Policy implications | Cattle Wahala

Cattle rustling’s role in the regional war economy represents a threat to stability and security in Ghana, Togo and Burkina Faso’s. The proceeds from the trade help JNIM continue its war in southern Burkina Faso and northern Togo, fuelling instability in northern Ghana in a circular manner through refugee flows and market closures, and by providing cover for violent actors.[113] Meanwhile, cattle smuggling into Ghana is empowering criminals who facilitate local corruption, eroding state capacity and legitimacy. Finally, JNIMs penetration of Ghana’s illicit markets provides the group with a foothold in the country, which could be used to its strategic advantage should the group decide to openly attack Ghana.

To counter this threat, the governments of Ghana and Burkina Faso should seize the opportunities that improved political relations offer by jointly dismantling the cattle rustling supply chains in their territories. This would have the added benefit of eroding some of JNIM’s supply lines without directly confronting the group militarily.

On a macro level, Ghana could also seek to decrease the demand for stolen livestock by raising awareness of the problem among traders and consumers, investing in border communities to promote licit cross-border trade and, most importantly, by building its domestic livestock industry to reduce demand for smuggled cattle. Working with Burkina Faso (and Togo) will be essential to the effectiveness of these approaches; it would also provide an opportunity for Ghana’s new leadership to further improve regional ties.

Policy considerations for Ghanaian, Burkinabe and Togolese authorities: Coordinate, prosecute, reform and invest

Coordinate the Ghanaian response with the Burkinabe and Togolese authorities. Disrupting the supply chain for stolen cattle could be an opportunity for the new administration in Accra to deliver on its goal of forging better relations with its neighbours. This could take place at local level, with workshops building connections between veterinary services, municipal authorities and security services on both sides of the border. At a higher level, increased coordination between intelligence services around this shared goal could also develop trust and improve outcomes.

Investigate and prosecute Ghanaians and Burkinabes for smuggling and selling stolen livestock. In investigating and prosecuting Ghanaians and Burkinabes for this crime, authorities should focus their efforts on individuals engaged at the higher end of the business instead of more-easily intercepted drivers and herders. Targeting well-connected and wealthy cattle dealers would likely be more difficult politically but would send a message that impunity will not be tolerated to other participants in the system and undermine the networks that facilitate rustling in Burkina Faso and Togo. Both countries have a joint interest in reducing illicit cattle rustling.

Raise awareness in Ghana about the public’s indirect participation in the war economy. Ghanaian consumers of beef are largely unaware their eating habits may be fuelling conflict in neighbouring countries. Respondents indicated that even Ghanaians who trade stolen livestock do not see the practice as problematic.[114] The government should engage local authorities, security services and the public by appealing to their patriotism and warning that trading and consuming stolen livestock contribute to the illicit conflict economy and threaten Ghana’s stability, with the goal of shaming intermediaries and buyers, and dampening the demand for stolen livestock in Ghana.

Invest in border communities and promote licit cross-border trade. Respondents indicated that the slump in the Ghanaian economy has contributed to cattle dealers, butchers, herders and drivers entering the trade in stolen cattle.[115] Efforts to create employment opportunities and stimulate licit local businesses with subsidies and investments in infrastructure may go some way towards convincing businesspeople to return to the commodities they previously traded, thus limiting the options for who cattle rustlers can sell to.[116]

Invest in and reform Ghana’s domestic livestock market. The smuggling of stolen cattle into the licit supply chain thrives in an opaque domestic livestock sector. Initially, Ghanaian authorities could aim to better document the movement of cattle into and through the country. There may be scope to reform the system of veterinary movement permits and explore schemes such as certificates of origin or microchipping animals.[117] Second, authorities could support smaller and medium-sized livestock markets by building the managerial and accounting capacity of market management committees, as well as investing in basic infrastructure. These measures would help authorities prevent stolen cattle being smuggled into the licit value chain.

Invest in domestic livestock rearing. Cattle rustlers and intermediaries bring stolen livestock into Ghana partly because of the unmet demand for beef in Ghana (and Côte d’Ivoire). The government should explore innovative schemes for raising cattle in Ghana, looking to successful models that allow for transhumance in countries such as Senegal, for example, instead of turning to capital- and land-intensive sedentary ranching.[118] Investing in producing meat and dairy domestically would contribute to national development and undermine armed rustlers’ and intermediaries’ business models. It is important that this is done in ways that are complementary with the interests of pastoralists in the Sahel (for example, through specialisation of parts of the supply chain).

International partners: Complementary support if requested

Ghana’s and Burkina Faso’s international partners – who have shared national security interests related to curbing the expansion of militancy in the region, and economic interests in bolstering Ghana’s economy as a regional trading partner – can play a complementary, if modest, role supporting Ghana to address cattle rustling in the tri-border area:

Regionally, international partners could help facilitate trainings in investigative techniques and non-lethal assistance to Burkinabe, Togolese and Ghanaian law enforcement investigating cattle rustling and smuggling networks. These could build on ongoing projects in the tri-border region related to migration and prevention of violent extremism.[119] Moreover, they could consider supporting systems that better organise registration of cattle.

Western donors could build the capacity of Ghana’s wider livestock industry through economic development assistance programmes. Improving domestic infrastructure and building the capacity of livestock market managers would strengthen the trading system and help market managers guard against smuggling, while improving the productivity of the market. Moreover, there is scope to support policies that address livelihood constraints at the border through socio-economic programmes that provide viable alternative livelihoods.

The research community should also deepen understanding of how Ghana’s wider livestock economy is structured, and how stolen cattle are sold along the supply chain. While this paper focuses on the tri-border region, many of the larger economic actors involved in the cattle trade are based in southern Ghana. Understanding the interconnected interests of abattoirs, trucking syndicates and political figures, to name just a few stakeholders, is crucial to wholesale reform.