Core regional alignments
Today, the Middle East consists of three competing alignments of actors that combine classic inter-state collaboration with the incorporation of looser networks made up of state, hybrid and non-state actors (see Figure 9).[44] The dominant alignment consists of the US and its clients-cum-allies: Saudi Arabia, Israel, the Emirates and the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) as well as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). It overshadows the region in the conventional military and formal economic sense but has lost credibility due to the perception that US commitment to maintaining the regional status quo is wavering, in part due to its pivot to Asia and, more recently, its rapid retreat from Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it has pursued an aggressive regional foreign policy over the past few years. For example, the US allowed the Saudis and Emiratis to instigate the Qatar diplomatic crisis in 2017, which led to an extensive boycott and provided Turkey with a significant opportunity to expand its influence. In 2018, the US walked away from the nuclear deal[45] and took a firm stance against Iran, driven at least in part by security concerns and lobbying from Tel Aviv, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi (even though the Emirates continued to act as an informal economic conduit around sanctions). In 2020, the US facilitated the Abraham Accords that brought Israel and the UAE closer together as well as, to some extent, Israel and Saudi Arabia via Bahrain. The Accords prioritised the creation of a joint front against Iran over Arab solidarity on the Palestinian issue. They also enabled Turkey and Iran to step up as defenders of the Palestinian cause.
Another alignment consists of Iran and its network of political and armed affiliates across Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Yemen. It dominates the region in the unconventional military and informal (including illicit) economic sense. Yet, its appeal is limited among audiences that are not Shi’a and, while it is capable of effective coercion, it is less skilled in the governance required to address glaring socioeconomic problems. All countries in which Iran is influential also face dire social, financial or economic crises. While these cannot necessarily be ascribed to Iran, they do make association with this alignment unattractive and are likely to generate future problems. In this context, Tehran’s ‘axis of resistance’ narrative can be seen as a PR effort to justify sacrifice and accept poor living conditions as the price for standing up to ‘Western and imperialist powers’.[46]
A third and smaller alignment consists of Turkey, Qatar and their clients. It is unequal in both its capabilities and agenda, since Turkey is by far the greater and more ambitious partner, but Qatari wealth and influence means they can make themselves count. The grouping has more limited ambitions centred on dominating its extended neighbourhood (Turkey in northern Syria, northern Iraq, Azerbaijan and the Mediterranean) and maintaining sovereignty (Qatar) respectively.[47] Turkey is furthermore involved in a prolonged war of frames, words and court judgments against the Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), as well as a military campaign against PKK and YPG across the region, in which Qatar has little part.
Rivalry, grey zones and hotspots
These alignments should not, however, be viewed as fixed and existentially opposed categories. To begin with, the groupings centred on Iran and Turkey are not in stark conflict with one another. Even though tensions are growing in Azerbijan and northern Iraq (e.g. Sinjar) due to Turkey’s expanded military activities, these have so far been contained. The primary regional conflict is between the Iran-centred and US-centred alignments. At its core lies Israel’s and the Saudis’ longstanding hostility towards Iran – and vice versa. Both Tel Aviv and Riyadh are ultimately too weak to contain Iran at the regional level by themselves, but they have so far successfully enlisted the US as their champion. This primary conflict is supplemented by a secondary conflict between the Turkey-centred and US-centred alignments that plays out in the background.
There are also several grey zones between the blocs that serve as ‘bridging’ areas and reduce confrontation. For example, the Al-Ula declaration of January 2021 brought Saudi Arabia and Qatar closer together, reflecting Riyadh’s historically lower threat perception of the Muslim Brotherhood compared with Abu Dhabi’s. In contrast, the UAE has had to remain on better terms with Iran throughout Tehran’s confrontation with the US due to the vulnerability of Dubai’s trade, financial and logistical hub business model to Iranian military pressure – as highlighted by its strikes on UAE shipping and the Abqaiq oil facilities in Saudi Arabia in 2019. Another important bridging area is Syria, where Turkish, Iranian and Russian interests have so far proved to be largely compatible, despite recurrent clashes in Idlib. While it is tempting to give Russia’s role in the Middle East greater significance in this constellation of three competing regional alignments, it has neither the presence nor capabilities to act as a significant extra-regional influencer except for its intervention in Syria in 2015.[48] Moscow also has its hands full in securing its continued influence in Belarus, Ukraine and Central Asia.
