Competition is the default interaction between political groups in any political order. However, in many cases political groups face the necessity of balancing competition with coalition-building with their rivals if they are to achieve their objectives. In this report coalitions are understood to form for utilitarian reasons, i.e. when political groups perceive that they are not able to realize their objectives by themselves, but that this requires developing longer-term collaborative relations with other political groups and a pooling of resources (such as votes or coercive capabilities) so as to generate greater collective benefits that can be distributed in such a way that all coalition participants end up being better off. Objectives can range from increasing general political power to the realization of specific policy objectives.

Good relations between political groups are essential to coalition-building. These do not have to be based on an alignment of political views or political sympathies (although that is likely to help), but they must be grounded in a basic sense of probity, a sense of general trust and reasonable confidence that agreements will be implemented in good faith. The relations between political groups are, so to speak, the texture from which coalitions can arise.‍[60] Naturally, relations influence coalition-building options while coalition participation experiences influence relations. In consequence, the report analyses both the nature of relations between Shi’a political groups in Iraq and the nature/effects of the coalitions that have sprung from these relations.

The report uses an analytical model to examine the dynamics of relation- and coalition-building between Iraq’s main Shi’a groups. This model is largely based on existing political science literature and consists of eight factors that analyse how: (a) ‘individual group strengths/weaknesses’ (factors 1–4), (b) ‘group compatibility’ (factors 5–7) and (c) ‘external effects’ (factor 8) influence political relation- and coalition-building. Figure 2 below visualizes the model.

Designed by Alfred Marseille and Egbert Bleyenburg

The next subsection summarizes key dynamics of Shi’a relation- and coalition-building for each of the five episodes that span the period 1991 to 2016. Although the research analysed each of the eight factors for each of the five periods, a summary is presented here to increase clarity and generate greater insight. This is followed by a factor-by-factor analysis. A distinction has been made between primary and secondary factors that influence relation- and coalition-building to establish a sense of what elements of Figure 2 have tended to matter most.

Together, these sections offer both a general summary of the report’s findings and the more in-depth analysis to substantiate them. This analysis is relevant to policy-makers because the nature, purpose and actions of Shi’a coalitions matter a great deal for the inclusivity of Iraqi politics, the sense of national identity and the long-term governability of the Iraqi state as they dominate its political centre. Understanding Shi’a coalition-formation dynamics is a first step in bringing about greater political participation and a greater sense of the collective good in the way Iraqi politics are conducted.

Key dynamics between 1991 and 2016

The complex dynamics of Shi’a relation- and coalition-building in the fast-evolving political environment of Iraq in the past quarter century can broadly be described as evolving from ‘emergence, fluidity and violence’ (1991–2010) to ‘consolidation and authoritarianism’ (2005–14) and finally to ‘unity versus strife and uncertainty’ (2010–16). Table 1 offers a summary breakdown.

Primary factors influencing relation- and coalition-building

Comparative analysis of the eight factors (see Figure 2) across the five periods suggests that the influence of most factors waxes and wanes over time. Nevertheless, on average, four factors are more influential than others and these are discussed in greater detail in this section. They are (in no particular order): i) the level of coherence of (a) group(s); ii) the level of leadership strength and authority; iii) the experience of coalition politics of (a) group(s); and iv) the extent to which shared values enable groups to bridge political differences.

The level of coherence of (a) group(s)

If group coherence is understood in terms of its internal unity and organizational cohesiveness,‍[62] a marked decrease in the level of coherence of a number of Shi’a political groups can be witnessed between 1991 and 2016. Its effect has been to increase the ad hoc and variable nature of relation- and coalition-building between these groups. In general, the coherence of Shi’a political groups developed from high under Saddam Hussein (1991–2003) and the immediate post-war period (2003–05) to fracturing along old and new fault lines from the 2005 elections onwards (2005–16).

Throughout the 1990s, there were essentially three dominant Shi’a groups: Da’wa, SCIRI and the Sadrist movement (see Box 1). The initial coherence of these groups largely derived from the ‘common enemy’ that the regime of Saddam Hussein was to all of them, as well as the enduring strength of traditional markers of socio-political organization, such as historical legacies, family-inherited leadership and traditional leadership positions. The only significant split that occurred between 1991 and 2005 was the breakaway of the Al-Fadhila party from the Sadrist movement in 2003, just after the US invasion.‍[63]

