In Ghana, chieftaincy institutions are a cornerstone of traditional governance, cultural heritage, and identity, particularly in rural communities.[64] Chiefs are formally recognized in the Constitution and perform multiple functions, including settling disputes, codifying customary law and playing specific roles in community celebrations.[65] Perhaps most importantly, chiefs also act as "custodians of customary/stool land," which encompasses around 80% of all land in Ghana. This custodianship provides chiefs with significant economic and political leverage, as they oversee access to land and mediate various forms of disputes within the community.

Chieftaincy institutions are the source of tensions, disputes, and at times, even violence. These frictions tend to be most explosive during competition between elites over a chieftaincy position or when matters of land ownership and natural resource governance are disputed.

A non-exhaustive mapping exercise conducted by Clingendael identified 29 violent chieftaincy conflicts since 2016 until 2024 (see figure 6).[66] When non-violent events were included, the West Africa Centre for Counter-Extremism found a staggering 352 chieftaincy disputes.[67] Prominent examples include the decades-long Dagbon chieftaincy crisis[68] or the ongoing deadly land-chieftaincy conflict between Kusasi and Mamprugu in Bawku, in the Upper East region.[69]

Violent extremism and the links with chieftaincy disputes

Studies on the risks of violent extremism in Ghana frequently point to chieftaincy disputes as a vector for militant expansion, but often do not detail the precise mechanisms.[70] This report identified three specific potential avenues for infiltration related to chieftaincy institutions: competition between elites over chieftaincy titles, disputes over land tenure and resource control, and general communal divisions, social discord and marginalization generated by communal conflict.

Competition for the position of chief mostly takes place between or within elite families (known as “gates” in Ghana). In general, these disputes tend to emerge during periods of succession or when ruling chiefs are ‘petitioned’ for removal by rivals, who sometimes succeed in replacing them through either established or illegitimate procedures.[71] As the dispute drags on and becomes more existential, rival elites mobilize their followers – in the immediate area, in major Ghanaian cities and even in the diaspora – to support their cause rhetorically, with material resources, or even by engaging in violence.[72] But unlike that which is often contended, there is little evidence of JNIM exploiting elite family fault lines. Instead, in the inner-Niger Delta JNIM initially sided with marginalized herders against ruling landlords(Dioros) and in Boni with those formerly enslaved against their ex-masters.[73] Where JNIM has engaged with chieftaincy structures, it has mostly opportunistically aligned with (or targeted) local powerbrokers to navigate relations with specific communities.[74] For example, JNIM later co-opted the Dioros back into the movement.[75] In neighbouring Burkina Faso, JNIM has specifically refrained from kidnapping popular traditional authorities to gain both their support as well as that of their followers.[76]

Disputes related to land ownership and resource control also present an avenue for violent extremists to expand their influence into Ghana. Chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana often revolve around the right to distribute or rule over land. For example, in the Sissala West district in the Upper West region, land distributions have led to court cases.[77] Elsewhere, in 2017, a local chief and at least three others were killed following an intra-ethnic dispute over land distribution around Nakpanduri in the North East region.[78] Meanwhile, in the Sahel region of Burkina Faso, the Segou and Mopti regions of Mali and the Alibori region of Benin, JNIM have exploited disputes over access to land to position themselves as advocating for greater autonomy or self-determination for marginalized communities.[79]

A third avenue for potential violent extremist expansion is through the social mistrust, communal divisions, and marginalization of ethnic groups that are exacerbated by chieftaincy conflicts. These conflicts often manifest themselves at the community level and can reinforce ethnic and social divisions. Respondents overwhelmingly pointed to broken relationships in their community as a result of chieftaincy conflicts.[80] For example, one individual in Chereponi in the North East region described the current atmosphere as “walking on thorns because at any moment anything can happen to you.”[81] These conflicts can also fuel grievances among marginalized or minority groups, some of whom do not feel represented within chieftaincy institutions.[82] In parts of the Sahel, such as Northern Burkina Faso or Central Mali, JNIM has advanced anti-elite agendas blaming traditional chiefs and religious leaders for the unequal system and a lack of social infrastructure to gain their own support among particularly marginalised communities.[83]

