Generally, three roles can be discerned on the pre-abattoir side of the cattle market: cattle rustlers (insurgents, bandits and to a lesser extent rogue VDP members); intermediaries (consisting of cattle dealers, butchers and some rogue VDP members and small and large buyers such as butchers and dealers); and those who – often unknowingly – facilitate the trade in stolen cattle.[67]

A political economy analysis of the roles of specific actors in the market yields three key insights summarised best as the development of – often unknowingly – symbiotic relationships between insurgents and commercial actors.

First, the cattle rustling value chain moves from an illicit to a licit market the further along the value chain one goes. This means a variety of licit actors in the market (including consumers) are unknowingly contributing to the market for cattle rustling. For example, a veterinary officer who provides a “movement permit” for a truck loaded with cattle may inadvertently facilitate the trade in stolen cattle.

Second, somewhat surprisingly, the actors who stand to gain most from the present cattle rustling trade are not the insurgents. Although JNIM generates income from cattle rustling, those who are already embedded in local society – such as butchers or experienced cattle dealers – gain the most from the present organisation of the illicit livestock trade.[68] Such actors might pose obstacles if Burkina Faso and Ghana were to jointly increase their efforts to counter the illicit cattle market.

Third, those who gain the most from the trade in stolen cattle leverage their wider authority and legitimacy in the local context to gain an advantage in the cattle market. Two groups that fit this description are the Ghanaian butchers mentioned above who organise cattle rustling in Togo, and rogue VDP elements who engage in rustling and trading. These positions provide structural advantages to these groups but may also generate obstacles to implementing policies that aim to address the illicit cattle trade.

Below we discuss three separate ‘groups’ of actors in the cattle value chain from the moment cattle is rustled to the moment it enters licit trade: Group A includes an array of actors involved in cattle rustling, Group B specifies a set of intermediaries and Group C finally points at different facilitators.

Group A.1 Rustlers: Insurgents

Insurgents are reported to hold and sell the majority of stolen cattle in the tri-border area.[70] Their primary motivation for stealing and selling livestock appears to be to fund their war effort.[71] Two respondents indicated that, for a while, trusted cattle dealers who sold stolen livestock for insurgents brought critical resources such as fuel and food directly to insurgents in their forest camps.[72] While insurgents have been known to demand zakat in the form of livestock in Burkina Faso’s Centre-Est region since early 2022, JNIM has not tried to curb banditry or track down stolen livestock in areas under its influence in the tri-border areas.[73] This differs from parts of Mopti and Ségou regions in central Mali, where JNIM’s governance model is more developed.[74] This suggests that, at this point, guarding against cattle rustling is not a component of the group’s legitimisation strategy in the area.

However, as the war escalated in late 2022 and movement to government-controlled urban areas became harder, insurgents narrowed the pool of trusted cattle dealers who could sell their stolen livestock in the market.

In response, insurgents have increasingly sold livestock directly to buyers who visit them in their forest camps. According to multiple respondents, in these settings insurgents often do not price each individual cow. Instead, they pick one they perceive as average, assign it a price (between GHS 3,000 and 5,000, equivalent to between GBP 163 and 273), multiplying this by the number of cattle they are selling to arrive at a total amount.[75] This often means that JNIM sells cattle far below the estimated market price (depending on season, size and location GHS 6,400 to 17,000, equivalent to GBP 384 to 1026). While insurgents have told buyers this pricing method reflects their religious ideology against overcharging in business, merchants and butchers suspect it also helps them to sell large numbers of cattle quickly.[76]

Group A.2 Rustlers: Bandits

Bandits, on the other hand, over time have lost the independence they previously enjoyed in Centre-Est region. Before the war, small groups of young men with weapons were the main actors involved in cattle rustling in the tri-border area. Initially, those who collaborated with JNIM gained access to weapons and larger markets, while operating without significant oversight.

However, particularly since early 2022, bandits in Burkina Faso have either been forced to merge with JNIM or, in a smaller number of cases, have opted to join the VDP.[77] In other areas – for example, on the Togo-Ghana border near Chereponi – some non-aligned bandits have abandoned cattle rustling, viewing it as too risky given the mysterious killing of bandits in 2023 (see above). Respondents indicated that a small number of bandits still operated independently in Burkina Faso, although they largely limited themselves to rounding up livestock from communities that had fled, taking the livestock into Ghana.[78] Even this carries great risks. One respondent detailed how insurgents ambushed a group of bandits and took their livestock.[79] In other cases, they have been cheated by butchers or cattle dealers.[80]

However, the situation is slightly different on the Ghana-Togo border. By the end of 2023, interviewees in two focus groups in Chereponi with Togolese and Ghanaian respondents, respectively, pointed out how cattle rustling remains a reality in their communities. They argued that “cattle rustling has been a age-old business” and that groups of bandits still “rob people of their cattle”.[81] Although the covert presence of insurgents was reported in 2024, bandits are most likely the primary group still operating in this area.

