Once disruptions have led to violence and once violence has become protracted due to the inability of the ruling elite and its institutional machinery to contain it, the government loses legitimacy and capability. This creates opportunities for political entrepreneurs and ‘entrepreneurs of violence’, i.e. those who monetise coercive capabilities.[58] In short, coercive organisations as tools of political competition are a feature of political orders that undergo protracted and violent disruption. At this point, we can ask how coercive organisations, especially those of the hybrid variety, develop.

Our basic model, based on a review of existing literature and our own case work, is simple.[59] We posit that the behaviour and development of coercive organisations is simultaneously influenced by three sets of incentives: 1) those arising from the domestic political economy; 2) those created by foreign support; and 3) those arising from social representation and mobilisation (constituency). They are illustrated in Figure 2 and discussed below.

First, incentives arising from the domestic political economy refer to the benefits that accrue to those who are politically or militarily in charge of a coercive organisation under the terms of the elite pact that brings selected elite groups together in a ruling coalition (i.e. that connects the key formal and informal elements of political order).[60] Such incentives are typically political, economic or religious in nature. For instance, during the Syrian civil war, the Syrian Kurds[61] have managed to obtain control over the territory known as Rojava in north and northeast Syria. In part, this was possible due to their discipline and organisational strength, and in part due to the withdrawal of regime forces early in the conflict.[62] Its newfound autonomy gave the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) an unprecedented chance to apply Öcalan’s political philosophy of ‘democratic confederalism’ in practice. This ‘experiment’ has the potential to reframe and strengthen the discourse about Kurdish autonomy/freedom by making it more compatible with existing national boundaries and nation-states.[63] In terms of incentives, it is likely that the ability to continue this governance experiment will be a key driver of PYD/YPG behaviour towards the Syrian regime during negotiations when modalities for the post-civil war governance of Syria will need to be agreed.[64]

Other types of incentives that arise from the domestic political economy include material benefits such as corruption, smuggling, bureaucratic control (enabling e.g. payroll overstaffing and tender fixing), informal taxation, resource control and economic privileges. As coercive organisations often control territory and/or constituencies based on their ability to mobilise violence, they are typically able to either reap such benefits directly or to extract rents – in addition to protecting broader political and elite interests. This makes them both a guarantor and a key operational mechanism that keeps an elite deal functional. Such incentives can be mapped through detailed political economy analysis examining both the role of coercive capabilities in a given political order and the position of particular coercive organisations in its power dynamics.[65]

Incentives arising from foreign support centre on the principal-agent relationship that many coercive organisations maintain with foreign sponsors. In keeping with our reconceptualisation of armed groups as coercive organisations, we argue that this is a phenomenon that benefits governmental and quasi-governmental coercive organisations (e.g. through military-to-military cooperation), as well as hybrid, anti-regime and anti-state coercive organisations (e.g. through proxy support). In the first case, the influence of the principal is channelled via formal mechanisms of state, but it is not necessarily less impactful.

Foreign sponsors can provide many types of support to coercive organisations, including weapons, personnel, training, sanctuary and diplomatic backing.[66] The main challenge for governmental sponsors that provide support to coercive organisations outside their own borders is that the interests of principals and agents are rarely fully aligned. The attractiveness of providing such support thus depends on balancing the loss of foreign policy autonomy (by delegating the achievement of foreign policy objectives to ‘proxies’) against the greater effectiveness by which these foreign policies can be achieved.[67] The reality is that most contemporary conflicts feature significant levels of foreign support.

Concretely, this means that the behaviour and development of coercive organisations is influenced by the interests and objectives that a foreign sponsor seeks to advance. The extent to which foreign support will influence behaviour depends to a large degree on how dependent the coercive organisation is on its foreign patron. Existing literature suggests a rough ‘dependency’ gauge based on four factors: a) the internal cohesion of the principal and its corresponding level of control; b) whether there is a choice of principals, i.e. a measure of substitution; c) the material volume and relevance of foreign support; and d) the domestic power base of the coercive organisation that is being supported (this links back to the domestic political economy).[68] It is these factors that need to be mapped to understand the behavioural influence of foreign support.

Examples of foreign support abound in the Levant. For instance, Turkey sponsors an array of Free Syrian Army related groups in Afrin (Syria); Iran backs a range of groups across Lebanon (Hezbollah), Syria (e.g. Afghan pro-regime militias) and Iraq (e.g. Asaib ahl al-Haq); while the US supports the Kurdish YPG and the SDF (both Syria). An intriguing example of a shift of foreign patron is how Hamas exchanged the Syrian regime and Iran for Egypt and Qatar in 2012 after taking a stance in favour of the revolution against Assad. It was forced to restore ties with Iran after the coup in Egypt and the Egyptian crackdown on Gaza that resulted from the Sinai insurgency.

