it hovered around 2-3% of GWP since the 2000s), the observed increases in absolute terms offer cause for significant concern. A $1.78 trillion commitment to defense spending transposed into significant efforts at R&D in 2018, resulting in efforts at modernizing nuclear arsenals and strategic delivery vehicles and in funding for autonomous weapons research (among others). Willingness to fight remained stable at the individual level, though disconnects between figures in low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high-income countries indicate that willingness to fight decreases with as economic welfare increases.

Conclusion

Table 15
The state of the world in 36 indicators
The state of the world in 36 indicators

A tally of indicator trends paints a bleak picture of global trends at the aggregate level, though some positive developments can also be observed. Over the entire available time series, high-level trends register a positive (14) to negative (17) ratio of 0.82. Trends over the course of the last two available years are, at the aggregate level, only slightly more positive, and exhibit a positive (14) to negative (16) ratio of 0.88. Indicators which show positive disconnects between these two observations periods are international inequality, trust in peers, trust in outgroups, negative military rhetorical assertiveness, and the GPI. Financial satisfaction, informational connectedness, the volume of international exchanges, and conflict fatalities show negative disconnects.

The aforementioned bleakness is further evident within the socioeconomic, connectedness, identitary, political, judicial, and security domains.

Socioeconomic. Positive trends within the socioeconomic domain are offset by the stagnation of individual-level perceptions of financial satisfaction and by deepening inequality. While this study suggests that the world has become more prosperous and that people today are, on average, better off than at any point in history, the available data suggests that the world has not become more equitable. Despite governments’ efforts at actively investing in their citizens’ welfare, domestic inequality is up across the board, including in Western Europe, the world’s most equitable region. Though inequality between states has decreased over time, the 2018 value remains decisively high.

Connectedness. Trends within the connectedness domain are equally mixed. The world has undoubtedly become more connected at the system and state levels. States have invested more actively into strengthening and expanding their diplomatic footprints, and have enjoyed an explosion in flow of goods and services as a result of increases in the scope of globalization. This monitor also finds that states have become more interconnected along military and (to a lesser degree) political lines. These positive trends notwithstanding, individual-level trends within the connectedness domain offer plenty of cause for concern. Trust in peers and informational connectedness both register negative trends, when viewed over the entire time series and over the 2012-2014 period respectively.

Identitary. The increases in state and system-level interconnectedness registered in the connectedness domain bring with them not only increases in the flow volume of goods and services, but also of people and ideas. Trends within the identitary domain register as almost universally negative, even despite the galvanizing effects of international initiatives such as the MeToo movement. Trust in outgroups and inclusiveness both register decreases at the individual level. At the state level, governments can be observed as enacting an increasing number of more and more draconian policies geared towards restricting religious freedoms, with the result being that social hostilities are on the uptick. At the system level, populist votership and leaders’ use of populist rhetoric have both increased significantly. In Western Europe, both of the aforementioned trends can crucially be observed as spiking during the onset of the European migrant crisis in 2015.

Political. Negative trends within the socioeconomic, connectedness, and identitary domains clearly manifest within the political domain. Desire to live in democracy has declined over all available time series and voter turnout registers as being at an all-time low. Democracy is also perceived more negatively by those living in it than at any point in the past. These combined trends speak to the “hollowing out” of democracy as a governance system. The negative nature of this process is mitigated somewhat by observations at the state and system levels. The number of democracies and the number of people living under democracy have both increased over the available time series, though the longevity of this trend is called into question by developments within the judicial domain – and by illiberal states’ increase in relative system-level influence specifically.

Judicial. Outside of registering an increase in illiberal states’ system-level influence, observations derived from the judicial domain are overwhelmingly positive. Trends pertaining to corruption perception, the rule of law, and human rights protection are all positive. Though absolute values within the rule of law measurement indicate that there still exists ample room for improvement outside of Western Europe, trends observed within the judicial domain are genuinely positive in nature, and serve to offset bleakness within the socioeconomic, connectedness, identitary, political, and security domains somewhat. Though the previously outlined increases in in illiberal states’ system-level influence calls the longevity of these positive trends into question, judicial trends as they stand at the time of writing thus offer cause for celebration.

Security. Trends within the security domain are less positive. Though caused almost entirely by violence wracking the MENA region, the number of conflict fatalities and the number of active conflicts have both experienced significant upticks over the course of the past decade, and global peace has decreased. The volume of militarily rhetoric assertive events has additionally increased (albeit minorly), and global military spending increased in absolute terms, though not in absolute terms. Though not captured by the indicators included within this study, these trends are endemic of significant increases in the volume of interstate military competition (IMC).[249]

Taken together, an aggregate analysis of domain-level trends outlined in the previous paragraphs allows for the formulation of two high-level findings. First, this discrepancies between trends at the individual, state, and system levels outline the utility of a multi-level analysis of global trends. Second, there remains an overarching problem with data availability across domains and observation level.

Starting with the utility of a multi-level analysis of global trends, this derives from the fact that observations within domains often differ significantly between observation levels (individual, state, and system). They also differ significantly between subjective and objective dimensions. Observation levels’ impact on domain-level interpretations are best exemplified by the political domain, while the impact of divergences between subjective and objective observations within domains is clearest within the socioeconomic domain. With regards to observation levels’ impact on interpretations within the political domain, this can be observed in divergences between the individual and state-system levels. The political domain’s state and system-level observations paint a rosy picture which does not recur at the individual level. Between increases in the number of democratic states, a low degree of disagreement within the UNGA, and an uptick in the world’s average Polity IV score, democracy appears to be on the right track. Conversely, the view at the individual level speaks to democracy’s erosion from within. Individuals are less interested in living under democracy, vote less in elections, and perceive it less favorably. Moving on to instances of meaningful divergences between subjective and objective observations within the socioeconomic domain, these can be observed in the fact that increases in human welfare have not necessarily resulted in increases in financial satisfaction (among others). Despite the fact that human welfare registers increases across the board and international inequality has decreased, subjective measurements within the socioeconomic domain emerge as overwhelmingly negative. Individual-level financial satisfaction has stagnated and even decreased, and the perception that working hard gets one ahead exhibits signs of decline within the “Western Europe and Others” region. Though it falls outside this study’s scope to explain disconnects such as these, their occurrence allows for the formulation of various follow-up questions vis-à-vis causality within domain-level trends. They also serve to reaffirm the shortcomings of observing global events through a monoperspectivist lens and validate the utility of geodynamics’ multiperspectivist approach.

