Russia’s war in Ukraine has a fundamental impact on Europe’s security and defence needs. The EU has taken a series of measures – from sanctions to funding the delivery of arms by member states as well as by adapting its Strategic Compass for security and defence – and NATO at its Madrid Summit in June 2022 has decided to step up its efforts to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture, next to various other measures. Finland and Sweden have applied for NATO membership, a step deemed unthinkable in the past. Defence budgets are on the rise across Europe and an increasing number of Allies is realising the NATO 2 percent GDP on defence target by 2024. With more money available for defence, it is important to explore further potential for deepening multinational defence cooperation in order to transfer from fragmentation to growing integration in the defence realm. In that context concrete options for specialisation should be explored. The previous chapter provided an inventory of the different forms of specialisation under three headings. This chapter explores options for new concrete specialisation formats, addressing the scope for expanding already existing formats as well as proposing new practical applications.[36]

Structured European capability groups

For many decades European countries have structured their armed forces in different ways, based on a variety of considerations related to their history, geographical location, strategic culture, threat perception and other factors of influence. To a large extent, multinational forces are also the result of this scattered capability landscape, as nations preferably cooperate most closely with like-minded partners and provide added value with their capabilities to the multinational format. Very often, multinational formations have been constructed according to the lead-nation or framework nation concept. Two evident examples of this are the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and the NATO Framework Nation Concept (FNC). The JEF, led by the United Kingdom, is an operational grouping of ten North-Western and Northern European countries. As a ‘first responder’ or ‘initial-entry’ force, it has a particular focus on Northern Europe, suitable for acting in all kinds of scenarios, including of a hybrid nature.[37] The NATO FNC, initiated and led by Germany, can be considered as a key building block for a European pillar in NATO, in particular for land forces.[38] Other countries can hook up military units (brigades or specialised capabilities) to heavy German divisions, providing the European nucleus for the NATO follow-on forces in case of a large-scale attack.[39]

So far, these groupings of countries with a specific capability profile have been the result of bottom-up initiatives by lead nations. The result is a patchwork of multinational formats, which lacks structure and cohesion. The question arises what can be done to realise a more structured approach, in which European countries organise their capabilities in a coordinated manner. At least the following factors should be taken into account:

Geography: although membership of the EU and NATO stretches over all parts and corners of Europe, the geographic location of the member states still matters. It is an important factor of influence for their security interests and, thus, for their defence priorities. Furthermore, geography also affects options for multinational groupings in the practical sense – in particular for land and naval forces. The proximity of Western, Central and Eastern European countries make the establishment of larger land formations with their participation relatively easy compared to combining land units for European countries at great distances from each other. In the Cold War era NATO’s forces were organised in a regional pattern, which seems to have been forgotten. Now, it is time to reconsider the formation of collective defence on a structured regional basis.

Collective defence vs. crisis management: the distinction between the types of forces required for collective defence under NATO’s Article 5 and for the Alliance’s and the EU’s crisis management tasks has almost disappeared[40], but there remains an important difference between the two. Collective defence is a ‘must do’, while crisis management is a ‘can do’.[41] The latter always has an element of uncertainty about who is willing to participate. Furthermore, crisis management forces have to be tailor-made to the crisis at hand – with diverging force packages needed for air campaigns, counterterrorism, stabilisation operations or training and assistance missions. Therefore, structured capability groups should first be considered for collective defence purposes, although there is also some scope for exploring the potential for crisis management.

Existing ‘specialisms’: many European countries already have ‘specialised’ or ‘niche capabilities’, which should explicitly be considered when advancing specialisation. Missile defence is an example: only the larger and medium-sized countries have land- or sea-based missile defence capabilities. Many other assets of ‘limited ownership’ can be mentioned, such as air-to-air refuelling aircraft, submarines, cruise missiles and military satellites. The increasing costs of high-tech military capabilities should encourage the grouping of ‘the few’ which can still afford this nationally in multinational cooperation formats to sustain and modernise these assets over time.

