Fulbe and the risk of violent extremism
Fulbe in Ghana face periodic mob violence triggered by crop damage or alleged Fulbe involvement in banditry. The expansion of agriculture, the southward drift of herders, and increased competition for land have all led to a perceived rise in the trampling of agricultural fields by livestock.[118] At the same time, criminal gangs, aided by the availability of small arms and a scarce state presence, stage armed robberies and commit mysterious murders. As Kaderi Burkari and others have shown, Fulbe are often blamed for these crimes, in many cases without any direct evidence.[119] Following crop damage or bandit attacks, victimized communities, fuelled by frustrations over perceived injustice and local corruption, sometimes attack Fulbe settlements, torching huts, stealing or slaughtering livestock, and, in a small number of cases, killing people.
Contributing to this violence is the deep-seated stigmatization and discrimination that Fulbe experience in Ghana. The Fulbe, even those born and raised in Ghana, are often considered as foreigners in Ghanaian society. A series of Ghanaian governments have responded to the crisis involving the Fulbe by deploying military and immigration officers to force them out of the country. For example, in 2012 local courts in Agogo responded to crop damage by ordering the security forces to expel the Fulbe from the country.[120] More recently the Ghanaian government has responded to an influx of Burkinabe asylum seekers by expelling only the Fulbe (including some Ghanaian citizens).[121] Beyond these dramatic militarized expulsion attempts, community members face difficulties in securing citizenship and national ID cards.[122] Without these documents, Fulbe cannot go to school, buy a SIM card, or even register a birth. This effective statelessness is a source of considerable frustration for many Fulbe in Ghana, who complain that among coastal countries Ghana is the most hostile to their existence.
The third vulnerability listed by Ghanaian Fulbe leaders that militants could exploit is internal divisions and a lack of leadership. Fulbe in Ghana identify one another by where their ancestors have originated.[123] While there is some internal discrimination against Fulbe from Nigeria (related to their alleged involvement in criminality), there are no explicit rivalries between different Fulbe communities. In the same vein, while Fulbe in Ghana are aware of one another’s caste status, discrimination against members of formerly-enslaved groups does not occur on a communal level.
In addition to these communal divisions, the Fulbe, unlike most communities in Ghana, do not have longstanding national institutions – chieftaincy or civil society – that unite or represent the entire community. Only in the last decade have civil society organizations (Tabital Pulaaku and the National Council of Fulani Chiefs) been established to advocate for Fulbe causes and, at times, serve as an intermediary with the authorities. These groups are led by elite well-educated Fulbe from southern Ghana who lack legitimacy among some rural and semi-nomadic communities.[124] On a local level, Fulbe settlements are led by chiefs who are enskinned by the chief of that town (who is non-Fulbe). While some Fulbe chiefs are at least first nominated by the community, others are appointed based on alliances with local non-Fulbe leaders. Considering that chieftaincy is externally conferred, the relative lack of accountability mechanisms, and the power that can come with this position, all point to the fact that disputes over chieftaincy issues within Fulbe communities are increasingly common.
As JNIM has expanded towards coastal states, there are indications that the militants have attempted, in a very small number of cases and with minimal success, to recruit or incite Ghanaian Fulbe by exploiting these vulnerabilities. Fulbe leaders claim that during discussions on WhatsApp groups following anti-Fulbe mob violence, some young men advocate training with militant groups and arming themselves.[125] After the forced repatriation of Fulbe Burkinabe asylum seekers in July 2023, a JNIM spokesperson released an audio message reminding Ghanaian Fulbe of the discrimination that they face and calling on them to engage in attacks against the Ghanaian state.[126] When a Ghanaian man known by the nom de guerre of Abu Jana released a video before a suicide attack in Mali in 2021 he referenced the discrimination that the Fulbe face as well as skirmishes between farmers and herders in his native community of Karaga.[127]
The overwhelming majority of Ghanaian Fulbe vehemently reject these appeals. Indeed, compared to other Ghanaian communities, the Fulbe tend to be more aware of the chaos that has enveloped the Sahel due to familial networks, and recruitment efforts have largely fallen flat. Nonetheless, many community leaders are concerned that further violence against, or division within, Fulbe communities will only aid extremists if they are trying to expand their presence in Ghana.
Is partisan political competition increasing vulnerabilities among Fulbe?
Since gaining independence in 1957 Fulbe have largely eschewed participating in Ghanaian politics. Beyond voting for the NDC during elections following the onset of multi-party democracy in the early 1990s, Fulbe neither joined the ranks of the political parties nor were they approached as a voting bloc during campaigning.
This changed during the 2016 election cycle when Samira Bawumia – the current second lady and the daughter of a rare Fulbe politician[128] – campaigned in Fulbe communities. By including Fulbe in the distribution of campaign largesse and promising to represent the communities’ interests at a high level, Samira Bawumia split the Fulbe vote between the NDC and her party, the NPP. While no one believed that the small Fulbe vote would decide the Presidential election, in constituencies in northern Ghana the addition of hundreds of relatively new voters in hyper-competitive polarized contexts can sway parliamentary and local elections. Since then, the Fulbe have been appointed to low-level positions and have even been elected into the “minority caucus” of both parties.[129] During campaigning in 2020 Fulbe established campaign organizations (Better Agenda for John Mahama and Pulaku for NPP) to solicit financial support and organize rallies in Fulbe communities.[130] The Fulbe, in short, are now entering into Ghanaian politics.
For the moment, many Fulbe are optimistic about their engagement in partisan politics. Their participation in politics has not (yet) provoked the violence that they sometimes face, nor has it exacerbated their statelessness.