The “unseen hand”: politicization of chieftaincy institutions

Ghana’s chieftaincy conflicts are intensely political.[84] This relationship can be traced back to the colonial era when British administrators co-opted chiefs to enforce their system of ‘indirect rule’.[85] The 1992 Constitution sought to depoliticize chieftaincy institutions, in part by denying chiefs the ability to run for office or to be a member of a political party. Nonetheless, fierce electoral competition between the NPP and NDC has led to an intricate web of “underground” relationships between politicians, ruling families, and their rivals.[86]

Politicians’ interest in chieftaincy aspects is clear: chiefs are appointed for life, control sizeable resources and command local legitimacy, all of which translate into their status as electoral assets.[87] At the same time chiefs can use politicians to maintain their status, outflank rivals and deliver state services to their communities. Many respondents described detailed attempts by politicians to influence chieftaincy disputes for political gain.[88] As one respondent from Woniuga noted: “They are always interested in infiltrating, dividing the chief in order to gain votes. They go to any extent to bribe the chiefs to help them succeed in their political bid.”[89]

Field work on the politicization of chieftaincy conflicts for this report was carried out in the Chereponi District of the North East region in April 2024. This district, which abuts the border with Togo, is the site of a number of ongoing chieftaincy conflicts. Across one town and five area councils, the district has a population of around 95,000 people who work mainly in agriculture and are largely Muslim.[90] It is home to two main ethnic groups – the Anufor/Chokosi and the Konkomba – alongside several smaller groups (Bimoba, Mossi, Ewe and Fulani).[91]

Political competition in Chereponi has long been fierce as the district has flipped between the NPP and NDC on multiple occasions. However, this competition entered a new more intense phase in 2019 following the NPP government’s decision to restructure Ghana’s administrative boundaries which led to the creation of the North East region.[92] Five of the six districts in the new region fell under the traditional authority of the Mamprugu. Chereponi is the exception and instead falls under the Dagbon traditional authority, the leader of which is a known NDC supporter.[93] While the people of Chereponi maintained their loyalty to their Dagbon traditional kingdom, they also appreciated the greater political representation that they had gained through the creation of the new North East region. In 2020, communities in Chereponi, believing that supporting those who created the new region could provide even more government attention, voted for the NPP candidate Razak Tahudi as their MP, marking a political shift.[94]

The election had major effects. At the political level, the NDC sought to protect its (former) base and stem the expansion of the NPP. Meanwhile, chiefs in the district with connections to the NDC suddenly had to navigate a new relationship with the NPP. This was made even more complicated by the fact that the overlord of the Mamprugu allegedly supports the NPP while the overlord of the Dagbon allegedly supports the NDC. At various levels, therefore, chiefs had different loyalties and affiliations to consider. The result was that chieftaincy-related problems were accelerated.

In the small town of Wenchiki the new political landscape ignited a frozen chieftaincy conflict. For several decades, Wenchiki was without a chief following a simmering succession dispute between the influential Fomboro and Jaabu families. In 2021, local NDC leaders allegedly encouraged the overlord of the Dagbon to enskin Feme Abubakari Awuffor (known as Buba), a former NDC chairman and a member of the Fomboro family, as the chief of Wenchiki – likely as a bid to maintain NDC influence and weaken the NPP support base. The enskinment was vehemently contested by the Jaabu family and took place amidst acts of violence.

Since then the conflict between the two families over the chieftaincy has led to fatal clashes between communities, property destruction and major disruptions to businesses and public service provision. With no clear resolution in sight, many civil servants have fled the area.[95] In public discourse, the violence is isolated from its root causes and is being used for political leverage. In the face of school closures and dwindling healthcare services, NDC politicians criticize the ruling party, pointing to their failure to ensure that people’s basic needs are met.