This research also finds that there continues to be a lack of granular and/or comprehensive datasets available for gauging geodynamic trends.[250] Subjective measurements, particularly at the state and individual level, are almost universally measured through data derived from the WVS, meaning that values are difficult to compare on a year-by-year basis.[251] Several indicators – notably those utilized within the identitary domain – are only available for two to three years. Not all data is available at the regional level, complicating the process of placing trends (whether positive or negative) within the context of dynamics specific to their respective locales. Perhaps most importantly, in many cases, the data necessary for gauging geodynamic trends through an “ideal” measurement simply did not exist. Perceived fairness (identitary: individual-subjective), CPI (identitary, state-subjective), and the GPI (security: system-subjective) are all examples of measurements which imperfectly capture the observation level-dimension combination they are intended to operationalize. The challenges associated with monitoring geo-dynamic trends in a systematic, comprehensive way relate almost universally to lack of data availability. To this end, HCSS aims to continue refining the datasets and approaches utilized to monitor global developments in future iterations of geodynamics.[252]

As previously outlined, geodynamics aims to answer the question “what is the state of the world today?” A high-level appraisal of the trends outlined in the preceding chapters (and summarized in Table 15 above) paints a bleak picture at the aggregate level, though some positive developments can also be observed. On the one hand, financial satisfaction has dropped in the past two years and inequality is up by all metrics. Informational connectedness and individual-level trust in peers have both decreased. Trends are almost universally negative across the identitary domain. Democracy is being “hollowed out,” with individuals perceiving it less positively, caring less whether they live beneath it, and voting less in elections. Illiberal states’ share of international influence has increased. Conflict fatalities, negative military rhetoric assertiveness, and global peace, and the number of active conflicts all display negative trends. On the other hand, the world has gotten better in many ways. Human welfare has improved significantly. By most metrics, the world is more interconnected today than at any point in the past. On average, democracy is on the uptick. The international rule of law, though it remains low in absolute terms, has shown encouraging trends. Short-term trends within the security show that the world is becoming more peaceful. Though the aforementioned positive trends do not necessarily serve to nullify the impact of the negative ones, they nonetheless offer some cause for celebration. Even in face of complex global phenomena such as IMC, migration flows, and new technologies, the world has improved by several metrics.

Works cited

Adnan, Isabel Coles and Ghassan. ‘Iraq, Rocked by Protests, Enters New Phase of Uncertainty After Premier’s Resignation’. Wall Street Journal, 1 December 2019, sec. World. link.

Agencies. ‘Spanish Police Clash with Thousands of Catalan Protesters in Barcelona’. The Guardian, 27 October 2019, sec. World news. link.

Al Jazeera. ‘US-Iran Standoff: A Timeline of Key Events’, 25 September 2019. link.

Alvaredo, Facundo, Lucas Chancel, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman. ‘The Elephant Curve of Global Inequality and Growth’. AEA Papers and Proceedings 108 (2018): 103–8. link.

———. World Inequality Report 2018. Harvard University Press, 2018.

Ang, Yuen Yuen. ‘The Real China Model’, 29 June 2018. link.

Associated Press. ‘Ecuador Protests End after Deal Struck with Indigenous Leaders’. The Guardian. 14 October 2019, sec. World news. link.

Bailey, Michael A., Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten. ‘Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data’. Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, no. 2 (2017): 430–56. link.

Bailey, Michael A., and Erik Voeten. ‘A Two-Dimensional Analysis of Seventy Years of United Nations Voting’. Public Choice 176 (2018): 3355. link.

Bel, Oliver-Remy, and Jörn Fleck. ‘A Geopolitical European Commission: Can the Incoming President Make It Work? - Atlantic Council’. Atlantic Council, 2019. link.

Benner, Thorsten. ‘An Era of Authoritarian Influence?’, 4 October 2017. link.

Biscop, Sven. ‘A Geopolitical European Commission: A Powerful Strategy?’ Clingendael spectator, September 2019. link.

Boy, John D., and Justus Uitermark. ‘Reassembling the City through Instagram’. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 42, no. 4 (2017): 612–624. link.

IE University: Shaping The Future. ‘Bubble Trouble: How Internet Echo Chambers Disrupt Society’, 8 February 2017. link.

Campos, Rodrigo. ‘Human Rights Chief Slams Security Council for Inaction on Syria’. Reuters, 20 March 2018. link.

Carpenter, Michael. ‘The Oligarchs Who Lost Ukraine and Won Washington’. Foreign Affairs, 29 November 2019. link.

Center for Systemic Peace. ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018’. Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR), 27 July 2019. link.

‘China’s National Defense in the New Era’. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2019.

Coats, Daniel R. ‘Statement for the Record’. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community. Washington, D.C.: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019. link.

Collier, Paul, V.L. Elliott, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis. ‘Breaking the Conflict Trap’, 2003. link.

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, et al. ‘V-Dem Codebook V9’. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2019. link.

———. ‘V-Dem Country-Year Dataset V9’. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2019. link.

‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2018: Technical Methodology Note’. Transparency International, 2018. link.

Council on Foreign Relations. ‘A Timeline of the U.S. War in Afghanistan’, 2019. link.

De Spiegeleire, Stephan, Kars De Bruijne, Frank Bekkers, Minke Meijnders, and Tim Sweijs. ‘Stilte Voor de Storm?’, 2018. link20Strategische%20Monitor-web.pdf.

De Spiegeleire, Stephan, Khrystyna Holynska, and Yevhen Sapolovych. ‘Things May Not Be as They Seem: Geo-Dynamic Trends in the International System’, 2018. link.

Encyclopedia Britannica. ‘Democracy - The Spread of Democracy in the 20th Century’. Accessed 5 December 2019. link.

Dollar, David. ‘The AIIB and the “One Belt, One Road”’. Brookings (blog), 21 June 2015. link.

NL Times. ‘Dutch Gov’t Pushes More Money into Defense, Climate; U.S. Disappointed’, 29 May 2019. link.

‘Economists Are Rethinking the Numbers on Inequality’. The Economist, 28 November 2019. link.

Einsiedel, Sebastian von. ‘Civil War Trends and the Changing Nature of Armed Conflict’. United Nations University, 2017. link.

Fariss, Christopher. ‘Yes, Human Rights Practices Are Improving Over Time’, 27 May 2019. link.

Foa, Roberto Stefan, and Yascha Mounk. ‘The Signs of Deconsolidation’. Journal of Democracy, 2017. link.

Frantz, Erica, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor. ‘A Dictator’s Toolkit: Understanding How Co-Optation Affects Repression in Autocracies’. Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 3 (1 May 2014): 332–46. link.

Freedom House. ‘Freedom in the World 2019: Democracy in Retreat’. Freedom in the World 2019, 15 January 2019. link.

———. ‘Freedom in the World Data and Resources’, 8 May 2018. link.

Fukuyama, Francis. Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018.

Gallup Inc. ‘World Poll’. Gallup.com, 2019. link.

Gallup Pakistan. ‘WIN/Gallup International’s Global Survey Shows Three in Five Willing to Fight for Their Country’. Press Release, 18 March 2015. link.

Inequality.org. ‘Global Inequality’. Accessed 21 November 2019. link.

Migration Data Portal. ‘Global Migration Data Portal’. Accessed 26 July 2019. link.

Gyes, Guy Van, and Lise Szekér. ‘Impact of the Crisis on Working Conditions in Europe’, 2013, 70.

Gygli, Savina, Florian Haelg, Niklas Potrafke, and Jan-Egbert Sturm. ‘KOF Globalisation Index - Revisited’. Review of International Organizations 14, no. 3 (2019): 543–74.

Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society. ‘2018 Inclusiveness Index’, December 2018. link.

Hawkins, Kirk A., Rosario Aguilar, Erin Jenne, Bojana Kocijan, Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, and Bruno Castanho Silva. ‘Global Populism Database: Populism Dataset for Leaders 1.0’, 2019. link.

HDRO. ‘Wide Inequalities in People’s Well-Being Cast a Shadow on Sustained Human Development Progress | Human Development Reports’, 2018. link.

Hosli, Madeleine O., Evelyn van Kampen, Frits Meijerink, and Katherine Tennis. ‘Voting Cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly: The Case of the European Union’. Porto, Portugal, 2010.

