Beyond the obvious point that interventions for dealing with hybrid coercive organisations – and the states in which they exist – must be based on context-specific analysis, this analysis offers a few more specific points for consideration. First and foremost, it is essential for effective peacebuilding interventions to understand the relative weight of the proxy, domestic political economy and social constituency interests of a particular hybrid coercive organisation, its relations and its growth perspectives. This is a difficult task – as it requires detailed study of local cultural, religious and political histories and dynamics – but it is far from impossible. Long-term research partnerships between local and international think tanks and universities that are guided by clear policy objectives and adequate research-policy-practice dialogue can go a long way.
Once the character of both a particular hybrid coercive organisation and the government of a particular state are understood, peacebuilding interventions that seek to reduce violence should take as a starting point whichever interaction dynamic prevails between a hybrid coercive organisation and the government (see Section 4). Since these interaction strategies are a function of the respective orientations, perceptions and relative strengths of hybrid coercive organisations and the government, they offer entry points for external interventions to make their support count – and can perhaps even tip the balance from one dynamic to another. Table 5 provides practical building blocks for interventions in response to each interaction dynamic.
Interaction dynamic |
Building blocks |
Concrete examples |
---|---|---|
1) Cooptation |
Key peacebuilding aim: Engage in inclusive statebuilding |
|
Promote transparency of the cooptation arrangement / parameters |
Publication and public discussion / outreach |
|
Promote flexibility in arrangements that reduce violence without locking in the future |
Sunset clauses, joint research on effects and joint committees, a national dialogue process |
|
Encourage competitive coordination of hybrid coercive organisations under the shadow of hierarchy |
Grant hybrid coercive organisations state-like responsibilities, formalise this, but supervise performance |
|
Interaction dynamic |
Building blocks |
Concrete examples |
2) Accommodation | Key peacebuilding aim: Prevent conflict |
|
Support confidence-building measures |
Establish de-escalation procedures, joint supervision committees and exchanges |
|
Create common incentives that can generate joint interests in stability |
Initiate joint economic projects through investment, charities or NGOs |
|
Encourage territorial control to shift to sectoral control |
Re-establish unified physical state control in exchange for e.g. control over an economic activity or a state asset |
|
Interaction dynamic |
Building blocks |
Concrete examples |
3) Confrontation | Key peacebuilding aim: Shorten conflict |
|
Decisively support one side if feasible and practical |
Diplomatic advocacy, aid, peacekeeping, arms, direct military intervention |
|
Support effective disarmament and reintegration after the conflict |
DDR-type initiatives, community security and development |
|
Promote generous inclusion of the defeated party once conflict is over |
National dialogue process, targeted reconstruction, development of historical/political narrative, pre-fixed limited political representation and/or other prerogatives |
|
Interaction dynamic |
Building blocks |
Concrete examples |
4) Gradual capture | Key peacebuilding aim: If government is positively re-established, engage in targeted statebuilding |
|
Encourage broad governance inclusion in terms of policy effects and resource allocation |
Promote research and analysis of policy effects, initiate perception surveys and promote gradual inclusion in the governance of the state |
|
Strengthen peaceful counter-voices in civil society and among religious actors |
Create a ‘dialogue and dissent’ trust fund to nurture civic capability for political advocacy and policy input |
|
Key peacebuilding aim: If government is cannibalised, limit aid and increase diplomatic pressure |
||
Instigate sanctions and make financial support conditional on practical governance improvements |
Analyse sources of revenue and target these, symbolically ostracise individual elite members |
|
Promote dialogue and constrain negative spillover in parallel to the above |
Explore track-II conversations, increase domestic intelligence and law enforcement capabilities where these are still functional, enforce due diligence of mineral supply chains, promote the likes of EITI |
While these strategies will need to be tailored to context, they offer basic ideas for how external parties might nudge the interaction between hybrid coercive organisations and the government in a direction that helps to reduce violence based on a more realistic assessment of what is feasible.