However, there is evidence that political participation is intensifying hyper-local disputes within Fulbe communities. This evidence comes from two chieftaincy disputes among Fulbe in the small towns of Gushegu and Karaga in the northern region, as well as from party leadership quarrels in Tamale and the satellite community of Kumbungu. The dispute in Karaga is particularly notable as Karaga is the site of one of the few examples of the successful JNIM recruitment of Ghanaian Fulbe in 2017. While these disputes have not resulted in the level of violence observed in the examples from Chereponi in the previous section, Fulbe residents of the aforementioned communities explained how party politics is prolonging local conflicts, undermining local sources of authority, and ultimately dividing the Fulbe.
Conversations with people in Karaga and Gushegu revealed that pre-existing chieftaincy disputes among Fulbe have recently become politicized. In Karaga, a group of Fulbe petitioned the local Dagomba chief to replace their chief in 2021, complaining that he no longer lived in Karaga or fulfilled his responsibilities. Following meetings between Fulbe factions, Dagomba chiefs, religious leaders, the security services, local politicians, and the National Council of Fulani Chiefs it was decided to retain the existing chief. Nonetheless, the Dagomba chief of Karaga announced that he would enskin the new chief (likely related to disputes within the hotly contested Dagomba chieftaincy). However, before the ceremony could take place, the prospective Fulbe chief was arrested and detained for two weeks. Since his release the aggrieved chief still resides in Karaga, and the recognized chief travels between Karaga and Tamale.[131]
In Gushegu, the dispute began when the long-term Fulbe chief saw a community member sneaking around his house and assumed that he wanted to harm him (others in Gushegu have pointed out that the man was having a romantic relationship with the chief’s sister). The chief demanded that the man be arrested, upsetting many Fulbe in the town who felt that he was abusing his power. A group of Fulbe went to the Dagomba chief of Gushegu and successfully convinced him to replace the Fulbe chief. The former chief tried to take his case to court, but it was thrown out and he was destooled. The brother of the man he had feuded with was appointed chief in early 2022. They both still live in Gushegu, albeit on different sides of town.[132]
In both Karaga and Gushegu the aggrieved chiefs and their supporters believe that they lost due to interference by the District Chief Executive (DCE), a position that is akin to a district Mayor and is appointed by the presidency and approved by the legislature. The DCEs in both communities are very open about their affiliation with the ruling NPP. Believing that they had been thwarted for political reasons, the aggrieved chiefs appear to be forming alliances with local opposition politicians in an attempt to relitigate their disputes under a new dispensation. For their part, politicians have welcomed this development as a way to make electoral inroads into Fulbe communities.
An NDC leader in Karaga reported that they tell the Fulbe that they will help solve the chieftaincy matter in the aggrieved chief’s favour in order to attract voters: “We are using the matter to help us win elections.”[133] In Gushegu, associates of the ex-chief’s brother have joined the NDC and local NDC members report that he meets regularly with the MP and has promised to bring people to their rallies and convince his supporters to vote for the party. According to one member of the community, “it didn’t start with politics, but it has become that way.”[134]
Chieftaincy disputes are not the only venues of emerging political contestation among Fulbe. As Fulbe are elected and appointed to the lower ranks of both parties, it has led to competition for these limited but potentially influential positions. The election for the NDC’s minority caucus seat for Tamale south was particularly heated when a younger Pullo challenged the Pullo incumbent. They split the Fulbe vote and a non-Pullo won the seat. After the young Pullo challenger was killed in a mysterious bandit attack, some wondered whether this was in retaliation, but for the moment these rumours have not led to competing factions being formed.[135]
However, competition among Fulbe supporters of the NPP in Tamale has intensified and is being exported to other communities. Under Samira Bawumia, the NPP has funnelled more gifts – cooking oil, rice, sugar (and rumours of motorcycles for prominent people who defect) – towards Fulbe communities than ever before. In Tamale, two factions have emerged, each vying for the responsibility of distributing annual gifts, deciding who is sponsored to go on the Hajj, and coordinating the second lady’s campaign trips. As campaigning has begun, partisans on each side release accusatory audio messages accusing their rivals of theft and disloyalty.[136]
These divisions have been exported to communities outside Tamale where they have generated rising tensions. In the small town of Kumbungu, the NPP’s annual distribution of Eid and Ramadan gifts – oil, rice and sugar – had previously been organized by a community elder named Musa.[137] However, in 2023 the Dagomba chief of Kumbungu forbade Musa from holding meetings at his house following an altercation between the two.[138] When people gathered at Musa’s compound to collect the NPP gifts that year, young men from the Dagomba chief’s family disrupted the distribution.
The following year these NPP gifts were sent to the house of Ahmed,[139] a younger man in Kumbungu who is aligned with one of the two factions in Tamale. However, as the goods were in transit, the leader of the other faction in Tamale contacted Musa and instructed him to intercept the distribution in an attempt to wrest control of the distribution back to their network. When Musa escalated the situation by calling on the NPP minority caucus coordinator to intervene on his side, Ahmed’s supporters threatened to beat anyone who tried to seize the goods. The minority caucus coordinator stood down, and an angry group of Musa’s supporters marched towards Ahmed’s house. They were driven back by a group of Ahmed’s neighbours who threw stones and burnt tires.[140]
In all three cases residents reported that these politically-infused disputes are exacerbating local tensions. In Gushegu and Karaga the politicization has provided new venues for aggrieved parties to plot their revenge instead of seeking a compromise. Meanwhile, in Kumbungu the transfer of a dispute from Tamale has sparked a local feud. People recall not attending each other’s social events, and some former friends now refuse to speak with one another. As these disputes smoulder, community members who want to remain neutral complain that they have no leader to turn to when they have problems that need resolving. “If we’re not careful,” an elder in Karaga cautioned, “politics will divide us like it has the [non-Fulbe].”[141]