4.1  Introduction

Although Ethiopia’s political transition has led to significant changes across the board, particularly deep and consequential shifts have taken place in three areas of the Ethiopian state: the cabinet, the security sector, and the economic sector. The cabinet – a key representative organ in Ethiopia’s executive power structure – has become a natural battleground, where political forces have sought to consolidate a new ruling coalition, as well as to increase their own power by gaining control over ministries, agencies, and policy areas. The struggles taking place in the security and economic sectors have also been particularly consequential, given that control over these two sectors allows political forces to exercise power through the legitimate use of force and the distribution of resources respectively. During the EPRDF times, both sectors had been key in underpinning the ruling coalition’s strategy of political control over Ethiopia.[93] With the fall of the EPRDF, these sectors were suddenly opened for contestation, with different political forces vying for control over these crucial levers of power. The aim of this chapter is to map the changes taking place in these three areas.

4.2  The cabinet: Building coalitions and rebalancing powers

The political transition taking place since April 2018 in Ethiopia has had a major impact on the cabinet’s make-up. On the one hand, the ever-shifting composition of the Ethiopian cabinet since April 2018 (see Figure 2) has reflected a protracted effort by the country’s political forces to build a new ruling coalition. This coalition has been largely based around an Oromo-Amhara alliance, with contributions from smaller ethnic groups (most notably Southern and Somali), and with a markedly reduced Tigrayan presence as compared to the EPRDF times. This new set-up has been grounded in the years-long protests that preceded the transition, which saw Oromo and Amhara youth protest against the EPRDF’s Tigrayan-led political order.[94] At the transition’s outset, this alliance was consolidated at the cabinet level through the appointment of OPDO’s Abiy Ahmed as PM and ANDM’s Demeke Mekonnen as deputy PM.[95] Moreover, throughout the transition, major ministries were awarded to politicians from these two blocs: Oromo officials controlled the defence, agriculture, and justice portfolios, while Amhara officials controlled foreign affairs, trade and industry, and transport (see Figure 2).

The new administration has also featured an increased presence of figures from previously marginalised ethno-political forces. The most prominent examples have been the appointments of Muferiat Kamil (Southern) and Ahmed Shide (Somali) to the powerful Ministries of Peace and Finance respectively.[96] Other cases have included the appointment of Aisha Mohammed Mussa (Afar), first to the Ministry of Defence and later to the Ministry of Urban Development and Construction.[97] These choices have been consistent with the new administration’s declared wish to broaden the ruling coalition’s ethno-political base. Yet, the extent to which a true political inclusion has actually taken place remains disputed: the appointment of individual politicians from certain ethnic groups has not necessarily satisfied the demands of representation brought forward by their constituencies, who have at times criticized their representatives in Addis for not representing their interests adequately.[98] At the same time, however, these appointments have been instrumental in building up support for the administration among a wider group of ethno-political forces, as shown most prominently in the case of the Somali region.[99]

Throughout the transition, the increased representation of the Oromo, Amhara, and other ethnic groups in the Ethiopian cabinet has been accompanied by a gradual but steady resizing in the influence wielded by Tigrayan politicians. Although the cabinet was not formerly one of the institutions where the TPLF’s domination was most visible, during the EPRDF’s times TPLF officials did oversee important ministerial portfolios, such as those of finance and economic cooperation, communications and information technology, and farming and natural resources.[101] With the advent of the transition, however, the TPLF’s presence in the cabinet was gradually but steadily eroded. A first cabinet reshuffle in October 2018 left the TPLF in control of only two ministries: one powerful (trade and industry) and one less so (women, children, and youth).[102] Yet, as relations between the TPLF and other political forces soured after the creation of the Prosperity Party, in spring 2020 the new PM decided to dispose of the last two TPLF ministers, thus leading to a fully ‘TPLF-free’ cabinet – an unprecedented development in post-1991 Ethiopia.[103] However, since then, the cabinet has included former TPLF members, most notably Abraham Belay (as Minister of Innovation and Technology first and Defence later) and Zadig Abraha (as Minister in charge of Democratization).[104] The appointment of Tigrayans without affiliation to the TPLF has helped the new administration to curtail the previous rulers’ influence, while at the same time deflecting accusations of discriminating against Tigrayans in general.

