Chapter 2
Contemporary context and history
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2.1  Introduction

This report explores the changing organisational structure of the Ethiopian state and its implications for the contestation over institutions and resources, in order to assess the implications for the state’s political economy and stability. However, the changes occurring throughout Ethiopia’s transition cannot be adequately understood and contextualised without an understanding of the foundations upon which the Ethiopian state has been built, and which various administrations have sought to contest over time. The Ethiopian state differs starkly from many other African states, due to the fact that its current structures and organising philosophy predates (de-)colonialisation by hundreds if not thousands of years.[14] As such, the Ethiopian state is a long-standing, strong, and value-infused institution, rather than a product heavily influenced by donor-driven state-building and democratisation projects.[15] Despite significant debate regarding the proper and legitimate role of the Ethiopian state and proper methods of representation (i.e., democratisation) of the popular will, especially since the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie, it is important to keep in mind that robust state institutions exist separately from the democratisation debate. Similarly, although state and government may at times align closely, the impact of strong state institutions has been known to vary. They may amplify a government’s ability to act or form a major roadblock to meaningful policy shifts, as institutional inertia or strongly vested interests within state institutions prevent change. As such, this chapter begins by highlighting the relevant historic context, and briefly captures contemporary developments in relation to the identified socio-political cleavages. Resurfacing history and context in its own terms will help see what kinds of forces are at play and what debates get popular attention (or not) to sustain these socio-political cleavages. Note, however, that the nuances of Ethiopia’s history and its historiography are complex and therefore cannot be comprehensively captured in this report.

2.2  Prelude to the transition

Ethiopia is an ancient state. Historians point out that, conventionally, the country’s history began with the visit of the queen of Sheba of Ethiopia to Solomon, king of Israel. Also, historians argue that Ethiopia’s history goes back to the prehistoric period on the basis of recent archaeological and linguistic research.[16] Before the state started to approximate its current form, various dynasties and kingdoms existed and contributed to Ethiopia’s political history. The unification of Ethiopia as a centralised and codified political system under Emperor Tewodros II and Emperor Menelik II further expanded the state.[17] As Rubenson (1972) put it, “for the first time in several generations, supreme authority in the Ethiopian state and factual military and political power were united in the same person” in February 1855 when Emperor Tewodros was coronated. Subsequently, under Emperor Menelik II, the new capital Addis Ababa started to feature an increasingly centralised state and modernised bureaucracy.

Through the state’s expansion and the urban centers’ increasing contact, a national Ethiopian identity was formed and further cemented through the defeat of Italian forces at the battle of Adwa (1896).[18] This system was further consolidated and modernised over subsequent years under Haile Selassie with the abolition of slavery, the introduction of social services, and a written constitution.[19] Although modern in a number of respects, governance also became an increasingly exclusive affair.[20] The Derg-regime that deposed Haile Selassie (1974) sought to redress a number of grievances that had accrued under imperial rule through the nationalisation of land and abolition of feudal imperial practices, but largely maintained the bureaucratic structure and repressive apparatus set up by its imperial predecessor.[21] As such, when the TPLF swept to power following protracted guerrilla warfare (1991), it inherited a professional bureaucracy with a strong presence from Addis Ababa to the kebele level, dedicated to serving the Ethiopian nation regardless of the ideological background of its political elites. This allowed for a high degree of organisational continuity as the TPLF took office, exemplified by the fact that salary payments to civil servants continued throughout the transition without interruption, regardless of the changing incumbent.[22]