Until 2003, leadership of the Shi’a body politic was essentially contested between the Al-Hakim and Al-Sadr families. Together with the less politically oriented Al-Khoei family, they are Iraq’s most prominent Najaf-based clerical families.‍[64] Although the Al-Hakim and Al-Sadr families together established Da’wa in 1957, the difference in their responses to the repressive actions of Hussein’s regime created an enmity that lasted for decades. Where Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim left Iraq to establish SICRI in 1983 with the aim of replacing the Baath regime with a replica of Iran’s theocracy, the Sadrist movement stuck it out in Baghdad by taking on a low profile and persisting quietly. This changed in the second half of the 1990s when Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr‍[65] became an increasingly vocal religious advocate for political change. He paid with his life in 1999. Simplified, the Al-Hakims have since been reproaching the Al-Sadrs for having tacitly supported Hussein’s regime, while the Al-Sadrs have accused the Al-Hakims of abandoning Iraq.‍[66] Nevertheless, the level of political coherence within Iraq’s main Shi’a parties was high until 2003 as these two families exercised effective control over their respective constituencies and dominated the Shi’a social and political community.

This situation initially remained unchanged after the US invasion. It saw both parties jockeying for influence in a fairly disciplined manner. SCIRI had to manoeuvre between its Iranian patron and the US Coalition Provisional Authority. It chose a strategy of pragmatic cooperation with the US to secure power to rule, which was in large part necessitated by its unpopularity among Iraq’s ordinary Shi’a (see Box 1), while retaining its Iranian connections.‍[67] The Sadrist movement manoeuvred between its rejection of the US and its desire for greater influence on Iraqi affairs. It ultimately chose a path of armed resistance against US forces. Already in the early days this included selective coercion, or even violence, against Iraqis who were perceived as advising or working with the US, as was most prominently illustrated by the tragic murder of Majid al-Khoei, a senior and respected cleric, in broad daylight in Najaf in 2003.‍[68] The Islamic Da’wa Party was a minor player at the time, seeking to recover from its long absence from Iraq, its internal splits and the absence of a powerful sponsor. It was buoyed up by the credibility it retained for its resistance against Saddam Hussein and the sacrifices it made.

Splits and factionalism within the main Shi’a political groups became more common after 2005, including Asaib ahl al-Haq under Qais Khazali breaking away from the Sadrist movement in 2006; Kataib Hezbollah from Badr in 2007, Badr distancing itself from ISCI in 2007 and breaking with it in 2012, and the National Reform Trend under Al-Ja’afari breaking away from Da’wa in 2008.‍[69] This pattern continued until 2014 when the rise of the Islamic State once more provided Iraq’s Shi’a with a common enemy. This decrease in coherence of key political groups can be explained by a mix of factors:

A further break, this time not within a party but between parties, occurred in 2009/10 when Al-Maliki established the State of Law coalition to run separately from the United Iraqi Alliance, which had been the vehicle via which Iraq’s Shi’a acquired control over the central state in 2005. This was a meaningful split because it manifested significant competition between Iraq’s Shi’a in the absence of a common threat or enemy, as both lists were Shi’a-dominated. The main reason for this split was Al-Maliki’s remarkable rise to power (discussed in greater detail in the next section).

The civil war in Syria gave a new impetus to intra-Shi’a divisions on the question of whether or not to engage in the fighting that had erupted next door. This saw Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas splitting from the Sadrists’ Mahdi army in 2012 when Al-Sadr prohibited his forces from fighting in Syria; Harakat al-Hezbollah al-Nujaba distancing from Asaib Ahl al-Haq in 2013, while the Badr Corps formally split from ISCI in 2012 to gradually drift into Al-Maliki’s camp, including establishing a presence in Syria.‍[70]

This cabal of internal debate, fragmentation and splitting of political groups quietened down after 2014 when the Islamic State emerged as a clear and present danger. It instilled Iraq’s Shi’a with a new sense of unity, underlined by the creation of the Hashd al-Sa’abi and stiffened by the religious authority of Najaf in support of joint resistance. In the background, however, a rift emerged within Da’wa between Al-Maliki and Al-Abadi. While this has not yet resulted in a formal leadership contestation or split, it is waiting to happen. Moreover, there is reason to expect present Shi’a unity to last no longer than the siege of Mosul. Signs of growing lobbying, jockeying for position and electoral competition can already be clearly discerned.

In short, the initial coherence of Iraq’s main Shi’a parties gave way to much more competitive intra-party politics after control of the central state had been established in 2005. Markers that used to guide intra-Shi’a political relations, such as historic legacies and traditional leadership, lost significant influence after 2005. The combination of reduced party coherence with the proliferation of parties has contributed to making coalitions unstable, ad hoc affairs that are based on short-term confluences of interests. In turn, this has increased political unpredictability and heightened the difficulty of actually executing the business of government.