In addition to these shifts in ethno-political representation, Ethiopia’s transition has also allowed individuals with weaker ties to the ruling coalition to find space in the country’s cabinet. During the EPRDF era, ministerial positions were usually allocated to high-level members of the various parties composing the ruling coalition.[105] Although this pattern has broadly continued after the transition, there has been increasing space for individuals without a strong party background, such as Attorney General Gedion Timotewos, Health Minister Liya Tadesse, and Planning and Development Commissioner Fitsum Assefa.[106] The appointment of these figures has allowed the administration to tap into fresh expertise, while also building new networks of control, as some of these individuals have been reported to be close to Abiy or have since been assimilated into the Prosperity Party’s structures.[107] Moreover, the latest cabinet inaugurated by Abiy Ahmed in October 2021 has included three members of the opposition, who have been granted control over the ministries of education (Birhanu Nega of EZEMA – Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice), Innovation and Technology (Belete Molla of NaMA – National Movement of Amhara) and Culture and Sport (Kejela Merdasa of OLF – Oromo Liberation Front).[108] In the latter case, however, it should be noted that Kejela represents only a splinter faction of the OLF; the main OLF group remains opposed to the ruling coalition.[109]

In addition to this raft of new appointments, throughout the transition the cabinet has also witnessed organisational changes that have altered its internal balance of power. The most significant trend in this regard has arguably been the increasing concentration of decision-making powers in the hands of the PM and his office’s staff, who have taken direct responsibility on an increasingly wide portfolio including both domestic and foreign policy issues. On the domestic front, for instance, the PM’s office has taken a particularly prominent role on politically sensitive economic issues, such as Abiy’s own promises in terms of economic reform, privatization, and job creation (further details in section 4.4).[110] On the foreign policy front, since early in the transition, Abiy Ahmed himself has taken an activist approach, most notably by brokering a historic peace deal with Eritrea and managing high-level contacts with Arab Gulf countries.[111] Although the PM also was a crucial figure during the EPRDF times, during the transition the importance of the PM Office has been further institutionalized, and a significant amount of power has been reportedly concentrated in the hands of a restricted group of officials with direct ties to the PM himself.[112]

In addition to the increasing role of the PM’s office, organizational changes within the cabinet have also increased the importance of two key ministries: the Ministry of Peace and the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Peace – successor of the Ministry of Federal Affairs – has added to its portfolio the control over Ethiopia’s powerful intelligence agencies, thus becoming the key reference point on matters of internal security (although recently the intelligence portfolio has been moved back under the direct oversight of the PM’s office; see further details in section 4.3).[113] The Ministry of Finance has also added new major responsibilities to its portfolio (e.g., control over Ethiopia’s SOEs via the supervision of PEHAA, and a role in the newly established privatisation processes), thus becoming – together with the PM’s office – a key center of power for economic policymaking (see further details in section 4.4).[114] In contrast, since the outset of the transition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seems to have lost some of its power. As noted above, the new PM himself has taken the lead in the most high-profile foreign policy enterprises. Moreover, in the wake of the November 2020 cabinet reshuffling, the post of foreign minister has been taken up by deputy PM Demeke Mekonnen, rather than by a new full-time minister.[115] Finally, as the conflict in Tigray has escalated, the new administration has sought to reduce costs and foreign exchange expenditures by dramatically downsizing Ethiopia’s diplomatic presence abroad (with over 30 diplomatic outposts set to shut down), thus weakening the country’s traditionally strong diplomatic capacity.[116]