As the TPLF guerrilla movement swept to power on an ethno-nationalist political platform, mobilising Tigrayan resistance against the Derg regime, it needed to reinvent its ideological appeal in order to maintain its now- dominant position in a vast and multi-ethnic state such as Ethiopia.[23] It did so through the introduction of the idea of “ethnic self-determination”. Following Meles Zenawi’s speech in 1992 stating that “The Tigreans had Axum, but what could that mean to the Gurague? The Agew had Lalibela, but what could that mean to the Oromo? The Gonderes had castles, but what could that mean to the Wolaita?”, a relatively broadly accepted historical narrative was unpacked into grievance-driven narratives specific to each ethnic group.[24] This new organising principle seeking to get “buy-in” from all ethnic groups across the country into the new state system was subsequently enshrined in the revised constitution (1995). This new organising logic was reflected in the creation of ethnically defined regional states, in which centrally recognized “native” ethnic groups were politically organised and recognised as legitimate representatives of the state as a whole, while non-native, non-recognised, and numerically smaller ethnic groups were largely excluded from governance.[25] This new principle of political representation through the EPRDF’s ethnic sister-parties had two results: (1) it led to a significant hardening of ethnic identities in what were frequently mixed and intermarried communities; and (2) it removed incentives for inclusive governance, considering that recognition as the predominant ethnic group within a territory formed the key to political representation, access to state resources (including donor aid), and influence over issues such as land policy.[26] Although the constitution formally noted an aspiration to democracy and the right to secession for each regional state, such liberal rights to representation and self-determination were never fully developed nor implemented. Additionally, the new systems of representation created a range of new “minorities” in the individuals that primarily identify as Ethiopian especially amongst urban populations, individuals of mixed heritage, and newly created new regional minorities. Both of these dynamics drove further grievances amongst a number of (newly created) constituencies against the EPRDF regime.[27]

Although the explicit political recognition of Ethiopia’s diverse ethnic composition in the federal structure – and in the EPRDF’s ethnic sister-parties – can be seen as an attempt to recognise ethnic grievances and build support from previously marginalised ethnic groups, it should be remembered that in practice the central components of the EPRDF regime dominated the devolved administrations.[28] Initially, this may have been due to the weak capacity of the newly set-up regional organizations; however, the centralising tendencies and top-down policymaking procedures associated with the EPRDF’s rule also directly undercut regional autonomy and limited the space for bottom-up initiatives from the regions.[29] The heavy-handed intervention of central state institutions in regional politics and land governance, as well as the use of ethnic divide-and-rule strategies by local and central officials, further reinforced ethnic grievances against the central state.[30] A dissatisfaction brewed, due to the use of ethnic divide-and-rule tactics within the population. It is particularly interesting to witness the level of support and legitimacy accorded to Team Lemma, a faction that emerged within the ranks of the EPRDF coalition party. It attracted support in favour of the Ethiopianist ethos that the group brought up, in contrast to the unpopular ethno-nationalist praxis pushed by the EPRDF. The reformist group, initially led by Lemma Megersa (an Oromo politician) and later taken over by Abiy, has effectively brought about the return of Ethiopian nationalism. Drawing on both nationalist sentiments and religious convictions (i.e., both Christian and Muslim groupings view Ethiopia as a sacred land), Abiy’s Medemer platform forms a conjugation of political actors around an Ethiopian nationalist conception (although without overcoming the different conceptions and motives the different groups attribute to Ethiopian nationalism).[31]

