Chapter 3
Taking control of the Ethiopian state
PDF

3.1  Introduction

As a country transitions away from an old political settlement towards a new one, the incumbent political forces managing the transition are bound to face a considerable challenge, namely, establishing effective control over state institutions that used to operate under the previous system. Even in a best-case scenario, the incumbents are likely to struggle with institutional inertia: despite changes in leadership, well-developed organisations tend to keep working in the way they are used to, thus making it difficult to implement substantial changes.[56] In the worst-case scenario for the incumbents, former ruling elites may even retain a significant degree of control over institutions – if not via the leadership, which is often replaced during a transition, at least via the presence of mid-level officials and engrained procedures affiliated with the former rulers. The persistence of these networks can make it extremely difficult for the new incumbents to exert their control, as it allows the former rulers to sabotage the transition from within.

The aim of this chapter is to map the main organisational changes through which the new administration has sought to take control of the Ethiopian state. To do so, the chapter focuses on three main ways in which the new administration has sought to expand its control over the country’s statal and parastatal institutions,[57] namely: (1) appointing new officials in key positions; (2) reorganizing reporting lines within and across institutions; and (3) rearranging the allocation of financial resources and the responsibility over their management. To track these changes over time, this chapter analyses appointments, reporting lines, and financing arrangements in four different timeframes, namely: (i) the late days of the EPRDF rule (between late 2017 and April 2018); (ii) the first phase of the transition (April 2018 – November 2020), from Abiy’s nomination as PM to the outbreak of the Tigray war; (iii) the second phase of the transition (November 2020 – September 2021), from the outbreak of the Tigray war to the conclusion of the 2021 electoral process; and (iv) the latest and current phase of the transition (since October 2021), marked by the establishment of a new post-election cabinet.

3.2  Appointing new officials

One major strategy that a new ruling coalition can use to gain control over key institutions is to appoint new officials, particularly in leadership positions. These new appointments can serve different purposes. First, replacing officials with strong ties to the previous regime can allow the incumbents to break (or at least significantly weaken) the networks through which their predecessors used to control relevant institutions. Second, a wave of new appointments can also give the incumbents an opportunity to build up their own networks of control, most notably by filling leadership positions either with loyalists (if the main aim is to strengthen political control over state structures) or with experts (if the main aim is to achieve a new policy goal).[58] Third, appointments can build political coalitions by rewarding allied political forces with attractive positions. In certain cases, these different considerations can and do coexist. For instance, some appointees may both be experts and have (or develop) ties to the party. Moreover, technocratic or political appointees may become loyalists over time, as their careers become dependent on their political patrons.

Throughout Ethiopia’s transition, the new ruling coalition has relied significantly on the appointment of new officials. During the three years and a half of transition, for instance, ministerial positions have been reshuffled seven times, the security sector’s top leadership three times, 9 out of 12 major state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have changed their Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at least once, and the Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC) has changed commissioner four times.[59] These figures are particularly striking if compared to the slow pace of turnover typical of the EPRDF rule, whereby high-level appointees would often maintain their position for several years, if not at times for decades. For instance, Fitsum Arega, EIC’s head in 2018, had occupied the position since 2013.[60] Such long stints were not uncommon in other positions too, especially for key roles in the economic sector (Teklewold Atnafu led the National Bank of Ethiopia from 2006 to 2018), as well as in the security sector (Siraj Fegessa was defence minister from 2008 to 2018, while Samora Younis and Getachew Assefa were head of the armed forces and of intelligence respectively for almost two decades).[61]