4.3  The security sector: Breaking into the TPLF’s stronghold

Since the advent to power of the EPRDF in the early 1990s, the security sector had been a key stronghold of the TPLF, which enjoyed a deep control over the armed forces (the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, ENDF) and the two main intelligence agencies: the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) and the Information Network Security Agency (INSA).[117] For decades, Tigrayan officials occupied all top leadership positions in these institutions, such as the chief of staff of the ENDF (Samora Younis), as well as the heads of NISS (Getachew Assefa) and INSA (Tekleberhan Woldearegay). Moreover, Tigrayan officials reportedly also held a majority of mid-level positions; in 2014, according to the opposition movement Ginbot 7, more than 90% of top- and mid-level officials in the ENDF were of Tigrayan ethnicity.[118] This dominance had its roots in the early stages of the EPRDF’s times, when the new rulers had decided to demobilise the old Ethiopian army and replace it with the EPRDF’s own armed forces, in which the TPLF enjoyed a prominent position.[119]

Given the importance of the security forces in ensuring the TPLF’s control over the country, it may not be surprising that the current transition has quickly turned the security sector into a political battleground, as the new incumbent political forces have sought to shore up their position vis-à-vis that of the former rulers. Most prominently, this has entailed the replacement of the security sector’s top leadership (see Figure 3). Although this process had started relatively mildly (the first ENDF chief of staff appointed by the new administration was a former TPLF general, Seare Mekonnen), several high-level assassinations in June 2019 and the steady deterioration of the relations between the TPLF and its former sister-parties over the following months led to new reshuffles, which resulted in the complete removal of Tigrayan officers from all top security leadership positions by early 2020.[120] Over time, these positions have been taken over mostly by Oromo and Amhara officers, as well as by close affiliates of the new PM. For instance, an Oromo general (Birhanu Jula) is now the ENDF’s chief of staff, an Amhara politician close to Abiy (Temesgen Tiruneh) has taken up the leadership of NISS, Abiy’s former chief of staff (Shumete Gizaw) has become INSA director, while an Oromo security official (Demelash Gebremichael) has been appointed Federal Police Commissioner.[121]

In addition to this raft of new appointments, the new administration has embarked on a broader reorganisation of the security sector. As for internal security matters, the new administration has seemingly sought to centralise previously dispersed powers into a single institution. In the early stage of the transition, the internal security portfolio was placed under the powerful Ministry of Peace, the successor of the Ministry of Federal Affairs.[123] In addition to its predecessor’s responsibilities, the new ministry was granted supervising powers over Ethiopia’s main intelligence agencies, the NISS and the INSA, which had previously been directly supervised by the PM’s office. The Ministry also took the lead in the sensitive efforts to regulate the functioning of the various special forces and militias operating in Ethiopia’s regions.[124] In the wake of the 2021 general elections, however, the new administration has moved both intelligence agencies back under the PM’s direct oversight, together with the Federal Police Commission (which had so far been under the MoFA/MoP).[125] This has put the PM in direct control of the most relevant entities working on internal security, although it leaves the MoP in charge of the sensitive issue of managing the federal government’s relations with the regions.

According to a security adviser of the PM, the reforms enacted by the new administration have been aimed at professionalising the security sector, aligning its mission and structure with Ethiopia’s national interests and with international standards, rather than with the political agenda of the ruling coalition.[126] The TPLF, however, has seen some of these changes as part of a strategy against Tigray. For instance, the federal government’s decision in early 2019 to relocate heavy military equipment away from the Northern Command in Tigray and towards other regions proved to be a bone of contention.[127] Although the federal government wanted to redistribute military hardware away from the Eritrean border in the wake of the peace deal signed with Asmara, the TPLF opposed such a move.[128] Security sector reforms thus became a contested issue up until the last days before the eruption of the Tigray conflict, as the federal government and the TPLF battled over the appointment of new military leaders for the ENDF’s Northern Command.[129]