The level of leadership strength and authority‍[71]

Strong leaders have been an influential factor in relation- and coalition-building throughout the entire period of research. It is no exaggeration to say that political power in Iraq centres on individuals and is tied to leaders’ personalities. Perhaps it is leadership more than any other factor that determines when Shi’a political groups are strong and how/when they engage in coalition-building processes. In fact, it is remarkable how a relatively small number of individual leaders have managed to concentrate significant power in their hands on a more or less permanent basis. This includes the likes of Moqtada al-Sadr, the Al-Hakim family and Al-Maliki. Nevertheless, changes are under way in the parameters that frame and enable leadership.

First, a major shift is taking shape in what makes leadership legitimate and effective. From a classic notion, which is based on inheritance and religious credibility combined with principled political advocacy and non-state sources of authority, there is a shift to a more contemporary notion, which is based on patronage-conferral and deal-making abilities, as well as control over key parts of the state. This is best illustrated by contrasting the development trajectories of two of Iraq’s better-known politicians.

Moqtada al-Sadr originally fitted the classic notion of leadership, He inherited from his father a vast network of charities, schools and mosques as well as a significant popular following. The combination of this legacy and his endorsement by Ayatollah Kazem al-Haeri (his father’s teacher) as his representative in Iraq enabled his rapid development from a young cleric of relatively poor religious standing into a figure of national political influence.‍[72] Events played a role too, in that the US invasion of Iraq created the space he needed to develop a home-grown, radical and populist movement on the basis of the popularity and esteem his father had accumulated under Hussein’s repressive regime. Moqtada al-Sadr’s achievement is that he merged a political party, religious standing, a network of social service organizations and a non-state armed group into a broad platform for exercising political influence. A shrewd political operator, he developed a quasi-personality cult by championing the lower social Shi’a classes while periodically rejuvenating himself.‍[73] But the fact remains that much of his initial ‘leadership status’ was inherited. The same argument can be made for the leadership inheritance of figures such as Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr (claimed by a number of individuals within Da’awa and the Sadrist movement) and Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim (conferred upon Abd Aziz al-Hakim and today Ammar al-Hakim).

Although Al-Maliki was also able to leverage Da’wa’s resistance credentials, it is his political skill and patronage, ruthlessness, capture of key elements of the state and good fortune that offer a better explanation for his rise.‍[74] Al-Maliki’s skill as political operator was proved between 2006 and 2009 when he gradually expanded his network and control over key parts of the administration (such as the Ministry of Defence and the Supreme Court), took credit for the decrease in violence between 2007 and 2009 (largely the result of the combined US troop surge and Sunni tribal ‘Awakening’), and built a strong political rapport with Iran.‍[75] His ruthlessness showed both in his military operations against the Sadrists in 2008 and in his confrontation with the Kurds in Diyala province, for example.‍[76] In respect of using state resources, Al-Maliki used his position as Prime Minister from 2005–10 to lay the basis for far-reaching centralization and personalization of the central state by allocating public positions and funds to cement networks of patronage and influence after 2010. As to the element of good fortune, it must be recalled Da’wa did not have an armed wing of its own in 2003, fewer resources than SCIRI and much less popular support than the Sadrists.‍[77] Because of this, a Da’wa Prime Minister proved acceptable to SCIRI and the Sadrists in 2005. Al-Maliki subsequently took advantage of poor perceptions of Al-Ja’afari’s leadership to replace him.

This short analysis of the stellar rise of two of Iraq’s most influential political figures leaders shows the importance of reputation and ‘inheritance’ effects for the legitimacy and effectiveness of leadership between 1991 and 2005. Such legacies flowed from a few towering figures in Iraqi society, who mixed principled political advocacy with religious credibility, to their successors. Once the political environment opened up and competition for power and resources became a possibility, the importance of this factor declined, making space for more patronage, ‘self-made’ and material resource-based notions of leadership. The aforementioned ‘inclusive big-tent approach’ to power by accommodating all main Shi’a political parties means that this style of leadership has become common – a far cry from the more religious and principles-based leadership of before.