The authoritarian rule under the EPRDF regime seemed to give way for a degree of hope in 2005, when the regime promised a credible democratic election. However, results from the election were immediately curbed and delegitimised by state actors after the election period. The national elections of 2005 were characterised by a relatively liberal election period and a strong performance of opposition candidates, but a subsequent violent crackdown on opposition and popular dissent cemented centralised authoritarian measures.[32] The EPRDF maintained control over state power and stayed on. Throughout the 2005 election period, the EPRDF regime not only utilised its security and state apparatus for domination but also conveniently used different ideological claims in different times to fit its total control of politics and society.[33] The democratic developmental state model was one of the ideological instruments used in search of a new basis for the regime’s legitimacy. Borrowing from Chinese, South Korean, and Taiwanese (authoritarian) experiences which favoured economic development over democratic reform, the Ethiopian developmental state model featuring a dominant vanguard party was expanded.[34] The party and the state increasingly integrated, as the government maintained an ever-growing large array of auxiliary organisations in order to build a political base that supported the parties’ aims (especially in the urban centers).[35] The wide range of organisations effectively allowed the EPRDF to crowd out other forms of (non-EPRDF) civic debate. For example, in the 2008 local elections, the EPRDF was the only party able to field sufficient candidates to cover the vastly expanded number of local council seats (approximately 3.5 million), thus reasserting control over the local level. These members were to a considerable extent drawn from the Addis Ababa Youth Forum, a youth organisation established by the EPRDF in 2006. The Forum grew rapidly as the EPRDF offered loyal members various enticements: recognition, access to Micro and Small Enterprise programmes, housing, and job opportunities in government positions.[36] Additional measures to reinforce the tie between individuals’ livelihoods and at least a marginal expression of support towards the state were implemented; these included job creation programmes, small enterprise development programmes (often run with aid funds), and the registration of cooperatives (reliant on government contracts and licensing) as well as the youth and women leagues.[37] As well, registration and memberships structures allowed for a significant degree of co-option given the state’s strong administrative capabilities, making it possible to trade a range of benefits for professed loyalty to the regime on the individual level.[38] The ongoing co-optation of civil society organisations and the private sector by regime elites allowed the party to reinforce its hold over formally non-state spaces, further weakening potential countervailing societal pressures.[39] Finally, two practices – the reinforcement of surveillance practices (at times in partnership with both Western states as well as China for access to technology) and the instrumental use of foreign investment to displace local communities in order to control remote areas – further reinforced central state control.[40] As a consequence, the Ethiopian developmental narrative – which placed a premium on livelihood security, food subsidies, social services, and job creation – became key to local legitimacy (effectively the securitisation of poverty), but could not prevent grievances against TPLF and central state dominance from arising.

2.3  Transition and continuity

Ethiopia is in transition. The political economic conditions are changing. The often-referred immediate cause of the changes is the social unrest that preceded the change of leadership within the ruling EPRDF coalition. A major grievance raised throughout the protests was the inability of the TPLF-dominated coalitions to maintain sufficient livelihoods for the growing population.[41] Some argue that changing demographic conditions, urbanisation, and rising education levels opened up a range of old and new fault lines in the final years of EPRDF rule, including within the party and within state institutions.[42] As for the political process, observers of Ethiopian politics argue that two processes have contributed to the power shift within the EPRDF. The first process is the popular protest, mainly by Oromo and Amhara youth, for about three years against the TPLF’s political and economic dominance in Ethiopia’s political landscape. The second and related process has been a power struggle within the coalition that forced the TPLF to give way to the other junior political party in the EPRDF coalition, i.e., the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) – renamed the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP) and finally subsumed within the Prosperity Party (functioning as Oromia-PP).[43]

From the OPDO side of the coalition, Abiy Ahmed emerged in 2018. He initially built an image as an Oromo-nationalist within the ruling coalition, noting that “The Oromo people have granted us a great opportunity, and we have to use the opportunity and address the demands of the Oromo people by working day and night.”[44] Yet, Abiy is more known for his speeches about Ethiopia’s glorious past, as well as his unequivocal love for the country and its future potential. His famous words at his inaugural speech in 2018 – “we are Ethiopians while alive and Ethiopia when we die” – starkly contrasted with his previous emphasis on ethnicity and excited many in the parliament and beyond.[45] Following an initially relatively smooth handover between administrations, including the former ruling party acknowledging the new administration, the renegotiation of power within the political settlement did not run smoothly. The new administration branded the entire EPRDF period as the ‘dark years’, and some TPLF elements attempted to maintain their hold over power in the new situation. Major parts of the Ethiopian state apparatus were still controlled by Tigrayan officials. Many such officials were subsequently selectively purged from state institutions as well as parastatal organizations, especially following the assassination attempt on the PM on June 23, 2018.[46] In addition to the removal of TPLF officials, a range of other measures were also perceived as means to break the TPLF’s power. These measures included the peace-deal with Eritrea (viewed as opening a second front against the TPLF) and the demonetisation of old currency notes (wiping out unofficial reserves of actors without the access to exchange them for new notes).[47] Although such measures may have curbed the TPLF’s hold over the state apparatus, it also allowed the party to: (1) rebrand itself from a weakened authoritarian party into an ethno-nationalist bulwark within the Tigrayan regional state; and (2) effectively contest the EPRDF’s absorption into the PP.[48]

