Since 2012, at least 57,000 people have been killed as insurgents aligned with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have waged a bloody campaign across northern and central Mali, swathes of Burkina Faso and Niger’s border regions. They are now expanding into northern Benin and Togo.[1]
Behind these grim statistics, livestock,[2] a key economic and cultural resource for rural communities, have long been integral to conflict dynamics and the war economy.[3] Some of the first people to join militant groups in northern and central Mali in 2012 and 2013 were pastoralists who sought to protect themselves from armed cattle rustlers.[4] As the war has evolved and expanded, livestock have served as war booty for anyone who takes up arms and provides financial resources for non-states groups to continue fighting.[5] Smuggling cattle far from where they were stolen and mixing them into licit livestock flows extends the war economy into neighbouring countries, potentially eroding stability far from the front line of the conflict.
Among the actors associated with livestock and cattle[6] rustling in the Sahel today are affiliates of JNIM and the Islamic State. These insurgents are reported to acquire livestock, then sell them into the livestock market system.[7] According to a 2023 report by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, Katiba Macina, a JNIM affiliate in central Mali, is estimated to have collected CFA 440 million per year (around GBP 572,000) in one district under its control through livestock theft. Similarly, Ansaroul Islam, a JNIM affiliate in Burkina Faso, was reportedly making between CFA 25 million and 30 million (between GBP 32,500 and 39,000) per month from cattle rustling in the north of the country.[8]
However, cattle rustling in the Sahel is not only the prerogative of violent extremists. Communal militias and even national armies have been accused of stealing livestock (often from the pastoralist Fulbe community, an ethnic group that is frequently scapegoated for jihadist violence).[9] Meanwhile, bandits across the region have taken advantage of insecurity to engage in cattle rustling, either coexisting, cooperating or in some cases merging with extremists or communal militias.[10]
Methods and the extent of cattle rustling vary considerably. For example, in areas controlled by governments, rugas[11] and police track down and prosecute cattle rustlers. Meanwhile, in the Niger delta in central Mali, JNIM insurgents also track down cattle rustlers and return stolen cattle – in exchange for organised payments of what they refer to as “zakat” (a form of Islamic charity but in this context a form of Islamic tax) – as part of their governance strategy. As a result, cattle rustling in the sense of armed ambushes or attacks on herders, is relatively rare in these zones.
However, in other areas, generally where armed groups and governments contest territory, the same actors are accused of engaging in cattle rustling or collaborating with cattle rustlers.[12] Thus, while JNIM affiliates guard against bandits engaged in cattle rustling in central Mali, in areas where they are actively fighting the government and civilian auxiliaries, such as in eastern and southern Burkina Faso, they are known to collaborate with bandits engaged in cattle rustling.[13] Given the range of contexts and actors, it is difficult to draw more than general conclusions about cattle rustling and smuggling, and what can be done.
The political economy of cattle rustling in the tri-border area
This paper focuses on cattle rustling and smuggling in the tri-border region of Burkina Faso, Ghana and Togo (Figure 1). The area comprises Centre-Est region in Burkina Faso, Savanes region in Togo, and Upper East, North East and Northern regions in Ghana. The paper addresses a key knowledge gap: how has the evolution of the conflict in the Sahel affected the cattle supply chain to coastal states and impacted actors in the value chain?