The appointment strategy of the Ethiopian administration has arguably reflected the multiple purposes and patterns outlined above. In a number of cases, the new administration appears to have prioritised competence by appointing technocrats.[62] This trend has been particularly pronounced in the economic sector, where councils of experts (e.g., the Independent Economic Advisory Council and the Privatization Advisory Council) have been created, and experienced foreign-educated economists have been appointed to important policymaking positions.[63] In other cases, political loyalty may have played a more prominent role in shaping appointments, as the new administration sought to ensure that its programmes would be implemented. In the early stages of the transition, for instance, important institutions such as the Attorney General’s office and the Ministry of Revenue were put in the hands of officials such as Berhanu Tsegaye and Adanech Abebe, seen by observers as close to PM Abiy.[64] The Prime Minister has also dispatched some of his former chiefs of staff (Fitsum Arega, Shumete Gizaw) to lead key institutions such as the Ethiopian Investment Commission and the Information Network Security Agency.[65] In other cases, appointments have also arguably served the purpose of coalition-building. For instance, throughout the transition, leaders of previously marginalised ethno-political forces have been awarded high-level ministerial positions, such as those of Minister of Peace (Muferiat Kamil, Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement – SEPDM), Minister of Finance (Ahmed Shide, ESPDP), and Minister of Defence (Aisha Mohammed Mussa, ANDP), thus consolidating these forces’ support to the new administration.[66] This coalition-building logic may have also underpinned the decision to retain Demeke Mekonnen as a deputy to PM Abiy Ahmed, which cemented Amhara support to the new governing coalition.[67]

3.3  Reorganising reporting lines

Gaining control over key positions and offices through the appointment of new officials can help the incumbents to break existing power structures and to create new ones. However, achieving the capacity to fully implement desired policies may prove considerably more difficult for the new ruling elites.[68] Although leadership changes can provide considerable impetus for change within an institution, such impetus is likely to meet significant resistance. To begin with, well-developed institutions have the tendency to continue operating in the way in which they are used to, thus stifling potential change coming from the top. Moreover, the appointment of a loyal figure as leader of an institution does not automatically ensure the loyalty of the institution itself, as mid-/low-level officials with links to the former ruling elite may well uphold their past allegiances and stifle their new leaders’ push for change.[69]

New incumbent political forces aiming to gain full control over policymaking may thus resort to the implementation of more structural changes, including a wider reorganization of the state’s institutional set-up. This can entail shortening reporting lines to particularly important institutions, bringing them under more direct control of the political leadership. For instance, to strengthen control over a sensitive institution, the PM may decide to bring it under the direct supervision of the PM’s office, or at least under the purview of an institution that the PM controls tightly (e.g., a specific ministry or agency led by a loyalist). In addition, structural organisational changes can entail a redistribution of existing responsibilities across different institutions. For instance, particularly sensitive issues may be moved under the purview of existing institutions that are trusted by the political leadership, or under new institutions created for this specific purpose.

Throughout Ethiopia’s transition, the new administration has implemented a wide range of organizational changes.[70] These changes have served different purposes. On the one hand, their declared aim has been to improve the effectiveness of the state and streamline its organisation. On the other hand, however, these changes have also reconfigured existing structures of control and power within the Ethiopian state, most often in a way that would allow the new administration to shore up its position vis-à-vis that of the former rulers. An example of such dynamics lies in the new administration’s reform of the country’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs), a crucial source of power in Ethiopia, reportedly accounting for approximately 15% of the country’s economy.[71] In order to streamline the management of Ethiopia’s SOEs, the new administration has brought them under the oversight of a single institution, the Public Enterprises Holdings and Administration Agency (PEHAA, successor of the Ministry of Public Enterprises), operating under the oversight of the Ministry of Finance. As often stressed by officials from the new administration, this change does have the potential to improve coordination in the management of Ethiopia’s SOEs.[72] At the same time, however, it can also allow the new administration to increase its control over a key source of economic power by centralising previously dispersed management structures.

Other changes implemented in the economic sector may reflect a similar pattern. For instance, in 2018, the new administration transferred responsibility for the Industrial Parks Development Corporation (IPDC, the SOE tasked with spearheading industrialisation and economic development) from the Ministry of Industry to the Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC).[73] The following year, the administration also transferred a wide range of responsibilities in the strategic telecommunication sector from the Ministry of Information and Technology to the newly created Ethiopian Communications Authority (ECA).[74] In addition to their potential gains in terms of efficiency, these moves also increased the relevance of two entities reporting directly to the PM’s office (the EIC and the ECA), while taking responsibility away from two ministries that had been under the TPLF’s strong influence (the Ministry of Industry was at the time headed by the TPLF’s Fetlework Gebregziabher, while the Ministry of Information and Technology had been led for several years by TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael).