Høvring, Roald. ‘10 Things to Know about the Crisis in Yemen’. NRC. Accessed 25 November 2019. link.

‘Huawei Launches New Legal Challenge against US Ban - BBC News’, 2019. link.

Human Development Report Office. ‘Human Development Reports: Technical Notes’, 2019. link.

Human Rights Watch. ‘ILO: New Treaty to Protect Workers from Violence, Harassment’. Human Rights Watch, 21 June 2019. link.

———. ‘#MeToo Movement’s Second Anniversary’. Human Rights Watch, 14 October 2019. link.

Lockheed Martin. ‘ICEWS’. Accessed 25 November 2019. link.

Institute for Economics & Peace. ‘Global Peace Index 2019: Measuring Peace in a Complex World’. Sydney: Institute for Economics & Peace, June 2019. link.

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). The Global State of Democracy 2019: Addressing the Ills, Reviving the Promise. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2019. link.

———. ‘Voter Turnout Database’, 2019. link.

Jakobsson, Ulf. ‘An International Actor Under Pressure: The Impace of the War on Terror and the Fifth Enlargement on EU Voting Cohesion at the UN General Assembly 2000-05’. Journal of Common Market Studies 47, no. 3 (2009): 532–54. link.

Jeff Stibel. ‘Fake News and Social Media: Confirmation Bias Puts Us in Echo Chambers’. UsaToday, 15 May 2018. link.

Kaldor, Mary. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.

Kaplan, Muhittin, Abdullah Yuvacı, and Amanov Shatlyk. ‘One Nation, Many Voices? External Cohesion of the Turkic Council States in the United Nations General Assembly, 1993-2011’. Bilig - Turk DunyasI Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 74 (May 2015): 125–49.

Ke, Xu, Priyanka Saksena, and Alberto Holly. ‘The Determinants of Health Expenditure: A Country-Level Panel Data Analysis’. World Health Organisation, 2011, 28.

Knight, Megan. ‘Explainer: How Facebook Has Become the World’s Largest Echo Chamber’. The Conversation. Accessed 29 March 2019. link.

Kurlantzick, Joshua. ‘Southeast Asia’s Populism Is Different but Also Dangerous’. Council on Foreign Relations, 2018. link.

Langman, Jimmy. ‘From Model to Muddle: Chile’s Sad Slide Into Upheaval’. Foreign Policy (blog). Accessed 29 November 2019. link.

Letsch, Constanze. ‘“What about Our Human Rights?”: Kurds Feel Force of Turkey’s Crackdown’. The Guardian, 6 October 2016, sec. World news. link.

Leyen, Ursula von der. ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy/Vice-President- Designate of the European Commission’. European Commission, September 2019, 6.

Maher, Paul J., Eric R. Igou, and Wijnand A. P. van Tilburg. ‘Brexit, Trump, and the Polarizing Effect of Disillusionment’. Social Psychology and Personality Science 9, no. 2 (2018): 205–13. link.

Mair, Peter. Ruling the Void: The Hollowing out of Western Democracy. New York City: Verso, 2013.

Maizland, Lindsay. ‘China’s Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang’. Council on Foreign Relations, 25 November 2019. link.

Manen, Hugo van, and Tim Sweijs. ‘Military Competition in Perspective: Trends in Major Powers’ Postures and Perceptions’. The Hague: The Hague Centre For Strategic Studies, 2019. link.

McGrath, Matt. ‘Putin: Russian President Says Liberalism “Obsolete”’. BBC News, 28 June 2019, sec. Europe. link.

Milanovic, Branko. ‘Description of All the GINIS Dataset’. Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality, 2019. link.

Morris, Chris. ‘Reality Check: The Numbers behind the Crackdown in Turkey’. BBC News, 18 June 2018, sec. Europe. link.

Mounk, Yascha. ‘Bolivia Should Worry Autocrats Everywhere’. The Atlantic, 2019. link.

Moyer, J. D., D. K. Bohl, and S. Turner. ‘Diplometrics: Diplomatic Representation’. Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, 2016. link.

Moyer, Jonathan D., Tim Sweijs, Mathew J. Burrows, and Hugo van Manen. ‘Power and Influence in a Globalized World’. Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures and HCSS, January 2018. link.

NATO. ‘Member Countries’. NATO, 2019. link.

Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. ‘Economic Grievances’. Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism, February 2019. link.

O’Connor, Nat. ‘Three Connections between Rising Economic Inequality and the Rise of Populism’. Irish Studies in International Affairs 28 (2017): 29–43. link.

Pew Research Center. ‘Global Restrictions on Religion 2007-2014’. Religion & Public Life, 2016. link.

———. ‘How Religious Restrictions Have Risen Around the World’. Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project (blog), 15 July 2019. link.

PEWS. ‘How Religious Restrictions Have Risen Around the World’, 15 July 2019. link.

Piketty, Thomas. Capita in the Twenty-First Century. Harvard University Press, 2014.

Pimentel, Diego Alejo Vázquez, Iñigo Macías-Aymar, and Max Lawson. Reward Work, Not Wealth: To End the Inequality Crisis, We Must Build an Economy for Ordinary Working People, Not the Rich and Powerful. Oxfam GB, 2018.

‘Post-War Reconstruction and Development in the Golden Age of Capitalism’. World Economic and Social Survey, 2017. link.

Putnam, Robert. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.

Rahmstorf, and Schellnhuber. Climate Change. 9th Edition., 2018.

Rasmi, Adam. ‘Photos: More than 1 Million Lebanese Have Protested Corruption and Inequality’. Quartz, 22 October 2019. link.

Al Jazeera. ‘Rights Group: Deadly Attacks on Sudan Protesters Were Planned’, 2019. link.

Roache, Madeline. ‘Central And Eastern Europeans Believe Democracy Is Under Threat, Poll Finds’. Time, 11 April 2019. link.

Roser, Max. ‘Democracy’. Our World in Data, 15 March 2013. link.

———. ‘Life Expectancy’. Our World in Data, 2019. link.

Roser, Max, and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina. ‘Literacy’. Our World in Data, 13 August 2016. link.

Roser, Max, Hannah Ritchie, and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina. ‘Internet’. Our World in Data, 2019. link.

Safi, Michael. ‘Frustration and Anger Fuel Wave of Youth Unrest in Arab World’. The Observer, 2 November 2019, sec. World news. link.

Schenkkan, Nate, and Sarah Repucci. ‘The Freedom House Survey for 2018: Democracy in Retreat’. Journal of Democracy, 2019. link.

Schnakenberg, Keith E., and Christopher J. Fariss. ‘Dynamic Patterns of Human Rights Practices’. Political Science Research and Methods 2, no. 1 (April 2014): 1–31. link.

Serrano, Francisco. ‘After 8 Months on the Streets, Protesters in Algeria Aren’t Giving Up’. Foreign Policy (blog), 2019. link.

Sewell, Kareem Chehayeb, Abby. ‘Why Protesters in Lebanon Are Taking to the Streets’. Foreign Policy (blog), 2019. link.

Silver, Laura, and Christine Huang. ‘Appendix A: How Smartphone and Social Media Use Relate to Social Network Diversity’. Pew Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech (blog), 22 August 2019. link.

Smith, Tom W., Michael Davern, Jeremy Freese, and Stephen Morgan. ‘General Social Surveys, 1972-2018 [Machine-Readable Data File]’. National Science Foundation, n.d. link.