Taking these factors into account, firstly, NATO’s collective defence posture should be regarded as the basis for structuring European capability groups. After the end of the Cold War, subregional force structures have been replaced by rapid deployment capabilities – the NATO Response Force – and, more recently, by the battlegroup-sized enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) units in Eastern European member states. Although constructed around a lead nation, the principle has been that the maximum number of NATO Allies contribute in order to demonstrate political and military solidarity. However, from the angle of maximising the military effectiveness of the Alliance’s forward deployed forces this is not the optimum solution. Often, smaller contributions (at company level) of a different nature (mechanised, light infantry, etc.) rotate as temporary elements of the eFP Battlegroups. It would be much better if these Battlegroups were to have a fixed composition, not deployed as permanent units but with the same components rotating continuously. This will also be required in view of the establishment of brigade-size units in the Eastern European countries, when these are required – as decided at the NATO Summit in Madrid.[42]

Most likely, NATO’s force posture will be restructured on a regional basis to allow for the optimisation of close cooperation, interoperability and standardisation, and even the integration of armed forces contributions by geographically close neighbours. The following force structures in ‘specialised’ European capability groups could be considered:

For Northern Europe: taking into account the vast distances and the complicated topography (sea areas, forested and mountainous terrain, etc.) rapidly deployable capabilities should form the ‘first responder’ forces. The JEF is already focused on Northern Europe in terms of participation and exercises. Furthermore, it has also been trained to respond to hybrid challenges. This could be further developed into a structured capability group for Northern Europe and the Arctic region. For example, Norway could contribute with surface fleet and air-defence capabilities and the UK and the Netherlands could strengthen their marine corps capabilities, providing the first responder capabilities for sea/amphibious capabilities in support of territorial defence on land.[43]/[44] The JEF could also be made available as an initial defence force for Finland and Sweden, either as non-NATO countries or as Allies, after they have joined the Alliance. Sea-based missile defence and submarine capabilities should also become part of such a capability group for Northern Europe.

For Eastern Europe: the NATO eFP Battlegroups in the Baltic States and Poland – as well as the newly formed Battlegroups in Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria – should have a fixed composition instead of the existing system of rotating units of different composition, providing credible war-fighting capabilities to brigade-size units. For the Battlegroups, the rotation principle can be maintained, but then the unit contributions (the building blocks) should always have the same composition in order to sustain the presence of standard force packages.

For Central Europe: the already existing FNC led by Germany has to be reinforced by strengthening the heavy land forces contributions of the contributing Allies in the region, based on the plug in/plug out system – meaning that European countries can hook up their own units (brigades or specialised units) to German divisions. The FNC should form the European core of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture for Central and Eastern Europe. Standardisation with NATO Battlegroups (plus) in Eastern Europe[45] (comparable battalions, same equipment) should be the norm.

For South-Eastern Europe: for the Alliance’s Battlegroups in Romania and Bulgaria the same principle of unit rotation should be applied by the lead nations (such as France in the case of Romania). Preferably, other troop contributors should come from the same region – including Greece and Turkey. The creation of a Multinational Division South-East could be the next step. The lack of a secure Black Sea environment also asks for a structured maritime group. In order to reinforce NATO’s deterrence and defence posture in Turkey, specific capabilities – such as for air and missile defence – could be located on a permanent basis in the country, once the relationship between Turkey and its Allies starts to improve.[46]

In addition to these regionally constructed European capability groups, others could be constituted based on functional needs and on the specific capabilities of its contributing member states[47]:

A European intervention group, in which the cooperation in the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) could be brought together with the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) as agreed upon in the EU Strategic Compass.[48] Within EI2, specialisation on the Baltic area, the Caribbean and the Sahel area has already been agreed upon in terms of converging doctrine, procedures and increasing preparedness. In the case of the EU RDC optimal arrangements should be in place to allow for participation by the UK, taking into account the expeditionary character of the British armed forces. The European intervention group could provide the framework for further specialised capabilities, for example for operations in urban areas, in a desert environment or at sea.

A European stabilisation group, focusing on post-conflict stabilisation operations, with its own CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) capabilities and whose contributors are well prepared to work closely with a variety of civil actors, non-governmental organisations and local authorities. Specialisation within this group could focus on e.g. medical, engineering and reconstruction support, transport and other capabilities. The FNC group led by Italy could be the basis for expanding the group to those European countries that prefer to contribute to these sorts of operations, such as Austria and Ireland. The Belgian-French Capacité Motorisée could be another core capability for this stabilisation group, but it should also be part of the European intervention group. CaMo with its wheeled vehicle fleet also seems to be a very suitable format for the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations in areas such as the Sahel.