The Wenchiki chieftaincy dispute has since spread to other royal families across Chereponi District. The contested Wenchiki chief, Buba, heads a group of three families who are loyal to him (known as the G3).[96] The Jaabu family leader, Abdulai Jamimja, heads a group of seven families (known as the G7), who oppose Buba and are aligned with the NPP parliamentarian and the District Chief Executive. An individual who was present at the Chereponi district chieftaincy meetings pointed to the public partisan affiliation of these two factions: “their sitting arrangement is according to party lines”.[97] A trader from Chereponi noted: “if you are NDC you only stick to Fomboro and if you are NPP you stick to Jaabu”.[98]

Tensions between these two proxies of the NPP and NDC have led to deep polarization and violence. Respondents indicated that family relationships have been ruined and inter-marriage between rival families are no longer possible.[99] Clashes erupted in early 2023 when Buba attempted to enskin a sub-chief in the Nyangbani community.[100] Shots were fired, several people were killed and property was destroyed.[101] Flare-ups in violence continue to be seen, including in November 2023 when a woman was killed and several others sustained gunshot wounds when the Jaabu and Fomboro again clashed.[102] This led to local government elections not being held due to safety concerns amid heightened communal divisions. In the same year Buba was attacked by Jaabu gunmen while passing through an area dominated by the Jaabu and normally off-limits for members of the Fomboro clan. In retaliation, Fomboro communities launched attacks against the Jaabu in Wenchiki, leading to 10 Fomboro casuaties.[103] Respondents from Wenchiki and surrounding areas were clear: Jaabu and Fomboro no longer feel safe being in the adversary’s area.[104]

The political shake-up following the creation of the North East region has also had repercussions in the small town of Naduni, which sits on the edge of the Chereponi and Saboba districts of the Northern region. In 2018, a dispute over land ownership – access to fertile land in this area is contentious – between the Anufor/Chokosi and Konkomba communities escalated into violence which displaced 50,000 people. There are numerous indications that the continued entrenchment of both sides and the ongoing violence are products of the polarized and hyper-competitive political environment.

The former MP for Chereponi, a Konkomba and a member of the NDC, is alleged to have encouraged Konkomba leaders to mobilize protests during his tenure as an MP.[105] At the same time, the then District Chief Officer, Razak Tahudi, was accused of siding with Anufor/Chokosi while establishing land demarcations between the two groups in 2019.[106] In 2020 Tahudi was elected as an NPP parliamentarian for the region.

Since Tahudi took office, Konkomba have complained of a growing sense of neglect and increasingly invoke older grievances of marginalization.[107] Many fear that state responses to their protests could be brutal and blame the security forces for being slow to mobilize during violent flare-ups.[108] However, while Konkomba are no longer represented at the Chereponi MP level, members of the community continue to occupy key government positions, such as the Minister of Defence. Rumours that the Konkomba were being favoured by the government spread when the bodies of Konkomba militants were found carrying Ghanaian Army weapons.[109]

Meanwhile, in order to respond to increasing communal violence, District Assembly funding has been directed towards security personnel rather than other pressing socio-economic concerns.[110] In such circumstances, political and elite competition plays out, leveraging people’s sense of marginalization to garner support.

A detailed investigation of the dynamics in the Chereponi district reveals a clear example of the politicization of chieftaincy conflicts. As one respondent described, there are “unseen hands” working in tandem with rival families to compete for power. One well-informed respondent even suggested that politicians in both Wenchiki and Naduni directly mobilize the youth and in some cases discreetly provide weapons to chieftaincy factions.[111] At the same time, chiefs also pursue alignments with politicians, often in a bid to avoid compromises with their rivals and instead to pursue total victory. The losers in this situation are the citizens of Chereponi, whose relationships with their neighbours have become politicized and who no longer dare to venture outside their own communities.