The Sahel region – located at the heart of ancient caravan trails and modern transnational trading routes – forms a central point of transit for mixed migration movements. The term ‘mixed migration’ refers to the complex flow of migrants, that is circular migrants travelling repeatedly or temporarily across a region in search of employment and/or escaping climate shocks, long-term economic and environmental migrants attempting to cross to Europe in search of a better future, victims of human trafficking networks who are transported and sold as commodities along the way, and refugees and asylum seekers who have escaped their homelands in search of international protection.[3] Along the migration routes, transit communities perceive the presence of mixed migration flows in the Sahel region both as a blessing, because of the profits they derive from facilitating migration, but also as a threat to their norms and values, health and security.

In recent years, the Sahel region has attracted the attention of European policy makers aiming to prevent Europe-bound irregular migrants from reaching the ungovernable Libyan coastline.[4] This approach is driven by the European Union (EU)’s May 2015 European Agenda on Migration. EU interactions with African transit countries are guided by the Agenda’s first objective: reducing the incentives for irregular migration.[5] The policies implemented under this objective aim to address the root causes behind irregular migration from non-EU countries, such as through support for socio-economic development of countries of origin, the dismantling of smuggling and trafficking networks, and defining actions for the better application of return policies.[6] The EU Council Conclusions of October 2017 and June 2018 have similarly emphasised the need for investment in the management of external borders and return policies as a way of reducing incentives for illegal migration, together with investment in development-oriented activities in Africa.[7]

One question that can be posed to the design of this approach to migration governance is whether it takes sufficient account of the larger development and stability contexts within which irregular migration and human smuggling takes place. A recent study by Swisspeace has shown that – generally speaking – migration policies and measures ‘tend to focus on short-term results, or “fixing the problem”’, and that this has problematic implications for local, regional and international peace and stability.[8] Migration governance therefore often overlooks the fact that both migratory movements and the policies that address them can have destabilising effects on the wider context.[9] This study investigates the extent to which this premise holds true for the implementation of migration policies in the Sahel.[10] In particular, it asks:

1.
how current migration governance in the Sahel, including hard security interventions, has affected irregular migrants’ journeys across the region and whether it has led to human rights violations
2.
how current migration governance in the Sahel has affected relationships between local communities and (international) authorities and organisations, as well as relationships between local, national and international authorities/policy makers, and grievances that may have arisen in the process
3.
how current migration governance in the Sahel has affected peace and stability in the region.

The study focuses on Niger and Chad. Niger has been at the heart of European efforts to manage migration in the Sahel and is therefore the most useful area in which to study these questions. Chad has not been a major transit country for migrants and has not been engaged as a main partner in migration governance as much as Niger has. Recently, however, there has been a displacement of routes to Chad, which has led Chadian authorities to become more actively involved in migration governance. Looking at Chad therefore provides insights into the ways in which migration governance could have regional effects.

Box 1
Contemporary European migration governance in Niger and Chad

Niger is one of the EU’s five principal African partners under the European Agenda on Migration.[11] Since 2016, in particular, the EU and European states have collaborated closely with Nigerien authorities to counter irregular migration and human smuggling through support for national migration policies, including the implementation of Law No. 2015-036, which targets human smuggling, and support for building the capacity of state security forces.[12] As part of this approach, the EU (and non-EU states such as Switzerland) have allocated EUR 230 million under the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) to fund 11 projects in Niger.[13] A substantial part of this funding is destined for development projects aimed at addressing the root causes of migration, but it also funds more securitised migration management projects such as funding for anti-smuggling efforts and border management.

Next to the support allocated to Niger under the EUTF, the EU also included an additional objective to its civilian European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) to Niger: to improve the capacity of local security forces to control irregular migration movements and to combat irregular migration and associated criminal activity more effectively. EUCAP Niger’s experts have so far trained around 12,000 members of the country's internal security forces, armed forces and judiciary.[14] The coming years will likely see a continuation of this approach. The new EU Multiannual Financial Framework, for example, allocates further development funding to migration governance projects.[15]

Chad has not been included prominently as a partner under the Agenda on Migration, given its marginal role as a transit country for mixed migration movements. As a consequence, the EU has not designed any specific migration governance interventions for Chad.[16] However, Chad is included in two regional EUTF migration-focused programmes. The first one, ‘Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Chad’, mainly focuses on support for return and reintegration of migrants to these countries.[17] The second programme, ‘Support for the most vulnerable migrants in West Africa’, focuses mainly on the protection of migrants.[18]