Yet, other than the evident differences with the previous regime, a remarkable range on continuity could also be observed. The new administration’s economic platform largely maintained the EPRDF’s focus on economic growth and job creation as a key legitimating factor underpinning the regime and outreach to international financial institutions.[49] Additionally, in a stark contrast to his Oromo nationalist credentials, the new prime minister stated that “Oromo nationalism reduced this great nation to a local community” in a speech to Amhara supporters shortly after coming into office.[50] Although these and similar popular appeals did allow the PM to consolidate power, in the longer run it generated significant distrust form both Amhara and Oromo groupings. PM Abiy also reinstated or maintained military control posts and other repressive measures throughout Oromia (and in Amhara and the Southern regions), as well as internet black-outs and measures restricting media freedom.[51] Following the abolition of the EPRDF party structure and its absorption in the PP on a Ethiopian Nationalist platform, the 2021 election period saw a range of changes to the electoral law and the entire political process. A crackdown on opposition politicians made campaigning difficult, leading one opposition party – the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) – to announce “that it was unable to participate in the election because so many of its leaders were in jail”.[52] In Oromia, the Prosperity Party contested all 170 seats, and ended up running uncontested in 103 of them.[53] In most regions, the regional PP branches held significant advantages over opposition parties in financing, recruitment, and name recognition. Coupled with varying degrees of administrative irregularities and repression across regions, the PP won the vast majority of seats in each region. Acquisitions of repressive tactics were reported for Gambella, Amhara, SNNPR (Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region), Benishangul-Gumuz, and Somali region. In other regions, some reports cite the impact of the co-option and absorption of the major opposition party within the PP (Sidama) and exceptionally high voter turnout (97% turnout, nearly fully in favour of the PP, in Afar).[54] For many, the choice at the polls was not simply one for their preferred candidate, but also a question regarding the political instability that a non-PP victory might generate. Although the opposition parties were weak and deeply divided in many regions, and hence likely unable to mobilise a large turnout, the landslide victory the party won across Ethiopia (securing 410 out of 436 seats in the federal parliament) was not viewed as a clear show of support for the PP by many constituencies across the country. Yet, other groups previously excluded from the EPRDF sister-party structure saw newfound gains within the PP party. For example, representatives from the Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP) and the Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party (ESPDP) managed to acquire significant positions within the new government. As well, the previously somewhat excluded sister- parties managed to take on a more central position (see section 4.2).[55] Thus, political contestation appears to remain largely confined within the (new) ruling party.

2.4  Conclusion

The Ethiopian state is an old, strong, and value-infused institution, rather than a product influenced by donor-driven state-building and democratisation projects. The Abiy administration swept to power on a platform of popular dissatisfaction with EPRDF policy and TPLF control. Although the popular debate may be driven by concerns over democratisation and the future of (ethno)federalism, the implementation of such changes entails a significant reorganisation of state structures in order to establish control and reorient them towards a new political order. Rather than assuming that a new political actor can set a new course, the political conflict for control of the state apparatus following the extensive integration of state and (EPRDF) party structure forms a major part of political contestation. Although this chapter explicates the context in which state structures were adapted under EPRDF rule, the next chapter sets out to map the changes made to this structure as the new administration assumes control. The identified changes may serve as important markers for the practical implementation of the PP platform as well as indications of the state of contestation between various political actors.

