As discussed in the previous chapter, EU-sponsored interventions targeting irregular migration in Agadez have been very effective at putting human smugglers out of business. However, these measures have also had significant negative economic consequences for the Agadez region, as migration provided direct jobs for more than 6,565 people[86] and indirect incomes to, reportedly, more than half of all Agadez households.[87] Previous survey research conducted by the Clingendael Conflict Research Unit has shown that nearly two-thirds (65%) of Agadez survey respondents believed that the Agadez community benefitted considerably from the economic dividends of migration, and that a similar proportion (71%) felt that anti-smuggling measures were harmful to the Agadez community.[88] This leads to the question of how current migration governance in the Sahel has been able to address these grievances and how it has affected relationships between local communities and (international) authorities and organisations, as well as those between local, national and international authorities/policy makers?

International development programmes and local expectations

The prevalent political (and public) perception in Agadez is that all funding goes to support for West African migrants and refugees and that no investment has been made into the host community, which has suffered the consequences of EU migration policies.[89] Yet, under the European Union Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), a substantial amount of money has been made available for (economic) development in Niger (see Figure 8). This raises the question of why there is such a large gap between perceptions of EU support for Agadez and EUTF investment in the (economic) development of the Agadez region (at least on paper).

A review of EUTF funding shows that the abovementioned perceptions are not accurate, and not all EUTF funding goes to support for West African migrants and refugees and a lot of development money does go to the Agadez community. As Table 2 shows, out of EUR 214.9 funding, only EUR 29 million is specifically destined for migrants and refugees. The HACP’s PAIERA (EUR 8 million) targets the Agadez community specifically, and other projects, such as GIZ’s ProGEM (EUR 25 million), AFD’s Rural Poles Project (EUR 30 million), LuxDev’s Nig/801 (EUR 6.9 million) and SNV’s job creation programme (EUR 30 million) include at least one Agadez regional sub-divisions among their locations of interventions.

Beyond EUTF funding, IOM has developed community stabilisation programmes in the Agadez region which implement activities related to reintegration, prevention of radicalisation, cash for work and job creation, as well as agricultural training and land restoration activities.[92] GIZ has similarly developed a range of other development programmes targeting the Agadez region.[93] In September 2018, the World Bank approved the USD 80 million ‘Niger Refugees and Host Communities Support Project (PARCA). This project will improve access to basic services and economic opportunities for both refugees and host communities in Diffa, Tahoua, Tillaberi and Agadez.[94] As a final example, AFD and the EU’s Africa Investment Facility are currently funding the construction of a hybrid power plant in Agadez.[95] This suggests that more development aid reaches Agadez than is accounted for in public and political discourse in the region.

A simple explanation for this could be that Agadez authorities seek to maintain the frame that ‘the effects that migration governance have had on the Agadez region have not been alleviated’ in a bid to capture more international development aid. Moreover, the discourse of failed former-smuggler reconversion and reintegration largely resembles the older narrative that rebel reconversion was not completely successful (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of this narrative) and may therefore constitute a repackaging of longstanding and ongoing grievances.[96] Yet there are also reasons to suspect that the effects of the international development projects mentioned above have truly not yet been felt by those who suffered a loss of income due to migration policies.

First, whereas the arrests of migrant smugglers started in mid-2016, it took the EUTF and other development projects another one to two years to become operational in the Agadez region.[97] Second, the Reconversion Plan, the one EUTF-funded project that truly addresses the negative economic consequences that the implementation of Law No. 2015-036 has had for the Agadez community, has remained structurally underfunded (see Box 5).[98] Third, the majority of development projects implemented in the Agadez region focus on the (more Tuareg-controlled) Aïr zone. As a consequence, the communities of the (more Tubu-controlled) Kawar zone – the main axis on the Agadez-Libya route – are compensated less for the effects that migration governance has had on their economy.[99] Finally, most of the development projects mentioned above are implemented beyond the Agadez region as well – with Agadez communities often constituting a minority group among the communities where interventions take place.

