Protestors, activists and civil society organisations are demanding an end to sectarian power sharing in the comparable political economies of Lebanon and Iraq. In Table 2, we summarise broad generic pathways for change based on an initial exploration of the large amount of literature available on political change and reform (hence, the table is indicative, not exhaustive). On the basis of this overview, we subsequently examine the feasibility of each pathway in the next section.
| Strategies |
Enabling circumstances |
Key success factors |
Risks |
Examples of success/failure |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) Enact radical governance reform through revolts |
Domestic policy failures affecting all citizens directly and rapidly worsening socioeconomic conditions. |
Persistence, structure, unity, external pressure and possibly violence.[59] |
Consociational systems are sticky; radical governance reform can be blocked at many turns. |
Success: Albania in 1997 (democratic setting).[60] Failure: Syria in 2011 (authoritarian setting).[61] |
| (2) Build greater economic agency and independence, through sustainable economic policies |
Economic crises can demonstrate the unsustainability of the consociational order by increasing the cost of patronage networks and clientelism – stimulating the transformation of public administration. |
Governance structures flexible enough to guide reform, capacity and expertise to reform the system, nature of the private sector, conditional international reform aid/investment. |
Government and citizens will have to go through a slow and painful process of economic adjustment and restructuring just after the Covid-19 downturn. |
Success: Estonia, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Latvia after the 2008 Eurozone crisis. Albania in 1997, post-Asian financial crisis 1998.[62]
Failure: Argentina in 2001.[63] |
| (3) Enable a generational transition via gradual electoral shifts |
Transformation of political culture by protest movements and socialisation experiences of youth that have not experienced sectarian conflict by creating a freer electoral context in which new voices can gradually compete more effectively. |
Gradual change in voting laws, political values, new civil society structures, social and economic modernisation. |
Political elites will seek to resist by monopolising electoral process or grant only a modicum of participation and suppress new political participation. |
Success: Germany (1950s) Failure: Jordan; Brazil; Namibia in 2015; Mozambique in 2017; Angola in 2017.[64] |
| (4) Increase the ability of civil society organisations (CSOs) to influence political debate and initiate societal renewal |
Improved access to high-quality education, improved legislation that fosters political activism and civic engagement, free and independent media, capacity building for political advocacy and activism.[65] |
Organised and structured protest movements, international assistance to civil society, conditionality of foreign aid to guarantee freedom of expression.[66] |
Fragmentation and competition within civil society structures, co-optation by political actors, de-legitimisation by religious authorities.[67] |
Success: CSOs’ involvement in the Philippines in 2009.[68] Failure: South Africa post-1989.[69] |
Feasibility considerations
As a next step, we consider four reform pathways in greater detail in the Iraqi and Lebanese contexts.
(1) Revolt and radical reform. While it is true that enabling circumstances for revolts exist today (e.g. the presence of resilient mass protest movements), a decisive and unified revolt is unlikely in Lebanon or Iraq since their sectarian quasi-democracies are too fragmented and retain core groups of supporters. More importantly, the stickiness and entrenchment of both political systems makes radical political reform difficult. Following the October 2019 protests, the political elites of both countries did respond to protesters’ demands by nominating new ‘technocratic’ governments. However, it turned out to be difficult to get even to this point, let alone consider further-reaching reforms.
In Iraq, the parliament approved Mustafa Al-Kadhimi’s (incomplete) government of 14 ministries on 7 May 2020 after five months of deadlock. While his predecessor, Al-Zurfi, failed to accommodate all political elites’ interests, Kadhimi used a more flexible strategy and altered his cabinet three times before he presented it in parliament. Since then, Kadhimi has had to accommodate the consociational order by appointing party representatives to key positions within the state.[70]
In Lebanon, Saad Al-Hariri’s resignation was followed by the nomination of Hassan Diab, who gained the support of Hezbollah and allies. Unlike Iraq’s stalemate, Lebanon’s prime minister was approved relatively quickly and without consensus from all factions. But with limited authority compared with the Iraqi PM, Diab’s nomination carries less significance. More significant are Diab’s failed attempts at reform once in office. He could not reform the system from within as party loyalists and parliament hindered his successive attempts at restoring control over his own governmental institutions. Parliament also rejected most of his proposed legislation and pressured him into resigning after an attempt to conduct a fair and independent investigation into the port blast.
In fact, revolts in quasi-democratic systems that overthrow the entire structure are not that common since power is presumably manifested through citizens’ voting behaviour and parliamentary representation.[71] However, this by no means suggests that protests are completely pointless or should be abandoned. They can be a significant source of pressure on political elites and can also help to monitor government decision making and commitment to reform, e.g. through targeting one particular goal such as the passing of a new law, a new regulation, or the abolition of a certain tax.
(2) Stimulate greater economic agency. Economic crises caused by systemic governance failure also offer an opportunity to increase economic agency to the benefit of private sector and non-sectarian actors. Even if international financial assistance were to smooth the sharp edges of the looming fiscal cliffs facing Iraq and, especially, Lebanon, it will not be sufficient to restore growth. Lebanon’s state-sponsored Ponzi scheme, run by the Central Bank to maintain the currency peg to the US dollar, ran out of money last year. This caused the Lebanese pound to lose about half its value on the black market, further burdening the lives of people who once moved easily between the two currencies. In Iraq, the drop in oil prices has put significant strains on government finances. Maintaining patronage expenditure on salaries and political side payments comes at a growing cost of cuts to investment spending plans, with the potential of eating into foreign reserves. Together, this could cause a similar currency devaluation as happened in Lebanon. In other words, sectarian elites in Lebanon and Iraq are running out of options as growing poverty and deteriorating prospects make seeking international financial assistance inevitable. In turn, this could open the door to a number of economic reforms that could, over time, decouple business activity from sectarian patronage politics.