There are, however, a number of hotspots across the region where these alignments clash. Syria and Iraq remain the primary zone of contestation. In Syria, Iran-linked forces together with Russia oppose US- and Turkish-linked forces across the north and northeast of the country. In northern Iraq, contestation increases between Iran-linked groups and Turkey, with the KDP acting as Ankara’s accomplice. Iraq also features a smattering of US bases critical to its presence in Syria, which are under regular pinprick attacks from Iran-linked forces. In both countries, a low-level IS insurgency continues.
The waters of the Persian Gulf and Yemen represent secondary zones of contestation. The former is basically an area that Iran uses to signal when economic measures against it become too restrictive and more leeway must be provided. This takes the form of limited but highly targeted military actions. Yemen is a secondary zone because it is too far removed from the heart of the Middle East, even though Iran’s links with the Houthis enable it to keep Riyadh focused south rather than north as it strategically should be. Finally, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza are and remain a tertiary zone of contestation between Iran- and US-linked forces. From a geopolitical perspective, it is mostly an escalation area for Iran, which it holds in reserve as a trump card to deter overt and/or direct Israeli and US attacks on Iran itself.
The presence of religious militant groups in the primary zone of contestation – i.e. the likes of IS, Al-Qaeda, Hurras al-Din and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria and Iraq – connects geopolitical competition to political orders across the region. Such militancy is primarily a by-product of authoritarian rule. Ruling elites use religion as a tool to mobilise militants (such as Iran’s Shi’a axis of resistance) and/or encourage ultra-conservative forms of religion to maintain power (as in some of the Gulf states). This polarises religious convictions and identity, as well as boosting religious agency, in a manner that serves the interests of ruling elites. Yet, it also enables radical thought and action. The marginalisation of entire population segments by many of the region’s authoritarian orders similarly increases the risk of radicalisation. In this sense, religious militants are the canary in the coalmine of authoritarianism and hold up a mirror to their own governments.[49] Effective authoritarian systems repress radicalisation at home, but this merely displaces militancy to peripheral or conflict zones where authoritarian control fades. Even though deaths due to terrorism declined steeply after 2017 – the result of a concerted international effort against IS – a revival of sorts might therefore be expected.
Outlook
The primary regional conflict between Iran- and US-linked alignments will continue whether a new nuclear deal is arrived at or not, with the crucial difference that unsuccessful negotations will intensify the conflict whereas a successful re-conclusion can dampen it. The absence of a new nuclear deal will continue to tie the US more strongly to the Middle East than it wishes to be in view of China’s siren call. It will also prolong the latent risk of an escalatory cycle of tit-for-tat incidents. But as long as Iranian society and its public budget can withstand the economic onslaught of US sanctions, realising a nuclear deal 2.0 is likely to require the US to cut its losses (as it just did in Afghanistan) or settle for less than it played for. The alternative is military strikes on Iran, which is certain to trigger a wider regional conflagration that will make the Syrian war pale in comparison. Meanwhile, Turkey will continue to pursue its regionalised war against the YPG/PYD in Syria and the PKK in Iraq. Turkey’s assertive nationalism, especially if infused with more radical forms of political Islam, may yet deepen sectarian polarisation across the region. While recent dialogues are encouraging – especially between Tehran and Riyadh,[50] but also between Ankara and Riyadh as well as between Ankara and Abu Dhabi – underlying conflicts remain unresolved.[51]