Zewde, B. A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991, Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002.
Rubenson, Sven. 1976. The Survival of Ethiopian Independence. London: Heinemann Educational Books.
Zewde, B. 1991. A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991. James Currey, Oxford.
Ibid.
Thompson, D. 2020. ‘Capital of the imperial borderlands: urbanism, markets, and power on the Ethiopia-British Somaliland boundary, ca. 1890-1935’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 14(3), 529-552.
Zewde, B. 1995. ‘Hayla-Sellase: from progressive to reactionary’, Northeast African Studies 2(2), 99-114.; Bahru Zewde. 2014. The Quest For Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement, C. 1960-1974. Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer Ltd.
Zewde, B. 1995. ‘Hayla-Sellase: from progressive to reactionary’, Northeast African Studies 2(2), 99-114.
Van der Beken, C. 2007. ‘Ethiopia: From a centralized monarchy to a federal republic’, Afrika Focus 20(1-2), 13-48.
De Waal, A. 2013. ‘The theory and practice of Meles Zenawi’, African Affairs, 112(446), 148-155, 150.
Gebregziabher, T. 2019. ‘Ideology and power in TPLF’s Ethiopia: A historic reversal in the making?’, African Affairs 118(472), 463-484.
Abbink, J. 2020. ‘History education in Ethiopia post-1991: rethinking the nation’s history in the context of ‘decolonization’ debates’, Africa Knows Draft Paper, 1-28.
Mehretu, A. 2012. ‘Ethnic federalism and its potential to dismember the Ethiopian state’, Progress in Development Studies 12(2-3), 113-133. However, certain groups were included in governance by being recognised in specific zones (Yusuf, S. 2019. What is driving Ethiopia’s ethnic conflict?, ISS East Africa Report, Pretoria: South Africa). Also note that the appointment of ethnic territories was not necessarily a demand-driven process.
Yusuf, S. 2019. What is driving Ethiopia’s ethnic conflict?, ISS East Africa Report, Pretoria: South Africa; Interview with an Ethiopian academic, Addis Ababa, November, 2019.
De Waal, A. 2018. The Future of Ethiopia: Developmental state or political marketplace?, Somerville, Massachusetts: World Peace Foundation; Abbink, J. 2009. 'The Ethiopian Second Republic and the fragile “Social Contract"', Africa Spectrum, 44(2), 3-28, 22.
Van der Beken, C. 2018. `The Challenge of Reform within Ethiopia’s Constitutional´, Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper.
Abbink, J. 2011. ‘Ethnic-based federalism and ethnicity in Ethiopia: reassessing the experiment after 20 years’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 5(4), 596-618.
Abbink, J. 2006. ‘Discomfiture of democracy? The 2005 election crisis in Ethiopia and its aftermath’, African Affairs 105(419), 173-199.
The EPRDF as a coalition party espoused ideological claims such as Ethno-nationalism, Marxism-Leninism, Revolutionary Democracy, and Democratic Developmental State (see Gebregziabher, 2019. Ideology and power in TPLF’s Ethiopia: A historic reversal in the making? African Affairs, Vol. 118, issue 472, 463-484).
Fouriej, E. 2015. ‘China's example for Meles' Ethiopia: when development ‘models’ land’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 53(3), 289-316.
Gebremariam, E. 2017. ‘The Politics of Developmentalism, Citizenship and Urban Youth in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’, PhD Philosophy (Political Science) dissertation. University of Manchester, United Kingdom, 108.
Vaughan, S. 2011. `Revolutionary democratic state-building: party, state and people in the EPRDF’s Ethiopia´, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 5(4), 619-640; Aalen, L. and Tronvoll, K. 2009. ‘The End of Democracy? Curtailing Political and Civil Rights in Ethiopia’, Review of African Political Economy, 36(120), 203.
