Tracing the evolution of the Syrian civil war (2011-2020)

This section traces the broad evolution of the Syrian civil war between 2011 and 2020 by identifying the main conflict periods that together make up its history of violence. These periods are simultaneously connected, overlapping and yet feature a unique mix of dynamics of their own. However, as parsimony does not have the virtue of completeness, the analysis confers only the essence of the conflict. For the purpose of this report, the analysis sketches a benchmark for examining the relevance of the EU’s policies and interventions in relation to the different episodes of the Syrian civil war. These EU policies and interventions are discussed in the next Section.

A national conflict in a sub-, inter- and transnational context

At the core of the Syrian civil war are the multiple transformations of the Syrian people’s initially peaceful uprising in early 2011 against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Competing claims on the legitimacy of an incumbent regime that are viable and violently contested are the essence of civil war, even though the Syrian regime today remains internationally recognised by a far greater number of countries than the opposing Syrian National Coalition (‘Etilaf’).[24] As the country’s powerful and authoritarian ruling incumbent, the actions of the regime and its allies (Iran and Russia) have largely determined the course of the war, which includes having enabled the initial rise of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Islamic State (IS).[25] Substantial but insufficient foreign support for armed groups opposing Assad also played a significant role in prolonging the conflict. It is for these reasons that the rebellion against the Syrian regime represents the central conflict of the country’s internationalised civil war. Having said that, the difficulty in analysing the Syrian civil war lies in the fact that it consist(ed)(s) of a number of nested conflicts that add to the central conflict outlined above. These include:

Internationally – Growing geopolitical rivalry between the US and Russia throughout the 2000s clashed more overtly over the nature of global order after the UN-mandated intervention in Libya in March 2011. Syria subsequently became a key conflict theatre in this broader argument. In addition, there was the longstanding standoff between Iran and the US, which transformed into a more open confrontation between Iran and the US, Saudia Arabia (KSA)and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) between 2017 (Qatar blockade) and 2018 (US withdraws from the nuclear deal), mixing international and regional conflict dimensions.

Regionally – There was the competition between Turkey/Qatar and KSA/UAE/Egypt after 2011 to take account of, based on markedly different perceptions of the Arab Uprisings (opportunity versus risk; Muslim Brotherhood-driven renewal versus maintenance of an authoritarian status quo). This competition escalated after the coup in Egypt in 2013, which ended the presidency of Mohammed Morsi. Qatar and Turkey only fully teamed up after the Saudi-led blockade of 2017, however. Moreover, there is the longstanding rivalry between Iran and Israel, and Iran and KSA/UAE at the regional level, which is nested in the broader Iran versus US confrontation at the international level. With regards to Syria, Israel especially has been strategically silent on the dynamics of conflict. However, at the same time it has intervened substantially in the military sense by seeking to roll Iranian influence back via aerial bombardment, as well as engaging in intensive political lobbying of the US administration.

Transnationally – To begin with, there was the rise of IS spanning both Syria and Iraq, and the International Coalition’s fight against it. In Iraq, it was conducted with the Iraqi Security Forces and the Hashd al-Sha’abi (PMF); in Syria with the YPG/Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which also maintain(ed)(s) pragmatic relations with Damascus. At the transnational level, there was also the revival and regionalisation of Turkey’s conflict with the PKK and the YPG/Democratic Union Party (PYD) since 2015, which is fought out in both Syria and Iraq, as well as in Turkey itself. In Syria, this has led to three Turkish interventions in the north (excluding Idlib, which is not related to the YPG/PYD). In Iraq, it has recently led to greater tensions in the Sinjar area where Turkey and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) are at odds with the PKK and Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS). Finally, there is transnational Shi’a militancy across the region to consider, with mobilisation framed in terms of engaging both IS and the US in conflict. Shi’a militancy is a multi-faceted and complex phenomenon that, in Syria, featured Hezbollah, various Iran-linked PMF groups from Iraq, as well as the Fatemiyoun (Afghan-recruited) and Zeinabiyoun (Pakistan-recruited) brigades.

Sub-nationally – at this level, there was both conflict and cooperation between the Free Syrian Army (FSA) (today called the SNA or TFSA), nationalist Islamist groups (like Ahrar al-Sham or the Levant Front) and radical Islamist groups (like Jabhat al-Nusra and IS), as well as both conflict and cooperation between the YPG/ PYD and the FSA, nationalist and radical Islamist groups.