Maritime surveillance (Marsur) groups, bringing together the various assets (maritime patrol aircraft-MPA, ships, unmanned systems, satellite information, etc.) in regional groups for the Baltic Sea, the North Sea/Norwegian Sea, the Mediterranean area and the Black Sea. These groups should include connectivity to civilian actors involved in maritime surveillance, the protection and monitoring of territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones and in safety/ecological matters. Within those groups member states could opt for the (coordinated) specialisation of assets (MPA, sea-based, drones, etc.). Most of these regional Marsur groups already exist in one form or another.

A humanitarian assistance and disaster relief support group, providing a collective European capability to provide ‘first responder’ support to civilian authorities in case of disasters such as high-impact earthquakes, large-scale flooding or forest fires, requiring e.g. heavy-lift helicopters, engineer capabilities, medical support, etc. Contributing member states could specialise their contributions accordingly. This particular European capability group should also be made available to the EU’s emergency capacity for disaster relief.[49]

An integrated air and missile defence group, within which contributors could specialise in land- or sea-based capabilities. Most likely, the importance of air and missile defence is growing due to the rapid development of unmanned systems and cruise missiles. In particular, drone defence requires prioritised attention and could become a new category of specialisation within this group (or as a separate group). Regionalisation within this group needs to be considered as well. The NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATIMADS)[50] should be the overall context for such specialisation within the group of contributors, but a European core should be constructed in order to be able to act alone when needed.

An unmanned air reconnaissance group, to constitute a much required capability alongside the Alliance’s unmanned air reconnaissance capability.[51] The development and production of the Eurodrone[52] (operational as of 2027), to be procured by at least four European countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain), offers scope for a European group. The pooling & sharing model of the air-to-air refuelling MRTT[53] group could serve as a model to be applied for this group. Participation and co-financing by potential civilian national and international operators, such as the EU’s border protection agency Frontex, should be considered.

A space defence group, bringing together the military space capabilities of European countries. France and Italy have already specialised their military capabilities in space with the former concentrating on optical observation satellites and the latter on spectral technology. Both countries also have data-sharing arrangements.[54] This bilateral specialisation could be enlarged to other European nations with military space-based capabilities.

A Special Forces (SF) group, within which contributing countries can specialise their contributions – such as para commandos, land-based and maritime special forces or delivery means, for example transport aircraft, helicopters, submarines and vehicles. The Composite Special Forces Command of Denmark and the Benelux countries could be used as the starting point for such specialisation. Later on, other European countries could join and coordinate their specialised SF capability with the other participating members.

A logistic support group within which countries could specialise in the acquisition and storage of munitions, spare parts and other supply goods when operating the same equipment, based on a regional approach. Within this group nations procuring expensive precision-guided munitions could also constitute a specialised category. Stocks of supplies should be procured based on national needs, but the arrangement should include that stocks are to be made available to group members that have urgent operational needs.[55]

Host nation support groups, consisting of countries whose harbours and territory play a central role in receiving, staging and transferring American reinforcement military equipment from the US to continental Europe. Harbour protection and support tasks could be grouped between Belgium (for the Port of Antwerp) and the Netherlands (the Ports of Vlissingen and Rotterdam) taking into account their close geographical proximity. Germany (Port of Hamburg) and Denmark (Port of Esbjerg) provide two other entry points for American reinforcements to Europe. As a starting point, two bilateral formats (Belgian-Dutch, Danish-German) could explore options for mutually agreed specialisation.

Naturally, structured European capability groups should also be used as the framework for the collaborative development and acquisition of military equipment. The proposals of the European Commission presented in May 2022 to increase European collaborative defence procurement – with financial incentives to be made available if at least three member states participate in joint acquisition – support this process.[56] This is of great importance for increasing specialisation at the support level, which is to be explained in the next section.

Regional and functional structured capability groups can be connected, dependent on their capability profile. For example, maritime surveillance is already organised in a regional manner. The model offered would logically build on this regional approach. Logistic support groups would have to be connected to regional groups per definition. Others, such as groups for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief support or for special operations, will not have to be regionally oriented per se. The European intervention and stabilisation groups are specifically tailor-made for crisis management operations – so they would ideally fit in the implementation of the EU Strategic Compass, in particular for establishing the Rapid Deployment Capacity.