The politics of migration governance

Suggesting that all international development projects should shift their focus to the Agadez region would be too simplistic a solution, and would ignore the fact that the distribution of development aid is a contentious issue in Niger. Provinces compete over development resources, and other regions in Niger complain that ‘Agadez is the pet region of international organisations to the detriment of the development of other regions.’[106] Implementers need to carefully balance the needs of other provinces, which are generally less wealthy than Agadez, with the needs of the Agadez province, whose population has experienced a sudden and rapid decline in income. The same goes for the distribution of development aid within provinces, as some communities in need of support might be less visible or less represented around the negotiation table.

Migration governance also affects the relationships between national and regional/local authorities in Niger. Discussions on migration take place at national level within the National Dialogue Framework on Migration (Cadre de Concertation) that brings together national government actors, regional representatives, international development partners and other relevant parties. Despite the inclusion of regional representatives on this Committee, regional authorities complain that interventions in the region are mainly developed at national level – despite the fact that regional government has taken important steps to manage migration in the Agadez region (see Box 6). This has created much frustration, with authorities claiming that regional issues and proposals are not being taken into account.[107] More importantly, it raises the question of whether, and to what extent, the current approach to migration governance is compatible with wider international efforts to support the decentralisation of governance in Niger.

Indeed, it should be noted that, in 2011, decentralisation was established in Niger through the organisation of parliamentary, presidential, regional and local elections.[109] The state was also meant to transfer a wide range of functions – such as development, education, transportation, healthcare, management of land and the public domain – to local governments (collectivités territoriales).[110] The international community lauded this development as a step towards promoting good governance and stability and has invested heavily in its implementation.[111] To date, authority and responsibility have been transferred to regions and local authorities in four pilot areas.[112] In addition, the National Agency for the Financing of Local Government (ANFICT) became operational on 21 August 2017.[113] Yet progress is slow and financial resources have not yet been made available to locally elected authorities to meet their constituents’ expectations for service delivery.[114]

Competition over migration management replicates these larger tensions between a state that is decentralised on paper but which continues to function as a centralised state. Regional authorities lament the fact that migration projects are designed in collaboration with national ministries rather than by strengthening their own migration initiatives.[115] Indeed, it should be recognised that municipalities and regions are probably the public entities most directly affected by migration and by the need to manage its (short- and long-term) consequences for development and the population’s well-being (basic service delivery, social and economic integration, housing, social cohesion, etc). It is mainly at the implementation stage that more direct partnerships are formed between the international community and partner municipalities.[116] As one staff member from a humanitarian organisation active in Agadez describes rather pointedly:

‘The regional authorities want international organisations to connect their intervention to the [Agadez] Regional Development Plan. They oppose any project that has been drafted in Niamey. It has become like a game for them. If you come with your own project, the regional authorities will criticise it. They will say that “this type of project will not change anything structurally but will just keep people in the same situation”.’

From the above, it follows that migration (development) money only partially reaches Agadez: it has taken large implementers several years to set up their programmes, the pilot Reconversion Plan targeted only a small set of migration actors, and development implementers need to balance the needs of the Agadez population with those of other regions and communities. At the same time, efforts to support the ongoing decentralisation process are largely divorced from strategic discussions on future development interventions, which mainly take place at national level. It is only at the programming and implementing stages that more bottom-up input is taken into account. This may explain the persistent perception that the international community does not deliver on its promises and that the Agadez region has not been compensated for its efforts to stem migration. Addressing this issue will require a careful balancing act, however, of the needs of the Agadez region and city with those of other regions and Agadez communities. The distribution of development aid is a political issue as much as it is a technical intervention.

The management of southbound movement

At the same time, and as partly touched upon in the previous chapter, the Agadez community currently experiences a reversed mixed migration dynamic whereby the majority of people no longer travel northwards, but southwards instead. In the first half of 2018, the expulsion of irregular migrants from Algeria accelerated, while a stream of largely Sudanese asylum seekers simultaneously made its way down from Libya and Chad to Agadez. Indeed, from December 2017 onwards, Agadez experienced a large influx of asylum seekers. Whereas in 2016, Niger received 46 asylum seekers (compared to a total of 47 before 2016), this figure rose to 309 asylum seekers in 2017 and 1,712 between January-August 2018. Of the total of 2,114 people, 1,848 (86%) of these asylum seekers are Darfurians (see Box 7 for an overview of potential push and pull factors).[117]