A second major development in the parameters that frame political leadership is the increase of religiously inspired political influence and advocacy that has intermittently emanated from Najaf since 2003.‍[78] Such religious guidance cannot be politically ignored and sets the frame for political focus, response and action. While the Najaf-based clergy always offered religious guidance, it kept a very low political profile throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, especially after the attempt on Grand-Ayatollah Al-Sistani’s life in 1996. This changed after the US invasion. For example, Al-Sistani issued a fatwa in June 2003 to demand that Iraqis would elect representatives to draft their constitution, basically declaring the US proposal for a hand-picked constitutional council unacceptable.‍[79] In the same period, he also shielded Moqtada al-Sadr from the fallout over clashes around the Shi’a shrines in Najaf ith US and SCIRI forces in the wake of the murder of Abdel Majid al-Khoei. Furthermore, his offices and authority were instrumental in pulling the United Iraqi Alliance together, which enabled Iraq’s Shi’a to win the 2005 elections.‍[80] Later major political interventions by Grand-Ayatollah Al-Sistani include his fatwa that called to arms against the Islamic State in 2014, his call for a change in political leadership in the same year (effectively barring Al-Maliki from a third term as prime minister) and his injunction against corruption in response to the Green Zone protests in 2016. Throughout, he has also provided religious guidance with political relevance via his many representatives during Friday sermons. His personal behind-the-scenes influence is more difficult to assess, but likely equally influential.

While the overall increase in religiously inspired political guidance is clear, its results are more mixed. For example, the United Iraqi Alliance’s electoral win in 2005 assured Shi’a political dominance, but also reinforced sectarian logic and negatively affected the quality of government as the alliance fell apart rapidly after the elections. In similar vein, the call to arms against the Islamic State effectively stopped its expansion, but also reinvigorated an array of non-state armed groups that had become a new political force to reckon with. Worse, the injunction against corruption and pro-reform largely fell on deaf ears.

Reviewing the range of examples above suggests that the influence of the Shi’a religious leadership in Najaf in setting the parameters for political relation- and coalition-building between Iraq’s Shi’a political groups is greatest when its appeals can be framed as: 1) defending a clear community interest (such resisting a US-driven constitution drafting process) or countering a clear threat to the Shi’a community (such as the Islamic State); 2) being relevant to ordinary people, and; 3) can be addressed by straightforward action. The first element provides a shared cause, the second enables direct action on the basis of undisputable religious authority while the third reduces the possibility for interference. For example, fighting the Islamic State meets all three criteria, barring Al-Maliki only two of them (countering a threat and direct action) and targeting corruption just one (a community interest). In short, while Najaf’s religious establishment is effective in framing political issues, it is less influential in bringing about complex change. It has neither the power nor the ambition to see political issues through in an action-oriented manner. Its guidance will not be publicly resisted by political operators, but they are likely to manipulate it ever so subtly if that serves their interests.

Experience of coalition politics‍[81]

Opposition parties and an independent press were basically non-existent during the rule of Saddam Hussain. The lack of freedom of association and speech meant that such things existed only in exile or underground. This severely limited the ability of political parties to engage in coalitional politics before 2003 as it served little purpose. Although the most pre-eminent political/religious figures of Iraq’s opposition in exile regularly spoke with each other in places like Tehran, Damascus or London, this generated little in the way of coalition-building experience but rather created the networks, perceptions and individual relations that would later matter for how political competition/alliances took shape.‍[82]

One important aspect of these politics-in-exile dynamics was that much of the opposition against Saddam Hussein was organized on an ethno-sectarian basis, despite the existence of the Iraqi Nation Congress that featured communist, secularist and Shi’a participation.‍[83] The salience of ethno-sectarianism in Iraq also grew over the same period as a result of the declining ability of the Iraqi state to provide for the basic needs of its citizens, especially after the Iran–Iraq war (1980–88) and the first Gulf War (1991). Social networks (such as tribes and clerical charities) stepped into the local governance and service provision voids that opened up and many of these were affiliated with an ethnic group or religious community.‍[84] This set the scene for ethno-sectarian identity politics in post-2003 electoral competition as the respective constituencies had already formed out of the necessity to survive. In consequence, when the Iraqi political scene ‘decompressed’ after decades of authoritarian rule, coalition politics have tended to be characterized by three experiences.

A brief look at the actual coalitions that formed after 2003 lends support to this reading of experiences in coalition politics. Both the Iraqi National Congress and the Iraqi National Accord proved too diverse in their composition to effectively counter the challenge of the Shi’a-only Iraqi National Alliance in the crucial 2005 elections. More importantly, all these three coalitions were short-lived in their active form and were mostly tactical alliances of convenience to win the vote. They did not represent common political platforms with a shared agenda, programme or principles.

The 2010 elections basically offered a repeat performance in respect of coalition experiences being short-lived. Deviating from the United Iraqi Alliance script, Al-Maliki set up the State of Law Coalition around his person in a bid to cement his political position. He overreached electorally and was beaten in the popular vote by Iraqiya. However, he outcompeted it by having recourse to the courts. With Iranian assistance, he subsequently enlisted the Iraqi National Alliance, including ISCI and the Sadrist movement, in support of his own list to obtain a majority and retain his prime minister post. These parties, however reversed course shortly thereafter, citing differences of political views, and went on to compete together against the State of Law Coalition in the 2013 provincial elections.‍[89] Such fragmentation of pre- and post-electoral alliance meant there was limited experience with durable coalition-building among Shi’a political groups.