Gebremariam, E. 2017, ‘The Politics of Developmentalism, Citizenship and Urban Youth in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’, PhD Philosophy (Political Science) dissertation. University of Manchester, United Kingdom. Note that this also imported a degree of opposition into the EPRDF, as individuals sympathising with opposition parties joined EPRDF parties (such as OPDO).
Arriola, L. and Lyons, T. 2016. ‘The 100% Election’, Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 76-88.
Abbink, J. 2009. ‘The Ethiopian second republic and the fragile “social contract”’, Africa Spectrum, 44(2), 3-28.; Gebregziabher, T. and Hout, W. ‘The rise of oligarchy in Ethiopia: The case of wealth creation since 1991’, Review of African Political Economy 45, 157 (2018), 501-510.
Turse, N. 2017. ‘How The NSA Built A Secret Surveillance Network For Ethiopia’, The Intercept, 13 September, link (accessed 5 October 2020); Human Rights Watch. 2014. ‘They Know Everything We Do’: Telecom and Internet Surveillance in Ethiopia, HRW Reports; Meester, J. 2021. ‘Designed in Ethiopia’ and ‘Made in China’, The Hague: Clingendael; Abbink, J. 2009, ‘The Ethiopian second republic and the fragile “social contract”’, Africa Spectrum, 44(2), 3-28; Abbink, J. 2011. ‘Ethnic-based federalism and ethnicity in Ethiopia: reassessing the experiment after 20 years’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 5(4), 596-618.
Gebregziabher, T. 2019, ‘The party that consumes the state: The rise of oligarchy in post-1991 Ethiopia’, PhD dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam.
Yibeltal, K. 2014. ‘Addis Abeba’s proposed Master Plan sparks nationwide university students’ protest’, Addis Standard, 2 May, link (accessed 24 February 2022); International Crisis Group. 2019. Managing Ethiopia’s Unsettled Transition, ICG Africa Report n. 269, Brussels: Belgium, 2-11; Yusuf, S. 2019. What is driving Ethiopia’s ethnic conflict?, ISS East Africa Report, Pretoria: South Africa. Interview with an Ethiopian academic, Addis Ababa, November, 2019.
Gebregziabher, T. 2019, ‘The party that consumes the state: The rise of oligarchy in post-1991 Ethiopia’, PhD dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam.
Tasfaya. E. 2021. ‘EIEP: Prosperity Party’s win is a loss for Oromia—and Ethiopia’, Ethiopia Insight, 19 August, link (accessed 26 January 2022).
Gebregziabher, T. 2019, ‘Ideology and power in TPLF’s Ethiopia: A historic reversal in the making?’ In The Party That Consumes the State: The Rise of Oligarchy in Post-1991 Ethiopia, PhD dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam.
At least two people died and 156 were wounded in the grenade attack. See the full story at Girma, M. 2018. ‘Explosion at rally proves that Ethiopia isn’t out of the woods yet’ The Conversation, 25 June, link (accessed 20 February 2022).
Paravicini, G. 2020. ‘Regional party wins vote in Ethiopia's Tigray, challenging federal government’, Reuters, 11 September, link (accessed 20 February 2022).
Meester, J., and Ezzeddine, N. 2021. A transition at work? The ethnicization of Ethiopia’s informal sector, CRU report, The Hague: Clingendael.
Tasfaya. E. 2021. ‘EIEP: Prosperity Party’s win is a loss for Oromia—and Ethiopia’, Ethiopia Insight, 19 August, link (accessed 26 January 2022).
Amnesty International, 2020. Beyond Law Enforcement: Human Rights Violations By Ethiopian Security Forces in Amhara and Oromia, London: Amnesty International Ltd.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ethiopia Insight. 2021. ‘EIEP: Lust for power trumped reformist zeal in Ethiopia’s election’, Ethiopia Insight, 21 September, link (accessed 26 January 2022).
Gebreluel. G., 2019. ‘Ethiopia’s prime minister wants to change the ruling coalition. Who’s getting left out?’, The Washington Post, 23 December, link (accessed 26 January 2022).
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Introduction
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Taking control of the Ethiopian state