Borgou Department’s political and sociological structure is characterized by the coexistence of two political authority lines: the (formal) government administration with its many (informal) links to the people; and a customary system of traditional rulers (Kings, Chefs de Terre) with not only an important cultural but also a political role. This two-fold political authority structure is reflected in the management of land in Borgou.

Waxing and waning

Just as throughout West Africa, the coexistence of two systems of authority has resulted in consistent attempts to gain political influence. In Benin under French colonization, the colonial authority sought to replace uncooperative traditional powers with more obedient ones or sometimes even to “invent” traditional chiefs to challenge the authority of existing ones.[8] This resulted in the traditional chiefs’ authority being reduced to a cultural or honorary status.[9] After independence and particularly during the Marxist Revolution era from 1972 to 1989, this situation did not change for the traditional leadership; the then president Mathieu Kerekou’s military regime limited traditional leaders’ authority, thereby demonstrating its hostility towards traditional chiefdoms.[10]

The position of the traditional authorities changed in the 1990s with the increasing authority of traditional rulers. This was the result of two simultaneous driving forces.

On the one hand, the new democratically elected president Nicéphone Soglo – a French-trained intellectual who had previously worked for the World Bank – intentionally reinvested in traditional rulers and other cultural norms of political and social authority. Traditional rulers were invited to participate more openly in the political sphere. Two concrete actions were, for example, the re-establishment of the National Voodoo and Traditional Religions Festival on the 10^th of January 1991 (still celebrated each year), and the rehabilitation of the Abomey Kingdom Palace in the early 1990s.

On the other hand, the electoral dynamics instilled by the Democratic Renewal era[11] compelled political actors to increasingly connect with traditional leaders to secure votes for various elections. Those dynamics increasingly reinforced the return of traditional chiefs as renowned authorities in the political sphere.[12] This trend would then significantly intensify under the regime of Boni Yayi (2006-2016), culminating in the creation of a High Council of Kings and Traditional Rulers in 2012.

To date, government and traditional structures have a predominantly cooperative relationship.[13] Traditional authorities have effective control over power leverages, including resources, political legitimacy, and ethnic or community alliances. Government authorities hold administrative and legal powers and have unchallenged control over country-level assets and resources. Traditional rulers benefit from strong legitimacy within their communities that allows them to conduct the day-to-day management of their communities.

Changing land regimes in the Borgou

The first Land Code in 1965 established the government’s authority over land. However, at that time, communities also applied customary mechanisms of land access, attribution, and tenure.[14] A new Land Code (2013) confirmed the two land management systems by granting legal value to land acquired according to customary rules, but under strict conditions, however.[15]

While these land reforms in Benin have mostly dealt with formal rules, there is a certain value in exploring customary rules. For example, under customary regulations land ownership can be granted to an individual by a traditional ruler after 10 to 20 years of uninterrupted exploitation of the land.[16] Other considerations can also influence that decision (by the traditional ruler), such as the implications of the individual for the host community’s daily life, his ethnic group, or the settlement of existing claims from other community members.

This practice had clear problems, one of them being that it was non-inclusive. For example, the Fulani could lease land for a set period of time but were “not entitled to land ownership” (as most traditional leaders interviewed still attest to this). For the authorities, only the Bariba, Boo, and in some cases the Nago and Dendi ethnicities can be landowners because of their (historical) first occupation. Whereas it was possible for some land to change hands and for ‘secondary occupants’ (ethnicities from other regions) to take over land, this did not include the Fulani people.

Another land reform came in 2017 with the reform of the Land Code. This code did not challenge customary land acquisitions and attribution mechanisms per se but made some important amendments.[17] The most important one was that it introduced stricter administrative and judicial conditions, with the purpose of establishing a land certificate as the sole means to “confirm” the ownership of land acquired through customary rules.[18] As such, the land certificate became the only valid proof of land ownership, which reduced other (previously acceptable) evidence of land ownership, such as the attestation of customary ownership or uninterrupted occupation, to merely presumptions of ownership.[19]

The consequences for customary authorities

This report explores the effects of these various reforms and, in particular, how the 2017 Code has affected the role of traditional Borgou rulers in the management of land. In the past, the traditional authorities played a role in the attribution of land (selling and donating land or negotiating land use) and in the resolution of conflicts. When conflicts arose, the traditional rulers in Borgou were often the first persons to whom the parties would go to. The 2017 Code changed this in two ways.

First and most importantly, even though the state declares ownership, traditional rulers can still confirm the ownership of the lands that they administer. This means that traditional rulers can transfer land even more securely under customary rules. As such, the traditional rulers have continued to play a role in the management of land, such as overseeing the attribution of cultural ownership land certificates.

Secondly, however, their role in managing disputes has changed. Land disputes fall under the administrative (formal) management system. This reduces traditional rulers’ negotiation and mediation capacity. Yet, it does not completely undermine this role.

There are currently two possibilities for dispute resolution under the formal administrative management system. One option is that parties to a land dispute bring the case to the police, who carry out an initial investigation and then refer the case to the justice system. In these cases, traditional rulers might play an informal role in hearing complaints.

A second option is to refer the claimants to the conciliation courts which can attempt to mediate. The conciliation courts are administrative bodies under the Mayor’s office that are dedicated to negotiating land disputes. The conciliation courts are composed of community elders who are appointed by the Mayor. Some of these elders are traditional leaders. However, many appointments are made as a result of political connections (even though there are examples of communities who ‘negotiate’ with the Mayor to select their favourite traditional ruler) and persons in these bodies have been removed when mayoral decisions have been questioned. Hence, the conciliation courts often lack legitimacy because they are perceived as being not impartial.[20]

In short, the role of traditional leaders in settling disputes over land seems to have been limited to a role where they can be consulted for advice by community members but have no formal status. The remainder of this report explores this further: a) how the new Land Law incentivises tensions concerning the management of land; and b) what has been the impact on dispute settlement and the role of the traditional authorities in managing these tensions?