In sum, it is safe to say that political coalitions in Iraq after 2003 have mostly been short-term utility vehicles to acquire power, not to exercise it coherently after electoral victory. Coalitions have been unstable, temporary alliances of convenience that do not provide a common political platform, structure or guiding mechanism. They tend to implode shortly after elections owing to internal rifts, which was the case in both 2005 and 2010. In 2014 it was only the advance of the Islamic State that arguably prevented a similar scenario. The exception has been the continuous presence of the State of Law coalition since 2010. TYet, this is more a manifestation of Al-Maliki’s dominance of Da’wa, supported by a range of satellite parties drawn in by his patronage and power.

The extent to which shared values enable groups to bridge political differences‍[90]

There is a consistent pattern between 1991 and 2014 of Iraq’s Shi’a coming together politically because they are Shi’a. More specifically, this happens when they are faced with an existential threat (e.g. a common enemy) that affects their entire community of belief. It is in these cases that guidance and instructions from the clerical establishment in Najaf are most powerful in providing an interpretative frame of events and in setting a course of action.

The pattern consists of events such as the 1991 rebellion against Saddam Hussein after the liberation of Kuwait by coalition forces, the 1999 uprising in the wake of the murder of Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr by regime hitmen, the rise of Al-Qaeda in 2004-2007 (exemplified by the destruction of the Al-Askari shrine in Samarra) and the expansion of the Islamic State in 2014-2016 (exemplified by the capture of Mosul in 2014). Interestingly, the US invasion (and subsequent occupation) were not uniformly considered a threat by the Shi’a community. Its political parties took different sides and religious guidance limited itself to specific processes and objectives that the US administration pursued – without necessarily pronouncing itself on the merits of the US presence in itself. Such specific processes included Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani’s resistance against the US-designed process for drafting a new constitution in 2004/5, his protection of Moqtada al-Sadr when his Mahdi army clashes with coalition forces around the shrines of Najaf in 2004 and his insistence on a joint Shi’a alliance to carry the 2005 elections.‍[91]

Politically speaking, however, these periods of increased intra-Shia solidarity that resulted in a united political front proved to be intense and brief. They did not ultimately result in higher levels of confidence or lasting political coalitions. Factionalism and strife re-emerged rapidly after occurrence of the event or threat, even when the common enemy remained. Examples include the disintegration of the United Iraqi Alliance after the 2005 elections when Shi’a dominance of the state was not yet fully consolidated, or the rapid return of political competition and intrigue after the worst of the threat of the Islamic State had abated, stalling reform efforts and hindering the fight against the group.‍[92]

Compounding the brevity of such unity in response to external threats, is the likelihood that the socio-economic development of Iraq’s Shi’a community will limit the type and volume of threats that can be addressed through appeals to communal solidarity. As Iraq becomes poorer due to a combination of lower oil prices, a growing population, the cost of fighting the Islamic State and political nepotism, the mass of Shi’a poor is likely to grow.‍[93] This will empower the Sadrist movement which champions this constituency. In contrast, parties such as ISCI and Da’wa have more support among the Shi’a middle classes, Shi’a merchants and the Najaf-based clergy. It is a straightforward matter to see why an issue like corruption is more relevant to Al-Sadr’s constituency than to others. It also helps understand why the anti-corruption drive has largely stalled despite Grand-Ayatollah Al-Sistani’s effort to frame it as a threat to the entire Shi’a community.

To make matters more complex, added to this socio-economic fault line within the Shi’a community is a clerical cleavage that emerged towards the end of the 1990s. It takes the form of junior and younger clerics resenting and rebelling against what they perceived as an insufficient level of political engagement and traditionalism of older members of the clerical establishment. A range of younger clerics considers that the poor social conditions of many Iraqi’s and the low quality of the country’s political leadership necessitate more religion-based political advocacy.‍[94] This more interventionist philosophy was powerfully articulated and effectively popularized by Sadiq and Moqtada al-Sadr. It enabled them to build a large popular following that includes a sizeable number of Hawza students in a bid to obtain more political influence that is, however, resisted by the traditional clergy.‍[95]

In sum, political relation- and coalition-building between Iraq’s Shi’a on the basis of common values is likely to become a rarer and more complex endeavour as economic and religious differences in the community deepen. The recent anti-corruption and pro-reform drive provided a taste of what is to come.

