This chapter explores the development and current nature of Georgia’s relations with the European Union. It first assesses the development of Georgia-EU relations from the 1990s up until today. It then turns to the current role that the EU plays in terms of democratisation and European integration. Third, the chapter delves more deeply into Georgia’s protracted conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
EU relations with Georgia revisited
EU relations with Georgia go back to just after the fall of the Soviet Union. Already in the 1990s and early 2000s the EU assisted the country in its state-building process through financial and technical support, creating an institutionalised relationship through a so-called Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The EU and US sought to promote the democratic development of the country, including when rejecting the outcomes of Georgia’s rigged elections in 2003. This contributed to the fall of President Shevardnadze and the rise to power of Michael Saakashvili’s United National Movement.[42]
Georgia became a part of the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood policy in 2004 and of the multilateral Eastern Partnership framework in 2009. The EU’s increasing engagement with the South Caucasus countries was inspired by the EU’s eastwards enlargement that brought the region closer to the EU and formed a reflection of EC President Prodi’s vision to create a ‘ring of friends’ around the EU. It also mirrored the EU’s approach towards the Southern Neighbourhood, for which another multilateral format (the Union for the Mediterranean) was created earlier.[43] The EU as such initially mostly adopted a soft-power approach towards Georgia, focussing its engagement on the promotion of good governance and democratisation, as well as the development of economic relations.
In 2008, however, the EU negotiated a ceasefire between Russia and Georgia to end the five-day war over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Demonstrating its actorness in the security realm, the EU shortly thereafter also installed an EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) on the ABL of the two breakaway territories, and also created the function of a Special Representative (EUSR) “for the South-Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia”.[44] The EU further altered its soft-power approach when the ENP and EaP throughout the 2010s became more interest-driven and the European Commission, especially under the Presidency of Von der Leyen, became more ambitious to play a more geopolitical role.[45]
A pivotal moment in the Georgia-EU relationship arose in 2014 with the signing of the Association Agreement (AA), which entered into force in 2016. The AA provided for far-reaching cooperation and an institutionalised relationship that also required Georgia to make far-reaching reforms in line with the acquis, a step reflecting Georgia’s ambitions to become a full member of the European Union. Another step in EU integration was achieved in 2017 with the acquirement of visa-free travel for Georgian citizens to the EU.[46]
Also economically, relations between Georgia and the EU have steadily increased in the past couple of decades. As discussed in chapter 2, the EU has been Georgia’s largest export destination and source of imports in the past decade, providing the EU with economic leverage over the country in addition to its normative leverage. The AA, which entered into force in 2016, played a major role in consolidating trade between the EU and Georgia as it included a DCFTA allowing for lowering trade barriers to the EU markets, building on earlier agreements going back to the 1990s. Georgia has in the past few years searched to capitalise from its position between Asia and Europe on the Black Sea coast, aiming to become a transit hub as part of the Middle Corridor of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that has gained in attractiveness as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[47] In addition to improving road and rail connections between the country’s borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey, Georgia also began dredging for an ambitious deep sea port project in Anaklia in 2017. The project was discontinued due to domestic political rivalry in 2020, although 2022 saw some first attempts at its revival.[48]
In the mid-2010s, Georgia became the EU’s ‘poster child’ of the Eastern Partnership region with decisive reforms made first under Saakashvili’s UNM government, and from 2012 under the Georgian Dream. However, alignment with European values and standards was met with problems in both periods. The Saakashvili government made good headway with economic modernisation and tackling petty corruption, amongst other things by modernising the Georgian police force with the help of Western partners. At the same time, high-level corruption remained and power centralised around the UNM with serious human rights abuses, amongst others in the prison system. From 2012 onwards Georgian Dream initially undertook a reform-minded path, but serious democratic reform efforts in the past few years have now ground to a halt. The oligarchic and personal interests of GD’s founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, who in 2012-2013 also served as the country’s prime minister, are having a major influence on the country’s politics, even if Ivanishvili has no formal political function.[49] In the past few years, especially concerning political criteria, the country has been moving away from EU standards, with the European Commission reporting ‘setbacks in the key areas of rule of law, governance and human rights’ in its 2022 Association Agreement implementation report.[50]