Specialisation in support functions

Education and training are areas of established cooperation between the armed forces of many countries. Logically, operating together requires first and foremost to learn and exercise together. Military personnel are often exchanged at schools, academies, colleges and other education facilities. In some cases – such as Belgium and the Netherlands – certain modules are provided by one of the two countries for the military of both nationalities – a model of specialisation that could be applied elsewhere. The Baltic States have taken this a step further in establishing a common college, thus creating one instead of three defence colleges.[57] At this political-military level of education, there is certainly scope for further integration by other countries.

Binational or multinational specialisation in education and training also exists at the level of weapon systems, although it is more the exception than the rule. Two important conditions have to be fulfilled to allow for specialisation at the lowest levels of education, training (and maintenance): first and foremost, countries have to operate the same equipment. Another important precondition is that the operators should speak the same language (same mother tongue or a common language, in most cases English). Both criteria are fulfilled for the Belgian-Dutch specialisation in the support functions of naval assets in the context of Benesam, as mentioned in chapter 2. This successful model could be followed by other countries and it should go hand in hand with further consolidation in the relevant defence industrial sectors, which would help to transfer from fragmentation to standardisation. In the case of the Belgian-Dutch minehunters, France would be the first candidate country to join the two northern neighbours, in particular as the French industrial Naval Group is currently constructing the twelve new vessels for both countries.[58] For the long term, the European Patrol Corvette project offers scope for a standardised class of patrol vessels, at least for the participating countries (France, Greece, Italy, Spain).[59] Specialisation in support functions should be an integral part of the project in order to prevent duplication between the participating countries.

In the land sector examples of specialisation in support functions are rare, which is the consequence of the wide variety of army vehicles, in particular among the larger European countries. Existing life cycle cooperation formats, such as for the Boxer armoured vehicle, often focus on common logistic support such as the acquisition of spare parts.[60] Rarely does specialisation in maintenance exist as different vehicle configurations and economic/industrial interests are important factors for each nation to have its own facilities. For that reason, the focus on exploring specialisation options in training and maintenance should be directed towards new collaborative armaments programmes, such as the Main Ground Combat Systems (MGCS) project by France and Germany. Both countries and their armoured vehicle industries aim to develop a networked class of common land vehicles (tanks, manned and unmanned vehicles, connectivity with drones).[61] Here, specialisation can already be planned in the design and development phases, connected to German and French defence industries focusing on particular parts of the programme. Logically, education, training and vehicle maintenance should then be arranged along comparable schemes with one of both countries having the lead effort. Several European countries, among them Italy and the Netherlands, have expressed their interest in joining the MGCS project. Once this is the case, the complexity of industrial participation by the newcomers will increase, but this should be approached from the principle of added value and technological-industrial expertise instead of juste retour.[62] Perhaps countries whose defence-industrial base has limited potential to contribute to the programme can receive compensation by a specialisation function in the support area.

Traditionally, the air sector is the area of the most far-reaching military cooperation between European countries, as the acquisition of the same platforms already has a long track record. The F-16 fighter aircraft are (or have been) utilised by ten national air forces in Europe and the F-35 are to be utilised by eleven or more European countries. Seven European countries (including Turkey) have procured A400M transport aircraft. The unmanned US-made Reaper/Predator drone is in the inventory of six European countries. Germany has now taken the decision to replace its CH-53 helicopters with CH-47 Chinooks. As a result, five European countries (will) operate the same heavy-lift helicopter. For most of these platforms there are combined training and exercise programmes and in many operations countries work closely together. However, with regard to the expensive maintenance of air platforms, most countries have chosen for national solutions, duplicating with other user nations. One of the exceptions is the maintenance of F-35 engines, which will take place for all these aircraft of European nations (plus Israel) in the Netherlands or Norway.[63] For the A400M, savings of up to 14% could be made by applying common maintenance[64], yet most purchasing countries seem to have their own maintenance facilities.[65] The Next Generation Rotorcraft Capability (NGRC) – a multinational framework for designing, developing and procuring the next generation of medium-lift multi-role helicopters – offers scope to arrange for such specialised support at an early phase.[66] Recently, the Netherlands has joined the project.[67] Belgium is already exploring how it can cooperate with the UK in training, maintenance, logistic support and upgrades for the MQ-9B Reaper drone.[68] Several other European countries have procured the same MALE-UAS[69] drone, which offers scope for expanding multinational specialisation in support functions. Naturally, the same will apply to the future Eurodrone.