Secondary factors influencing relation- and coalition-building

Just as the preceding four factors are, on average, more influential in understanding relation- and coalition-building processes between Iraq’s main Shi’a parties, so are the four that follow less influential. This is a difference of modest degree only, however, and it is for this reason that they are also extensively discussed. They include (in no particular order): i) the extent and nature of foreign sponsorship (a) group(s) enjoy(s); ii) the domestic power base and perceptions of (a) group(s); iii) the degree of structural compatibility of political objectives with other groups; and iv) the level of enmity or amity with other groups.

Extent and nature of foreign sponsorship that (a) group(s) enjoy(s)‍[96]

Given that Iraqi politics experienced eight years of US occupation (2003–11) and remains exposed to substantial Iranian influence, it may come as a surprise that this factor is considered to be of secondary importance. This is largely the case because US political (not military) influence declined substantially after 2004/05, because Iranian influence gradually shifted from political parties to armed groups and because Iraqi nationalism and patriotism meant that Iranian influence always had to contend with Iraqi domestic political imperatives.‍[97] In fact, one could argue that Iraq’s Shi’a political elites have been rather adept at using Iranian connections and resources to further their own political objectives – much like the Afghans have done with the US or the Congolese with international donors.

This notwithstanding, Iran was and remains the most influential foreign actor in Iraq by far, largely because of its close affiliation with a number of Iraq’s Shi’a political and armed groups. Iran’s twin objectives are to ensure Iraq is Shi’a-dominated and well disposed towards Iran (partly to avoid any possibility of a repeat of the horrors and defeat of the Iran–Iraq war) and to secure an axis of influence connecting south Lebanon (Hezbollah), Syria (Assad), Baghdad and Tehran.‍[98] There are many moments when Iran exercised substantial influence, such as when it supported the creation of the United Iraqi Alliance in 2005 (although Al-Sistani’s role was more decisive), pressurized Moqtada al-Sadr to accept a ceasefire several times between 2007 and 2008 (the military odds were also stacked against the Mahdi army), brokered Al-Sadr’s tacit support for Al-Maliki after the 2010 elections (it was unable to prevent the pre-election split between the State of Law coalition and the United Iraqi Alliance of which the Sadrist movement was a member) and kept Al-Maliki in power in 2012 when Al-Sadr, Al-Allawi and Barzani nearly unseated him as Prime Minister through a no-confidence vote.

To achieve these objectives, Iran has consistently pursued a dual strategy to hedge its bets by, on the one hand, maintaining good relations with several Shi’a political groups at the same time and, on the other hand, by encouraging splits in groups that it considered to have become too autonomous (consider Asaib Ahl al-Haq breaking from the Sadrist movement or Kataib Hezbollah from the Badr Corps). The level of Iranian influence on Shi’a political parties has waned since 2005–10 as these groups acquired political power of their own and reduced their ties with Iran for a variety of reasons, including electoral ones.

A good example of this development is SCIRI. The party has had to make practical adjustments, culminating in 2007, to the fact that Shi’ism has historically been less politically significant in Iraq, that popular sentiments on the territorial integrity of Iraq run high, nationalism is strong and that Iraq’s influential clerical establishment largely rejects the notion of clerical rule (wilayat-al fiqh).‍[99] As to Da’wa, a distinction must be made between the party and the person of Al-Maliki. The party has generally taken a pragmatic, relatively sympathetic approach to Iranian interests while prioritizing domestic considerations. Al-Maliki established stronger relations with Iran from 2011 onwards by allowing Iranian supplies to pass Iraq en route to Syria and by permitting Iraqi Shi’a non-state armed groups to commence expeditionary operations on their neighbour’s territory.‍[100] Although the Sadrist movement is strongly nationalist, the reality is that the movement has, on occasion, also accepted Iranian support, and accommodated Iranian preferences.‍[101] This decreased after 2010, however, and was usually driven by transactional convenience.‍[102]

In contrast, Iran remains highly influential in respect of a number of non-state armed groups. Some of these groups have been effective in developing a political profile (such as the Badr Corps with over 20 seats in parliament) while others have been less successful in this regard (like Asaib ahl al-Haq). The rise of the Islamic State has empowered such armed groups, but their political relevance and future remain unclear.

A final word is needed on US influence on Shi’a relation- and coalition-building in Iraq. SCIRI and Da’wa pragmatically worked with the US administration and forces for various reasons that have been discussed earlier on in this report (more between 2003 and 2005 than between 2005 and 2011). This served them well and increasing Iraqi political agency meant that US political influence declined correspondingly, especially after its peak in 2005 when it managed to get the Kurdish parties (PUK and KDP) and SCIRI to support its constitutional project.‍[103] After 2005, the US was politically largely outmanoeuvred by Iran that worked with it via SCIRI/ISCI and Da’wa while also working against it via Asaib ahl al-Haq (2006), Kataib Hezollah (2007) and the Sadrists (until 2008).