In spite of stalling reforms and incentivised by Ukrainian and Moldovan applications for EU membership after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Georgia formally applied for EU candidate membership in 2022. However, the country received a negative opinion from the European Commission due to the level of political polarisation and the lack of reform progress in recent years. Nevertheless, the country has received a formal perspective as a ‘potential EU candidate country’, which, even if it is conditional upon the fulfilment of 12 conditions described in the Avis and building on the agenda of the Association agreement, as agreed earlier, constitutes a new chapter in EU-Georgia relations.[51]
The EU as a promoter of democracy through European integration
Since Georgia has entered the EU enlargement context, the EU wields considerable influence over Georgia through the conditionality mechanism of the European integration process. The EU’s ability to determine what ‘sticks’ and/or ‘carrots’ to apply makes it clear that, at least in theory, it can alter decision-making in the Georgian government as well as influencing societal preferences. In practice, the EU currently has to consider two interconnected issues: how to move forward on the candidate status, as well as how to address the internal political polarisation in Georgia.
Regarding candidate status, one of the major intermediate ‘carrots’, Georgians are strongly divided about the extent to which Georgia missing out earlier this year was justified. A majority believe that Georgia deserved the status on both geopolitical and technocratic grounds. In their view it faces the same Russian imperialism as Ukraine and, despite stagnation, is objectively still a frontrunner in terms of alignment with the EU. Indeed, according to a 2021 CEPS report comparing the alignment of the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus countries, Georgia scored better than three out of six long-standing candidates in the Balkans, as well as better than Moldova and Ukraine on both economic and political criteria, but that does not depict the full picture.[52]
Given the polarised political climate and increasing signs of state capture in the country, the expectation of most Georgian experts that granting candidate status could provide a motivation for further reform, can be met with serious doubts. Experiences in the Western Balkans show that encouragement from the EU by creating incentives can only be effective if there is already a reform-minded government in place.[53] There is therefore a case to be made for the EU’s July 2022 decision not to grant candidate status, both for the credibility of the EU and to maintain pressure on the government to reform. In the ensuing protests on the streets of Tbilisi just after the EU’s decision, Georgian citizens voiced their discontent towards their government for failing to secure candidate status, showing their understanding for the EU’s step as a result of the failure of the GD government to deliver on reforms.
The EU’s decision not to grant Georgia candidate status in 2022 has proven to be all the more justified in the context of the developments of early March 2023, when Georgian Dream attempted to push a law through the Georgian parliament, proposed by a parliamentary faction close to the government, that would label civil society organisations as foreign agents when receiving more than 20 percent of their funding from abroad. Such organisations, e.g. those focussed on human rights or democracy, would subsequently be subject to rigid reporting requirements to the Georgian government. In the case of a failure to comply, they would face considerable fines, with individuals also risking prison sentences. GD lawmakers argued that the law would serve to limit foreign influence in Georgia and function in a similar fashion to a US law on foreign interference. In practice, however, it more closely resembled the Russian Foreign Agent Law that the Kremlin introduced in 2012 and meant the end of the beginning for the freedom of expression and association in Georgia’s northern neighbour.
The law would have made the work of civil society organisations practically infeasible, if it were not for the counter-reaction that followed. On 8 and 9 March Georgian citizens flooded the streets of Tbilisi to protest against what they described as ‘the Russian law’ and demanded its withdrawal. EU leaders for their part made it abundantly clear that the law would be diametrically opposed to Georgia’s EU integration path.[54] The US State Department and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights voiced similar concerns.[55] The combined pressure from citizens and Georgia’s foreign partners eventually forced the Georgian government to revoke the law on 10 March, thereby undoing the earlier adoption of its first reading a few days earlier.