Spiegeleire, Stephan de, Yulia Aleshchenkova, Koen van Lieshout, Christopher Frattina, and Tariq Zaidi. ‘Nowcasting Geodynamics, Great Powers and Pivoting’. Den Haag: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2017.

Spiegeleire, Stephan de, Khrystyna Holynska, and Yevhen Sapolovychh. ‘Geo-Dynamic Trends in the International System’. Den Haag: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2018. link.

Standish, Amy Mackinnon, Reid. ‘Russians Begin to Consider Life Without Putin’. Foreign Policy (blog), 2019. link.

Sundberg, Ralph, and Erik Melander. ‘Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset’. Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 4 (2013): 523–32. link.

Team Populism, and The Guardian. ‘Coding Rubric and Anchor Texts for the Global Populism Database’, 5 March 2019.

The GDELT Project. ‘The GDELT Project: Data’, 2019. link.

The New York Times. ‘Explaining Greece’s Debt Crisis’. The New York Times, 17 June 2016, sec. Business. link, link.

The World Bank. ‘GDP per Capita (Current US$) | Data’. Accessed 18 November 2019. link.

The World Bank Group. ‘Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (% of General Government Expenditure)’. The World Bank Data, 2019. link.

———. ‘GDP (Current US$) - Saudi Arabia | Data’. The World Bank Data, 2019. link.

———. ‘GDP per Capita (Current US$)’. The World Bank Data, 2018. link.

———. ‘GINI Index (World Bank Estimate) - South Africa, Namibia | Data’. World Bank Data, 2019. link.

———. ‘Government Expenditure on Education, Total (% of Government Expenditure)’. The World Bank Data, 2019. link.

———. ‘Military Expenditure (% of GDP)’. The World Bank Data, 2019. link.

———. ‘Military Expenditure (Current USD) - China’. The World Bank Data, 2019. link.

———. ‘Total Population’. The World Bank Data, 2019. link.

———. ‘World Bank Country and Lending Groups’. The World Bank Data, 2019. link.

Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index. ‘The Data’. Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index 2019, February 2019. link.

Trading Economics. ‘Crude Oil | Data’, 28 November 2019. link.

Transparency International. ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2018’. www.transparency.org, 2019. link.

‘UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program’. Accessed 25 November 2019. link.

Ulfelder, Jay. ‘Global: More Democracy, Less Freedom’. Koto, 19 January 2018. link.

United Arab Emirates Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Authority. ‘Perception of Working Hard Getting One Ahead’. UAE Numbers, 29 June 2018. link.

United Nations. ‘Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2018: International Trade Rebounds.’, 2019.

United Nations Development Programme. ‘Human Development Data (1990-2017) | Human Development Reports’. Human Development Reports, 2018. link.

———. ‘Human Development Index (HDI)’. Accessed 12 September 2019. link.

Van Beek, Ursula, ed. Democracy Under Threat: A Crisis of Legitimacy? New York City: Springer, 2018.

Vicario, Michela Del, Gianna Vivaldo, Alessandro Bessi, Fabiana Zollo, Antonio Scala, Guido Caldarelli, and Walter Quattrociocchi. ‘Echo Chambers: Emotional Contagion and Group Polarization on Facebook’. Scientific Reports 6, no. 1 (1 December 2016): 1–12. link.

Walker, Christopher, Jessica Ludwig, Juan Pablo Cardenal, Jacek Hucharczyk, Grigorij Meseznikov, and Gabriela Pleschova. ‘Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence’. National Endowment for Democracy and the International Forum for Democratic Studies, 12 May 2017. link.

Welzel, Christian. ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’. Lueneburg, Germany, 2014. link.

Wike, Richard, and Janell Fetterolf. ‘Liberal Democracy’s Crisis of Confidence’. Journal of Democracy, 2018. link.

Wike, Richard, Laura Silver, and Alexandra Castillo. ‘Many People Around the World Are Unhappy With How Democracy Is Working’. Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project (blog), 29 April 2019. link.

Williams, M. a. J., and R. C. Balling. ‘Interactions of Desertification and Climate.’ Interactions of Desertification and Climate., 1996. link.

Wilson, Audrey. ‘China Warns Hong Kong After Weekend of Violence’. Foreign Policy (blog), 2019. link.

World Bank. ‘Military Expenditure (% of GDP) - Israel | Data’. Accessed 25 November 2019. link.

Human Rights Watch. ‘World Report 2019: Rights Trends in Egypt’, 17 January 2018. link.

Xu, Ke, Agnes Soucat, Joseph Kutzin, Callum Brindley, Nathalie Vande Maele, Hapsatou Touré, Maria Aranguren Garcia, Dongxue Li, and Helene Barroy. ‘Public Spending on Health: A Closer Look at Global Trends’. World Health Organisation, 2018. link.

Yerkes, Sarah E. ‘The Tunisia Model’, 23 November 2019. link.

Zavaleta, Diego, Kim Samuel, and China T. Mills. ‘Measures of Social Isolation’. Social Indicators Research 131, no. 1 (1 March 2017): 367–91. link.

Annex

Indicator selection

Notes:
1 Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
2 United Nations Development Programme, ‘Human Development Index (HDI)’, accessed 12 September 2019, link.
3 The World Bank Group, ‘Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (% of General Government Expenditure)’; The World Bank Group, ‘Government Expenditure on Education, Total (% of Government Expenditure)’.
4 Gallup Inc, ‘World Poll’.
5 United Arab Emirates Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Authority, ‘Perception of Working Hard Getting One Ahead’.
6 The World Bank Group, ‘GDP per Capita (Current US$)’, The World Bank Data, 2018, link.
7 Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
8 Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society, ‘2018 Inclusiveness Index’.
9 Pew Research Center, ‘Global Restrictions on Religion 2007-2014’.
10 Pew Research Center.
11 Hawkins et al., ‘Global Populism Database: Populism Dataset for Leaders 1.0’.
12 Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index, ‘The Data’.
13 Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
14 Welzel.
15 Moyer, Bohl, and Turner, ‘Diplometrics: Diplomatic Representation’.
16 Gygli et al., ‘KOF Globalisation Index - Revisited’.
17 The GDELT Project, ‘The GDELT Project: Data’.
18 Moyer et al., ‘Power and Influence in a Globalized World’.
19 Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
20 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), ‘Voter Turnout Database’.
21 Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
22 Center for Systemic Peace, ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018’.
23 Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten, ‘Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data’.
24 Center for Systemic Peace, ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018’.
25 The World Bank Group, ‘Total Population’.
26 Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
27 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2018’.
28 Transparency International.
29 Coppedge et al., ‘V-Dem Country-Year Dataset V9’.
30 Fariss, ‘Yes, Human Rights Practices Are Improving Over Time’.
31 Moyer et al., ‘Power and Influence in a Globalized World’.
32 Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World Data and Resources’.
33  Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
34  ‘UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program’.
35 The GDELT Project, ‘The GDELT Project: Data’.
36 The World Bank Group, ‘Military Expenditure (% of GDP)’.
37 Institute for Economics & Peace, ‘Global Peace Index 2019: Measuring Peace in a Complex World’.
38  ‘UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program’.

