From the outset in 2009, the EaP was ‘to be governed by the principles of differentiation and conditionality.’[15] During the 2015 Riga Summit, it was reaffirmed that it is ‘the sovereign right of each partner freely to choose the level of ambition and goals to which it aspires in its relations with the European Union’.[16] Over the years, relations between the EU and the six EaP countries and the domestic developments within them have all developed differently. The trend of the last couple of years has moved towards bilateral cooperation and differentiation, especially after the EU signed AAs with three out of six EaP countries. The European Commission (EC) confirmed in its 2020 Joint Communication that ‘Bilateral cooperation remains the way to ensure a tailor-made approach’, aiming for ‘deeper sectoral cooperation and exchange between interested partner countries’.[17] At the same time the Commission also maintained its multilateral approach, arguing that ‘The revised multilateral EaP architecture adopted at the 2017 summit is a useful framework for exchanges and cooperation, through regular meetings and exchanges.’[18]

Source: @European Union 2020

As such, the EaP is currently built on two pillars: a framework for multilateral cooperation as well as deepening bilateral cooperation with the EU. The multilateral track of the EaP covers issues such as good governance, economic cooperation, energy security, mobility and people-to-people contacts. Apart from the governmental level, cooperation takes place at civil society level through the EaP Civil Society Forum, as well as at parliamentary level through the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly.

Bilateral cooperation, on the other hand, is strongly differentiated. With Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, bilateral cooperation revolves around the AAs, which include Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs). Armenia represents a unique situation with simultaneous participation in the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Bilateral cooperation with Belarus and Azerbaijan remains at a relatively low level (see figure 1).

The divergence in both ambition and actual levels of bilateral cooperation between the EU and individual EaP countries raises questions about the multilateral format. What is the added value of continuing with the multilateral format with all six countries for the EU, its member states and the EaP countries themselves? This question is particularly relevant now, as the countries themselves increasingly question the value of the multilateral framework. The three Association Countries are reluctant to share a format with three countries that have very different relations with the EU and the Russian Federation, while the acrimonious relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan make a multilateral conversation even more difficult than before.

The added value of an ‘empty’ framework?

At this moment, the three associated countries have a strong wish to cooperate closer on more sector-specific integration with the EU. In their view they have made the reforms required in their AA frameworks. They feel they are being held back by being in the same multilateral basket as the ‘slower’ EaP members who are less ambitious in their Europeanisation efforts, and are openly considering applying for EU membership in accordance with article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union.[19] Further differentiation is likely to lead to even more divergence between the six countries. For the already associated countries, the next steps in deepening bilateral relations could include more sectoral cooperation with the prospect of becoming part of the EU energy and banking market. Access could also be granted to the EU’s Single European Payment Area (SEPA) as an impetus for business opportunities.[20] However, differentiation within the EaP could also benefit the non-associated countries. It could assist Azerbaijan in diversifying its resource-driven economy, reduce the rising levels of industrial energy consumption in Belarus, foster Armenia’s economic development, and eventually back Azerbaijan’s and Belarus’ bid for WTO membership to ensure further potential for bilateral trade relations.[21] For each country there is more to gain from the bilateral track than from the multilateral track. Still, the latter could function as an important platform to return to when needed. There are benefits for the six EaP countries and for the EU itself to maintain the multilateral track.

A primary benefit of the multilateral format is that it functions as a framework for discussion of certain priorities that are important for the region at large, such as democracy, human rights, rule of law and structural reforms. The multilateral framework stimulates regional and sectoral cooperation among the six EaP-countries, for which extra EU funding is available. Coherence in the EaP is key for addressing the shared challenges the region has been facing and will continue to struggle with in the years to come; this includes, for example, corruption, the rule of law, climate change and, more recently, the Covid-19 crisis and its aftermath.[22] On the other hand, the EU uses the EaP multilateral framework to its advantage to address problems that are important for the EU itself, such as energy and connectivity.

A second benefit of the multilateral track is that it provides individual EaP countries with a window of opportunity to gain prominence on the EU agenda. The EaP offers bi-annual summits, annual ministerial meetings and various thematic reunions and multilateral flagship projects that can be used by countries individually to intensify their dialogue with the EU. Ukraine in particular has used the multilateral framework to its own advantage.[23] By themselves, Georgia and Moldova would be less likely to attract a similarly high level of political attention. In the same context, the multilateral format is beneficial because it enables non-associated countries to learn from countries that have already deepened their relations with the EU through the AAs, which at present is particularly of interest to Armenia. Despite waning interest from the EaP countries, they would hence do well to realise the added value of the multilateral format. The EU, on its part, could more actively communicate the long-term benefits of the multilateral framework of the EaP.

A third advantage of the multilateral track relates to the fact that the situation is in flux and the EaP needs to be able to constantly adapt to challenges in the region. Belarus, for example, is currently largely left out of the EaP bilateral cooperation, but there is a chance the situation might change in 2021. To that extent, the multilateral aspect serves as a minimum level of engagement that allows the EU to scale up fast(er) when opportunities arise or demand increases. For that reason the inverse should also be asked: what might happen without the multilateral component? Would, in that case, the EU need to reinvent the wheel time after time without being able to use the tools available that were once meant for the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach? As for Azerbaijan and Belarus, the two countries with which bilateral relations are least developed, the multilateral track has been the only form of dialogue possible.

As also argued by Cristina Gherasimov in Annex 2, there is clearly no alternative to further differentiation. However, there are ways to make it ‘smarter’. This means that although more significance will be given to the bilateral agreements, there is no need to compromise the multilateral framework as it remains ‘an important source of reference and inspiration in particular for the three non-associated partners’.[24] In that sense, the EaP as a multilateral framework should not merely be considered the ‘lowest common denominator’, but rather as the foundation for relations with all EaP countries. From there, following the principle of differentiation, bilateral relations could be further developed with non-associated countries – potentially leading to AAs in the future. For the already associated countries the AAs could be updated by granting enhanced EU market access or by means of approximation of legislation to explore further possibilities for cooperation.[25]