The developments have clarified that the Georgian Dream government’s nominal EU integration agenda is in practice influenced by more narrow interests. The anti-Western rhetoric from the Georgian government in the past two years and the lack of reform progress make Georgia’s current commitment to EU integration at least questionable. It remains unclear whether political consolidation, a geopolitical shift towards Russia, or both are the implicit and overarching objectives of the Georgian government.[56] What is clear is that Georgia has in the past couple of years become more prone to Russian leverage as a result of its political course set by the oligarch Ivanishvili.[57]
Second, the developments have demonstrated both the fragility of Georgia’s EU path, but also the pro-European orientation of the Georgian population. The Tbilisi protests of early March found support throughout the country. Overall support for the EU has remained high in Georgia in recent years, with 85% of Georgians supporting the EU in 2022.[58] Georgian society may have developed more democratic resilience than the country’s political system, which suffers from strong political polarisation.
That means that in the time ahead the EU should closely monitor the implementation of the 12 conditions in the Avis and subsequently grant candidate status only if these conditions are fully fulfilled. This would fit well within a “normative and consistent approach that offers a longer-term perspective of good governance, transparency and the rule of law” which does not necessarily undermine the EU’s geopolitical clout, but can, on the contrary, reinforce it, as the EU’s values are its “most potent geopolitical instruments”.[59] At the same time, the EU will need to remain attentive and support civil society and its resilience. It can do so amongst other things by countering disinformation campaigns, including those that exploit fears of war or social conservative values and religious sentiments in Georgia.
A specific challenge for the EU is how to deal with political polarisation in Georgia. The European Commission recognised the problem in its Avis by conditioning candidate status on Georgia’s willingness to ‘address the issue of political polarisation, through ensuring cooperation across political parties in the spirit of the April 19 agreement’.[60] This agreement was mediated by the EU with the personal involvement of Council President Charles Michel after the 2018 elections. These led to a boycott of parliament and other institutions by the majority of the opposition, who questioned both the outcome and the election process as such. While securing a partial return of the opposition to parliament, the agreement did not resolve polarisation at large. As scholars already warned in April 2021, “signing the deal was the easy part” and the agreement broke down soon afterwards when Georgian Dream withdrew its signature, arguing that UNM had used the document as a campaigning tool.[61]
Problematically, Georgia's European integration as well as its democratisation have become a zero-sum game and a plaything of partisan politics for the two major parties.[62] Moreover, in spite of efforts from EU member states like the Netherlands to enhance political pluralism, new political parties such as European Georgia are unable to consolidate themselves between the UNM and the Georgian Dream, or – like ‘People’s Power’, for example – are merely a spinoff at arm’s-length of the GD.[63]
The partial failure of the EU’s mediation efforts raises major questions about the desirability of EU involvement at such a high level in the internal politics of partner countries, as well as about the next steps to be taken by the EU. Various people have asserted in interviews with the researchers of this report that Georgian politicians did not sufficiently appreciate the value of EU intervention at such a high level.[64] Given that Michel’s exceptional involvement did not work, the ball may now be in the court of Georgian political parties. The EU and its member states could best retain influence and credibility by applying strict conditionality requirements to reassure citizens that the EU does not reward political polarisation or undemocratic processes by continuing its support for political plurality and civil society, in equal measure, through more technical assistance. At the same time, the European Parliament should refrain as much as possible from offering largely unconditional party-political support to its associated member parties in Georgia. It is therefore a welcome development that in response to the foreign agent law episode, the S&D criticised the steps made by the Georgian Dream, which is associated with the political family.[65] In short, as other authors have described it, the EU should show some “tough love”.[66]
The protracted conflicts: How should the EU deal with Abkhazia and South Ossetia?
Apart from its role as a promotor of good governance and democracy, the EU has a stake in the solution of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts. Various of its bodies are directly or indirectly involved, among which are the High Representative and Vice President of the EU (HR/VP), the EUSR and the EUMM. The EU is also amongst the co-chairs of the Geneva International Discussions (GID), the formal negotiation format for the resolution of the conflict, together with the OSCE and the UN.
