Lessons learned for the EU

The effectiveness of the EU in motivating EaP partners to implement reforms and in supporting democratic transformation has varied across countries. While the EU has been successful in some sectors of cooperation (e.g. decentralisation reform in Ukraine[40]), many reforms demanded by the EU have not been implemented, particularly with regard to anti-corruption and the judiciary. The following elements of the EU's approach to democratisation have failed:

Applying the logic of enlargement policy

The EU supports reforms in partner countries based on the logic of its enlargement policy. Together with its partners, it selects ambitious sectoral reforms, formulates conditions mainly concerning approximation of legislation with EU standards, provides assistance for their implementation, and then scores the results. The partners most often agree to such an approach due to the need to maintain good relations with the EU, without conducting in-depth analyses of the gains and losses of the introduction of required acquis (e.g. Georgia thus agreed to the DCFTA, which has not so far been highly beneficial for its economy). However, in the absence of any prospect of EU membership, sufficiently high EU funds to cover the costs of transformation and the interests of oligarchs hampering reforms, partner countries use ‘cherry-picking’ strategies, selectively implementing EU guidelines and conditions. Two examples of EU failure are its support for the reform of decentralisation in Georgia, where there was no political will to carry out such a reform, and its support for reform of the Ukraine energy sector during the presidency of Yanukovych.

Bearing in mind the absence of structural funds for investments in infrastructure, EU support for structural reforms has not been visible in EaP societies, which are mainly interested in improving welfare in the short term. EU aid for an independent judiciary and anti-corruption mechanisms as well as legal approximation are abstract concepts for the average citizen and brings economic and social benefits only in an indirect way and in the long term. The EU is trying to respond to this challenge by launching social aid, for example to mitigate the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, but its financial capacity does not allow for ambitious projects in this area (e.g. in the field of infrastructure).

Wrong political calculations

The EU has been inconsistent in applying conditions to aid disbursement to individual EaP countries. In some cases it has been trying to encourage EaP governments to cooperate by using low-conditional political and financial support, while turning a blind eye to their lack of progress on reforms. In such cases the EU has often overestimated the European ambitions of supported governments; it has not appreciated their real interests, the scale of their ties with local oligarchs and Russia, and their low interest in implementing reforms. An example was EU support for the pro-European government coalition in Moldova in the period 2010-2013 and the promotion of Moldova as an EaP policy success. The 2014 banking scandal exposed the scale of nepotism and the fact that reforms had not actually been implemented. The EU also provided additional financial support to Armenia during Sargsyan's presidency under the ‘more for more’ principle in order to convince the country to tighten integration with the EU, although the reforms were not implemented.

The failure of EU policy in Moldova marked a turning point and the EU began to apply a more conditional approach. More frequently, it retained aid tranches when conditions were not met and publicly announced such action (e.g. several times in Moldova in the period 2015-2018). However, this approach has still not been consistently applied in relations with other EaP countries – an example being the disbursement of macro-financial assistance to Ukraine despite the country’s failure to meet all EU conditions. Still a dilemma for the EU is the wise use of conditionality with a view to not causing a significant deterioration of the internal economic and political situation, which would likely for instance increase the popularity of pro-Russian political parties.

Focusing on cooperation with governments, and to a lesser extent with society

Despite increased EU funding for civil society organisations (CSOs) in its neighbourhood following the 2011 Arab Spring, it is a secondary priority in EU aid disbursed in the EaP region; aid is directed mainly towards central and local authorities. In the years 2009-2019 grants for CSOs accounted for one-fifth of the EU financial aid.[41] Thus, the EU is not adequately responding to the social potential of the EaP region, which has seen largescale social mobilisation over the last decade (at least 16 protests on a large scale contesting the policies of the authorities). Moreover, even though relations with the authorities are important for maximising cooperation within the EaP, in the situation of oligarchic systems, unstable democracies and autocracies in this region, the EU’s focus on cooperation with governments has not brought the expected results.