Finally, incentives arising from social representation, mobilisation and legitimacy relate to the constituency of a coercive organisation.[69] Individuals and societies have multiple identities with different levels of salience at particular points in time. A common characteristic of hybrid political orders is that some segments of a society – defined in class, religious, loyalty, tribal or other terms – are starkly privileged, while others are starkly marginalised. Often, this pattern is replicated within marginalised groups, which will have a privileged subgroup – usually its own elite – that is typically co-opted by elites of more privileged groups to keep its own constituency in check. The role of the Kurdish elites in post-2003 Iraq can in part be understood from this perspective.[70]

Under conditions discussed elsewhere and largely outside the scope in this analysis,[71] social groups or social segments can mobilise and articulate a shared identity, and develop agency.[72] Common mobilisation pathways include elite and mass action.[73] The former sees elites frame, manipulate and highlight identities that mobilise constituencies to advance their own interests; the latter sees the mobilisation of masses that are fed up with relative neglect or repression in a bid to acquire greater status and/or resources.[74] Such mobilisation can tap into different societal grievances, vary in intensity across time and take both peaceful and violent forms. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood pursued a predominantly social countermobilisation strategy in Egypt prior to the Arab uprisings, which focused on service and governance provision at the grassroots level. Only gradually was this approach ‘upgraded’ in some places to include a more forceful discourse (counter-ideology) and political countermobilisation.[75]

Coercive organisations can emerge from social constituencies and/or mobilisation, as well as by tapping into existing mobilisation processes to increase their power and legitimacy. Whichever the case, the perception, expectations and objectives of such constituencies will subsequently influence their behaviour and development, and coercive organisations need to act broadly in line with these to retain popular support. For example, because Hezbollah based its right to arms and claim to legitimacy with its non-Shi’a constituencies in Lebanon on its resistance against Israel, it had to justify its engagement in the Syrian civil war against fellow-Muslims by introducing the notion of fighting radical extremism that would eventually also threaten Lebanon. While the organisation’s core Shi’a constituency has held up well under the ensuing ideological strain, this argument/justification was not cost-free for Hezbollah among its non-Shi’a constituencies. It led to it being perceived as even more partisan, reinforcing a trend that had been evident in domestic Lebanese politics since 2005.[76] Understanding what is often a complex set of interests requires detailed analysis of how a coercive organisation and its constituency(ies) are linked.

In sum, we argue that the behaviour and development of coercive organisations – once they have emerged in the crucible of protracted violence following the political contestation that disrupted a pre-existing political order – can be explained by the balance between the incentives arising from the domestic political economy, foreign support and social constituency demands.

For hybrid coercive organisations, the picture is even more complicated by the fact that they are often part of a broader sociopolitical platform that also features other strategic elements, such as a political party, charitable foundation and/or religious organisation. While this is a topic for another analysis, such organisational sophistication diversifies the range of modalities for competition and cooperation with the state and enables hybrid coercive organisations to engage in political contestation more effectively and at times also more legitimately. For example, Moqtada al-Sadr’s Saraya al-Salam – ‘(re)created’ in response to the 2014 invasion of northern Iraq by IS – is a hybrid coercive organisation that is also the armed wing of the Sadrist Trend (a political party), which supports the broader socio-religious movement around Moqtada al-Sadr and vice versa. This mix ensures that Moqtada al-Sadr has a wide range of possibilities for exercising power and pressure, both with and against the Iraqi state, each of which is enhanced by the other components of his platform.[77]

Interaction strategies between governments and hybrid coercive organisations

The preceding analysis suggests a number of factors that codetermine interaction strategies between hybrid coercive organisations and the government in which, with which and against which they operate. These factors include:

On the basis of these four factors, basic interaction strategies can be identified that are schematically reflected in Figure 3.

Cooptation: This strategy is likely to guide interaction in cases where both the hybrid coercive organisation and the government are strong and they do not see each other as existential threats. It denotes a situation in which the government has the upper hand on one or several dimensions of capability – such as benefiting from greater legitimacy or more resources – so that it is able to co-opt the hybrid coercive organisation into the state on terms acceptable to the former. This is more likely to happen when the hybrid coercive organisation is not predominantly seen as a foreign proxy and can take the form of a mix of incentives for the hybrid coercive organisation’s leadership, or policies that specifically benefit its constituency. It is possible for such cooptation to acquire a formal shape and become institutionalised over time.[79] The development of the Badr corps in Iraq after 2004/05 offers a tentative example.