Figure 1 below offers a schematic rendering of these nine conflicts that sit nested within the core conflict of the Syrian civil war: the rebellion against the regime. The total of 10 resulting conflicts are linked with variable intensity at different moments in time. Their interactions have been analysed in greater detail elsewhere (see sources below Table 2) and for the purpose of this paper it suffices to note their existence and highlight their linkage.

Figure 1

The Syrian civil war as a nested set of conflicts

Note: The sources for this assessment can be found underneath Table 2.

Key conflict episodes

With a structure of nested conflicts in mind, several main periods of civil war can be distinguished. Each features a different mix of the conflicts reflected in Figure 1. For each period, Table 2 identifies the key contestation, major conflict factors and central turning points.[26]

Table 2

Conflict dynamics in different periods of the Syrian civil war

Periods	Key contestation	Synopsis	Major conflict factors (continuity (c) / new (n))
From peaceful protest to militancy Early 2011 to early 2012	Syrian regime versus protestors and an emerging FSA Turning point to next period: Creation Jabhat al-Nusra	The Syrian regime consistently sought to repress protests with overwhelming violence that was coordinated out of the presidential palace. Its reform proposals were modest and not considered credible. The FSA was built bottom-up in haphazard fashion. Internal divisions and external patronage increased fragmentation. The YPG/ PYD stayed out of the growing rebellion.	Hardline regime response (n) Different ideologies and regional orientations fractionalise the rebellion (n) Lack of unified international support to the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and FSA (n)
From militancy to radicalization Early 2012 to 2017	Syrian regime and Iran-linked groups versus a growing FSA, emergent nationalist and radical Islamist armed groups Turning point to next period: Recapture of Mosul in July 2017	The emergence of Ahrar al-Sham in 2012, Jabhat al-Nusra in 2012, the Islamic Front in 2013 and IS in 2013 created a range of well-armed and organised Islamist forces that fought with and against FSA groups, each other and the regime. This further fragmented the rebellion, as did various coordination mechanisms and funding channels from the Gulf/US. Paradoxically, both the regime and the US (through the 2003 invasion of Iraq and its 2011 withdrawal) brought the conditions for armed radicalisation about, while Turkey and European countries fanned its flames through lax border controls. The capture of Mosul and proclamation of the Caliphate in June 2014 enabled a new IS offensive in Syria that culminated in the battle for Kobani (2015), Dabiq (2016) and Raqqa (2017). The rise of IS accelerated intervention by the International Coalition. Meanwhile, the regime and its allies continued their fight against all opposition forces from their ‘rump Syria’ bastion, including with barrel bombs, starvation tactics and chemical weapons (e.g. August 2013 in Ghouta) until the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) initiative puts a temporary stop to this particular tactic to stave off the risk of direct US intervention.	Hardline regime response (c) Different ideologies and regional orientations fractionalize the rebellion (c) Lack of unified international support for the SIG and FSA (c) Iranian support for regime, including Hezbollah entry (n) Turkey and Gulf countries / individuals (mostly Qatar and KSA) support a variety of Islamist groups (n) Western (US) response shifts to IS as primary threat (n)
From regime setbacks to regime recovery 2014 to 2016	Syrian regime, Iran-linked groups and Russian forces versus a reduced FSA, national and radical Islamist armed groups Turning point to next period: Battle for Aleppo (December 2016)	The combination of opposition forces (mostly Jaysh al-Fateh, the Southern Front and IS), more aligned Turkish/Gulf support, and manpower shortages nevertheless brought the regime closer to defeat as Latakia and Daraa were threatened in early 2015 while the rebel Ghouta salient remained active right next to Damascus. Greater Iranian support and militiafication of regime forces sustained it, but ultimately proved inadequate. A high-end Russian expeditionary intervention in September 2015 rescued the regime and paved the way for the reconquest of Aleppo in late 2016. Meanwhile, IS started to be rolled back by the International Coalition after the battle for Kobani (2014/2015). UNSC Resolution 2254 was passed in December 2015 – after the Geneva-I and Geneva-II UN-led peace talks – to almost no effect.	Hardline regime response (c) Iranian support for regime (c) Western (US) focus on IS (c), US enlists YPG after Kobani (n) Russian support transforms from political to military (n) Turkey enters the conflict via operation Euphrates Shield (n)
From regime recovery to reconquest 2017–2018	Syrian regime, Iran-linked and Russian forces versus weakened opposition groups of all stripes Turning point to next period: Regime assault on Idlib	With Russian and Iranian support, the regime renews its offensives, using the de-escalation zone logic of the Astana process as a foil to reconquer major opposition-held areas one after another (northern Homs, eastern Ghouta and along the Jordanian border) after the battle for Aleppo, leaving only Idlib (HTS) and the northeast (SDF). Meanwhile, HTS forms in Idlib in January 2017 as a reincarnation of Jabhat al-Nusra. Turkey escalates its fight against the YPG by occupying Afrin in 2018.	Hardline regime response (c) Iranian support for regime (c) Russian support for regime (c) Western (US) focus on IS (c) Turkey joins Astana process (n)
From reconquest to stalemate 2019-2020	Syrian regime, Iran-linked groups and Russian forces versus SNA + Turkish forces, and YPG + US forces Turning point to next period: Resumption of hostilities in Idlib or northeast (if)	Having completed its reconquest of Syria – except for ongoing low-level incidents in the south, the YPG/PYD-held northeast, HTS-held Idlib and various Turkish-held border areas – the regime and allies started their next offensive in Idlib, Hama and north Aleppo. This caused Turkey to double down, move into Idlib with substantial forces and complete the process of nominally unifying FSA and NLF forces into the TFSA/SNA. The US keeps backing the PYD/YPG, pushing it to increase its distance from Damascus as well as the PKK, while HTS and its Hurras al-Din offshoot keep control over parts of Idlib. HTS also formed the Syrian Salvation Government. There are initial signs of an IS resurgence in the regime-held Badia desert.	Hardline regime response (c) Iranian support for regime (c) Russian support for regime (c) US alliance with YPG see-saws (n) Turkey turns against regime and Russia (n)

