Shi’a political parties, objectives and manifestations journeyed from a repressive dictatorship through a period of chaotic competition for power and bloody civil wars with their Sunni compatriots and their own to consolidate temporarily around the figure of Nouri Al-Maliki. This fragile balance was shattered by the brutal expansion of the Islamic State. Despite the peculiarities and uniqueness of each major political manoeuvre between 1991 and 2016, it is nevertheless possible to identify a few overarching tendencies that have characterized Shi’a relation- and coalition-building. This a useful exercise because victory in Mosul will only mark the next waystation on the winding path of Shi’a politics in Iraq.

An observation that is as critical as it is obvious, is that Iraq’s Shi’a are far from a unified and homogeneous political force: their political and religious leadership is contested, their loyalties divided and their worldly views diverse.‍[122] In short, when external threats are removed from the equation, Shi’a politics and political parties are, in many regards, remarkably similar to those found in non-sectarian democracies. This suggests a need for fine-grained analysis of parties, factions within parties and existing political interests as a precursor to understanding Shi’a political activity in Iraq. Notions that a ‘Shi’a crescent’ – including Iraq – represents an existential and uniform transnational threat to regional peace and stability must be treated with considerable scepticism as they are too selective of reality.‍[123]

In the context of Iraq’s emergent post-Hussein democracy, Iraq’s Shi’a parties have consistently sought to acquire and maintain political power for the sake of it.‍[124] In the main, Iraq’s Shi’a parties have not differentiated themselves a great deal by offering competing views on how they wish to develop governance and stimulate society in Iraq. Even principled positions, such as views on the role of clerics in political life or the structure of the Iraqi state, have proved flexible to the point of unreliability while they retained discourse and voter mobilization value. Examples include the gradual loosening of SCIRI’s alliance with Iran, Al-Sadr’s pragmatic cooperation with Al-Maliki or his tacit acceptance of Iranian support in the mid-2000s. Instead, Iraq’s Shi’a political parties have adroitly jockeyed for position and ferociously competed with each other for political power by use of most means imaginable.

In this quest for power, the role of individual leaders and their predecessors has been highly salient, both in terms of the success of specific parties and in terms of relation- and coalition-building. Iraqi Shi’a politics are both historically influenced and highly personalized. Individuals such as Moqtada Al-Sadr and Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim have capitalized on the religious and political legacies of illustrious relatives by force of association. For example, Moqtada al-Sadr rapidly rose from being a junior cleric to a dominant political/religious figure via the broad popular base he inherited from his father and by continuing his championship of an under-represented constituency (the Shi’a poor).

A consequence of the combination of political competition for its own sake and the personalized-cum-patronage character of Iraqi Shi’a politics has been that political coalitions have largely been vehicles of opportunity to win power and associated resources. They have tended to take the form of either pre-electoral lists to legitimately acquire control over the state, or of post-electoral alliances to form government. Examples include the United Iraqi Alliance electoral list of 2005 or the post-2010 elections alliance between the State of Law Coalition and the United Iraqi Alliance. Such coalitions have equally rapidly fallen apart once the business of government got serious after elections. This has had a negative impact on the quality of governance due to long periods of negotiation, high levels of discontinuity and a heightened risk of abuse of public authority.

The above notwithstanding, Iraq’s Shi’a political groups have also repeatedly demonstrated a sense of solidarity and unity when threatened by clear and imminent danger. This is based on their historical marginalization, a shared sense of victimhood and fear of Ba’ath revanchism. Examples include resistance against an inclusive constitution drafting and electoral process in 2003–05, the rise of Al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist Sunni groups between 2004 and 2007 or the Islamic State in 2014. Yet, such unity tends to be temporary. The front against the Islamic State, for instance, is fraying at the edges now that the group is presumably contained in Mosul, as different parties stake claims on the success of the Hashd al-Shabi.

Furthermore, Iraq’s main Shi’a parties became willing participants in a ‘big tent’ political logic after 2010, which is premised on accommodating them by giving each a stake in the form of political influence on government policy, control over parts of the administration and/or public resources. This was largely instigated by Al-Maliki and his tactical approach can be stylistically summarized as: ‘cooptation where possible, marginalization where necessary’ in respect of Iraq’s Shi’a and ‘marginalization where possible, cooptation where necessary’ in respect of the country’s Sunni and Kurds. That this approach has increased levels of state capture, enhanced sectarian frames and led to the fragmentation of public authority has been well documented.‍[125]

Finally, the level of continuity of Shi’a political parties and individual leaders has been remarkably high since 2003. There have been few new political parties entering the fray or fresh faces taking on a leadership role. Da’wa, ISCI and the Sadrists Trend were, and have remained, the key political platforms. Their leaders dominate the political scene together with individuals who have a more militant background but who are gradually increasing their political influence. These includes figures such as Qais al-Khazali (Asaib ahl al-Haq), Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (Kataib Hezbollah) and Amer al-Ameri (Badr Corps). Moreover, Iraq’s Shi’a leaders seem largely occupied with each other and their relative positions. A key consequence is that rejuvenation of the Shi’a body politic has been very limited. As poor governance, insecurity, low economic growth prospects and inadequate service delivery are creating a growing body of grievances, few channels exist outside of the political establishment to manifest them.‍[126]

In sum, coalition formation between Iraq’s main Shi’a groups has been an unstable, rough-and-tumble affair that has, since 2003, largely been conducted by the same cast of characters and parties. Despite violence and poor relations between a number of them, they have pragmatically formed coalitions, overcoming existing enmities and adjusting principled positions with flexibility where this was in their interests. While this has ensured the consolidation of Shi’a political dominance, increased the confidence of the main Shi’a political parties and established a measure of stability of governance, it has also reduced the quality of governance and administration and discouraged new political entrants. A key question for the future is to what extent these negative effects can be remedied on the basis of current Shi’a political strength and confidence. Present-day political dynamics between Iraq’s Shi’a suggest that competition and fragmentation are likely to remain the norm, perhaps with new alliances forming from the same cast of players.