Over the past year and a half, the unfolding of the Tigray conflict has radically changed Ethiopia’s security sector. First, the security forces – and particularly the ENDF – have reportedly suffered a significant loss of capacity. At the outset of the conflict on November 4, 2020, a large number of Tigrayan soldiers (half of the Northern Command’s fighters, according to some reports) defected from the ENDF to join the TPLF, taking with them a sizable share of the ENDF’s arsenal (over half of the ENDF’s military hardware was reportedly stocked in the Northern Command, as a legacy of the long border war with neighbouring Eritrea).[130] This defection has not only significantly reduced the ENDF’s capacity, but it has also created mistrust towards Tigrayan members of the security forces, triggering efforts to remove those suspected of links with the TPLF from their positions, both at home and abroad. For instance, Tigrayan security personnel have reportedly been asked to hand over their weapons.[131] Second, the federal government has successfully pressed the African Union into firing its security chief, Ethiopian General Gebregziabher Mebratu Melese, on account of suspected links with the TPLF, while Tigrayan officials participating in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in Somalia and South Sudan have reportedly been disarmed and pressured to return to Ethiopia.[132] These removals, coupled with the significant losses incurred during the conflict in Tigray, have further weakened the capacity of Ethiopia’s security forces. The federal government has sought to compensate for such losses by stepping up its recruitment efforts.[133]

In addition to the reduced capacity, the Tigray conflict has increased the level of fragmentation of Ethiopia’s security sector. A trend towards fragmentation had already been visible before the conflict, as Ethiopia witnessed the emergence of powerful regional special forces falling under the control of various regional administrations.[134] Born in Somali region as a counter-insurgency tool, these forces had quickly spread to most other regions (while Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia developed particularly powerful forces, smaller regional states also developed their own special units).[135] This development had created a number of sub-national armed groups with an unclear relation to the federal government’s command structures, thus increasing fragmentation in Ethiopia’s security sector. Even before the eruption of the Tigray conflict, these forces already had been involved in a number of inter-Ethiopian armed clashes, both between different regional states (e.g., Somali and Oromia), and between regional states and the federal government (e.g., in Somali state).[136] The war in Tigray has given an even more prominent role to these forces: Tigray’s own special force has been engaged in a direct confrontation with the ENDF, which in turn has widely relied on the support of allied regional special forces (most notably from the neighbouring Amhara and Afar regions, but also from other distant regions).[137] To further complicate the picture, informal youth militias (most notably the Fano in Amhara region) have been empowered by their significant contribution to the war effort, thus adding an extra layer of fragmentation to the composition of Ethiopia’s security sector. The federal government has subsequently attempted some (cautious) moves towards reining in the power of these armed groups, for instance by labelling regional special forces as unconstitutional and by suggesting the need to deal with irregular armed groups.[138] Yet, the growing influence of these forces – and the ENDF’s dependence on them in the current war efforts – looks set to make it difficult for the federal government to exert its full authority over them.

4.4  The economy: Professionalisation and centralisation

Throughout the transition, Ethiopia’s economy has turned into a key arena where the new administration has sought to implement significant changes. Improving the performance of the country’s economy to deliver prosperity to the population has been a key pledge of the new rulers since the early stages of the transition.[139] As a result, economic reforms have quickly become a key priority for the new administration, which has sought to increase the state’s capacity to deliver economic benefits to its citizens. At the same time, however, the changes taking place in the economic sector have also carried important political implications. During the EPRDF era, political elites from the ruling EPRDF coalition (and particularly from the TPLF, which enjoyed a prominent position in it) had leveraged their control over the economic sector to expand their own political power.[140] In this context, the implementation of deep economic reforms has also offered a chance to the new administration to disentangle the complex networks of control built by its predecessor, while at the same time consolidating its own position within the Ethiopian state structures.

For instance, as part of its effort to improve the state’s capacity to deliver on its promise to the population, the new administration has sought to professionalise economic policymaking. Criticising the EPRDF’s traditional way of handling appointments as excessively based on political considerations, the new administration has pledged to increase the importance of expertise, rather than party connections, when selecting new officials in the economic sector. This has entailed, for instance, the appointment to key positions of experienced economists without relevant party background (e.g., Eyob Tekalign as state minister of finance, Mamo Mihretu as senior policy advisor to the PM), as well as the increasing reliance on advisory councils – the Independent Economic Advisory Council (IEAC) and the Privatisation Advisory Council (PAC) – made of experts without formal party affiliation.[141] Moreover, the criteria adopted for the appointment of the CEOs of Ethiopia’s SOEs have reportedly placed more emphasis than in the past on management expertise and on performance reviews, rather than on political connections.[142]