Periods

Key contestation

Synopsis

Major conflict factors (continuity (c) / new (n))

From peaceful protest to militancy

Early 2011 to early 2012

Syrian regime versus protestors and an emerging FSA

Turning point to next period: Creation Jabhat al-Nusra

The Syrian regime consistently sought to repress protests with overwhelming violence that was coordinated out of the presidential palace. Its reform proposals were modest and not considered credible.

The FSA was built bottom-up in haphazard fashion. Internal divisions and external patronage increased fragmentation. The YPG/ PYD stayed out of the growing rebellion.

Hardline regime response (n)

Different ideologies and regional orientations fractionalise the rebellion (n)

Lack of unified international support to the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and FSA (n)

From militancy to radicalization

Early 2012 to 2017

Syrian regime and Iran-linked groups versus a growing FSA, emergent nationalist and radical Islamist armed groups

Turning point to next period: Recapture of Mosul in July 2017

The emergence of Ahrar al-Sham in 2012, Jabhat al-Nusra in 2012, the Islamic Front in 2013 and IS in 2013 created a range of well-armed and organised Islamist forces that fought with and against FSA groups, each other and the regime. This further fragmented the rebellion, as did various coordination mechanisms and funding channels from the Gulf/US. Paradoxically, both the regime and the US (through the 2003 invasion of Iraq and its 2011 withdrawal) brought the conditions for armed radicalisation about, while Turkey and European countries fanned its flames through lax border controls.

The capture of Mosul and proclamation of the Caliphate in June 2014 enabled a new IS offensive in Syria that culminated in the battle for Kobani (2015), Dabiq (2016) and Raqqa (2017). The rise of IS accelerated intervention by the International Coalition.

Meanwhile, the regime and its allies continued their fight against all opposition forces from their ‘rump Syria’ bastion, including with barrel bombs, starvation tactics and chemical weapons (e.g. August 2013 in Ghouta) until the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) initiative puts a temporary stop to this particular tactic to stave off the risk of direct US intervention.

