Since the early days of independence, Lebanese politicians have relied on foreign actors to strengthen their domestic influence and control.[49] This has included the Saudi-imposed Taif agreement and the Syrian military intervention after the country’s civil war. Actors and parties approved by the Saudis and Syrians were deemed legitimate while others were sent into exile or imprisoned. In Iraq, politics after 2003 also became intertwined with regional and international politics, as the weakening of the state made it more susceptible to external influences. For the first years after the US-led invasion, the American Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) became the sovereign of Iraq. During this period, all political actors in Baghdad needed to have strong relationships with the CPA to be deemed legitimate. Some parties still focus largely on foreign legitimisation. For instance, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) used the strength of its relations with the US and Turkey to increase its capabilities and demonstrate to its constituents that the party was now on the world stage. This form of international recognition gave Masoud Barzani, the leader of the KDP, considerable legitimacy in the eyes of his people and encouraged the party to focus its communication efforts on publicising his relationships with world leaders.

In addition to foreign legitimisation, most political parties benefit directly from foreign financial contributions, which are necessary to sustain their political activities. Unlike in most European countries – where public funding of political parties is increasingly used as a way to strengthen representative democracy by addressing resource disparities among political groups – political parties in Iraq and Lebanon are not allotted a portion of public finances to sustain their activities. There has been little discussion of public funding for political parties in Lebanon and Iraq and politicians have continuously expressed reservations against it.[50] A public funding system would also require parties to reveal their funding sources, something that many parties in both countries are unwilling to do. Instead, their current political financing systems force parties to rely largely on a mix of domestic and foreign revenue streams to launch and run competitive political campaigns – including their own television channels, campaign materials, religious celebrations, conferences and workshops – and vote buying.

Foreign funding tends to tilt competition in favour of sectarian parties that can, at times, act as proxies, and disadvantages local political groups with a more national agenda. In Lebanon, Iran is believed to finance all Hezbollah’s allies directly, including Amal, Marada and Tawhid. Most of these would have found it difficult to sustain political activity without such support. The situation is similar, if not more complex, in Iraq, with funding coming from a wide number of regional and international actors. PM Haidar Al-Abadi previously stated that his State of Law Coalition received about US$250 million from a European country to fund his 2010 parliamentary campaign.[51]

The simple reality is that domestic political rivalry between and within sectarian blocs in Iraq and Lebanon encourages foreign patronage as a way to gain a leg up in domestic political competition. For example, during his second term, Maliki worked more closely with the Iranian government to outcompete his Kurdish, Sunni and Shi’a political rivals; the KDP moved closer to Turkey as differences with Baghdad grew; and Sunni leaders reached out to Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia to improve their relative weight and competitive position vis-à-vis Iraq’s Shi’a-dominated central government. In turn, foreign powers have been active in supporting their respective allies among the different sects to achieve advantageous geo-strategic positions. In Lebanon, Saudi Arabia continuously provides financial assistance to Sunni candidates running against Hezbollah to reduce Iranian influence and Shi’a dominancy. The risk of such linkages is that domestic power-sharing arrangements are shaped in a bid to correct the regional balance of power instead of reflecting domestic group interests and relevance. This polarises ethno-sectarian tensions and risks undermining the consociational state to the benefit of specific groups. Logically, with the growing complexity of contemporary regional power struggles, politics in Lebanon and Iraq have further fragmented along party lines, pitting different groups against each other. The consociational state plays, at best, the role of referee.

Foreign backing has the additional disadvantage of limiting domestic agency in decision making. Over the years, foreign actors in both Lebanon and Iraq have played the role of informal kingmakers in government formation processes and political appointments. A prime example is Lebanon’s PM Saad Hariri being held hostage in Saudi Arabia and forced to resign in a televised statement because Saudi Arabia did not approve of Hariri’s decision to make a political deal with Hezbollah and its allies. In Iraq, Iran and the US play a role similar to Saudi Arabia in Lebanon. Take, for instance, the nomination of Mustafa al-Kadhimi as Iraq’s new prime minister in May 2020. This is widely believed to have been the result of a horse trade between the US and Iran in which Tehran agreed to back the former intelligence chief in return for unfreezing some of its assets targeted by sanctions.[52]

The relevance and impact of foreign sponsorship has increased recently due to the militarisation of regional rivalries since 2005 (Lebanon) and 2014/2017 (Iraq). For instance, the mere fact that powerful foreign-backed parties possess arms makes reform efforts much riskier. In Lebanon, the events of May 2008 remain relevant today. As the government moved to shut down Hezbollah’s telecommunication network, Hezbollah-led fighters seized control of several West Beirut neighbourhoods controlled by Future Movement groups loyal to the government, while the Lebanese security forces watched from the sidelines. In a similar vein, Kataib Hezbollah recently set up camp in front of the PM’s office in Baghdad to make clear its capability to attack Kadhimi’s government if it deems necessary. It has also carried out a number of violent attacks against embassies and civilians. The limiting impact of foreign sponsorship of political and armed groups on prospects for reform has also been clearly evidenced in the violent response to protesters in Iraq and Lebanon. In Iraq, the political elite deployed high levels of violence, killing hundreds of demonstrators, wounding thousands, and arresting and torturing thousands more. Repression has become the only route by which Iraq’s ruling elites can prevent the reform of their sectarian quasi-democracy.[53]

Interim conclusion

Over the years, domestic political actors in Iraq and Lebanon have relied on their ties with foreign actors to preserve (international) legitimacy, constituency control, and adequate financial support. Such foreign support has permitted larger political blocks to maintain and increase their political influence and patronage networks. However, foreign backing also limits the agency of domestic political actors in their decision making, since foreign powers seek to advance their own geopolitical interests by working through, or manipulating, their local clients, proxies and allies. Foreign interference in domestic affairs reduces sovereignty at the national level and leads to securitisation in competitive sectarian systems as foreign patrons are not above arming their local partners to gain advantage.

The Maronites relied on the French colonisers to legitimise control of the state in 1943.
Despite attempts by the Lebanese parliament in 2005 to discuss a proposed law on political parties including a general principle that gives the Lebanese state the right to fund electoral campaigns for political parties, parties expressed strong reservations against it. See: Waleeki, M et al., 2009. Public Funding Solutions for Political Parties in Muslim-Majority Societies, Washington DC: International Foundation for Electoral Systems.
Hussainy, M, 2010. ‘Shadowy campaign financing will mire Iraq’s democratic elections’, openDemocracy. link (accessed 15 July 2020).
Jiyad, S, 2020. ‘Time for a reset Iraq’s new prime minister and the US-Iran rivalry’, European Council on Foreign Relations. link; Rubin, A, 2020. ‘Iraq Chooses New Prime Minister, an Ex-Intelligence Chief Backed by US’, The New York Times.; Hearst, D, 2020. ‘The secret US-Iran deal that installed Kadhimi in Baghdad’, Middle East Eye. link.
Dodge, T and Mansour, R, 2020. ‘Sectarianization and De-sectarianization in the Struggle for Iraq’s Political Field’, The Review of Faith and International Affairs 18(1) 58–69.