Finally, in some cases the new administration has more explicitly leveraged the reorganisation of reporting lines to shift strategic portfolios away from TPLF-controlled institutions. For instance, in the wake of the 2018 Meskel Square attack, the protection of Ethiopia’s top politicians (including PM Abiy) was entrusted to the newly created Republican Guard. This shift removed a particularly sensitive task from the portfolio of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), traditionally a TPLF stronghold, and shifted it to a new body reporting directly to the PM’s office and led by an Oromo commander.[75]

3.4  Rearranging financing

Besides appointing new officials and reorganising existing reporting lines, the new incumbents’ efforts to exert control over state structures may focus on another crucial issue: the allocation of financial resources across institutions. First and foremost, the new rulers have the power to shift funds across different institutions, thus (dis)empowering specific ministries or agencies according to their own agenda. For instance, the incumbents may increase funding to ministries controlled by political allies, or in policy areas that they deem particularly important, either for their agenda or for their political stability. Conversely, they may withdraw funding from institutions that do not fulfil these criteria. Moreover, on a more structural level, the new rulers can modify the system through which funds are allocated by changing financing lines, i.e., by redefining where different institutions source their funds from, as well as where they deposit potential revenues. For instance, an SOE’s funding may come from the Ministry of Finance, from the entity in charge of public enterprises, or from the relevant sectoral ministry, and the company’s profits may similarly flow to any of these institutions. By changing these financing lines, the new incumbents can alter the institutional set-up so as to shore up their own position within state structures.

Throughout Ethiopia’s transition, the new administration has altered financing arrangements in ways that have to an extent reflected its political and reform agenda. For instance, the Ministry of Peace (MoP) has witnessed a major increase in the budget allocated for its recurrent expenditures (which increased by a factor of four in 2019-21 as compared to 2015‍-‍17).[76] This increase has reflected the importance that the MoP has assumed throughout Ethiopia’s transition. In addition to the already significant responsibilities inherited from the former Ministry of Federal Affairs, in 2018 the MoP was tasked with supporting peacebuilding efforts, as well as overseeing Ethiopia’s intelligence agencies (although this latter task was removed from the MoP’s portfolio after the 2021 elections).[77] Moreover, until the 2021 elections, the MoP arguably played a role in the new administration’s coalition-building strategy, as the post of minister was awarded to SEPDM head Muferiat Kamil. Budget allocations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in contrast, have decreased throughout the transition. Between 2015-17 and 2019-21, the budget share allocated to the Ministry’s recurrent expenditures has decreased by 20%, and the new administration has recently ordered the closure or resizing of approximately 30 diplomatic missions around the world (including very relevant ones such as that in Egypt) in an effort to reduce expenditures and foreign exchange losses.[78] This budget reduction has been paralleled by the new administration’s tendency to conduct its foreign policy through personalised high-level networks, often running through the PM’s office (see, for instance, Abiy’s direct involvement in peace negotiations with Eritrea and in shaping Ethiopia’s relationship with the United Arab Emirates – UAE).[79] Ethiopia’s intelligence agencies have also witnessed a relative decrease in funding, particularly during the first phase of the transition. The budget share allocated to the NISS in the 2019 budget, for instance, was 40% lower than the previous year – potentially reflecting the new administration’s scepticism towards an institution traditionally controlled by the TPLF.[80]

The change in financing patterns has also affected the subsidies transferred by the federal government to Ethiopia’s regions. For instance, the share of subsidies received by Tigray has fallen by 10% during the transition, while the share received by the Somali region has increased by 12%.[81] This trend has arguably mirrored the new administration’s wish to rebalance the distribution of resources in the country away from Tigray and towards some of the previously marginalised regions. This has been particularly true for the Somali region, whose political profile in Ethiopia has significantly increased during the transition, as reflected by the prominent role of ESPDP leader Ahmed Shide. However, it should be noted that other historically marginalised regions have not benefited from any increase in transfers – to the contrary, the share of subsidies flowing to Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambela has further decreased.[82]