The sudden arrival of this group of asylum seekers in the city of Agadez created tensions with Agadez residents and the Agadez authorities. Apart from general issues of ‘fear of the other’, fears of labour competition, and communication problems (due to linguistic differences), the population complained about the behaviour of the mainly young male asylum seekers.[128] In light of the absence of proper facilities, asylum seekers slept on the street and urinated and defecated in public. Residents also complained about petty theft, sexual harassment and the risk of asylum seekers bringing contagious and venereal diseases into the community.[129] These fears were compounded by a greater (baseless) suspicion that these young men were part of Sudanese armed groups present in southern Libya and reportedly operating occasionally in north-east Niger.[130]

These tensions had serious consequences for the protection space available to the Darfurian asylum seekers in Agadez. On a structural level, the Niger government decided to exclude Sudan from the list of countries whose residents are eligible to apply for asylum in Niger and to subsequently qualify for resettlement since March 2018.[131] Yet even when UNHCR staff explained to the Darfurian refugees that resettlement was not an option for them, the majority stayed in Agadez.[132] At city level, international refugee law was violated in May 2018 when the authorities arrested a group of around 160 asylum seekers (including women and children) and deported 135 of them to the Madama border crossing with Libya.[133]

In response to these tensions and the shrinking protection space, UNHCR and the regional authorities undertook several activities to deflate potential conflict dynamics. They organised meetings with traditional authorities, civil society actors and religious leaders to raise awareness among the Sudanese about the need to respect Nigerien laws and customs and among Agadez residents about the plight of refugees and the need to show solidarity with asylum seekers. The Sultan of Aïr talked about these issues on the radio as well. UNHCR organised community activities with the Sudanese, such as cleaning up the hospital and sweeping the streets. It also organised soccer matches between residents and asylum seekers to build rapport between the two groups.[134]

But perhaps the most important measure to deflate tensions was taken on 4 July 2018, during a regional forum on the place of asylum seekers within the context of mixed migration. The authorities agreed that UNHCR would build a reception centre for asylum seekers 15 kilometres outside of the city. UNHCR rerouted 250 prefab houses that had been destined for the Diffa province to Agadez, and over the course of August 2018 326 asylum seekers were moved from the city to the new centre.[135] In the short term, these measures helped stabilise the situation in Agadez. The fact that Sudanese arrivals had dropped to 99 in May 2018 and to 13 and 17 in July and August 2018 respectively also contributed to relieving the immediate pressure on Agadez.[136] New arrivals of asylum seekers to Agadez have virtually stopped. Facilities at the centre – although better than those at the old site in the city centre – are very basic and mostly still under construction[137] – leaving the asylum seekers with nothing to do and without any shade in the sweltering heat.[138]

In the longer term, the question remains, what should be done with the Darfurian asylum seekers now hosted in the centre outside the city and in the old site in the city centre. As part of the 4 July deal, Sudanese asylum seekers will be allowed to request asylum in Niger again. Requests will be processed on a case-by-case basis, however, and informal conversations suggest it will take over a year to register the current Darfurian population as asylum seekers.[139] As long as this population is not formally registered as asylum seekers with UNHCR, they cannot be offered anything other than basic humanitarian assistance, nor is there any funding available to ensure that Agadez residents also benefit from the presence of UNHCR and asylum seekers in their community or to ensure that Agadez authorities gain greater capacity to provide basic social services to residents, migrants and asylum seekers.[140]

All of this suggests that more durable solutions are needed – for both asylum seekers and the host community. The influx of southbound migrants in the Agadez region has further aggravated tensions between the Agadez community, Agadez officials and the two UN agencies (IOM and UNHCR) mainly in charge of managing these populations of concern.[141] Leading regional authorities and former smugglers say, with a sigh, that ‘when Agadez residents are paid to facilitate migration, it is seen as a criminal activity, but when UN organisations are paid to facilitate migration in the other direction, it is ok all of a sudden.’[142] Furthermore, there is widespread frustration that international humanitarian aid money is being made available to support the well-being of migrants and refugees, ‘while nothing is done for us, the population that suffers from the effects of these migration policies’.[143] With regard to irregular migrants expelled from Algeria, regional authorities are frustrated that only West African migrants fall under IOM mandate – leaving the Agadez authorities in charge of managing the Nigerien majority of the expelled migrants.[144]