Senegal’s Expanding Migration Cooperation with the EU
- EU–Senegal cooperation has intensified, especially on migration management and security
- However, the new government came to power with the promise of greater sovereignty and a break with Western influence
- In 2023, Senegal became the main irregular migration departure point to Spain’s Canary Islands, with over 32,000 arrivals
- Stricter cooperation and enforcement led to a decrease in the number of migrants reaching the Canary Islands via West-Africa
- At the same time, concerns have been raised about enforcement practices by the Senegalese government
Talking Sovereignty, Practicing Alignment
On 2–3 March 2026, two senior EU Commissioners visited Dakar for high-level meetings with President Bassirou Diomaye Faye and members of the government, as part of ongoing negotiations toward a new Strategic and Global Partnership between the EU and Senegal. The visit emphasised shared priorities around investment through Global Gateway, cooperation on security and defence, and collaboration on migration and mobility. The delegation also visited EU-supported programmes in security, anti-trafficking, and urban mobility, including the Operational Joint Programme II (POC II) and the Train Express Régional.
The prominence and tone of the visit stand in contrast to early expectations that Senegal’s new sovereigntist leadership would distance itself from European partners. Instead, the engagement in Dakar illustrates how cooperation has continued – and even expanded – under the Faye–Sonko government.
In 2024, Senegal entered a new political era marked by promises of sovereignty and “rupture” as Bassirou Diomaye Faye assumed the presidency and Ousmane Sonko became prime minister. During the campaign, Ousmane Sonko focused on pan-Africanism and issued strong criticism of French military presence in Senegal. Some feared that this rhetoric would lead to clear break with Western partners and a shift towards BRICS+ and the Sahel Alliance.3 European observers in particular believed it could undermine cooperation, including on migration.
However, the sovereigntist turn in Senegal has resulted in neither a rupture with Western partners nor divergence from European migration priorities. Instead, it has coincided with a deepening of collaboration on irregular migration. This commentary explores the paradox to explain why this has happened. It argues that the key is in the way in which the Faye–Sonko government has politically mobilised sovereignty.