In terms of financing lines, the new administration has seemingly sought to centralise the management of the country’s resources. For instance, as part of its reorganisation of Ethiopia’s public enterprises, the administration has sought to strengthen the control exercised by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) over the resources generated by the country’s SOEs. This has entailed establishing clearer rules with respect to the financial management of these enterprises.[83] Under the previous management system, different SOEs were at times accountable to different entities (most notably MoPE or relevant line ministries); however, under the current system almost all SOEs are supposed to answer to PEHAA, including financially. After the payment of taxes to the competent authority, each SOE is supposed to transfer 80% of its dividend to a single account managed by PEHAA under the MoF’s supervision.[84] A share of this sum may be retransferred to the SOE to fund expansion activities, in agreement with PEHAA and the MoF. This arrangement leaves PEHAA and the MoF fully in charge of the management of the SOEs’ resources. Further adding to this centralisation trend, after the beginning of the Tigray conflict, the federal government has reportedly taken control over 34 companies previously managed by the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT), the powerful endowment fund run by the TPLF and active in a wide range of economic activities across Ethiopia.[85] Similarly, TIRET – the endowment fund under control of the Amhara branch of the ruling party – has been rebranded (under the new name of Nigat) and reorganized under an increased oversight by the Amhara regional state administration.[86] These moves have the potential to further centralise the management of the country’s economic resources, notably by moving several large companies away from the control of ruling parties, and under the control of state institutions.

3.5  Elements of continuity

Although transitions can be extremely momentous and bring about significant change, such change is rarely all-encompassing. As noted above, institutional inertia and the persisting presence of elements linked to the previous ruling elites tend to make change particularly difficult. In addition, although the new incumbents may want to call for a clear break with the past, structural constraints are likely to restrict the options available to them in implementing change. On some occasions, as the transition moves forward, the new incumbents may also gain new insights or develop new interests that can call into question the desirability of some of their earlier proposals. As a result of these phenomena, transitions can feature a significant degree of continuity.

Ethiopia’s transition is no exception to this pattern. To be sure, the pace of change in the country since 2018 has been tremendous, as proved by the developments related to the conflict in Tigray, as well as by the momentous shifts outlined above. At the same time, however, what has often gone less noticed in the public discourse is the significant extent of continuity that has characterised Ethiopia’s transition. Many of the informants interviewed for this report have stressed that the new administration has embarked on a reformist project rather than a revolutionary one, particularly in terms of economic policy. For instance, although the new administration has put much more focus than its predecessor on the importance of the private sector, Ethiopia’s economy continues to feature a strong involvement of the state. Similarly, despite the promise to privatise several of Ethiopia’s SOEs, progress on this front has been rather slow. The sale of 40% of Ethio Telecom’s stakes – the only concrete project in the pipeline so far – has recently been suspended by the Ministry of Finance.[87] Moreover, Ethiopian officials with knowledge of the matter have informally acknowledged that the administration’s privatisation drive has been actually slowed down, casting doubts on the prospects for future progress on this front (for more information, see section 4.4).[88]

Some of the new administration’s appointments further highlight how Ethiopia’s transition has featured a remarkable degree of continuity. At the top levels of the government, for instance, Demeke Mekonnen has retained his position as deputy PM, in order to cement the support of the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM)/Amhara Democratic Party (ADP) to the new administration.[89] Another relevant case is that of Seleshi Bekele, Minister of Water, Irrigation and Energy in both the old and the new administration, and recently appointed chief negotiator and advisor on transboundary rivers and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).[90] This continuity may be motivated by a desire to provide stability to the management of a crucial project such as the GERD, which falls under the Ministry’s remit. Other examples of prominent officials retaining an important role throughout the transition are those of Girma Birru (former cabinet member and ambassador to the United States (US) during the EPRDF times, later appointed to advise PM Abiy on macro-economic issues and to chair the boards of different Ethiopian SOEs), Abadula Gemeda (former defence minister and speaker of the House of People’s Representatives, who has reportedly retained an important role as informal adviser to the PM), as well as Tewolde Gebremariam (long-standing CEO of Ethiopian Airlines).[91] It should also be noted that, in the early stages of the transition, Abiy’s first pick as a new Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) was Gen. Seare Mekonnen, a former TPLF fighter. The assassination of Gen. Seare in June 2019, however, has put an end to this continuity, as former ANDM official Adem Mohammad was named to fill the position.[92]

3.6  Conclusion

The transition taking place in Ethiopia has triggered a struggle within the country’s state institutions, as the new ruling coalition has sought to consolidate its own position, while weakening that of its predecessors. In order to assert its control over the state, the new administration has relied on a variety of strategies. First, it has reshuffled the leadership of Ethiopia’s ministries, agencies, and SOEs, by appointing a mix of experts, loyalists, and political allies. Second, the new ruling coalition has implemented a wide range of organisational changes, which have provided some openings for improving the state’s effectiveness, while at the same time helping the new rulers to weaken the networks of control established by their predecessors. Third, the new administration has also changed financing arrangements in a way that has reflected its priorities, increasing budget allocations to a number of key ministries (most notably the Ministry of Peace), while also centralising its control over political finance streams. Although the impact of Ethiopia’s transition on the country’s institutions has entailed somewhat more continuity than reflected in the international public discourse, the shifts described above have significantly altered the inner functioning of the Ethiopian state. The next chapter delves more in depth on the changes taking place in three key areas of the Ethiopian state.