Notes

See Daniel R. Coats, ‘Statement for the Record’, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community (Washington, D.C.: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019), link. See also he recently released Chinese White Paper: ‘China’s National Defense in the New Era’ (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2019).
Ursula von der Leyen, ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy/Vice-President- Designate of the European Commission’, European Commission, September 2019, 6.. See also Sven Biscop, ‘A Geopolitical European Commission: A Powerful Strategy?’, Clingendael spectator, September 2019, link.; Oliver-Remy Bel and Jörn Fleck, ‘A Geopolitical European Commission: Can the Incoming President Make It Work? - Atlantic Council’, Atlantic Council, 2019, link.
See ‘Huawei Launches New Legal Challenge against US Ban - BBC News’, 2019, link.
‘Post-War Reconstruction and Development in the Golden Age of Capitalism’ (World Economic and Social Survey, 2017), link.
Max Roser and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, ‘Literacy’, Our World in Data, 13 August 2016, link.
Max Roser, ‘Life Expectancy’, Our World in Data, 2019, link.
‘Democracy - The Spread of Democracy in the 20th Century’, Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed 5 December 2019,link. See also Max Roser, ‘Democracy’, Our World in Data, 15 March 2013, link.
This constitutes a substantial measure that in most of the world, most of the time, is fairly stable. See
Rahmstorf and Schellnhuber, Climate Change, 9th Edition, 2018; M. a. J. Williams and R. C. Balling, ‘Interactions of Desertification and Climate.’, Interactions of Desertification and Climate., 1996, link.
See ‘Global Migration Data Portal’, Migration Data Portal, accessed 26 July 2019, link.
The term geodynamics was first introduced in 2016 in the Report The Wheel of Fortune, pp. 91-110, with assessments in the contributions to the Dutch government’s Strategic Monitor. See Annual Report 2017: Stephan de Spiegeleire et al., ‘Nowcasting Geodynamics, Great Powers and Pivoting’ (Den Haag: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2017); Annual Report 2018: Stephan De Spiegeleire et al., ‘Stilte Voor de Storm?’, 2018, 42–54, link; 2019 Research report: Stephan De Spiegeleire, Khrystyna Holynska, and Yevhen Sapolovych, ‘Things May Not Be as They Seem: Geo-Dynamic Trends in the International System’, 2018, link.
Stephan de Spiegeleire, Khrystyna Holynska, and Yevhen Sapolovychh, ‘Geo-Dynamic Trends in the International System’ (Den Haag: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2018), link.
The state-level inequality measurement is a good example. An Economist article discussing the virtues of new measurements – and challenging the virtues of existing ones – was published during the study’s implementation phase. See ‘Economists Are Rethinking the Numbers on Inequality’, The Economist, 28 November 2019, link.
Best practices do not exist for all indicators. For example, this study’s metric for military threats is derived from a custom ICEWS filter which was developed by HCSS. As a general rule, these custom methods are only applied in instances where best practices and/or “industry standard” datasets could not be identified.
Only countries with a population of over one million in 2010 are considered, unless otherwise indicated.
Using the 2019 classification of income groups, see: The World Bank Group, ‘World Bank Country and Lending Groups’, The World Bank Data, 2019, link.
An additional problem is that this affects countries in a state of war and poorer countries disproportionally. Because of this, these groups of countries are sometimes underrepresented. This is generally a problem in national statistics.
“United Nations Millennium Development Goals,” accessed November 20, 2019, link.
Esteban Ortiz-Ospina and Max Roser, ‘Government Spending’, Our World in Data, 2016, link.
Keeley Brian, OECD Insights Income Inequality The Gap between Rich and Poor: The Gap between Rich and Poor (OECD Publishing, 2015).
Thomas Piketty, Capita in the Twenty-First Century (Harvard University Press, 2014).
HDRO, ‘Wide Inequalities in People’s Well-Being Cast a Shadow on Sustained Human Development Progress | Human Development Reports’, 2018, link.
Human Development Report Office, ‘Human Development Reports: Technical Notes’, 2019, link.
HDRO, ‘Wide Inequalities in People’s Well-Being Cast a Shadow on Sustained Human Development Progress | Human Development Reports’.
United Nations Development Programme, ‘Human Development Data (1990-2017) | Human Development Reports’, Human Development Reports, 2018, link.
United Nations Development Programme, ‘Human Development Data (1990-2017) | Human Development Reports’.
Christian Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’ (Lueneburg, Germany, 2014), link.
Xu Ke, Priyanka Saksena, and Alberto Holly, ‘The Determinants of Health Expenditure: A Country-Level Panel Data Analysis’, World Health Organisation, 2011, 28.
Ke Xu et al., ‘Public Spending on Health: A Closer Look at Global Trends’ (World Health Organisation, 2018), link.
The World Bank Group, ‘Government Expenditure on Education, Total (% of Government Expenditure)’, The World Bank Data, 2019, link; The World Bank Group, ‘Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (% of General Government Expenditure)’, The World Bank Data, 2019, link.
The World Bank Group, ‘Government Expenditure on Education, Total (% of Government Expenditure)’; The World Bank Group, ‘Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (% of General Government Expenditure)’.
Jimmy Langman, ‘From Model to Muddle: Chile’s Sad Slide Into Upheaval’, Foreign Policy (blog), accessed 29 November 2019, link; Adam Rasmi, ‘Photos: More than 1 Million Lebanese Have Protested Corruption and Inequality’, Quartz, 22 October 2019, link; Nat O’Connor, ‘Three Connections between Rising Economic Inequality and the Rise of Populism’, Irish Studies in International Affairs 28 (2017): 29–43, link.
See for example Human Development Report Office, ‘Human Development Reports: Technical Notes’; Facundo Alvaredo et al., World Inequality Report 2018 (Harvard University Press, 2018).
Facundo Alvaredo et al., ‘The Elephant Curve of Global Inequality and Growth’, AEA Papers and Proceedings 108 (2018): 103, link.
Alvaredo et al., World Inequality Report 2018.
Alvaredo et al.
‘Global Inequality’, Inequality.org, accessed 21 November 2019, link.
See Alvaredo et al., World Inequality Report 2018. See also Branko Milanovic, ‘Description of All the GINIS Dataset’ (Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality, 2019), link.
Diego Alejo Vázquez Pimentel, Iñigo Macías-Aymar, and Max Lawson, Reward Work, Not Wealth: To End the Inequality Crisis, We Must Build an Economy for Ordinary Working People, Not the Rich and Powerful (Oxfam GB, 2018).
Guy Van Gyes and Lise Szekér, ‘Impact of the Crisis on Working Conditions in Europe’, 2013, 70.
Gallup Inc, ‘World Poll’, Gallup.com, 2019, link.
United Arab Emirates Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Authority, ‘Perception of Working Hard Getting One Ahead’, UAE Numbers, 29 June 2018, link.
Gallup Inc, ‘World Poll’.
United Arab Emirates Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Authority, ‘Perception of Working Hard Getting One Ahead’.
The World Bank, ‘GDP per Capita (Current US$) | Data’, accessed 18 November 2019, link.
The World Bank Group, ‘GINI Index (World Bank Estimate) - South Africa, Namibia | Data’, World Bank Data, 2019, link.
The World Bank, ‘GDP per Capita (Current US$) | Data’.
United Nations Development Programme, ‘Human Development Data (1990-2017) | Human Development Reports’.
The World Bank Group, ‘Government Expenditure on Education, Total (% of Government Expenditure)’; The World Bank Group, ‘Domestic General Government Health Expenditure (% of General Government Expenditure)’.
Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
Gallup Inc, ‘World Poll’.
Pimentel, Macías-Aymar, and Lawson, Reward Work, Not Wealth.
Alvaredo et al., World Inequality Report 2018.
Max Roser, Hannah Ritchie, and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, ‘Internet’, Our World in Data, 2019, link. Roser, Ritchie, and Ortiz-Ospina.