This tendency towards professionalisation, however, has not left the new administration’s approach to the economy devoid of political elements. Political considerations have remained crucial in shaping key appointments, as shown by the choice of a key political ally of the PM, Ahmed Shide of the Ethiopian Somali People’s Democratic Party (ESPDP)/Somali Democratic Party (SDP), to lead the powerful Ministry of Finance. Moreover, even supposedly apolitical entities such as the advisory councils established by the PM have reportedly come to be marred by political disputes.[143] In addition, regardless of the criteria used to choose new CEOs for Ethiopia’s SOEs, the decision to replace the old generation of CEOs with a new one has had a strong political dimension. Throughout the transition, the new administration has replaced the leadership of 9 out of 12 major SOEs, showing a clear willingness to break with previous management structures, considered by many as too close to the TPLF.[144] In some cases, the old leaders were arrested and charged with corruption.[145]

In addition to the changes taking place in terms of appointments, the new administration’s efforts to reform Ethiopia’s economy have entailed a rearrangement of the country’s economic policymaking structures. Since early in the transition, the new administration has empowered a new entity, the National Macroeconomic Committee (NMC), to coordinate and lead economic policymaking efforts.[146] The Committee, chaired by the PM himself, has brought together all relevant entities in charge of economic policy, i.e., the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), the National Planning Commission/Ministry, and the PM’s office. In this new structure, the PM has acquired a particularly relevant role. As well as his chairmanship of the NMC, the PM has sought to exercise direct control over some of the policy areas related to the promises made in the early phases of the transition, most notably in terms of job creation and economic liberalisation. This has entailed the establishment of new ad hoc institutions under the PM’s direct supervision, including the Job Creation Commission, two advisory councils (the Independent Economic Advisory Council, IEAC; and the Privatization Advisory Council, PAC), as well as the Ethiopian Communications Authority (ECA, which has been playing a key role in the privatisation of Ethio Telecom).

In addition to the PM, the Ministry of Finance has also strengthened its profile, most notably by streamlining its control over Ethiopia’s public enterprises. Before the transition, Ethiopia’s SOEs used to be under the oversight of different entities. Although the MoF was ultimately responsible for all SOEs, their management was entrusted either to the Ministry of Public Enterprises (MoPE) or to their specific line ministry (i.e., the ministry in charge of the relevant sector, e.g. Ministry of Transport for Ethiopian Airlines).[147] Moreover, the SOEs operating in the financial sector (e.g., Development Bank of Ethiopia, Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, Ethio Insurance) were supervised by the Public Financial Enterprises Agency (PFEA), which reported directly to the PM.[148] The new administration’s reforms, in contrast, have brought all of Ethiopia’s SOEs under the direct oversight of a single institution, the Public Enterprises Holdings and Administration Agency (PEHAA, formerly the MoPE), in turn accountable to the MoF.[149] The newly established Liability and Asset Management Corporation (LAMC), a public enterprise tasked with managing the debt of Ethiopia’s SOEs, has also been placed under the MoF’s direct supervision.[150] As a result, in the words of an Ethiopian government official, this reorganisation has left the MoF as a ‘super ministry’, with increased powers to coordinate Ethiopia’s federal-level SOEs, which reportedly account for approximately 15% of the country’s economy.[151]

The changes brought about in the management of Ethiopia’s SOEs have been a particularly important element of the economic reforms implemented by the new administration. One the one hand, the centralisation of responsibilities around the MoF has provided an opening for improving coordination and coherence across Ethiopia’s public enterprises. On the other hand, however, these changes have also helped the new administration to disrupt the control networks that had allowed the TPLF to control Ethiopia’s political economy. This latter impact has been reinforced by the new administration’s decision to dismantle some of the strongholds of the TPLF’s power within Ethiopia’s economy. Most notably, this was the case for the Metals and Engineering Corporation (METEC), a large military-industrial conglomerate traditionally controlled by the TPLF.[152] Throughout the transition, METEC has witnessed the arrest of its leadership (including TPLF-affiliated CEO Kinfe Dagnew) on corruption charges and the cancellation of major state contracts (including on the GERD). Subsequently, the federal government has split the conglomerate into two branches (one military and one civilian), thus dramatically decreasing its standing within Ethiopia’s economy.[153] These measures have been part of a broader effort to reduce the amount of political finance available to the TPLF by curbing its control over SOEs, party-affiliated businesses, and federal subsidies.[154]