Powell, Walter and Paul J. Dimaggio, eds. The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis, Chicago: Chicago Press, 2012.
The definition of ‘statal and parastatal institutions’ include entities such as ministries, commissions, agencies, and state-owned enterprises. Given the close relation between the state and the party in the EPRDF’s Ethiopia, one may also consider including the business conglomerates (known as endowment funds) owned by the EPRDF’s regional branches in Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and SNNPR.
The choice of whether to appoint a loyalist or an expert can involve difficult trade-offs. Appointing a loyalist may be helpful in ensuring control over an institution. However, to achieve satisfactory policy outputs, it may be necessary to rely on someone with expertise – and experts often tend to have their own ideas. For an exploration of this phenomenon, see: Ray, Dennis. 1970. ‘”Red and expert” and China’s cultural revolution’, Pacific Affairs 43(1), 22-33.
For a more detailed account of these changes, see Chapter 4.
Addis Fortune. 2018. ‘Investment Commission Gets New Head’, Addis Fortune, 28 April, link (accessed 20 February 2022).
Yewondwossen, M. 2018. ‘EBA says goodbye to long time leaders’, Capital Ethiopia, 23 July, link (accessed 20 February 2022); Global Security. N.a. ‘Siraj Fegessa’, link (accessed 20 February 2022); Tesfa News. 2018. ‘Ethiopia: Army and Intelligence Chiefs Replaced’, Tesfa News, 8 June, link (accessed 20 February 2022).
Interview with a senior Ethiopian official in the economic sector, Addis Ababa, December 2021; Interview with a scholar of Ethiopian politics, Addis Ababa, November 2021; Interview with an economic official in the economic sector, Addis Ababa, December 2021.
However, it should be noted that these councils were soon reportedly mired in political disputes. Moreover, issues of political (and ethnic) affiliation cannot be ruled out in the appointments of educated technocrats.
Mandefro, H. 2019. ‘Old habits die hard’, Ethiopia Insight, 04 July, link (accessed 20 February 2022).
Addis Standard. 2018. ‘Fitsum Arega moving back to head investment commission’, Addis Standard, 27 October, link (accessed 20 February 2022); Africa News. 2020. ‘Abiy’s chief of staff new head of Ethiopia’s cyber security outfit’, Africa News, 06 February, link (accessed 20 February 2022).
As part of the third reshuffling of the Cabinet by PM Abiy Ahmed, Aisha was later moved to Ministry of Construction and Urban Development.
Within the party’s structures, Demeke was also elected as Deputy Chairman of the EPRDF, and as Vice-President of the Prosperity Party after its creation.
For further reference on the debate between office seeking and police seeking, see: Budge, I. and Michael Laver. 1986. ‘Office Seeking and Policy Pursuit in Coalition Theory’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 11(4), 485-506.
Powell, Walter and Paul J. Dimaggio, eds. The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis, Chicago: Chicago Press, 2012.
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Federal Negarit Gazette. 2018. Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 1097/2018; Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Federal Negarit Gazette. 2021. Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 1263/2021.
Interview with a senior Ethiopian official in the economic sector, Addis Ababa, December 2021.
Interview with a senior Ethiopian official in the economic sector, Addis Ababa, December 2021; Interview with an economic official in the economic sector, Addis Ababa, December 2021.
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Federal Negarit Gazette. 2018. Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 1097/2018
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Federal Negarit Gazette. 2019. Communications Service Proclamation No.1148/2019.
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Federal Negarit Gazette. 2018. Republican Guard Establishment Council of Ministers Regulation No. 426/2018.