In other words, having the same equipment does not automatically result in multinational maintenance models, in which participating countries specialise their contributions. Thus, it is of the utmost importance that this element is taken on board in new acquisition programmes while still being in the design phase. The Future Air Combat Systems (FCAS) programme is a German-French-Spanish programme for a networked system of ‘flying’ systems, both manned and unmanned.[70] Most likely, it will be opened up for other European countries. Just as the MGCS programme, FCAS with its wide scope offers possibilities for specialisation, not only in the development of the various platforms but also in support functions.[71]

Traditional specialisation

There are almost no examples of traditional specialisation. Unfortunately, many nations have given up capabilities unilaterally, without any coordination with other countries – specialisation ‘by default’ (see the previous chapter). On the other hand, there are examples of ‘non-specialisation’ by design, such as Baltic Air Policing (BAP), as referred to in chapter 2.

Taking into account that European countries are already dependent on each other for certain capabilities, are there other options for ‘traditional specialisation’? The most radical model would be a division of labour with regard to defence tasks, such as countries concentrating on either collective defence or crisis management. This can be considered as an unrealistic model as such a task specialisation would raise fundamental political problems: solidarity in collective defence efforts as well as for crisis management would be severely undermined and it might also be in violation of the basic law stating that a country has to execute both tasks (as is the case for the Netherlands). Another far-reaching option is that nations completely abandon one of their services (e.g. the army), while specialising in another (say the navy). This model is also unrealistic as ‘trading services’ is a ‘no go’ both in national and multinational political terms. Thus, traditional specialisation has to be found at the levels of specific service components or weapon systems such as: artillery, engineers, air mobile forces (for the land sector); carriers, frigates, patrol vessels, submarines (for the naval sector); and fighter aircraft, unmanned systems, helicopters (for the air sector)[72] and space assets.

Another important limitation for traditional specialisation – in particular for land forces – is geographic proximity. Relying on a partner’s capabilities will be considered more acceptable between neighbouring countries that have often been cooperating closely for decades. Trust, confidence and solidarity are key prerequisites for deeper defence cooperation[73], and this also applies to mutual dependencies resulting from specialisation. Thus, traditional specialisation can best be agreed upon on a bilateral or mini-lateral basis. However, countries should not act in isolation but inform and consult with all EU and NATO member states on specialisation initiatives. Both organisations should keep track of these initiatives, coordinate them and take specialisation formats into account in their capability development activities. Carried out in this way, ‘specialisation by design’ will replace ‘specialisation by default’. The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) is still focused on ‘translating’ the collective requirements into capability ‘targets’ for individual member states. The NDPP should be rearranged to allow for targets allotted to groups of member states, taking ‘specialisation’ on board.[74] The NDPP should not replace national targets by group targets, but have the latter added to the system, also to overcome political and bureaucratic resistance in moving from ‘national‘ to ‘multinational’.[75] Equally, the EU’s Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) should also incorporate assessments of multinational capability efforts in a structured manner. This will help to explore further potential for collaborative defence investment by EU member states, also through the tools of the European Commission such as the European Defence Fund.

On the basis of these parameters the following options for traditional specialisation could be explored:

Long-range missile systems (land, air or sea-based) vs. short-range firepower (tanks, artillery).

Heavy weaponry units vs. light/wheeled units or air mobile units (brigades, battalions).

Heavy-lift helicopters vs. ground-based transport vehicle fleets.

Land- and air-based special forces (commandos, paratroopers) vs. sea-based special forces (marines).

Engineering capabilities for reconstruction vs. CBRN capabilities.

Blue water/ocean-going naval assets (carriers, frigates, nuclear-driven submarines) vs. brown/regional water naval assets (small frigates, patrol vessels, conventional submarines).

Maritime patrol aircraft vs. unmanned maritime reconnaissance assets.

Ground-based missile defence systems vs. sea-based missile defence systems.

