Ghana is often viewed as a “a beacon of democracy”. However, political tensions are developing in the country’s highly competitive political system and violence in the Sahel casts its shadow over Ghana. This report has considered the interconnection between Ghana’s political system, on the one hand, and the risks of violent extremism, on the other.

Ghana has problems that cast doubt on its image as Africa’s “beacon of democracy”. Since 1992, elections have seen violence; evidence suggests that money plays a growing role in party politics and key indicators give an indication that the country’s democratic systems are mildly regressing. At the heart of these observations is Ghana’ hyper-partisan politics. Competition between the NDC and NPP and within both parties leads to a quest for votes and support at the national, regional and local levels. One important consequence is occasional policy failure as politics takes priority.

The threat of violent extremism tends to be viewed separately from Ghana’s partisan politics. But this report shows how hyper-competitive politics effects Ghana’s vulnerability to violent extremism. Three key vulnerabilities for violent extremisms – chieftaincy conflicts, the role of the Fulbe and vigilante groups – are fuelled by competitive politics.

A study/chapter on chieftaincy conflicts in the Chereponi district highlights how renewed competition regenerates simmering conflicts in an area that is suspected to be close to violent extremist operations. A study/chapter on the Fulbe finds that Fulbe are increasingly approached by Ghana’s political parties which allows the Fulbe to vocalize their concerns and trepidations but also starts to sow divisions within the community. Finally, a study/chapter on vigilantes finds that, despite a ban, vigilantes are still being instrumentalized by Ghana’s political parties but that simultaneous distance between vigilantes and the state creates clear vulnerabilities for extremists’ expansion.

A particular contribution of the report is that while politicization clearly reinforces existing fault lines and communal vulnerabilities, it is not so clear what the net effect is on the risk to Ghana. The study finds that in the short term Ghana’s political system may actually act as a momentary bulwark against violent extremist infiltration. This is mainly because the depth of politicisation and the reach of political entrepreneurs makes it very difficult for competitors (like extremist organizations) to present viable bids to potential allies.

However, this should not deflect attention from the fact that this is just a temporary stopgap. The politicization of these vulnerabilities (and likely various others) is exacerbating vulnerabilities. And once the election is over and political parties change their relationship with constituents, these vulnerabilities can be used by militants to expand their influence in Ghana. Vulnerabilities around vigilante groups seem to be imminent.

The topics investigated for this report may be the tip of the iceberg connecting politicization and vulnerabilities to violent extremism. Considering the exorbitant cost of election campaigns, rumours are rife concerning connections between politicians and lucrative illicit businesses. A security expert in Accra hinted that the people who import small arms through the port in Tema are suspected of having connections with politically powerful people who help facilitate the trade.[190] Similarly, legal squabbles over access to artisanal gold mining areas suggest that some politicians have a stake in the illicit side of the trade. Detailed research into these sensitive networks is necessary. As with the cases studied in this report, involvement in these illicit spheres may, in the short term, frustrate potential JNIM attempts to advance further into Ghana. However, in the longer term the continued enmeshing of these illicit businesses will only exacerbate the social divisions that they thrive on – namely poverty and communal conflict.

One of the key implications for implementing organizations that are flocking to Ghana on the wave of programming is that Western policy attention will pivot towards the littoral states. The insight that Ghana’s hyper-political system fuels existing vulnerabilities to violent extremism has a direct and indirect implication. The direct implication is that programming interventions and stabilisation activities must not pay lip-service to “thinking and acting politically” in Ghana’s border regions but must rather commit to a real understanding of Ghana’s politics and how it interacts with the problems that implementers seek to tackle.[191] It likely requires forms of adaptive programming based on a solid knowledge base/political economy analysis. The indirect implication is that also the present priorities of donors and the government (e.g. topics, communities and areas) should be considered as potentially serving political interests (particularly in an election season). At best these interests ensure political will but implementers have to realize that policy failure has also been a common outcome. The new wave of programmes to tackle violent extremism have to include politics at their heart.