Hardline regime response (c)

Different ideologies and regional orientations fractionalize the rebellion (c)

Lack of unified international support for the SIG and FSA (c)

Iranian support for regime, including Hezbollah entry (n)

Turkey and Gulf countries / individuals (mostly Qatar and KSA) support a variety of Islamist groups (n)

Western (US) response shifts to IS as primary threat (n)

From regime setbacks to regime recovery

2014 to 2016

Syrian regime, Iran-linked groups and Russian forces versus a reduced FSA, national and radical Islamist armed groups

Turning point to next period: Battle for Aleppo (December 2016)

The combination of opposition forces (mostly Jaysh al-Fateh, the Southern Front and IS), more aligned Turkish/Gulf support, and manpower shortages nevertheless brought the regime closer to defeat as Latakia and Daraa were threatened in early 2015 while the rebel Ghouta salient remained active right next to Damascus. Greater Iranian support and militiafication of regime forces sustained it, but ultimately proved inadequate. A high-end Russian expeditionary intervention in September 2015 rescued the regime and paved the way for the reconquest of Aleppo in late 2016.

Meanwhile, IS started to be rolled back by the International Coalition after the battle for Kobani (2014/2015). UNSC Resolution 2254 was passed in December 2015 – after the Geneva-I and Geneva-II UN-led peace talks – to almost no effect.

Hardline regime response (c)

Iranian support for regime (c)

Western (US) focus on IS (c), US enlists YPG after Kobani (n)

Russian support transforms from political to military (n)

Turkey enters the conflict via operation Euphrates Shield (n)

From regime recovery to reconquest

2017–2018

Syrian regime, Iran-linked and Russian forces versus weakened opposition groups of all stripes

Turning point to next period: Regime assault on Idlib

With Russian and Iranian support, the regime renews its offensives, using the de-escalation zone logic of the Astana process as a foil to reconquer major opposition-held areas one after another (northern Homs, eastern Ghouta and along the Jordanian border) after the battle for Aleppo, leaving only Idlib (HTS) and the northeast (SDF).

Meanwhile, HTS forms in Idlib in January 2017 as a reincarnation of Jabhat al-Nusra. Turkey escalates its fight against the YPG by occupying Afrin in 2018.

Hardline regime response (c)

Iranian support for regime (c)

Russian support for regime (c)

Western (US) focus on IS (c)

Turkey joins Astana process (n)

From reconquest to stalemate

2019-2020

Syrian regime, Iran-linked groups and Russian forces versus SNA + Turkish forces, and YPG + US forces

Turning point to next period:

Resumption of hostilities in Idlib or northeast (if)

Having completed its reconquest of Syria – except for ongoing low-level incidents in the south, the YPG/PYD-held northeast, HTS-held Idlib and various Turkish-held border areas – the regime and allies started their next offensive in Idlib, Hama and north Aleppo. This caused Turkey to double down, move into Idlib with substantial forces and complete the process of nominally unifying FSA and NLF forces into the TFSA/SNA.

The US keeps backing the PYD/YPG, pushing it to increase its distance from Damascus as well as the PKK, while HTS and its Hurras al-Din offshoot keep control over parts of Idlib. HTS also formed the Syrian Salvation Government. There are initial signs of an IS resurgence in the regime-held Badia desert.

Hardline regime response (c)

Iranian support for regime (c)

Russian support for regime (c)

US alliance with YPG see-saws (n)

Turkey turns against regime and Russia (n)

Main sources: Phillips, C., The battle for Syria: International rivalry in the new Middle East, New Haven: YUP, 2020; Van Dam, N., Destroying a nation: The civil war in Syria, London: IB Tauris, 2017; Lister, C., The Syrian jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the evolution of an insurgency, London: Hurst, 2015; Cockburn, P., War in the age of Trump, London: Verso, 2020; Van Veen, E. and I. Abdo, Between brutality and fragmentation: Options for addressing the Syrian civil war, The Hague: Clingendael, 2014; Ahmadian, H. and P. Mohseni, ‘Iran's Syria strategy: the evolution of deterrence’, International Affairs, Vol. 95, Issue 2, 2019, pages 341–364; Lund, A., From Cold War to Civil War: 75 Years of Russian-Syrian Relations, Stockholm: Swedish Institute for International Affairs, 2019; Hauch, L., Mixing politics and force: Syria’s Constitutional Committee in review, The Hague: Clingendael, 2020.