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Ministry of Finance. 2015. 2008 E.C Budget Year Federal Budget Proclamation; Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Ministry of Finance. 2019. 2012 E.C Budget Year Federal Budget Proclamation.
Alfa Shaban, A.R. 2018. ‘Ethiopia's Minister of Peace: the country's most powerful woman?’, Africa News, 17 October, link (accessed 20 February 2022); Addis Standard. 2021. ‘PM Abiy forms new gov’t; adds 20 institutions including NISS, INSA, investment & financial security accountable to his office’, Addis Standard, 06 October, link (accessed 20 February 2022).
Addis Standard. 2021. ‘Ethiopia recalls dozens of diplomats, closes consulates in various countries’, Addis Standard, 08 July, link (accessed 20 February 2022). Budget data from: Ethiopian Ministry of Finance. 2021. ‘Budget Resources’, link (accessed 20 November 2021); Additional documents obtained via a senior Ethiopian official in the economic sector. Elaboration by the authors.
Agence France Press. 2018. ‘Ethiopia and Eritrea leaders end decades of war after signing joint declaration at historic meeting’, South China Morning Post, 9 July, link (accessed 20 February 2022); Fick, M. and Cornwell, A. 2018. ‘In peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea, UAE lends a helping hand’, Reuters, 8 August, link (accessed 20 February 2022); The National. 2019. ‘Ethiopia's prime minister arrives in Abu Dhabi’, The National, 20 March, link (accessed 20 February 2022); Africa News. 2022. ‘Ethiopia's PM Abiy in the United Arab Emirates on state visit’, Africa News, 30 January, link (accessed 20 February 2022).
Budget data from: Ethiopian Ministry of Finance. 2021. ‘Budget Resources’, link (accessed 20 November 2021); Additional documents obtained via senior Ethiopian official in the economic sector. Elaboration by the authors.
Ibid.
Ibid. The allocation to SNNPR has remained unchanged.
Interview with senior Ethiopian official in the economic sector, Addis Ababa, December 2021.
Addis Fortune. 2020. ‘EFFORT Gets Board of Trustees’, Addis Fortune, 26 December, link *accessed 20 February 2022).
Interview with a senior Ethiopian official in the economic sector, Addis Ababa, December 2021. For a background on EFFORT, see Vaughan, S. and Gebremichael, D. 2011. Rethinking business and politics in Ethiopia: The role of EFFORT, the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray, Africa Power and Politics Report, London: UK Aid, Irish Aid.
Endale, A. 2022. ‘New breed regional conglomerates replicating EFFORT’, The Reporter Ethiopia, 12 March, link (accessed 20 February 2022). A senior Ethiopian official in the economic sector noted that this reorganization has transformed the party-owned conglomerate into a regional SOE.
Tadesse, F. 2022. ‘Ethiopia Suspends Sale of Telecom Firm’s Stake Sought by Orange’, Bloomberg, 18 March, link (accessed 18 March 2022).
Interview with a senior Ethiopian official in the economic sector, Addis Ababa, December 2021.
Addis Standard. 2013, ‘PM Hailemariam reshuffles his cabinet’, Addis Standard, 04 July, link (accessed 20 February 2022); Addis Standard. 2021. ‘PM Abiy forms new gov’t; adds 20 institutions including NISS, INSA, investment & financial security accountable to his office’, Addis Standard, 06 October, link (accessed 20 February 2022).
BBC Amharic. 2021. ‘”The Lawyer of the GERD”: Who is Dr. Eng. Sileshi Bekele?’, BBC Amharic, 13 July, link (accessed 20 February 2022); Addis Standard. 2021. ' PM Abiy appoints Seleshi Bekele as chief negotiator & advisor on GERD, transboundary rivers’, Addis Standard, 07 October, link (accessed 20 February 2022).
Addis Fortune. 2020. ‘Prime Minister Appoints Girma Birru to Chair Ethio telecom's Board’, Addis Fortune, 26 February, link (accessed 20 February 2022); Africa Intelligence. 2021. ‘Abiy Ahmed Ali's parallel government’, Africa Intelligence, 29 January, link (accessed 20 February 2022); Ethiopian Airlines. N.a. ‘Meet the Winning Team’, link (accessed 20 February 2022).
Ezega. 2019. ‘Adem Mohammed Appointed Army Chief, Demelash Gebremichael Security Chief’, Ezega, 28 June, link (accessed 20 February 2022).
Previous
Contemporary context and history
Next
Controlling the commanding heights