The third case study investigated by this report is political vigilantism. In the context of this report ‘vigilantes’ refers to groups of civilians – almost always young men – engaged by Ghanaian political parties as security personnel, mostly during political campaigning.
While the presence of vigilante groups in Ghana dates back to before the country’s independence, they gained prominence following the return of multi-party democracy in 1992.[142] Since then, Ghana’s two main political parties have created a broad web of vigilante groups operating across the country. These groups have burgeoned as partisan electoral competition has become fiercer and both parties have adopted a ‘win at all costs’ mentality.[143] The expansion of these groups has been further aggravated as political parties, which have lost confidence in institutions such as the security forces or the electoral commissions (particularly when they are in opposition), seek other ways to ensure security and win the election.[144]
Today’s vigilantes come in different forms. There are “foot soldiers”, who are political activists who take part in regular campaign activities such as organizing rallies and displaying posters. While most “foot soldiers” stick to these lawful activities, some may temporarily engage in violence and other vigilante activities during the election season. Then there are more organized vigilante groups, who more readily use violence to serve political ends.[145] This second category can take the form of larger vigilante groups with a capacity to send members all over the country and who can operate more autonomously from politicians. It also includes smaller groups who are present on a regional or constituency level and are often referred to as “follow-follow” groups. These smaller groups are generally more easily controlled by politicians.
The leaders of these groups often have some education, but most of their followers are young, unemployed and impoverished. They are trained and used by parties to win elections at all costs.[146] These vigilante groups usually have a strong clientelist relationship with specific executives or high-profile members of political parties, but some are simply available to the highest bidder. While there are exceptions, vigilante groups tend to be multi-ethnic. Outside of the election season vigilante groups are known to be involved in other local disputes over land, ethnicity or chieftaincy issues.[147]
Vigilante groups have been responsible for significant violence, particularly during election periods. For example, in 2019 a by-election in Accra saw vigilantes attack a polling station and a candidate’s house.[148] The ensuing national outrage and National Peace Council consultations led to Parliament promulgating a law to ban vigilante groups on August 23, 2019, and National Peace Council developed a Roadmap and Code of Conduct to Disband Vigilante groups. Despite this new law and the Roadmap, the 2020 general election was once again marked by violence from vigilante groups.[149] Multiple respondents have indicated that vigilantes will be mobilized by both parties in the upcoming 2024 general election.[150]
The link between vigilantism and violent extremism
The existence of these vigilante groups is problematic as violent extremists move closer to and in some cases infiltrate into Ghana. Multiple reports, including the government’s own 2019 National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana, have argued that links could emerge between vigilante groups and violent extremist groups.[151] However, little has been written on precisely how the presence of vigilante groups may exacerbate the vulnerabilities that violent extremists are known to exploit.
Vigilantes are only “at work” during the campaign season. During the so-called “off-season” when there are no political campaigns, many vigilantes take part in what is known locally as “macho men” ventures.[152] For instance, some vigilantes work as “land guards” – people hired to seize ownership of contested land. In chieftaincy conflicts competing families are known to have hired vigilante groups.[153] Vigilantes also take part in ad-hoc youth groups, sometimes organized along ethnic lines, who participate in communal violence or take part in artisanal mining (known as Galamsey in Ghana).[154] A politician in the Upper East region warned that some of their activities could turn into banditry.[155] In the same vein, reports indicate that in the Upper-West region some members of a youth camp associated with vigilantism had lost their lives while attempting to steal motorcycles.[156]
This generates a clear risk for Ghana as violent extremists may be able to lure vigilantes into their fold with stipends or the promise of a regular income. Moreover, dense networks between individual vigilantes and other violent groups mean that members can easily ‘cross carpet’ to violent extremism and attract other members of the political vigilante group (as some politicians themselves warned in interviews).[157] Finally, past studies have highlighted that artisanal mining activities and ethnic tensions had already been used by JNIM and Islamic State groups to recruit in both the Upper West and Upper East regions of Ghana.[158]
While a small number of vigilantes are able to secure legal employment – sometimes even a job in the security services, most respondents reported that vigilantes are increasingly dissatisfied with the benefits that they receive, even when the party they are affiliated with wins the election. [159] This is compounded by the fact that once a party comes to power, they tend to rely on formal security forces at the expense of ‘informal’ vigilante groups.[160] This can create tensions between the party and their vigilante groups. There are even cases where disgruntled vigilantes have opposed their own political party.[161]
Lastly, vigilante groups can exacerbate tensions around ethnicity. In the Upper West and Northern regions some vigilante groups have operated on a mono-ethnic basis. Hence, during elections their violence has been misinterpreted as ethnically targeted and leads to calls for retaliation.[162] This can create the kinds of tension between ethnic groups that JNIM has used in other contexts to win sympathizers. Moreover, this research also found that some vigilante groups are involved in supplying state security forces with intelligence. While this is useful for the state, it runs the risk of these groups beginning to resemble some of the communal militias that are seen in the Sahel who have inflamed communal tensions to the benefit of violent extremists.