Degree of structural compatibility of political objectives with other groups‍[104]

This factor plays a secondary role in understanding political relation- and coalition-building between Iraq’s Shi’a because political ideologies, viewpoints and programmes have been less differentiating characteristics of groups and their activities than their general socio-political identity, the charismatic authority of their leadership and their historic legacy and legitimacy. Simply put, expediency has mattered more for coalition-building than political viewpoints. Having said this, different viewpoints on three main issues nevertheless differentiated the key parties. These were fairly constant until about 2007/08 and can be summarized as per Table 2 below.

Nevertheless, such positions were generally treated pragmatically in processes of coalition-building and there have been few, if any, ideological non-negotiables if temporary compromises and/or alliances could increase the share of power of any particular group. In short, the scope for negotiation and compromise under the right conditions was significant.

Partly as a result of being fed up with deteriorating socio-economic prospects resulting from years of violence, the Iraqi electorate started to attach less importance to the issues listed in Table 1, historical legacies/loyalties, and national ethno-sectarian identity politics after 2008. Instead, it prioritized local issues (such as local identity) and day-to-day priorities (such as housing and security).‍[105] ISCI (formerly SCIRI), for example, lost a significant slice of the vote in the 2009 provincial elections because it was perceived as contributing to insecurity rather than reducing it. In contrast, Al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition managed to benefit in the 2010 national elections from an improving security situation that occurred under his watch. The surprise win of the Al-Iraqiya list in the same elections on the basis of a non-sectarian and pragmatically oriented platform provides further evidence for this shift (it outcompeted the State of Law Coalition by two votes).‍[106] Generally, both ISCI and the Sadrist movement continue to be hindered by the popular memory of their part in the terrible sectarian violence of 2006–08.

This development of voters prioritizing acute daily life problems and what political parties propose to do about them, can be expected to continue. The recent protests about corruption and clamours for government reform illustrate its potential. However, there are also opposing trends. One is that several parties, Da’wa in particular, have established such deep influence/control over many parts of the government and Iraq’s public resources that they can run extensive patronage networks that are more decisive for electoral results than the quality of their political ideas and policy programme.‍[107]

Another opposing trend is that few channels exist for Shi’a opposition parties and/or movements to register their discontent and exercise political influence, despite widespread disgust with the Shi’a ruling elite among both the population and the Najaf-based clergy. The governance of Iraq has become somewhat of an insider job between the usual suspects that are superficially united in a ‘big tent’ division of power and resources. This creates the possibility that dissenting voices and an aggrieved population will look for different ways to manifest their grievances, as Al-Sadr has already sought to pioneer with the street protests and storming of the Green Zone in the summer of 2016, temporarily abandoning the internal logic of the political system altogether.

The domestic power base and perceptions of (a) group(s)‍[108]

This factor can also be considered of secondary importance in terms of its influence on Shi’a relation- and coalition-building processes because, for various reasons, the main three Shi’a political parties of 1991 remain so in 2016.‍[109] Although the power bases and perceptions of SCIRI, Da’wa and the Sadrist movement have waxed and waned throughout the research period, they have remained constant enough in overall relative terms to maintain approximate political parity. The issue is perhaps not so much their primacy, but the relatively narrow support base on which it is based. Each party typically obtains a relatively modest part of the vote of around 10–15%,‍[110] which suggests that none has a sufficient socio-political power base to lead without either entering into (a) durable coalition(s).‍[111] Both stand in the way of building the durable coalitions that have so far proved to be rather elusive. Be that as it may, the main shifts in the relative positions of Da’wa, SCIRI and the Sadrists between 2003 and 2016 are the following:

When Da’wa re-entered Iraq from exile in 2003 it had great credibility, but was without constituency, foreign sponsor and unified leadership. This explains why it started out as the junior Shi’a party in 2003 compared with the Sadrists and SCIRI. In 2016 it arguably is the main Shi’a political party, even despite its internal division between Al-Maliki and Al-Abadi. In the period 2003–10, Da’wa acquitted itself professionally of the tasks of re-uniting its globally dispersed leadership after exile, avoiding overt association with either the US or Iran, retaining a belief in the need for a strong state (in part by not building up its own armed wing and by avoiding being seen to contribute to sectarian violence) and rebuilding a domestic constituency. As a result of these efforts and Al-Maliki’s individual leadership skills, it came to exercise substantial control over important parts of the Iraqi government and administration. It also remained relatively secular but with sufficient religious affiliation to be broadly acceptable. Despite Al-Maliki’s divisive style, the party still has a broad political cadre and enjoys appreciable popular legitimacy.‍[112]