There are several ways in which government cooptation of a hybrid coercive organisation can affect government performance and state development. Plum jobs in the political, administrative, security or economic spheres may be assigned to the leaders of a hybrid coercive organisation; particular revenue streams, territorial units or administrative institutions fall under its control, (il)licit economic activities tolerated or sponsored; or the constitution and electoral laws revised. There might even be a public pact outlining how particular legal and administrative provisions are interpreted by the parties. In general, the impact on state development will largely depend on how cooptation-facilitating concessions are designed. The more short term and flexible they are, the more likely they are to be net positive as this reduces the risk of violence without blocking possibilities for change in the longer term.

Temporary accommodation: This strategy is likely to guide interaction in cases where both the hybrid coercive organisation and the government are weak. Neither is sufficiently strong to make life really difficult for the other and so a tentative form of coexistence – even some cooperation – can emerge. This is unlikely to be sustainable, however, as both actors will hedge their bets and see what the future brings. Depending on their respective images of the enemy, they may well pursue parallel strategies to increase their relative bargaining power in the meantime. Accommodation is an interim interaction strategy that is likely to lead to one of the others. The relation between Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank between 2006 and 2016 was an example of accommodation of sorts, until President Abbas cut salary payments and reduced electricity provision in 2017.

In terms of impact on state development, one might expect to see an absence of violent incidents and issue-specific, pragmatic cooperation where this suits both parties. Coercive capabilities will be retained, violent confrontation refrained from, and respective areas of territorial control will remain untouched. Occasional efforts at dialogue will be well published to keep up appearances without leading to meaningful change. Outbursts of hostile rhetoric will occur when constituency support needs to be shored up and blaming ‘the other’ does the job. In general, government performance is likely to weaken due to the instability that temporary accommodation brings about, and state development hampered by continued division.

Confrontation: This strategy is likely to guide interaction when the hybrid coercive organisation is weak and the government strong. It occurs when the government considers it possible to subjugate the hybrid coercive organisation with only minimal concessions. Confrontation does not have to be violent and can also happen in the public discourse by focusing on legitimacy. Or it can take on economic overtones or be political in nature, using judicial and legislative routes. Confrontation can also occur when both the hybrid coercive organisation and the government are weak or strong and see each other as existential threats. In such cases, violence is more likely. The clash between the Peace Brigades of Moqtada al-Sadr and the Iraqi government led by Al-Maliki in 2008/09 is an example.

In terms of impact on state development, one might see large-scale campaigns to delegitimise or discredit the other, the use of other government tools like the judiciary and administrative rules to re-establish control, the use of kidnappings, assassinations and personalised threats and occasional/large-scale violence. In general, government performance is likely to suffer in the short term as scarce resources are consumed by confrontation. In the long term, state development may be stabilised or advanced if defeat is brought about within a relatively short time frame and the constituency of the hybrid coercive organisation is re-included in the new political order on adequately generous terms.

Gradual capture:[80] This strategy is likely to guide interaction when a hybrid coercive organisation is strong while the government is weak. It will see a gradual encroachment of one or several such organisations on government prerogatives, together with institutional ‘infiltration’ of key governing institutions that will come under the control of the hybrid coercive organisation, or its associated elements. Two scenarios would seem possible here: either a single hybrid coercive organisation or a strong alliance of such organisations establishes a new and more progressive government that reinvigorates the state; or a more predatory new government is established that cannibalises the state – i.e., it fragments the existing sense of identity and belonging while the state continues to exist as a hollowed-out medium for international relations. The Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan are a possible positive example in relation to their control over the Kurdistan Region of Iraq – if one accepts that they have been a hybrid coercive organisation in relation to the Iraqi state for part of the period 2003–2017.[81]

In terms of impact on state development, the re-establishment of the government can enable major improvements in terms of better representation of the hybrid coercive organisation’s constituency(ies) and policies that are more geared towards its interests. It can, however, also simply bring a new cast of elites to power with bad habits that foster corruption and nepotism, ultimately even cannibalising the state and so reducing its performance in the short term and undermining its legitimacy in the long term.

The value in setting these different interaction strategies apart from one another is that it helps us to understand the interaction dynamics between governmental and hybrid coercive organisations from different angles, assess what support and/or strategic shifts in interaction might be useful, and tailor diplomatic, policy, mission and programmatic interventions accordingly to influence the success or failure of different forms of interaction (see Section 5). The model is more explanatory than predictive, but is nevertheless suitable to inform forward-looking intervention choices.