Based on this broad review of the Syrian civil war, several observations can be made with regard to the conflict’s evolution at the national level (i.e. the core conflict of rebellion against the regime, which interacts with the nine nested conflicts identified – see Figure 1):[27]

The Syrian regime did not indicate at any point in time that it was willing to seriously negotiate or compromise with either the opposition or its foreign backers in any international forum. This meant that the contestation of its rule would be decided on the battlefield. At the local level and as part of its battlefield tactics, the regime did consistently propose ‘local reconciliation agreements’ which, however, usually prevented outright warfighting but not further repression and displacement in their wake (i.e. after a cease fire had been arranged). If such agreements could not be achieved, the regime consistently applied all possible means of coercion at its disposal and spoke the language of violence throughout.

ii.

Throughout the conflict, the regime has welded temporary informal ‘deals’ (including with the YPG/PYD and IS), progressive use of fear-inspiring tactics (bombardment, barrel bombs, chemical weapons, starvation and deportation), concentrated offensives, insistence on control over humanitarian relief efforts in its areas and various diplomatic processes (Geneva especially) to advance its agenda of reconquest.

iii.

The international allies of the regime, Iran and Russia, proved to be steadfast in their support and were willing to increase their involvement to prevent collapse of the regime. Iran did so via military supplies and credit lines, successively sending in Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) elements followed by Hezbollah armed formations, helping to mobilise the NDF, and mobilising Shi’a armed groups from Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Russia shifted from political support and military supplies (in part on credit) to a high-grade expeditionary intervention in 2015.

iv.

In contrast, other international support for Syrian opposition forces consistently offered a mix of promising rhetoric but limited or fragmented actual support / intervention which, while contributing to the prolongation of the conflict, did (too) little to improve the battlefield position of the opposition forces. This holds for the initial support for the FSA by Turkey and the Gulf countries (mostly Qatar and KSA), limited Western support for selected FSA groups as well as for Gulf and Turkish support for a range of Islamist groups (both from the countries themselves and from individuals/’charities’). The only exception of sorts was US support for the YPG since early 2015, which continued fairly consistently and at scale. But this was aimed at fighting IS, not the Syrian regime – with which the PYD/YPG engaged in practical deals in the early years of the civil war.

A Western military intervention against Assad, be it direct or indirect (following an Afghanistan Northern Alliance or Benghazi-type support model of special forces and aerial intervention) was not seriously on the cards after the US let the regime chemical weapons attack on Ghouta go unpunished in 2013, despite having marked it as a red line.[28] In fact, it was consistent with US policy to look for a settlement for a number of reasons, including to avoid a Sunni Islamist takeover of Syria (associated with the risk of radical extremism).[29]

vi.

Unsurprisingly, Western (especially US) conflict concerns shifted from the rebellion against Assad to fighting IS in the course of 2013. With growing doubts about rebel battlefield performance, increasing concerns that the rebellion was becoming more religious, and with resources being funnelled into the International Coalition, any hope of cohering and growing support for the FSA and, perhaps, nationalist Islamist groups, against the regime disappeared. The campaign against IS brought a brutal group of extremists down and also further aggravated the ravages of the war with, for example, Raqqa reduced to a total ruin.[30] Once the fight against IS was over, the core rebellion against the regime had run its course and it was too late to turn the tide.

vii.

Turkey has used a mix of its own military and Syrian-recruited auxiliary forces (SNA) to establish four areas under effective Turkish control in northern Syria via unilateral interventions. In Idlib, its military makes it more difficult for Syrian regime and Russian forces to unleash a new major offensive. In Afrin, the Azaz-Al-Bab-Jarablus area, and between Ras al-Ain and Tel Abyad, Turkish forces have carved out buffer zones against the YPG/PYD. The nature and scale of reconstruction in the areas under effective Turkish control suggest that Turkey is there to stay. Turkey appears to be aiming to resettle Syrian refugees in these areas and have them controlled by the SNA and the local police force that it backs.

Although one could argue that these observations can only be made with the benefit of hindsight, this is not entirely correct. Much of the above had become readily apparent before the Russian intervention of 2015 (points i, ii, iii (re Iran), parts of iv, v and vi) and the remainder shortly after this intervention (iii (re Russia) and parts of iv). Only point vii is of a later date. For the purpose of this analysis, we argue that these core conflict factors became clear between 2014 and 2016, i.e. before the battlefield situation decisively turned in favour of the Syrian regime and its allies.