Politics and vigilantism
Unlike with chieftaincy conflicts or issues involving Fulbe communities, the connection between vigilante groups and the political system is apparent. However, relations between politicians and vigilantes are changing and becoming more strained.
Vigilante groups have always enjoyed some degree of autonomy from their political patrons. However, this autonomy has gradually become a threat to political parties as vigilante groups are increasingly leveraging pressure on the political representatives they are supposed to support and serve.
Smaller vigilante groups have always had limited room for autonomy or contestation and fear losing the advantages they are provided with by their party and are thus more obedient to their “paymasters”, i.e., the politicians.[163] However, larger vigilante groups, due to their size and importance, have more negotiating power in conversations with politicians. In fact, some can vigorously halt development projects (e.g. the instalment of water pumps) if they oppose the project.[164] The leader of a major vigilante group in Tamale explained in an interview: “[the parties] don’t give us instructions, we can’t allow people to sit on our interest too much, we take our own decisions and decide what we want to do by ourselves. […] We make our own decisions and even sometimes the party can even call on us to back down and we will refuse to listen”.[165]
Vigilante groups affiliated with the opposition also enjoy more autonomy than those affiliated with the party in power. The ruling party appoints people from within the security apparatus, and thus can feel confident in calling on state forces to protect their rallies and political events. In turn, ruling parties often rely less on their vigilantes, and only call on them when using the security forces would result in bad press.[166] The opposition, however, have less trust in state security forces and are thus more reliant on vigilante groups to ensure the safety of their political events or on voting day. For example, one opposition politician in the Upper West region acknowledged that vigilante groups will be key to claiming victory in 2024 if the ruling party attempts to manipulate the elections in order to remain in power.[167] Vigilante groups linked to the opposition recognize this power imbalance and use their negotiations with politicians to enhance their autonomy.
Another reason for strained relationships is that vigilante groups can resort to violence and threats against their own party. In some cases, groups have used violence against their own party when political nominations have proved to be unpopular.[168] Some political figures even report being intimidated by vigilante groups linked to their own party.[169] One representative of a civil society group reported that in 2013 vigilantes in Tamale burnt tires and demonstrated on the streets to register their protest against the former president, John Mahama ,for refusing to nominate an MP from the Rawlings faction for a ministerial position.[170] The MP was eventually given a ministerial position.[171]
A final reason for strained relations is that the relevance of vigilante groups and their violent services for politicians is changing.[172] Stealing ballot boxes or causing confusion at polling stations was once critical for winning elections, but today these tactics are more difficult to achieve, which has both necessitated more aggressive strategies an decrease their use. Furthermore, even though rallies are still key to winning elections, politicians are increasingly complementing rallies with other campaign strategies including television programmes as well as social media to reach out to the electorate. As protecting rallies was a key vigilante role, their importance in this domain has slightly waned, even though their activities remain fatal.
The changing character of vigilantism and the outlook
The 2019 ban on vigilante groups was partly motivated by political parties wanting to take a step back and to create a certain distance from their own vigilante groups in light of these strained relationships.[173]
Since the ban, some of the most notorious vigilante groups such as the NDC-linked Hawks in Tamale have lost their political backing and have since disappeared.[174] In other cases vigilantes were told to join the party formally as members and to stop using violence. Vigilantes in Tamale and other centres no longer display their affiliation with distinctive clothing and are far less visible in the community.[175] Many respondents reported that it is no longer possible to openly identify the leaders of vigilante groups.[176]
However, many interviewees highlighted that vigilante groups still exist.[177] In interviews, vigilante members complained that parties publicly voice their opposition to vigilantism but continue to establish and support them clandestinely. A politician interviewed for the report acknowledged that this was indeed true.[178] A political figure stated that the 2019 ban has “rebranded vigilante groups”.[179] The Azorka boys in Tamale have simply renamed their group and continue to operate. The Regional Peace Council in Tamale has concluded that vigilantes “still exist but are not political as they used to be”.[180]
In conclusion, political vigilantes can find themselves with great autonomy but limited support from their patrons. Nonetheless, many of the underlying incentives that drive political vigilantism still exist. Respondents who were interviewed as the 2024 election approaches have indicated that politicians were already reluctantly resorting to mobilizing these groups. A key question – to be answered in the next section – is how this new context interacts with the risk of violent extremism.