Roser, Ritchie, and Ortiz-Ospina, ‘Internet’. Roser, Ritchie, and Ortiz-Ospina.
Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
Welzel.
Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).
John D. Boy and Justus Uitermark, ‘Reassembling the City through Instagram’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 42, no. 4 (2017): 612–624, link. Michela Del Vicario et al., ‘Echo Chambers: Emotional Contagion and Group Polarization on Facebook’, Scientific Reports 6, no. 1 (1 December 2016): 1–12, link. See also Jeff Stibel, ‘Fake News and Social Media: Confirmation Bias Puts Us in Echo Chambers’, UsaToday, 15 May 2018, link; Megan Knight, ‘Explainer: How Facebook Has Become the World’s Largest Echo Chamber’, The Conversation, accessed 29 March 2019, link; ‘Bubble Trouble: How Internet Echo Chambers Disrupt Society’, IE University: Shaping The Future (blog), 8 February 2017, link.
Diego Zavaleta, Kim Samuel, and China T. Mills, ‘Measures of Social Isolation’, Social Indicators Research 131, no. 1 (1 March 2017): 367–91, link.
Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
Welzel.
United Nations, ‘Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2018: International Trade Rebounds.’, 2019.
Savina Gygli et al., ‘KOF Globalisation Index - Revisited’, Review of International Organizations 14, no. 3 (2019): 543–74.
J. D. Moyer, D. K. Bohl, and S. Turner, ‘Diplometrics: Diplomatic Representation’, Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, 2016, link.
Moyer, Bohl, and Turner.
Jonathan D. Moyer et al., ‘Power and Influence in a Globalized World’ (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures and HCSS, January 2018), link.
Moyer et al.
The GDELT dataset records prevalence of diplomatic events based on media reports. Therefore, a decreasing trend could also mean that diplomatic events receive (relatively) less attention in the media, while they still occur with the same frequency. The nature of the data makes it impossible to control for this possibility.
The GDELT Project, ‘The GDELT Project: Data’, 2019, link.
CAMEO codes: 015: Acknowledge or claim responsibility; 016: Deny responsibility; 0313: Express intent to cooperate on judicial matter; 0314: Express intent to cooperate on intelligence; 031: Express intent to engage in material cooperation, not specified below; 032: Express intent to engage in diplomatic cooperation (such as policy; support)"; 033: Express intent to provide material aid, not specified below; 0333: Express intent to provide humanitarian aid; 035: Express intent to yield, not specified below; 036: Express intent to meet or negotiate; 037: Express intent to settle dispute; 052: Defend verbally; 054: Grant diplomatic recognition; 1013: Demand judicial cooperation; 1014: Demand intelligence cooperation; 1041: Demand leadership change; 1042: Demand policy change; 1043: Demand rights; 1044: Demand change in institutions, regime; 131: Threaten non-force, not specified below; 101 - Demand material cooperation, not specified below; 104 - Demand political reform, not specified below; 1053: Demand release of persons or property; 103 - Demand material aid, not specified below; 1055: Demand to allow international involvement (non-mediation); 105: Demand that target yield, not specified below ; 106: Demand meeting, negotiation; 107: Demand settling of dispute; 111: Criticize or denounce; 1121: Accuse of crime corruption; 112: Accuse, not specified below; 1122: Accuse of human rights abuses; 1123: Accuse of aggression; 1124: Accuse of war crimes; 1125: Accuse of espionage, treason; 114: Complain officially; 1311: Threaten to reduce or stop aid; 1313: Threaten to reduce or break relations; 134: Threaten to halt negotiations; 135: Threaten to halt mediation; 136: Threaten to halt international involvement (non-mediation); 139: Give ultimatum.
The GDELT Project, ‘The GDELT Project: Data’.
Moyer, Bohl, and Turner, ‘Diplometrics: Diplomatic Representation’.
Moyer et al., ‘Power and Influence in a Globalized World’.
Gygli et al., ‘KOF Globalisation Index - Revisited’.
The GDELT Project, ‘The GDELT Project: Data’.
Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
Francis Fukuyama, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018).
Note: The data indicates a small increase of the trust in outgroups measurement between 2012-2014 (the two most recent years). However, due to the nature of the WVS Data (sampling a different set of countries each year) year-to-year comparisons are not meaningful.
Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society, ‘2018 Inclusiveness Index’, December 2018, link.
Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society.
Laura Silver and Christine Huang, ‘Appendix A: How Smartphone and Social Media Use Relate to Social Network Diversity’, Pew Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech (blog), 22 August 2019, link.
Human Rights Watch, ‘#MeToo Movement’s Second Anniversary’, Human Rights Watch, 14 October 2019, link. Human Rights Watch, ‘ILO: New Treaty to Protect Workers from Violence, Harassment’, Human Rights Watch, 21 June 2019, link.
Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society, ‘2018 Inclusiveness Index’.
Tom W. Smith et al., ‘General Social Surveys, 1972-2018 [Machine-Readable Data File]’ (National Science Foundation, n.d.), link.
Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
Welzel.
Kirk A. Hawkins et al., ‘Global Populism Database: Populism Dataset for Leaders 1.0’, 2019, link.
Team Populism and The Guardian, ‘Coding Rubric and Anchor Texts for the Global Populism Database’, 5 March 2019.
Hawkins et al., ‘Global Populism Database: Populism Dataset for Leaders 1.0’.
Hawkins et al.
Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index, ‘The Data’, Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index 2019, February 2019, link.
The TAPI defines populism not only through its ‘us vs. them’ narrative, but also through its authoritarian tendencies. This logic is explained by populist parties’ focus on “majority rule without speed bumps” and on strong leaders leading strong state institutions. These two characteristics are thought to facilitate a disregard for minorities and democratic checks and balances, therefore weakening democracy in general. See Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index.
Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index.
Along UN voting groups.
Joshua Kurlantzick, ‘Southeast Asia’s Populism Is Different but Also Dangerous’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2018, link.
Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index, ‘The Data’.
Economic grievances have the potential to result in majorities scapegoating specific outgroups such as religious minorities. See Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, ‘Economic Grievances’, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism, February 2019, link.
Pew Research Center, ‘How Religious Restrictions Have Risen Around the World’, Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project (blog), 15 July 2019, link.
Pew Research Center, ‘Global Restrictions on Religion 2007-2014’, Religion & Public Life, 2016, link.
PEWS, ‘How Religious Restrictions Have Risen Around the World’, 15 July 2019, link.
Pew Research Center, ‘Global Restrictions on Religion 2007-2014’.
Constanze Letsch, ‘“What about Our Human Rights?”: Kurds Feel Force of Turkey’s Crackdown’, The Guardian, 6 October 2016, sec. World news, link.
Pew Research Center, ‘Global Restrictions on Religion 2007-2014’.
Pew Research Center.
Pew Research Center, ‘How Religious Restrictions Have Risen Around the World’.
Pew Research Center, ‘Global Restrictions on Religion 2007-2014’.
Pew Research Center.
Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society, ‘2018 Inclusiveness Index’.
Pew Research Center, ‘Global Restrictions on Religion 2007-2014’.
Pew Research Center.
Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index, ‘The Data’.
Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2019: Democracy in Retreat’, Freedom in the World 2019, 15 January 2019, link; International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), The Global State of Democracy 2019: Addressing the Ills, Reviving the Promise (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2019), link.