Large and medium-sized air transport aircraft vs. small air transport aircraft.

The existing force structures, specialised capabilities and the future requirements of European countries should be the starting point for exploring specialisation options in connection with capability needs and shortfalls as defined by NATO and the EU.

It is assumed that European capability needs and shortfalls – as defined in the EU and NATO context – are guiding specialisation, but this report does not list these requirements and capability priorities as such.
Sean Monagan, The Joint Expeditionary Force: Global Britain in Northern Europe?, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 25, 2022.
Framework Nations Concept: Militärkooperation in Europa weiter stärken, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 28 August 2020.
For a further explanation, see: Rainer L. Glatz & Martin Zapfe, Ambitious Framework Nation: Germany and NATO – Bundeswehr Capability Planning and the “Framework Nations Concept, SWP Comments 35, September 2017.
Also expressed as ‘wars of necessity’ vs. ‘wars by choice’.
“Allies have committed to deploy additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on the eastern flank, to be scaled up to brigade-size units when and where required, underpinned by credible rapidly available reinforcements, prepositioned equipment, and enhanced command and control”, Madrid Summit Declaration – Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid 29 June 2022, paragraph 9.
Idea mentioned in interviews.
The Royal Marines are in the process of restructuring into two Littoral Response Groups, each with a strength of around 1,800 personnel. See: Matthew Alderton, A force in flux, Briefing UK Royal Marines, Jane’s Online, first published 6 July 2021.
In the Baltic States, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.
Additionally, regional capability postures could be built on already existing or newly created multinational capability formats for ‘Southern Europe’ (the Mediterranean) and ‘South-Western Europe’.
This section of proposals builds on: Dick Zandee, European defence: Specialisation by capability groups, p. 4-5.
EI2 was launched in 2017 by France. Participating countries aim to converge concepts and doctrines for various operational scenarios and EI2 also acts as a network of experts allowing for quick interaction in times of crisis. For a further explanation, see: Dick Zandee, Kimberley Kruijver, The European Intervention Initiative – Developing a shared strategic culture for Europe, Clingendael Report, September 2019. The EU Strategic Compass was approved by the Council of the EU on 21 March 2022, see: link
The European Humanitarian Response Capacity, see: link.
The Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) capability, consisting of five RQ-4D Global Hawk drones, based at Sigonella Air Base in Italy. See: link.
Also known as the European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (MALE-UAV), link.
Multi-Role Tanker and Transport
Information based on interviews.
This proposal has also been made by: Sven Biscop, A European Defence Summit in May 2022: From Compass to Capabilities, Egmont Policy Brief 275, April 2022, p. 2.
The Baltic Defence College in Tartu (Estonia). See: link
The European Patrol Corvette (EPC) is an EU PESCO project (Permanent Structured Cooperation) and is funded by the European Defence Fund (EDF). See: Nathan Gain, European Patrol Corvette Could Start In Four Years, Naval News, 17 March 2022.
UK joins Boxer Multi-Role Armoured Vehicle Support Partnership, May 2020 News Defense Global Security army industry, 5 May 2020.
For further details: Danny Pronk, Dick Zandee, Adája Stoetman, Identity, Industry and Interoperability: The drivers of European armaments collaboration, Clingendael Report, January 2022.
In the past the ‘juste retour’ principle was often applied in multinational armaments programmes: the procurement share of a country was mirrored in its industrial share in the programme, even if its industrial base was not fully qualified to contribute. Quite often, this resulted in delays and the rising costs of the programmes.
In the case of the UK at a cost of almost half a billion euros. See: UK MOD agrees £ 410 m Atlas A400M aircraft maintenance contract, Airforce Technology, 5 January 2017.
Brooks Tigner, Allies sign off on NATO Next-Generation Rotorcraft concept phase. Jane’s Defence Weekly, 16 June 2022.
Ed Adamczyk, Britain, Belgium to collaborate o MQ-9B drone acquisition, Defense News, 19 August 2020.
Multi-Altitude Long-Endurence Unmanned Aerial System.
Depending on the country in question, helicopters are flown by either Air Force or Army pilots.
Dick Zandee, Margriet Drent, Rob Hendriks, Defence cooperation models: Lessons learned and usability, Clingendael Report, October 2016. p. 4.
Information from interviews.
Information from interviews.