In relations with authoritarian regimes, the EU's reliance on cooperation with the authorities, in turn, reduces its credibility among the independent non-governmental sector. An example is the policy of critical engagement in Belarus pursued in 2016 to 2020. The EU’s compliance with the Belarusian authorities’ restrictive law on the registration of foreign aid led to delays and refusals in the registration of grants as well as financing of GONGOs (government-organised non-governmental organisations) that could obtain approval for registration. This has called into question the EU's credibility as a donor of aid to non-governmental sector.[42]

However, the EU has been gradually boosting its support to civil society in countries that have seen a deterioration in human rights standards. Since 2014 and the crisis in relations with Moldova, the EU has been re-shifting aid from the central administration towards civil society (e.g. in Moldova in 2018 and Belarus in 2020). In response to a wave of social protests, the EU also granted additional aid to non-governmental communities, for instance it granted EUR 10 million in Ukraine in 2014 in relation to Revolution of Dignity, and EUR 7.5 million in Armenia in 2018 after the Velvet Revolution.

The following elements of the EU's approach to democratisation in EaP countries are examples of good practice:

EU assistance responds to the partner's needs and is conditional

EU support for democratic transformation in the EaP region works when some of the following conditions are met: EU-supported reforms already happen to be a priority for the government; good relations with the EU are important for the government for various reasons (e.g. difficult economic and geopolitical situation) and it is ready to make some concessions in its relations with the EU; the conditions are realistic; and reforms are supported through EU advice and coordinated international aid.

An example of EU good practice is the signature of visa facilitation and visa-free agreements, which are highly important for EaP countries. The deals were combined with numerous EU conditions regarding border and migration management reforms (signing of readmission agreements), as well as issues related to minority rights (e.g. refugees, sexual minorities), which the countries had to meet. Georgia has introduced, for example, an anti-discrimination law, despite the dominant conservative views in society. Moreover, the EU noted partial success in supporting reforms in Ukraine after 2014. It offered a significant aid package, coordinated with the IMF and EU member states and conditional on progress in reforms, and it launched a special support group for Ukraine to help it implement the reforms.[43] Although many reforms could yet be reversed, and the introduction of anti-corruption measures is blocked by oligarch interests, the EU has successfully supported the process of Ukraine’s decentralisation, reform of the energy sector and improvement of public procurement law (the introduction of the ProZorro online procurement system).

EU assistance to civil society is flexible and reaches local communities

With regard to EU assistance mechanisms directed to civil society, the launch of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) in 2013 proved to be successful. Thanks to this foundation, remaining outside of EU structures but receiving permanent funding from the EU and some member states, it has been possible to provide fast and flexible support for pro-democracy forces (i.e. informal civic groups, local NGOs, independent media). The EED supports activities that cannot be subsidised by the EU or member states for various reasons (e.g. it is not an aid priority, there are technical problems in providing aid) and in crisis situations when immediate aid needs to be activated. Importantly, the EED is able to subsidise small initiatives, which is a challenge for the bureaucratic European Commission.

For example, the EED is effectively supporting local pro-democracy groups in Belarus. While many donors faced technical problems delivering on-site assistance, the EED has developed electronic channels for the transfer of funds. The foundation has granted, for example, the purchase of equipment for journalists, publication of materials on protests produced by citizens, activities of informal and local groups, creation of digital tools used to organise protests as well as covering cost-of-living expenses for human rights defenders. The effectiveness of the EED in providing support to Belarusian society has been confirmed by increased funding from the European Commission and some member states (e.g. Poland).

Increasing people-to-people contacts

Since the formation of the EaP in 2009, the EU has increased the number of people-to-people contacts with the EaP region. This is indirectly important for strengthening democratisation processes, as it allows people to understand the experience of democracy ‘with their own eyes’. For example, the current protests in Belarus have been initiated partly by the middle class (IT sector) and young people who have numerous contacts with Western countries.