Center for Systemic Peace, ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018’, Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR), 27 July 2019, link.
Note: we filter out nations with less than one million inhabitants and exclude non-UN nation.
The total number of countries with a Polity IV score amount to 100% in each year. This therefore excludes countries not in the Polity dataset and countries in transition or occupation.
Center for Systemic Peace, ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018’.
A Polity IV score between 6 and 10.
Polity IV score between -5 and 5. Note: We filter out all nations with less than 1 million inhabitants in 2010 and exclude non-UN nations. Source: Center for Systemic Peace, ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018’.
Polity IV score between -10 and -6.
Center for Systemic Peace, ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018’.
The World Bank Group, ‘Total Population’, The World Bank Data, 2019, link.
Note that Polity IV does not assign a democracy score to countries in occupation or transition, meaning that, for example, Yemen, Tunisia and Iraq are all periodically disappear and reappear in the dataset. Tunisia’s revolution causes the rise in 2014, as until then it was coded as in transition.
Center for Systemic Peace, ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018’.
For example Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2019’.
See Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, ‘A Dictator’s Toolkit: Understanding How Co-Optation Affects Repression in Autocracies’, Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 3 (1 May 2014): 332–46, link.
Center for Systemic Peace, ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018’.
Chris Morris, ‘Reality Check: The Numbers behind the Crackdown in Turkey’, BBC News, 18 June 2018, sec. Europe, link.
Michael Carpenter, ‘The Oligarchs Who Lost Ukraine and Won Washington’, Foreign Affairs, 29 November 2019, link.
Paul J. Maher, Eric R. Igou, and Wijnand A. P. van Tilburg, ‘Brexit, Trump, and the Polarizing Effect of Disillusionment’, Social Psychology and Personality Science 9, no. 2 (2018): 205–13, link.
Center for Systemic Peace, ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018’.
Center for Systemic Peace.
Jay Ulfelder, ‘Global: More Democracy, Less Freedom’, Koto, 19 January 2018, link; Nate Schenkkan and Sarah Repucci, ‘The Freedom House Survey for 2018: Democracy in Retreat’, Journal of Democracy, 2019, link.
Richard Wike and Janell Fetterolf, ‘Liberal Democracy’s Crisis of Confidence’, Journal of Democracy, 2018, link.
Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk, ‘The Signs of Deconsolidation’, Journal of Democracy, 2017, link.
Note: As with other WVS data in this report, the group of sample countries differs per year. Individual years’ rises and falls can therefore not confidently be attributed to trends, although the overall trend in this ten-year period is certainly indicative worldwide feelings about democracy.
Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
Richard Wike, Laura Silver, and Alexandra Castillo, ‘Many People Around the World Are Unhappy With How Democracy Is Working’, Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project (blog), 29 April 2019, link.
Peter Mair, Ruling the Void: The Hollowing out of Western Democracy (New York City: Verso, 2013); Ursula Van Beek, ed., Democracy Under Threat: A Crisis of Legitimacy? (New York City: Springer, 2018); Madeline Roache, ‘Central And Eastern Europeans Believe Democracy Is Under Threat, Poll Finds’, Time, 11 April 2019, link.
Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
Center for Systemic Peace, ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018’.
Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
Welzel.
Center for Systemic Peace, ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018’.
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), ‘Voter Turnout Database’, 2019, link.
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).
Francisco Serrano, ‘After 8 Months on the Streets, Protesters in Algeria Aren’t Giving Up’, Foreign Policy (blog), 2019, link.
Yascha Mounk, ‘Bolivia Should Worry Autocrats Everywhere’, The Atlantic, 2019, link.
Kareem Chehayeb Sewell Abby, ‘Why Protesters in Lebanon Are Taking to the Streets’, Foreign Policy (blog), 2019, link.
Langman, ‘From Model to Muddle’.
Associated Press, ‘Ecuador Protests End after Deal Struck with Indigenous Leaders’, The Guardian, 14 October 2019, sec. World news, link.
Audrey Wilson, ‘China Warns Hong Kong After Weekend of Violence’, Foreign Policy (blog), 2019, link.
Isabel Coles and Ghassan Adnan, ‘Iraq, Rocked by Protests, Enters New Phase of Uncertainty After Premier’s Resignation’, Wall Street Journal, 1 December 2019, sec. World, link.
Agencies, ‘Spanish Police Clash with Thousands of Catalan Protesters in Barcelona’, The Guardian, 27 October 2019, sec. World news, link.
‘Rights Group: Deadly Attacks on Sudan Protesters Were Planned’, Al Jazeera, 2019, link.
Amy Mackinnon Standish Reid, ‘Russians Begin to Consider Life Without Putin’, Foreign Policy (blog), 2019, link.
While the UNGA’s resolution rarely produce real policies on important issues, it does function as a key stage where states can express their opinions on global issues. UNGA voting cohesion is frequently used in studies such as: Michael A. Bailey, Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten, ‘Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, no. 2 (2017): 430–56, link; Michael A. Bailey and Erik Voeten, ‘A Two-Dimensional Analysis of Seventy Years of United Nations Voting’, Public Choice 176 (2018): 53, link; Madeleine O. Hosli et al., ‘Voting Cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly: The Case of the European Union’ (ECPR Fifth Pan-European Conference, Porto, Portugal, 2010); Muhittin Kaplan, Abdullah Yuvacı, and Amanov Shatlyk, ‘One Nation, Many Voices? External Cohesion of the Turkic Council States in the United Nations General Assembly, 1993-2011’, Bilig - Turk DunyasI Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 74 (May 2015): 125–49; Ulf Jakobsson, ‘An International Actor Under Pressure: The Impace of the War on Terror and the Fifth Enlargement on EU Voting Cohesion at the UN General Assembly 2000-05’, Journal of Common Market Studies 47, no. 3 (2009): 532–54, link.
The years are UNGA sessions rather than calendar years. It occasionally happens that a vote extends into January or even spring of the next calendar year, although most votes take place in autumn.
Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten, ‘Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data’.
Center for Systemic Peace, ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018’.
Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), ‘Voter Turnout Database’.
Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
Moyer et al., ‘Power and Influence in a Globalized World’.
Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2019’.
Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World Data and Resources’, 8 May 2018, link.
With a civil liberties score between 1 and 2.5.
With a civil liberties score between 3 and 5.
With a civil liberties score between 5.5 and 7.
Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World Data and Resources’, 8 May 2018, link.
Sarah E. Yerkes, ‘The Tunisia Model’, 23 November 2019, linkl.
Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World Data and Resources’, 8 May 2018, link.
Freedom House.
Center for Systemic Peace, ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018’.
p≈0,004 without correcting for interfering variables. The correlation is not significant for rule of law (p≈0,991) or civil liberties (p≈0,147), implying that there is something peculiar about corruption.
Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2018: Technical Methodology Note’ (Transparency International, 2018), link.
Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2018’, www.transparency.org, 2019, link.
Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2018’, www.transparency.org, 2019, link.
The New York Times, ‘Explaining Greece’s Debt Crisis’, The New York Times, 17 June 2016, sec. Business, link, link.
Council on Foreign Relations, ‘A Timeline of the U.S. War in Afghanistan’, 2019, link.
Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2018’.
Transparency International.
The V-DEM Rule of Law Index considers factors such as independence of the judiciary, transparency of laws, predictability of legal enforcement, access to justice, and governmental officials’ compliance with the law. See Michael Coppedge et al., ‘V-Dem Codebook V9’ (Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2019), 269, link.
Michael Coppedge et al., ‘V-Dem Country-Year Dataset V9’ (Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2019), link.
p<0.0001 for both without correcting for interfering variables.
Coppedge et al., ‘V-Dem Country-Year Dataset V9’.
The dataset used here is "Latent Human Rights Protection Scores Version 3" (v3.01, 2019-05-28), first developed by Schnakenberg and Fariss (2014) and subsequently updated by Fariss (2019). The Latent Human Rights Protection Scores—which we simply call Human Rights Scores here—have values from around −3.8 to around 5.4 (the higher the better). Indicators used are binary variables on: torture, government killing, political imprisonment, extrajudicial executions, mass killings and disappearances. To construct the Human Rights Scores, Fariss (2019) uses data from nine sources. For more information see Christopher Fariss, ‘Yes, Human Rights Practices Are Improving Over Time’, 27 May 2019, link.
Fariss.
Fariss.
Rodrigo Campos, ‘Human Rights Chief Slams Security Council for Inaction on Syria’, Reuters, 20 March 2018, link.; Roald Høvring, ‘10 Things to Know about the Crisis in Yemen’, NRC, accessed 25 November 2019, link. Lindsay Maizland, ‘China’s Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang’, Council on Foreign Relations, 25 November 2019, link. ‘World Report 2019: Rights Trends in Egypt’, Human Rights Watch, 17 January 2018, link.
Keith E. Schnakenberg and Christopher J. Fariss, ‘Dynamic Patterns of Human Rights Practices’, Political Science Research and Methods 2, no. 1 (April 2014): 1–31, link; Fariss, ‘Yes, Human Rights Practices Are Improving Over Time’.
Fariss, ‘Yes, Human Rights Practices Are Improving Over Time’.
See Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, ‘A Dictator’s Toolkit’.
Fariss, ‘Yes, Human Rights Practices Are Improving Over Time’.
Center for Systemic Peace, ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018’.
Moyer et al., ‘Power and Influence in a Globalized World’.
Christopher Walker et al., ‘Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence’ (National Endowment for Democracy and the International Forum for Democratic Studies, 12 May 2017), 15, link.
David Dollar, ‘The AIIB and the “One Belt, One Road”’, Brookings (blog), 21 June 2015, link.
Yuen Yuen Ang, ‘The Real China Model’, 29 June 2018, link.
Matt McGrath, ‘Putin: Russian President Says Liberalism “Obsolete”’, BBC News, 28 June 2019, sec. Europe, link.
Thorsten Benner, ‘An Era of Authoritarian Influence?’, 4 October 2017, link.
Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World Data and Resources’.
Moyer et al., ‘Power and Influence in a Globalized World’.
Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World Data and Resources’.
Moyer et al., ‘Power and Influence in a Globalized World’.
Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World Data and Resources’.
Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2018’.
Alvaredo et al., World Inequality Report 2018.
Coppedge et al., ‘V-Dem Country-Year Dataset V9’.
Fariss, ‘Yes, Human Rights Practices Are Improving Over Time’.
Moyer et al., ‘Power and Influence in a Globalized World’.
Ralph Sundberg and Erik Melander, ‘Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 4 (2013): 523–32, link.
‘UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program’, accessed 25 November 2019, link.
‘UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program’.
‘UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program’.
Sundberg and Melander, ‘Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset’.
The World Bank Group, ‘Total Population’.
Michael Safi, ‘Frustration and Anger Fuel Wave of Youth Unrest in Arab World’, The Observer, 2 November 2019, sec. World news, link.
Sebastian von Einsiedel, ‘Civil War Trends and the Changing Nature of Armed Conflict’, United Nations University, 2017, link. Paul Collier et al., ‘Breaking the Conflict Trap’, 2003, link.
Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
Gallup Pakistan, ‘WIN/Gallup International’s Global Survey Shows Three in Five Willing to Fight for Their Country’, Press Release, 18 March 2015, link.
Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
‘ICEWS’, Lockheed Martin, accessed 25 November 2019, link.
See for example Al Jazeera, ‘US-Iran Standoff: A Timeline of Key Events’, 25 September 2019, link.
CAMEO codes: 1012: Demand military cooperation; 1056: Demand de-escalation of military engagement; 1032: Demand military aid; 1034: Demand military protection or peacekeeping; 138: Threaten with military force, not specified below; 1381: Threaten blockade; 1382: Threaten occupation; 1383: Threaten unconventional attack; 1384: Threaten conventional attack; 1385: Threaten unconventional mass violence
The GDELT Project, ‘The GDELT Project: Data’.
The brief spike in 2009 is caused by a decrease in world GDP as a consequence of the Great Recession, rather than a marked increase in world military spending.
World Bank, ‘Military Expenditure (% of GDP) - Israel | Data’, accessed 25 November 2019, link.
The Middle East’s high average is especially remarkable as countries engaged in active conflict (in this case Yemen, Syria and Libya) are generally absent from this dataset. If these were included, the average would be higher still.
The World Bank Group, ‘Military Expenditure (% of GDP)’, The World Bank Data, 2019, link.
The World Bank Group.
The World Bank Group, ‘GDP (Current US$) - Saudi Arabia | Data’, The World Bank Data, 2019, link.
Trading Economics, ‘Crude Oil | Data’, 28 November 2019, link.
The World Bank Group, ‘Military Expenditure (Current USD) - China’, The World Bank Data, 2019, link.
Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012).
Hugo van Manen and Tim Sweijs, ‘Military Competition in Perspective: Trends in Major Powers’ Postures and Perceptions’ (The Hague: The Hague Centre For Strategic Studies, 2019), link.
The World Bank Group, ‘Military Expenditure (% of GDP)’.
‘Dutch Gov’t Pushes More Money into Defense, Climate; U.S. Disappointed’, NL Times, 29 May 2019, link.
World Bank, ‘Military Expenditure (% of GDP) - Israel | Data’.
NATO, ‘Member Countries’, NATO, 2019, link.
Institute for Economics & Peace, ‘Global Peace Index 2019: Measuring Peace in a Complex World’ (Sydney: Institute for Economics & Peace, June 2019), link.
Institute for Economics & Peace.
Institute for Economics & Peace.
Institute for Economics & Peace.
World Bank, ‘Military Expenditure (% of GDP) - Israel | Data’.
van Manen and Sweijs, ‘Military Competition in Perspective: Trends in Major Powers’ Postures and Perceptions’.
Though not for lack of trying. HCSS analysts spent a significant amount of time combing through obscure openly available datasets and – where necessary – constructing their own in order to arrive at the final indicator list, which contains a series of imperfect proxy measurements.
The WVS conducts surveys in different countries every year. Several of the survey questions utilized in this study are operationalized within as many as 30 countries in one year, but in only 3 or 4 the year after, thus severely complicating granular over-time analysis. This is why the WVS-derived indicators presented within this study are typically displayed both as over-time trends and as regional breakdowns. See Welzel, ‘WVS 1 to 6 Key Aggregates, Version 1’.
Some low-hanging fruit – which was partially incorporated in the previous iteration of geodynamics but which was omitted this time around – manifests in the inclusion of measurements relating to an environmental domain.