Georgia itself implements a two-track approach with regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On the one hand, it focusses on de-occupation through diplomatic means in the international arena, and on the other on human-focused reconciliation through people-to-people contacts and confidence building measures (CBMs).[67]
In its rhetoric, the Georgian government links the Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as much as possible to Russian actions in Ukraine, which is not entirely justified given the different nature and origins of the conflicts. Such a perspective especially ignores the domestic dynamics in Abkhazia, where the ethnic Abkhaz population is far from happy with cultural Russification and Russian attempts to buy Abkhazian land and real estate (such as the beach resort of Pitsunda).[68] The appointment of the de facto 'Minister of Foreign Affairs' Inal Ardzinba, who was actually installed by Russia, shows that the region has difficulty in resisting Russian pressure, even if Russia since 2008 formally regards both regions as independent states.
The situation in South Ossetia is markedly different from Abkhazia, as there is less domestic political pluralism and less desire to retain a degree of national autonomy; instead, the region appears more open to join the Russian Federation in order to unify with North Ossetia. Moscow has held off on this and uses the scarcely populated area as a staging ground in order to maintain military pressure on Georgia. Russia could potentially use its control over the region to quickly close off the increasingly important energy, railroad and road connections as part of the 'Middle Corridor' from Azerbaijan to Turkey which run just south of the ABL. Russia continues to ‘borderise’ the line of contact and move it further south, even if such attempts have decreased in intensity since the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[69], [70] In spite of this decrease, the EUMM remains pivotal in keeping the situation under control and more direct supervision of the ABL through innovative means may be considered to alleviate the risks.
One factor that may explain the decrease – at least for the time being – in borderisation efforts is that Russian troops have withdrawn from both Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the past year to be deployed in Ukraine. Already in March last year, about 800 troops from the Russian Gudauta Base Abkhazia and 1200 from Tskhinvali in South Ossetia were seen crossing into Russia in the direction of Eastern Ukraine.[71] According to different interviewees, the total number of Russian troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia ranged between 10,000 and 12,000 before the invasion, but after withdrawals throughout 2022, now mostly the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards remain.[72]
Even if its security presence has decreased, Russia is increasingly putting pressure on Abkhazia as it senses more political openness in the region towards Georgia and the West. The EU will need to stand ready to make use of any opportunities to alleviate negative effects of such Russian pressures on Abkhazia. One key element is to ensure that Abkhaz continue to be able to travel to Georgia and/or the European Union. By keeping the door open for cooperation, the EU would signal that it supports those Abkhaz who do not want to be dominated by Russia. The EU’s political approach to both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which can be described as ‘non-recognition and engagement’, provides a solid basis to continue a pragmatic approach for the benefit of citizens in the region.
One of our Georgian interlocutors furthermore noted that ‘If in Abkhazia you take 100 kids per year to European universities, in 10 years it is a gamechanger’.[73] Such educational exchanges could indeed be one way of ensuring that the Abkhaz remain in contact with the rest of Europe in spite of Russian efforts to Russify the region and make it fully dependent on the Russian Federation. For example, since 2016 Russia has ordered the phasing out of Georgian-language education in Abkhazia which leads to barriers for any potential reintegration or constructive cooperation.[74] This provides Georgia as well as the EU with the challenge of ensuring that the younger generation in the region are not further alienated from Georgia proper. EU measures against Russification, where possible, will be needed.
Lastly, when it comes to the Georgia-Abkhazia relationship, the EU will also need to maintain its focus on Georgia itself. The Georgian government has taken a rather maximalist approach towards Abkhazia, focussing on full reintegration instead of more gradual measures.[75] Specifically, the Georgian discourse has lacked propositions for a common future in which Abkhazia can retain some form of autonomy. Confidence building measures will need to remain in place and will need to lead to a gradual process, eventually addressing difficult highly political topics.