The increase in people-to-people contacts as seen by the rapid growth in short-term travel has largely been achieved by means of agreements on the visa-free regime or visa facilitation.[44] Together with the signature of Common Aviation Agreements, they have boosted the development of the low-cost airline network and tourist traffic. The other important factor in the growth of personal contacts has been student exchanges programmes with the EU. Thanks to the boost in Erasmus+ funding for EaP countries in the years 2014 to 2019, around 22,000 students went to the EU, while about 11,000 students from the EU obtained scholarships in EaP countries.[45] Although the scale of exchanges does not yet reflect the population potential of Eastern Partnership countries, it is a positive change. Before the EaP launch, the number of exchanges was negligible. Importantly, the EU has successively included the universities of EaP countries in its programmes in the fields of education, science and culture (e.g. Horizon, Jean Monnet programme).

Recommendations

The EU should pursue democracy promotion in its relations with EaP countries. Unlike Russia, China and Turkey, which have become more engaged in this region, the EU is a reference point for an increasingly active EaP civil society. In Moldova, the EU's strict conditionality related to reform implementation after 2014 has helped to restore public confidence in the EU.

While the EU should differentiate its approach to individual partners, there are steps that could be undertaken by EU in the majority of EaP countries to increase its influence on democratisation processes:

EU delegations should consult more often with parliamentarians, interest groups and the non-governmental sector on the choice of reforms required by the EU and its terms. Public pressure on government is key and to achieve this campaigns are needed to explain the essence of supported reforms and their impact on human well-being. The EU should also work with other international organisations and aid donors to coordinate aid in a given sector. Local NGOs should regularly participate in EU aid monitoring committees to ensure transparent use of financial resources (e.g. as in Georgia).

The EU should consistently apply conditionality to the authorities on the basis of the ‘less for less’ principle when it comes to granting financial aid in all EaP countries, as in the case of Moldova. Where human rights standards have deteriorated, the EU should always increase funding for civil society at the expense of support for government administration.

In order to increase its impact in the fight against corruption, the EU should link the conditions related to independent judiciary with the disbursement of EU funds. This should apply to all financial resources for central and local authorities (not only macro-financial assistance, but also budget support or assistance under sectoral cooperation). However, the conditions should be realistic for partner countries.

In the new financial perspective, the EU should increase funds for European Endowment for Democracy in the EaP region. Assistance for civil society distributed at EC level (DG NEAR) should be provided primarily through agencies, foundations and large organisations from member states with the relevant experience in providing assistance to organisations in the EaP region.

The other factors include the importance of relations with individual EaP countries for the member states, the position of EU institutions dependent on appointments in high positions in the EC and the EEAS, the importance of the EU as a guarantor of security and EU assistance to individual EaP states, the internal situation in the EaP states and the possibility of EU support for development of civil society in authoritarian states.
See Daniel Szeligowski (August 2020). ‘The Next Step Towards Decentralisation in Ukraine’, PISM Bulletin, or Valentyna Romanova and Andres Umland (September 2019), ‘Ukraine’s Decentralization Reforms Since 2014. Initial Achievements and Future Challenges’, Chatham House Research Paper.
Giselle Bosse (2019). ‘Ten years of the Eastern Partnership: What role for the EU as a promoter of democracy?’, European View, vol. 18(2), 2019, pp. 220-232.
Elżbieta Kaca (November 2020). ‘EU Aid to Belarusian Civil Society: Needs and Challenges’, PISM Bulletin no 223.
Kataryna Wolczuk and D. Žeruolis (August 2018). ‘Rebuilding Ukraine An Assessment of EU Assistance’, Chatham House Research Paper.
Synthesis Report for the EMN Study (March 2019). ‘Impact of Visa Liberalisation on Countries of Destination’.
Own calculations based on data Erasmus+ Country factsheets: The EU's Neighbourhood, Western Balkans and Russia, accessed on 25 November 2020, link.