(3) Enabling generational political transition. A third reform path is one of gradual steps that bring about a generational change in political culture. Democratic political cultures develop through the departure of older, more politically traditional citizens, and the entry of new generations with new political values. Unlearning values from prior regimes can take a long time. For example, ‘Saddam nostalgia’ is noticeable even among some of today’s Iraqi protestors.[72] Similarly, in Lebanon, several protestors have expressed frustration with the system but still want to be represented by their own socio-religious leader (or Zaim). Nonetheless, since 2015, Iraq and Lebanon have witnessed the rise of broad-based movements of popular protest that are mobilising a generation of young people demanding radical changes in governance. The protests in both countries manifest the growing gap between the political elite and the rest of the population. This path will become stronger and more feasible as an effect of strengthening civil society structures, making them more inclusive and less elitist (see below).
(4) Strengthening civil society structures. Both Lebanon and Iraq suffer from a weak civil society. For generations of Iraqis, a meaningful role as an active member of civil society was fraught with (lethal) risks. The laws governing non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Iraq are also outdated and endorse strong government control over civil society.[73] In Lebanon, contrary to the seemingly liberal legal environment, the NGO law gives government authorities large discretionary powers that are used to prevent ‘illegal’ assemblies and prosecute individuals criticising the government. According to a recent community survey, most Lebanese are not motivated to join CSOs, and show very limited civic engagement.[74] Moreover, none of the hundreds of Lebanese media institutions or outlets is national in its orientation. Instead, each operates as a voice for a political or sectarian faction, reinforcing and encouraging social divisions.[75] Similarly in Iraq, most media outlets are considered mouthpieces for powerful political groups. Finally, in both countries civil movements are weakened by limited capacity and expertise due to limited access to high-quality education and training. Civil society development requires capable and knowledgeable members to lead, including knowledge of political processes, civic responsibilities, and policy matters. Civil society structures should be inclusive and take into account the divergent socio-religious identities and realities of Lebanon and Iraq.
A two-stage exit of the roundabout of resilience against reform
A new political setup in both countries is required to guarantee democratic representation and to improve citizens’ rights as well as access to basic services. This can take several forms, such as a sectarian (con)federation, a new consociational order, or a civic state, and will require extensive political discussion. Also, despite calls to do away with the status quo and its enabling political setup, Lebanon’s and Iraq’s history and recent developments demonstrate that socio-religious and ethnic identities are a difficult-to-ignore reality. In other words, change will require time in the best of circumstances.
Yet, the pressure for change is there, and it is there now. A key distinction between the current and previous crises in Lebanon and Iraq is their depth: government and administration, population and political elites – all are suffering from forms of financial and moral bankruptcy, albeit to different degrees. Political elites will not be able to continue financing the sectarian mobilisation and patronage machines that maintain their legitimacy while vulnerability grows. In the short term, this makes the international community’s response pivotal. Meaningful reform will require heavy external conditioning to erode the stranglehold of sectarian elites over the state. This will only be effective if there is strong popular support for such conditions and a dedicated civil society effort to advocate for them and monitor their implementation. For this reason, a strong partnership between external donors (e.g. the international financial institutions (IFIs), EU and US) and Lebanese/Iraqi civil society needs to be created. It is likely that only the mix of international financial fire power and domestic legitimacy can bring about change. Working with the more reform-minded elements of existing ruling elites will be inevitable, but hardly the primary strategy given noted constraints.
For this reason, conditions attached to international financial support (blue section in Figure 2 below) should combine economic and civic aspects. They should insist both on greater budgetary efficiency (e.g. centralising basic service delivery based on citizenship, facilitating private sector enterprise, and reducing the public payroll while providing a minimum social safety net) and on the creation of a safe space for domestic debate and influencing (e.g. by promoting legal and fiscal reform that enables the easier formation and effective operation of labour unions, civil society organisations, new political parties, economic empowerment and independent media while using pressure tools to protect activists from security threats). International support should be channelled to weaken the position of elites instead of strengthening it, by providing aid to independent agencies (e.g. a national fund), providing loans instead of grants, working on the basis of direct implementation of projects by donors and enforcing stronger monitoring of aid funds.
Such measures will help to create a broader, more mature and more knowledgeable landscape of activists, opposition groups and NGOs, as well as new political parties. Civil society structures (orange section in Figure 2 below) should continuously lobby for a level playing field and multi-party and competitive elections by pressing for a fair electoral law, independent monitoring of elections and independent media. Success also requires buy-in from elements of the political classes who might use such pressure to push for reforms from within the system. Finding potentially supportive individuals is important – not just to exploit divisions within the oligarchy, but also to have a chance of enacting change. Additionally, reinforced civil society structures should seek greater engagement through decentralising opposition to accommodate different socio-religious realities. This includes redefining structures of solidarity and governance at the local level and laying the groundwork for stronger localised opposition.
Note: The light blue areas indicate the economic and civic reform conditions that international actors should attach to their support; the dark blue areas indicate where civil society and protestors should put pressure on the government in order to bring about gradual change in political structures. It is the effective interplay between these dimensions that can create momentum for real reform.
To conclude, our analysis has shown that escaping the limitations of entrenched sectarian systems in quasi-democracies requires a sustained effort that simultaneously seeks to curb the public authority and resources of the political elites that have dominated these systems for so long, as well as developing civil society, the private sector and new political players. The window for implementing such a complex strategy, which requires a synchronised approach by international and domestic forces for positive change, has been left ajar by the triple budgetary, pandemic and social crises that have hit Iraq and Lebanon. It is time for the international community to bring a crowbar to pry that window open and encourage legitimate domestic forces of change, recognising that these are emergent and require support.