For many years, Borgou has experienced tensions over land and its management. Most of these tensions take place between farmers and herders.
Figure 2 presents data on political disorder from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) on the Borgou. This data distinguishes between conflicts over ‘Land’ (e.g. an escalated land dispute), ‘Farmer-Herder’ conflicts (e.g. a farming community attacks a pastoralist settlement), ‘both’ of these conflicts (e.g. a farmer-herder conflict with explicit land dimensions) and ‘other’ events (e.g. mob violence, election-related incidents, etc.). From this picture two conclusions can be drawn: a) there is a variation over time with many events in early 2020 and a plateauing of events at a lower level since 2021; b) that land and farmer-herder tensions make up about half of all the events in Borgou and prove to be a significant source of friction.
Interviews and FGDs in the various towns and villages in the Borgou for this research strongly confirm what can already be gauged from the data: land is a key driver in many farmer-herder conflicts.[21] In the Borgou, this often takes the form of crossing intra-Benin transhumance corridors’ borders – by farmers who crop their farms into the corridors – or herders who allow unattended cattle to roam out of the transhumance corridors. Detailed assessments of some apparently ‘purely’ farmer-herder incidents often show an underlying contestation of land ownership, lease arrangements and land use.
Such conflicts over land in Borgou have been gaining in complexity in recent years for two main reasons (although also the wider circulation of small arms has resulted in more clashes of a lethal nature).[22] Both of them are partly related to the changes in the law governing land and the changing role of customary authorities therein.
How land reform introduced new actors
First, disputes involve a greater diversity of actors and this stems partly from the new Land Code (2017). In the past, conflicts often involved rural farm operators and nomadic or semi-nomadic herders. However, over the past ten years new actors have emerged. This involves, for example, wealthier owners who increasingly entrust their herds to small groups of herders – the ‘bouviers’.
Moreover, wealthy political and economic elites have acquired land in rural areas for crop farms, as land can be more easily transferred. When the interests of both groups are at stake (often vis-à-vis the population rather than one another), they can use their political relations or economic power to settle farmer-herder clashes for their benefit or the benefit of their operators. As one interviewed traditional leader put it, “if it is all about money, there is no need to negotiate: the one who is the wealthiest takes it all.”
Various respondents argued that land conflicts are increasingly difficult to settle. They point to the judicialization of disputes: cases are systematically referred to the justice sector, which limits or prohibits the possibility of (informal) negotiated settlements.[23] The data show that respondents generally agree that the involvement of the security forces is an aggravating factor as far as conflicts are concerned. In these disputes, the involvement of the security forces is frequently cited as a tipping point for the escalation of disputes. Both farmers and herders point out that the involvement of the security forces is often associated with perceived corruption that casts doubts on their impartiality (e.g. they are paid to ‘intervene’).
In order to compare the data, all qualitative interview responses on perceptions about specific authorities were coded (see Annex 1 for the codebook). This coding shows that both farmers and herders perceive the security forces’ involvement as having a negative impact on dispute settlement, yet that perception is relatively higher for farmer respondents than herders (see Figure 3 above). Farmers often accuse herders of involving their business relations in dispute settlement, particularly by including wealthy cattle owners or leveraging their higher economic capacities to influence the course of the procedure in their favour.[24]
On the herders’ side, the respondents have other concerns. Some herders claim that their access to land is relatively more difficult, due to customary land ownership rules. For the majority of both farmer and traditional leader respondents, land ‘naturally’ belongs to the indigenous communities. This means that under customary land ownership rules, herders – who are mostly from the Fulani community – are not allowed to possess land except when the indigenous community temporarily ‘lends it’ to them.
Interestingly, these were the exact problems that the Land Law sought to address. Yet herders in Borgou point to specific issues where the law works against them. Under the new Land Code (2017) there is a need to present “documentation” to prove or enforce their land ownership.[25] Many herders highlight that they often cannot access such supporting documentation, especially the certificate of customary ownership, as it needs to be issued with the participation of the customary authorities in the administrative process.[26]
How land reform changed incentives for ‘negotiated land usage’
A second reason why land conflicts have intensified are changes to the land renting processes by villages for the benefit of outsiders, so-called ‘negotiated land usage’.
Negotiated land usage was a type of traditional arrangement by which a community agreed on how a particular plot of land would be used. Those land areas were rarely purchased, but were ‘borrowed’ or ‘rented’ for a certain period of time and for a specifically agreed usage. According to the agreement, communities could agree to reserve a particular plot for herding. For example, plots of land in the close vicinity of rivers are protected from both farming and herding in order to allow the community to use suitable drinking water for humans and for their herds.[27]
Where this is more contentious is in the transhumance corridors. Negotiated land use is the system upon which the transhumance corridors are demarcated. These are strips of land where no farming activities are possible. The agreements over these strips were often negotiated between farmers’ and herders’ associations. As one farmer association leader puts it, “even the state had to discuss with us when in the 2000s they decided to institutionalize the transhumance corridors in our area.”[28]
Interviewees highlight that the Land Law has changed this. Communities can now use their economic and political networks to secure exclusive control over these areas with no consideration being given to their previously agreed usage within and between communities. Both the farmers and the herders interviewed stated that this is one area where existing social rules have been eroded; abiding by the negotiated usage and operation of the land in their villages now only depends on the goodwill of each actor. They felt that any individual seeking greater benefits, or pursuing a certain political agenda, can acquire land and impose its usage on the community. Thus, the power of negotiated land usage has been significantly reduced, thereby creating more scarcity and competition. Interviewees on both sides expressed a fear that farmers’ relationships with herders will further change because of these rules.