On January 26, 2025, Belarusian strongman Aliaksandr Lukashenka once again solidified his authoritarian rule through a carefully orchestrated ritual that was a presidential election in name only. Despite facing mass protests back in 2020, in recent years Lukashenka’s regime has managed to retain a tight grip on power. However, under this repression-induced veneer of stability, Belarus is facing a profound crisis that may well prove to be existential. Years of diplomatic and economic isolation from the West have made Minsk dangerously dependent on Moscow. Meanwhile, Lukashenka’s persistent authoritarian rule and his complicity in Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine are obstructing Minsk’s efforts to re-establish relations with the European Union and thereby weaken the Kremlin’s tightening grip on Belarusian sovereignty. The intersection of this Belarusian sovereignty crisis with Russia’s war against Ukraine and a broader geopolitical standoff between Russia and the West creates profound dilemmas for Western policymakers. With the so-called “elections” in Belarus putting the country in the international spotlight, this is an opportune moment to analyse where the country might be heading and whether European policy towards it needs to be revised.

This report analyses possible scenarios for the future of Belarus within the period 2025-2030, a topic that has acquired a profound geopolitical significance in recent years. The main research question is: What are the main future developments of the political system and the geopolitical orientation of Belarus that could occur during the period 2025-2030? In addition to elaborating scenarios for the future of Belarus, the project is also concerned with the policy implications of these scenarios. The secondary research question is thus: What are the implications of these scenarios for the future of Belarus for policymakers in the Netherlands and the EU at large? Given that Dutch and European policy towards Belarus is primarily enacted through the EU and NATO, the focus will largely be on those institutions.[1]

The policy implications of this scenario study have two aspects. The first concerns the policy options that Dutch, EU, and NATO policymakers will have in response to these scenarios. The second aspect concerns the options that policymakers have to try to steer events towards the preferred scenario outcomes. With regard to both of these questions, this study aims to map the key trade-offs – meaning the (opportunity) costs and benefits – of the different policy options in the various scenarios to provide policymakers with something approaching a policy “menu” that helps them understand the options they have and the choices they have to make. Since policy can never maximally achieve all the goals that policymakers deem important simultaneously, it is important to think in terms of trade-offs in order to highlight not only the opportunities that policymakers have, but also the limitations and costs that they face in their attempts to pursue their objectives.

This study also builds on the 2021 Clingendael Report An Ever Closer Union? Ramifications of further integration between Belarus and Russia.[2] Within the framework of the scenarios then drawn up, we consider that Belarus currently is mostly in the scenario “Reluctant Integration,” which was then defined as: “Lukashenka clings on to power, either as President or behind the scenes, but is forced to make a steady stream of concessions in exchange for continued economic, political and security support from the Kremlin.”[3] The main differences between the current situation and the 2021 scenario are that the scenario presumed that there would be continued protests, which have not occurred; that the integration with Russia was presumed to have occurred mainly within the Union State framework, which has remained relatively obsolete; and that the 2021 scenario did not foresee a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine and the consequences for Belarus in terms of sanctions and diplomatic isolation.

Recent scenario studies on Belarus have had varied time horizons ranging from less than one year to 10 years.[4] Choosing between different time horizons involves certain pros and cons. Having a shorter time horizon enables one to focus on the impact of very specific events (like, for example, upcoming elections), but it also constrains the level of divergence between different scenarios and thereby one’s strategic horizon. Scenario studies with longer time horizons, on the other hand, make it easier to come up with more distinct scenarios and enable one to more substantially broaden one’s strategic horizon. At the same time, the longer a time horizon becomes, the weaker the link with current realities and thereby the more speculative the scenarios become. Taking these trade-offs – as well as Belarus’ relative stability since 2021 – into account, Clingendael has chosen for a medium-length time horizon of 5 years. This will enable a significant broadening of the strategic horizon, while at the same time remaining grounded in current political, economic, and geopolitical realities.

Existing scenario studies on Belarus also differ regarding the key factors that are chosen to build these scenarios. This scenario study employs a commonly used methodology with two key aggregate factors and two axes to create a scenario matrix with four quadrants within which scenarios are built. Many similar scenario studies have opted for one axis with an internal (domestic) factor and another one with an external one.[5] This study identifies the stability of the Belarusian regime and the level of Russian influence in Belarus as the two most important aggregate factors shaping Belarus’ future political system and geopolitical orientation (see Figure 2). Russian influence was chosen as the external axis because it encompasses not just Moscow’s intentions and capabilities to influence Belarus, but also the level of dependence of Belarus on Russia, which, as discussed below, is also impacted by Western policies, primarily sanctions. Russian influence thus seems to be the proper aggregate factor that includes all the key variables of the international dimension. These aggregate factors were determined on the basis of an extensive literature review of the key factors influencing the future of Belarus (see chapter 2), which resulted in the identification of 23 variables clustered into 5 categories (see Figure 3).

To provide further insight into the importance of the various key factors identified in the literature review, the research team also submitted them to a multidisciplinary panel of Dutch and international experts and policymakers working on Belarus, who were given an opportunity to score these factors (the results of the survey are presented in the report) and to critique the selection of key factors during the subsequent scenario workshop in October 2024. During the scenario workshop, the research team together with these policymakers and Belarus experts constructed 2 scenarios for each of the 4 quadrants – one being a low probability/high impact scenario and another one being a more likely scenario – for a total of 8 scenarios. These were subsequently refined and reduced to the 6 distinct scenarios that are presented and analysed in this report.

The report will start by providing some historical and geopolitical context for understanding the current crisis that Belarus is facing. The second chapter will then focus on outlining the key factors influencing the future of Belarus, as identified by the academic and policy literature. Chapter 3 will then discuss the Western policy debate regarding Belarus in the past few years. The fourth chapter will lay out the scenarios for the future of Belarus, as well as their policy implications. And the conclusion will summarise the main findings of this report and highlight the key policy recommendations that follow from them.