The eight factors below form the analytical model that the report uses to examine relation- and coalition-building processes between Iraq’s main Shi’a groups. Although the model was designed for this study, it is likely to have broader applicability due to its (partial) grounding in political science literature. The factors assess how the interplay between individual group strengths/weaknesses (factors 1–4), group compatibility (factors 5–7) and external effects (factor 8) influences political relation- and coalition-building.

Table 4
A political science based model for analyzing political relation- and coalition-building

Category

Factor

Possible indicator

(A). Group strengths/ weaknesses

1.
Level of coherence of (a) group(s)

Higher levels of unity of (a) group(s) makes it easier to build coalitions as their greater singularity of purpose and discipline gives (a) group(s) better confidence and greater leverage in negotiations, and it facilitates implementation of compromise once it is reached. Lower unity has the opposite effect.

Number of competing factions within (a) group(s)

 

Number of splits within (a) group(s) that result in exit

2.
Level of leadership strength and authority

Strong, unified leadership makes it easier for (a) group(s) to engage in coalitions as it enables both effective representation and compromise. It is also a factor that influences the level of homogeneity of (a) group(s): strong leadership makes groups more cohesive if it is seen as legitimate. The reverse holds for the opposite.

Status and prestige of (a) group(s) leader(s)

 

The extent to which group leadership is disputed

3.
Domestic power base of (a) group(s) and perceptions of (a) group(s)

(A) group(s) with a greater domestic power base and/or that enjoy(s) more positive perceptions from either masses or elites, is/are likely to have a more decisive influence on the formation of coalitions. Such groups are not only more attractive coalition partners, but can also provide leadership in coalition-formation processes more easily, provided they have the wherewithal to do this diplomatically and do not feel they are so powerful that they can go it alone. If (a) group(s) has/have a smaller power base and/or if negative perceptions of (a) group(s) prevail, this is likely to have the opposite effect.

Historic legacies of leaders, events, alliances and actions of (a) group(s)

 

Popular/elite perceptions of (a) group(s)

 

Relative electoral power (votes) and

resources of (a) group(s)

4.
Extent and nature of foreign sponsorship (a) group(s)

Foreign sponsorship consists of material and immaterial support that influences a group’s resource base and perceptions of the group. Substantial foreign support makes groups more powerful, eases coalition formation with groups supported by the same sponsor and makes coalition formation more difficult with groups that are not. Sponsor pressure on particular political or policy objectives can also influence coalition formation positively or negatively

Discourse analysis of key group leaders on foreign political sympathies/ loyalties that can be connected to known relationships of support

(B). Group compatibility

5.
Degree of structural compatibility of political objectives with other groups

Having broadly compatible political objectives on structural issues makes it easier to engage in coalitions as common ground is more readily identified. However, this can also make coalition formation more difficult when groups tap into the same pool of voters/supporters as their identities become more difficult to distinguish.

Document analysis of a group’s key public documents or speech analysis of key group leaders

6.
Level of enmity / amity with other groups

Greater levels of enmity make it more difficult for (a) group(s) to engage in coalitions because of existing ‘enemy images’ and constituency resistance. Consider e.g. past episodes of mass violence, assassinations or political betrayal. Greater levels of amity make it easier for (a) group(s) to engage in coalitions. Consider e.g. positive experiences or good relations between leaders. The level of enmity / amity is also likely to be influenced by the degree of structural compatibility of political objectives with other groups.

Consistent ‘hate’ or ‘ally’ elements in the discourse of key group leaders

 

Nature of relations between leaders of different groups

 

Use of tools of political or administrative power (e.g. judiciary) or violence against another group(s)

7.
Experience of engaging in coalition politics

Positive experiences of working in coalitions to achieve political ends demonstrate the value of balancing competitive with cooperative behaviour to (a) group(s) and may strengthen it in the future. Positive experiences are those that generate the expected benefits of coalition formation over a reasonable amount of time, i.e. they are sustained. Conversely, negative experiences are likely to do the opposite. Moreover, the experience(s) of engaging in coalitions also makes it operationally easier to do so again as a group has already gone through the practicalities of this type of relation- and consensus-building.

Prior coalition participation between groups and its duration

 

The experience of (a) group(s) actually operating in a specific coalition over a particular period

 

High-level positions obtained as a result of coalition participation

(C). External effects on group(s)

8.
The extent to which shared values enable groups to bridge political differences

(Latent) commonalities between competing political groups, such as religious affiliation, sectarian identities, citizenship or kinship, can become unifying factors under particular circumstances that, temporarily or permanently, enable political groups and/or leaders to transcend their differences and influence coalition formation.

Events that triggered commonalities between groups, e.g. because they generated inter-group solidarity

 

Effective political or religious appeals to group commonalities

 

Presence of a ‘common enemy’

Source: The table represent a model developed by the authors of this report that was inspired by the following general works: Lijphart (1977); Dahl (1991); Higley and Gunther (1992); Bäck (2005); Menkhaus (2006); Anderson (2006); De Mesquita et al. (2011); Cunningham et al. (2012); Asal et al. (2012); McLauchlin and Pearlman (2012); as well as by a number of Iraq-specific reports, articles and books, in particular: Van Veen and Grinstead (2014), Al-Qarawee (2014), Makiya (2016) and Haddad (2016).