The tri-border region has long been an important trade node connecting the arid Sahel with coastal West Africa. Given limited development and relatively high poverty in these largely rural areas, trade includes both licit and illicit flows.[14] Similar border zones in northern Benin and eastern Burkina Faso have served as staging grounds for insurgents to tap into illicit economies and co-opt bandits, smugglers and other outlaws.[15]
Reports indicate that JNIM operatives were engaging with bandits, hunters, herders and artisanal gold miners in Centre-Est (Burkina Faso) at least four years before they began their active campaign.[16] Rising illicit cross-border trade, banditry and cattle rustling in northern Togo were reported before attacks increased there.[17] In northern Ghana, there are indications that insurgents are involved in illicit cross-border trade between Ghana and Burkina Faso on the Burkinabe side of the border, including stolen livestock.[18]
However, the scale of the Burkina Faso-Ghana illicit cattle trade, the value chain (where profits are made) and the wider political economy (who benefits) of this illicit industry remain unknown. Figures from Ghana’s Veterinary Services Directorate show that imports of cattle from Ghana’s neighbours tripled between 2016 and 2019.[19] Moreover, the escalation of the conflict in south-eastern Burkina Faso (and to a lesser extent, Togo) in 2022 led to more cattle rustling, largely by JNIM militants, but also by bandits and a small number of rogue elements of the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie – VDP), a government-supported militia intended to act as auxiliaries to the military.
Little is known about how insurgents and other violent actors participate in illicit economies in this area, where they sit in longer supply chains, and which other actors are knowingly or unknowingly contributing to insurgent financing. This report seeks to fill this gap.
The right moment for a joint response by West African states
The knowledge gap is hampering Ghana, Burkina Faso and Togo from confronting cattle rustling in a sustainable way. However, there are also other reasons why a response has not gained momentum.
Political relations in the region over the last few years have temporarily made confronting this dire security situation more difficult. Public allegations by Ghana’s former president Nana Akufo-Addo regarding Russian private military company Wagner Group’s presence in southern Burkina Faso soured personal relations with Burkinabe President Ibrahim Traoré until the end of Akufo-Addo’s term.[20] The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States regional grouping and the creation of the Alliance of Sahelian States (Alliance des États du Sahel – AES) have further complicated matters.
The election of John Mahama as Ghana’s new president in December 2024, however, opened a new chapter in relations between the two countries. Mahama, who hails from the northern border with Burkina Faso, has signalled a desire to reset and deepen engagement through a visit to Ouagadougou and the appointment of an ambassador to the AES.[21] Meanwhile, Togo’s president, Faure Gnassingbé, already enjoys good personal relations with both President Traoré and President Mahama.
This report details how livestock are stolen in Burkina Faso and Togo by conflict actors and smuggled across the border into Ghana where they are laundered into the licit cattle market system. Beyond providing income to extremists, the report finds that evolving cattle rustling and smuggling dynamics have also empowered a range of intermediaries such as cattle dealers and butchers, who reap even larger benefits from cattle smuggling than rustlers. This enmeshes more actors in the trade dynamics fuelling the conflict, including Ghanaians, and constitutes a threat to all three countries’ security.
The countries share an interest in dismantling insurgent networks that operate on their territory, and advancing regional unity and sovereignty. The variations in how insurgents operate mean that each country needs to pursue slightly different policies to achieve the same goal. In Ghana, for example, intercepting stolen cattle, prosecuting intermediaries and reforming the livestock system present opportunities for the government to ensure security, foster development and build regional unity. Such policies to address cattle rustling could allow the Ghanaian government to tackle JNIM funding without directly confronting the group militarily and risking further escalation. Reforming the livestock system and investing in domestic production could spur development and disincentivise cross-border smuggling.
In brief, by pursuing their own objectives, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Togo alike will help one another’s shared security concerns.
Data and methodology
The paper is based on three iterative rounds of data collection. The first, in mid-December 2023, consisted of 32 qualitative interviews and six focus group discussions with Ghanaian and Togolese respondents in northern Ghana on the political economy of the cattle market. The second was a household survey, in January and February 2024, in Ghana’s North East and Upper East regions of 150 Ghanaian and 150 Togolese respondents on cattle markets and local authority structures. The third was an additional round of qualitative data collection, in October 2024, involving 30 one-on-one interviews with cattle market actors in north-eastern Ghana.[22]
Due to the illicit, fragmented and volatile nature of the market, reliable figures on flows and prices of cattle rustled and smuggled are difficult to ascertain, including on the relative importance of Ghana in the West Africa cattle market. The figures presented in this paper reflect an average of the prices presented at the time of the research.