The new administration’s efforts to reform Ethiopia’s economy have also involved, at least in rhetoric, the privatisation of a number of SOEs – a central pledge of the new PM in the early phases of the transition.[155] The rationale behind these privatisation pledges has been manifold. To an extent, they have been a political signal of a shift away from the EPRDF/TPLF’s ideological framework of the developmental state, towards a more liberal economic model. Yet, a degree of privatisation had already been proposed and implemented during the rule of Meles, Abiy’s pledges represented a significant step-up in this regard. Moreover, privatisation has been seen as a way to attract money from abroad, with the double aim of plugging budgetary gaps and replenishing the country’s foreign exchange reserves. Finally, the administration’s commitment to privatisation has helped the government to captivate not only its domestic electors, but also international financial institutions and Western governments, resulting in a significant wave of political and financial support (e.g., a USD 2.9 billion financing package by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in December 2019).[156]

In terms of effective progress, however, Ethiopia’s privatisation programme has not matched the rhetoric surrounding it. To be sure, the administration has achieved some progress in terms of laying the ground for the privatisation process. For instance, the parliament passed a proclamation on the privatisation of public enterprises in 2019, and the government has established an independent Privatization Advisory Council to support the process.[157] Moreover, the administration has for the first time awarded a telecom license to a private business (a consortium led by Kenya’s Safaricom), and it has revealed its intention to allow foreign banks to operate in Ethiopia – moves unseen in the EPRDF’s Ethiopia.[158] At the same time, however, the federal government has recently suspended further progress towards the privatisation of the telecom sector (most notably the issuing of a second telecom license, as well as the sale of 40% of Ethio Telecom’s stakes), citing as reasons the impact of the Tigray conflict and the deteriorating macro-economic situation.[159] The eruption of the Tigray conflict in November 2020 has added a particular layer of complexity to the privatisation programme, as foreign investors have been reportedly discouraged by the deteriorating security situation and by the sanctions imposed by the United States.[160] Regardless of the conflict’s impact, however, Ethiopian officials have noted off-the-record that the administration has reconsidered its previous pledges on privatisation, and that meaningful progress is expected to take place mostly, if not only, in the telecommunication sector (where the government is, however, still planning to retain a degree of control).[161]

4.5  Conclusion

Although Ethiopia’s political transition has led to significant changes across the board, particularly deep and consequential shifts have taken place in three areas of the Ethiopian state: the cabinet, the security sector, and the economic sector. The cabinet has witnessed a raft of new appointments, which have reflected the administration’s efforts to consolidate its political base, while also providing more space to figures with weaker ties to the ruling party. As well, the transition has altered the balance of power within the cabinet, particularly by empowering the PM’s office and the Ministry of Finance. Changes in the security sector have included a significant resizing of the TPLF’s influence and a (temporary) centralisation of internal security matters in the hands of the Ministry of Peace. More recently, the Tigray war has significantly damaged Ethiopia’s armed forces, reducing their capacity and increasing their fragmentation. In the economic sector, although the new administration has increased its reliance on experts with less-pronounced political associations, political considerations have continued to play a significant role in shaping economic policymaking. Although the new administration has implemented significant reforms in the management of Ethiopia’s SOEs, its privatisation programme has shown limited progress, and has been put on hold.

Although Ethiopia’s transition has featured somewhat more continuity than reflected in the public discourse (most notably in terms of state involvement in the economy and the importance of ethnicity in the political sphere), the shifts described above have engendered significant change within the Ethiopian state. The next chapter explores the repercussions of these changes, both for Ethiopia and for the external actors willing to engage with the country.