Policy insights and recommendations

As the dominance of ethno-sectarian logic makes the emergence of cross ethno-sectarian alliances less likely and as Iraq’s Shi’a will continue to dominate the central state, their political unity and attitude are critical factors influencing Iraq’s future. One would assume that if there was unity of purpose among the political leadership of Iraq’s Shi’a, and if they held a positive attitude towards the country’s Sunni and Kurds, that this would increase the chance of an attractive deal being developed that could keep the country together. Focusing on the first part of this hypothesis, the report’s findings suggest that such intra-Shi’a political unity was absent for most of the 1991–2016 period. Intense and personalized political competition for power between the same cast of elite players, fractious coalitions and a low level of trust indicate that general agreement on major future policy challenges for Iraq, let alone a broadly shared vision of the country’s future, has not generally been in place between the main Shi’a political groups.

That makes it paramount that greater efforts are made to address this gap. On the one hand, this will need to be done via existing political parties and their leadership because of their dominant position. On the other hand, this will need to be done outside of these very same parties and their leadership because of their dominant position. This is not a contradiction, but a reflection of the fact that change will require, in all likelihood, complementary political initiatives from inside and from outside Iraq’s political system.

As domestic politics are a notoriously difficult area to understand for external actors,‍[127] let alone to engage effectively with, a high degree of modesty and humility is in order. External actors will not be able to drive any of the recommendations suggested below. The rapidity with which the political influence of the US declined after 2003 – despite the vast resources it brought to bear on the twin tasks of securing and rebuilding Iraq – offers a cautionary tale, as does the mixed record of Iranian intervention. Yet, external actors can discreetly and indirectly support these recommendations. The preceding analysis suggests four that may have particular merit. These are briefly discussed below.

Working with existing political parties and their leadership

Reconciliation efforts in Iraq have so far largely focused on bridging the divides between Iraq’s three main ethno-sectarian communities: Sunni, Shi’a and Kurds.‍[128] However necessary and urgent such efforts are, the preceding analysis suggests that they may be a step too far as Iraq’s Shi’a are insufficiently politically united to give them much traction.‍[129] Although not covered by this report, the same fragmentation characterizes Iraq’s Sunni community, given its fragmented and delegitimized leadership, as well as its Kurdish community, given the deep political rifts between the PUK, Goran and KDP. This suggests that building political confidence and bringing political reconciliation about within ethno-sectarian groups is of the essence. Practical initiatives that could be supported to this effect at the national political level include:

Iraq faces a range of daunting development problems including the need to improve its economic situation, defeat the Islamic State, resolve territorial divisions and ethno-sectarian divides, as well as increasing the poor quality of governance. Most of these issues are politically contentious, as was well illustrated by the recent reform and anti-corruption efforts. In other words, creating more deliberative space, which is less politically charged and more infused by evidence-based ideas of what can be done, would seem useful. It would seek to bring the Shi’a political leadership together to discuss policy issues and options for the future of Iraq in a confidential and informal manner. Whatever emerges from it, could then be exposed to political preferences and debate. It would have the dual aim of enabling more open, less sensitive exchanges on key political issues while also increasing the quality and diversity of ideas to address them. Practical initiatives that could be supported to this effect include:

Working outside of existing political parties and their leadership

Given the high level of Shi’a political elite and party continuity and the difficulty of penetrating existing arrangements, there is value in supporting the development of new Shi’a political actors that constructively and peacefully challenge the performance of those in charge of Iraq by contributing new ideas, tapping into new constituencies and reinvigorating debate. This will help to shake up some of the apparent current complacency and perhaps even to break through some of the resistance in the course of time. In other words, countervailing Shi’a social forces are needed to create more meaningful social contestation. This may seem a bit paradoxical, given Iraq’s many ethno-sectarian divides that already exist, but merely reflects the need to redress Shi’a elite capture of Iraq’s political centre. Practical initiatives that could be supported to this effect include:

Iraq is an emergent democracy with a young population that has seen significant levels of violence and deteriorating ethno-sectarian political relations in the first 13 years of its post-Hussein existence. It has little by way of an independent press that provides unbiased, high-quality reporting, and economic prospects are worsening. Its economy is dominated by state-provided employment in which oil revenue plays a substantial role. The convergence of these elements means that popular conceptions of what might be expected from political parties in an emergent democracy are relatively easily influenced and managed by Iraq’s elites. Citizens are largely dependent on the state for employment and services, and these are increasingly patronage-based. In short, the quality of politics and governance in Iraq can be raised by increasing the political expectations of its population. Practical initiatives that could be supported to this effect include:

Although further action research is needed to operationalize these recommendations, they offer a direction for building on the positive features of Shi’a relation- and coalition-building in Iraq, such as its pragmatism, speed and ability to develop compromise, while addressing its less productive aspects.