Populations across the Middle East face mounting socioeconomic problems in terms of poverty, inequality, corruption and unemployment, while the mostly authoritarian orders governing their lives have limited capabilities – and even less intent – to address such problems in a root-and-branch like fashion. Large-scale reforms are not on the cards and the re-entrenchment of authoritarianism continues across the region, including in its largest countries: Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Tense geopolitical rivalry also worsens socioeconomic problems and sustains authoritarian orders through the securitisation of discourse and policies that distracts from domestic governance shortcomings. US interventions in its capacity as extra-regional power have proven to be uniquely unconducive to regional stability over the past two decades. Despite recent talks between Ankara, Tehran, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, more crises and brinkmanship are likely in the near term since none of the underlying conflict drivers across the region have been resolved. This indicates more misery lies in store for many in the region and greater negative external effects for those living around it. It may be possible to restructure the vicious cycle of socioeconomic deterioration, authoritarian order and geopolitical rivalry more or less peacefully, but only in the long term as it will require a gradual re-ordering of power and social relations. Faster methods are likely to be far more violent. From this perspective, regional policies that the EU and/or the Netherlands could consider to nudge such processes along fall into several categories:
Increase efforts to contain conflict in the short term. From a national security perspective, the EU/Netherlands should invest in conflict containment at a much larger scale to reduce the impact of regional conflict on its own society, but also to diminish its incidence in the Middle East. Interventions can include:
Limit practices that enable conflict – such as stopping arms sales to the region, but also refusing elites from the region second passports (and similar services and goodies) that provide them with an opt-out card when conflict heats up.
Increase humanitarian aid to the region’s 18 million IDPs and refugees, as well as the communities hosting them. External support will remain essential for these groups for quite some time and should be maintained as an inadequate international safety net of sorts. Support should be given in ways that improve resilience and economic agency where possible.
Impose stricter controls on (illicit) trade to make it more difficult to finance conflicts through e.g. drug sales, sanction busting (e.g. Syria under Assad) and whitewashing the proceeds of corruption.
Stop legitimising authoritarian governments internationally by elevating their status beyond what is required for the conduct of normal diplomacy. Special welcomes, honours and privileges – such as a Legion d’Honneur for Egyptian President Sisi – should be replaced with a more critical conversation about corruption, human rights and repression. The notion that one can be feted internationally and yet repress an entire society must be discarded as quickly as possible.
Engage in regional peacebuilding efforts. From a longer-term conflict resolution perspective, the EU/Netherlands should invest in economic and educational upgrades that create large-scale benefits for populations across the region AND are attractive from a regime survival perspective. Interventions can include:
Create a OSCE-type confidence-building platform. A series of conferences can be initiated through existing centres of relatively independent thought, such as the Lebanese American University (Lebanon), METU (Turkey) and the University of Tehran (Iran), with the aim of informally bringing together individuals who are close to ruling elites over a sustained period of time. The aim is to identify and put in place regional confidence-building measures through dialogue, study visits, research and confidential briefings.
Set up a Middle Eastern version of the EBRD or ADB. The aim is to link such regional dialogue with a practical facility to increase socioeconomic cross-border connectivity where progress allows for it (e.g. electricity supply from the Gulf to Iraq or Turkish-Iraqi joint water management). The facility can be funded in large part by the Gulf countries as a way of boosting their international legitimacy, as long as it is professionally run and governed by all participating states.
Initiate a large-scale programme to promote high-quality education and study. This can for example include founding two or three Lebanese American University-style institutions for independent higher education research with funding for at least a decade. Such establishments should be located either in marginalised areas or make an effort to attract students from marginalised populations. A Middle Eastern version of Erasmus, with EU participation, is another idea.
Discretely support the right to protest where possible. More contentiously, enduring protests across the Middle East point to the usefulness of developing clearer and braver protocols to support protests based on international human rights agreements. While political reform in societies cannot be effectively influenced by external parties, nor should it be, defending the right to life, protest and dissent is a fundamental tenet of the corpus of UN values. Interventions can include:
Create fast and generous asylum procedures for protestors at risk. Such procedures can be temporary in nature but should enable protestors whose lives are threatened to exit the country quickly. Short-term protection in embassy compounds or safe houses could also be an initial option. Recent history has shown that regimes do not hesitate to resort to targeted assassinations and this literally kills both civic engagement and protest.
Standardise joint EU demarches against violent suppression of protests in a way that gives them teeth. Where repression of protest escalates into sustained violence, the EU ambassador in-country should be able to activite a standard protocol for a joint demarche with all EU Member States. Should violent repression nevertheless continue, aid, grants and loans should be made conditional on its cessation in a matter of days.
We outline these proposals on the assumption that the EU/Netherlands have neither the intent nor the capability required to engage in the hard security issues that sit at the core of regional geopolitical rivalry. We also assume that wholesale political reform is not on the cards and/or is difficult to stimulate externally, but that more incremental administrative and policy reform might nevertheless be attractive to ruling elites. If such reforms can be designed in a manner that creates greater opportunities and rights for existing social groups, such as the middle classes, SME owners or cross-border population groups, they can have beneficial civic effects in the longer term.