Group B.1 Burkinabe intermediaries: VDP members

The VDP, on the other hand, occupies a more complicated position in the illicit cattle trade. Our research revealed that a small number of individuals who are enrolled in the VDP in Centre-Est region also engage in cattle rustling and smuggling. These rogue individuals are illegally leveraging their position as state-sanctioned militia to move between the rural front line of the war and urban areas where the government remains in control and where cattle can be sold into the wider, licit market system.[82]

Several respondents also claimed that since mid-2023 a small number of rogue VDP members have operated as intermediaries for the insurgents. These individuals are alleged to transport cattle from insurgent camps in forested areas and bring them directly to trusted merchants or regular livestock markets.[83] Two respondents specifically noted that rogue VDP members who engage in smuggling are keen to move cattle from the area where they were stolen. In some cases, the rogue VDP members themselves travel to Togo or Ghana; in other cases they instruct merchants to sell the stolen cattle over the border.[84] These rogue individuals take on significant risk in dealing with insurgents, and are reportedly so keen to offload cattle quickly that they sell below market prices (although not as low as the insurgents do). One respondent indicated that when rogue VDP members act as intermediaries, it eats into the profits of merchants who previously purchased directly from insurgents in their forest camps.[85]

However, respondents in northern Ghana indicated that in late 2024 Burkinabe officials began to investigate and arrest individuals – both private citizens and rogue VDP members – alleged to be helping insurgents sell cattle. The government also temporarily closed cattle markets in Bittou and Cinkassé. As a result, a few (former) VDP members fled to Ghana to avoid arrest and prosecution.[86]

Fieldwork for this study also revealed allegations that specific individuals within the VDP participate in cattle rustling. These individuals have access to a broader distribution network than their insurgent competitors – in many cases working directly with butchers and cattle dealers in neighbouring countries – but deal in smaller quantities.[87]

Group B.2 Burkinabe and Togolese intermediaries: Cattle dealers

Intermediaries – mostly cattle dealers or butchers from any of the tri-border countries – buy stolen cattle from insurgents, and to a lesser extent from bandits and rogue VDP members, and smuggle them into the licit market.

As rustling increased and the war complicated the supply chain, the number of intermediaries has grown as more people seek to profit from the mass theft of Burkinabe livestock.

Intermediaries who buy directly from the insurgents stand to gain the most from this trade. The insurgents tend to sell cattle in bulk at cut-rate prices (between 3,000 and 5,000 Ghanaian cedi per head which is between GBP 162 and 273). But according to respondents, intermediaries can sell livestock purchased for the previously cited cut-rate prices for between GHS 7,000 and 10,000 (equivalent to between GBP 382 and 546) a head. Indeed, many suggested that while insurgents are turning a profit selling stolen livestock, intermediaries are collecting a larger share of the profit.[88]

While this pricing structure and the difficulty insurgents face finding buyers have empowered a range of intermediaries, they have also likely changed dynamics within insurgent groups by empowering individuals with previous connections to cattle markets, merchants and butchers. Without speaking directly to the insurgents, it is difficult to gather further insight into who specifically may have been empowered within insurgent organisations.

Group B.3 Burkinabe, Togolese and Ghanaian intermediaries: Butchers

The next step in the cattle value chain is small and large buyers, including both butchers and cattle dealers. While butchers usually purchase between five and 20 head of cattle at a time, cattle dealers tend to move between 30 and 60 in large lorries.[89]

Butchers are a professional caste whose status is passed down through families; they represent a tight-knit community that straddles the tri-border region.[90] They come from all ethnic groups except the Fulbe. With local knowledge on informal routes that cross the borders, as well as relationships with meat vendors in the markets, butchers are important facilitators for transhumant, pastoralist and general cattle movements.[91]

Butchers from all three countries were directly involved in cattle rustling and smuggling long before the current war. This was not uncontroversial; a butcher from Chereponi referenced a meeting of butchers in 2017 where one group tried to convince the others to abandon pre-financing cattle rustling.[92] Butchers’ other role, however, has been as small buyers. They were among the first to take advantage of the influx of stolen livestock into Ghana by relying on cross-border relationships with other butchers, as well as with herders, drivers, veterinarians and police to facilitate transport or ease transport burdens.[93] These small buyers maintain networks of clients to distribute the livestock outside of the licit market system.

Respondents claimed that butchers who purchase stolen cattle can make a profit of between GHS 2,000 and 5,000 (equivalent to between GBP 109 and 273) per head of cattle after reselling them in the licit market in Ghana.[94] Since the escalation and expansion of the war in 2022, however, butchers now find themselves in a complicated, yet still profitable, position. Many butchers in Ghana were already purchasing stolen livestock from Burkinabe butchers or cattle dealers, but the increase in intermediaries following the escalation of the conflict has eaten into the butchers’ profits.[95] However, their relative distance from the actual cattle rustlers – whether insurgents, bandits or rogue VDP members – and plausible deniability in the trade have protected their access to livestock amid a crackdown on the illicit aspects of the trade in Burkina Faso.