This report is structured as follows. The first section analyses if and how migration governance in the Sahel has contributed to a rise in human rights abuses and risks for migrants and refugees as well as an increase in human trafficking in Niger and Chad. The second section looks at if and how migration governance has affected relationships between the local community and (international) policy makers, as well as relationships between local, national and international policy makers in the Agadez region – the main Sahel region targeted by EU migration governance. The third section analyses if and how the implementation of migration policies has affected stability in the region. The report ends with recommendations that incorporate human rights and peace-building principles, that is, processes and measures that contribute to a society’s capacity to address conflict in a constructive manner,[19] and which would allow policy makers to add a more holistic and conflict-sensitive dimension to migration governance.

Source: © MAP grafix 2018

Clear distinctions between these various groups are often hard to make in reality. Often lumped together into the category of irregular migrants, these groups tend to use the same routes and itineraries, they rely on the same logistical structures to facilitate their travels, and they are consequently hard to distinguish from one another. Migrants may also shift from one group to another throughout their journeys, such as when they fall in the hands of human traffickers.
Given that it is often difficult to distinguish between the various groups of irregular migrants, an unfortunate consequence of this approach is that it blocks the movement of migrants who do not necessarily intend to go to Europe. Irregular migration is defined here as migration undertaken by persons ‘who, owing to unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of entry, or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country.’ Malakooti, A. 2015. Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean, Paris, Altai Consulting and IOM, 3.
European Commission 2015. A European Agenda on Migration. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Brussels, 13.5.2015, COM (2015) 240 final, link (accessed 24-10-2018).
Its other pillars seek to save lives and secure external borders, strengthen the common asylum policy, and develop a new policy on legal migration.
European Council conclusions, 19 October 2017 (link). European Council conclusions, 28 June 2018 (link).
Hörler Perrinet, T et al. 2018. Desk Study: Peace-Migration Nexus. Geneva, Swisspeace. 3. For similar conclusions, also see International Rescue Committee 2018. Pushing the boundaries: Insights into the EU’s response to mixed migration on the Central Mediterranean Route, July, link.
Hörler Perrinet, T et al. 2018, op. cit., 12.
It builds upon a 2017 Clingendael Conflict Research Unit study, which emphasised that the implementation of these policies could exacerbate local conflict lines and might strengthen armed groups involved in human rights violations. Molenaar, F. et al. 2017. A Line in the Sand. Roadmap for sustainable migration management in Agadez. CRU report, the Hague, Clingendael Institute. link. Also see: Tubiana, J. et al. 2018. Multilateral Damages: Impact of EU migration policies on central Saharan routes. CRU report, the Hague, The Clingendael Institute.
The other partners are Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal.
Examples are the organisation of police training in Agadez and – more recently – Italy’s deployment of a military contingent to Niger to target smuggling networks. See, for example, Ursu, A. 2017. The Italian Military Deployment. Nothing new under the Sahelian sun. CRU Commentary, The Hague, Clingendael Institute. link.
These projects aim to improve migration management, improve governance and conflict prevention, strengthen resilience, and create greater economic and employment opportunities. See : European Commission, EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. Niger. link (accessed October 2018).
European External Action Service 2018. Common Security and Defense Policy. Civilian Mission EUCAP Sahel Niger, link,.
For a comprehensive overview of the funding of EU migration policies, see Rachel Westerby. 2018. The Way Forward. A Comprehensive Study of the new Proposals for EU funds on Asylum, Migration and Integration, ECRE and UNHCR.
Personal interview with EU official. 2018. Location withheld, May. The EU funds a security and border management programme in Chad (SECGEF), but it focuses on the Lake Chad region only. European Commission 2017. Annexe IV à l'Accord Instituant le Fonds Fiduciaire ‘European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa’, et ses règles internes., link (accessed 24 October 2018).
European Commission 2016. Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Chad, link
European Commission (no date). Annexe IV à l'Accord Instituant le Fonds Fiduciaire ‘European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa’, et ses règles internes, link (accessed 24 October 2018).
This definition of peace building is in line with the one used by Swisspeace. Hörler Perrinet, T et al. 2018, op. cit., 8. Peace building may include strategies aimed at peacefully transforming violent conflicts, for example conflict prevention and conflict transformation.