The Eastern Partnership is continuously at risk of slipping off the priority list, despite efforts by the EU’s easternmost member states in particular. This is due not only to the many other issues that crowd themselves on to the EU agenda, but also to disagreements among EU member states on a range of questions – including the three dilemmas outlined in this paper.
For the Netherlands, the EaP is one of the ways to achieve the overall aim of promoting a stable, well governed and prosperous neighbourhood with respect for the rule of law.[38] In order to make a future iteration of the EaP better fulfil that purpose, the following steps could be considered in the run-up to the 2021 EaP Summit:
The Netherlands should strive to help the EU reconcile its geopolitical interests and its values. Both The Hague and Brussels need to acknowledge that the EaP is part of a broader geopolitical game with the Russian Federation – but it should not play that game by Moscow’s rules. Pandering to nominally pro-European kleptocrats or going easy on unpalatable regimes out of short-term geopolitical interests harms the EU’s longer-term credibility. Instead, the Netherlands should propagate playing the ‘long game’, in which the EU harnesses its core values as its main geopolitical tool and offers a longer-term perspective of good governance, transparency and rule of law to the societies of all six EaP countries.
While the greatest value of the EaP clearly lies in its bilateral approach towards the different countries, the Netherlands should aim to maintain the multilateral track of the EaP. It could use the framework for specific priorities for the EU and the Netherlands, such as rule of law, good governance, energy security and green growth/green transition within the EaP. Without the multilateral track there would be scant – if any – discussion on these issues with Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan. A minimum level of engagement should also be maintained within the multilateral framework to enable the EU to scale up its cooperation should the political situation change.
On security, the Netherlands should advocate for a realistic approach that strengthens both the institutions and societies of the EaP against hybrid threats. Signing a ‘security compact’ consisting of pragmatic and realistic steps, such as stepping up cyber dialogues and the inclusion of military and intelligence officers from the three association countries in relevant training programmes could be an important step. It would reduce the security deficit and also signal to the Russian Federation that the EU aims to address the current asymmetry in which the EU focuses on soft issues while Russia exploits hard security vulnerabilities.
On the protracted conflicts the Netherlands could encourage the EU to take a two-track approach, including in its strategic communications. First, it could make it explicit at the upcoming summit that the EaP is not the preferred format for conflict resolution. At the same time the EU should indicate that it intends to invest more political and financial capital in the understanding of and engagement with these conflicts. It can do this particularly by strengthening its leverage and role in the respective negotiation processes outside the EaP framework. It could consider, for example, asking the EUSR for the South Caucasus to take up the position of co-Chair of the Minsk Group on the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh, a position currently held by France.