SCIRI entered the Iraqi political fray in 2003 as an Iranian proxy with strong discipline, tight organization and abundant financial resources. But it lacked a domestic support base and faced substantial popular mistrust in Iraq. Through its collaboration with the US, it gained control over nine provinces (including Baghdad) and parts of the central government, notably the ministries of the interior and finance and a vice-president position.‍[113] It subsequently rebranded itself as an Iraqi Shi’a middle- and upper-class party in 2007/08. But where Da’wa was able to claim credit for the security improvements of 2008/09, ISCI was blamed for contributing to insecurity and for failing to provide essential government functions. The rise of the State of Law coalition (2008/09), the death of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim (2009) and the breakaway of the Badr Corps (2007/12) led to a decline in the (electoral) fortunes of the party. It sought to revive these – rather successfully – via alliances with the Sadrists in the provincial elections of 2013 and national elections of 2014. Today the party is diminished but remains a relevant force.‍[114]

In 2003, the Sadrist movement featured a strong popular following. It provided a wide range of social services to the Shi’a poor with dedication and discipline in the wake of the US invasion. Its strong nationalist agenda enabled it to stay clear of accusations of being a proxy of anyone (save from the charge of having collaborated with the Ba’ath regime). This strong starting point was, however, diminished by its violent resistance against the US that saw combined coalition and domestic security forces bear down on the movement to the point that it had to cease its armed struggle in 2008. Al-Sadr subsequently ‘re-invented’ himself by positioning himself as a religiously based political advocate for the Shi’a underclasses with a willingness to work across sectarian groups, as was recently demonstrated during the 2016 street protests against corruption. However, his self-styled role as ‘outsider’ has not prevented the movement from joining electoral lists (2005), teaming up with vote-winning ‘others’ (Al-Maliki II in 2010) or running various ministries (e.g. 2010–12).‍[115] In short, depending on what best serves its interests, the movement blends participation in government with exit from government and street protest.

In short, it is perhaps fair to say that at present ISCI is the party with the weakest domestic support base but, until 2012, had the strongest foreign sponsorship. The Sadrists continue to have the strongest popular support base, but have largely been unable to translate this into decisive political influence and power. Da’wa has steadily increased its support base, in part as a result of the skilful political leadership of the person of Al-Maliki. The ultimate effect of his divisive style cannot yet be assessed, however, and casts a shadow over the party.

Level of enmity/amity with other groups‍[116]

This factor is of secondary importance in influencing relation- and coalition-building because the significant enmities – historical and more recent – that exist between Iraq’s main Shi’a political groups have generally not stopped them from pragmatically working together when this was in their interests. However, the absence of trust such enmities have engendered, helps explain why durable Shi’a political coalitions are so hard to establish.

Unsurprisingly, in the long years of intra-Shi’a violence between 2004 and 2008 many enmities accumulated. To an appreciable extent, these built on historic family feuds and long-simmering tensions between leaders that preceded the US occupation of Iraq. A primary example is the rivalry between ‘Sadr’ and ‘Badr’ (SCIRI) between 2003 and 2008 that continued the clash for control and influence between two of Iraq’s most powerful religious families, the Al-Hakims and the Al-Sadrs.‍[117] Major episodes include the firefight between their forces in Karbala in 2007 (50 Shi’a pilgrims died) and the 2008 Charge of the Knights operation during which Badr forces fought on the side of government and coalition forces against the Mahdi army in Baghdad, Basra, Amarah and other cities.‍[118] This did not prevent both parties from teaming up in the United Iraqi Alliance (2005 elections), the Iraqi National Alliance (2010 elections) or during the provincial elections of 2013.‍[119] Yet, mutual distrust lingers.‍[120]

Other significant enmities between Shi’a political groups include Al-Maliki/Da’wa initiating the 2008 military operation against Sadrist forces, Da’wa efforts to marginalize and reduce the influence of ISCI in the second half the 2000s, Al-Maliki’s divisive policies during his second tenure (2010–14), a series of assassinations of leading Sadrists by Asaib ahl al-Haq in 2012 or, more recently, the stand-off between Sadrists and other Shi’a groups on the reform agenda that nearly resulted in violent clashes across Baghdad city.‍[121]

The general impression that emerges is that enmity/amity between political groups does not stand in the way of pragmatic power deals that further their specific interests at a particular point in time. A common enemy, if present, does further reduce levels of enmity as it prompts Shi’a groups to close ranks, while its absence amplifies intra-Shia rivalries.