Group B.4 Ghanaian intermediaries: Large cattle dealers

Cattle dealers have extensive contacts with police, herders, drivers and veterinarians to facilitate the movement of large numbers of cattle across Ghana. Some of the larger cattle dealers have more capital and broad networks that stretch into the most lucrative markets in Accra and Kumasi.[96] While all roles in the market have evolved amid the regional conflict, cattle dealers have experienced particularly pronounced changes.

In the early stages of the war in Burkina Faso, cattle dealers could deal directly with insurgents without going through intermediaries. However, the escalation of the war has made it more dangerous for dealers to purchase directly from insurgents, thus incentivising them to buy through intermediaries, with whom they share the profits.

Cattle dealers in northern Ghana alleged that some of their Burkinabe colleagues had recently “disappeared”.[97] This has led some respondents who are cattle dealers in border towns to stop travelling to Burkina Faso to buy cattle. As a result, only those Ghanaian dealers with long-standing relations who are able to conduct business from afar are currently buying cattle from Burkina Faso.[98] Finally, amid the slump in cross-border trade and Ghana’s general economic downturn (which is particularly acute in neglected border communities), businesspeople working in border areas in other commercial sectors (such as electronics, used clothes or non-perishable foods) have noticed the burgeoning livestock trade and entered into the market. Given, their greater access to capital and connections in southern Ghana (where they sourced their previous goods), in some places, they have pushed out smaller cattle buyers.[99]

Respondents estimated that by selling stolen livestock dealers could make between GHS 4,000 and 12,000 profit per head of cattle (equivalent to between GBP 218 and 655).[100] This means that cattle dealers, alongside intermediaries, profit the most from cattle rustling.

Group C.1 Facilitators: The role of veterinary officers

The escalation in cattle rustling has also implicated local authorities in northern Ghana. The main government body responsible for regulating the trade and slaughter of livestock is the Veterinary Services Department, which operates under the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Each district has at least one veterinary officer who is tasked with inspecting livestock leaving the district for any health concerns before issuing a movement permit that indicates the livestock are in good health. Cattle traders entering a livestock market or abattoir from another district are supposed to present this document. Veterinary officers also regularly inspect abattoirs to issue slaughter permits for each butcher, inspect livestock destined for slaughter and issue receipts to indicate that meat came from a healthy animal.[101]

Veterinary officers were not previously implicated in cattle rustling and smuggling as stolen cattle entered Ghana in smaller numbers and were usually sold or consumed locally. However, as the numbers of stolen cattle entering the country have increased, respondents reported that cattle dealers are increasingly paying veterinary officers between GHS 10 and 30 (equivalent to between GBP 0.54 and 1.63) per head of cattle to issue permits that allow them to move the livestock out of the district.[102]

Group C.2 Facilitators: Local security services

Historically, a small number of police in border areas have also played a peripheral yet important role in cattle smuggling. In the Chereponi area, respondents alleged that in the past police would sometimes escort stolen livestock from the border with Togo to intermediary markets in Ghana.[103] While these specific cattle rustling networks have been disrupted by insurgents’ infiltration deeper into Togo, respondents indicated that police along different Ghanaian borders pretended not to notice, despite the clear increase in the numbers of cattle entering the country. Some respondents suggested that the police know the livestock are stolen; even if a transporter has a valid movement permit, the police will hold the cargo truck at a barrier until they are paid between GHS 5 and 15 (equivalent to between GBP 0.27 and 0.82) per head of cattle.[104]

Group C.3 Facilitators: Chiefs

Traditionally, chiefs have played an important role in the cattle trade.[105] Moving cattle through a chief’s territory (including stolen cattle) required transhumant populations to obtain permission to move across the chief’s land. Those who negotiated the transit were often paid in cattle.[106] In the past, groups of young men from local communities would sometimes team up with either the transit negotiators or the chiefs and steal cattle from the transhumant herders.[107]

Some chiefs tax transactions taking place in their territory, including at cattle markets.[108] They are also responsible for adjudicating cases involving stolen cattle – so much so that butchers have been known to gift cattle to a chief’s advisors to shift decisions in their favour – and for tracking down cattle.[109] However, as the war escalated in Burkina Faso and expanded into Togo, communities affected by cattle rustling stopped looking for their stolen cattle, depriving chiefs of a source of income and legitimacy.[110] In some places respondents indicated that chiefs were unaware of stolen cattle passing through their territory.[111] However, in other places, respondents reported that chiefs were aware, but pretended not to notice – sometimes after being gifted cattle.[112]