This study has been conducted in accordance with the Conflict Research Unit’s political economy analysis framework, thus focusing on power arrangements. By analysing changes in arrangements of power, one can understand: why decisions are made, what incentives play a role, how alliances form or break, and what narratives dominate. In turn, such understanding is key to identifying feasible approaches to conflict resolution. Examining shifts in arrangements of power enables the simultaneous exploration of the perspectives of those who govern and those who are being governed, as power is always relational. Doing so requires the use of three lenses: (1) the power networks and relationships between conflict actors; (2) the power practices and exchanges between them; and (3) contextual factors, such as institutions and ideology, that affect the power distribution underlying the conflict.[218]

The framework combines traditional conflict analysis with elements from social network and power analysis, and draws on recent research across a range of disciplines, namely, new political economy, new institutional economics, and conflict studies. It thus brings to the surface the politics and power dynamics that may facilitate or hamper proposed interventions in conflict-affected situations. In this way, it uncovers: hidden stakeholders, the practices and exchanges that facilitate the main actors’ relation to power, and the written and unwritten rules and structures that form the silent backdrop of these relations. This identification of arrangements of power helps to identify potential spoilers and entry points for action by showing which structures might be amenable to changes and which structures might be used to the policymaker’s advantage.

This report supports conflict-sensitive programming, by recognising that “[t]he success of most development efforts, including efforts to strengthen the state and build institutions of public accountability, rises or falls according to the degree to which these efforts are aligned with – or at least do not fundamentally threaten – the interests of powerful national and local actors who are in a position to thwart or co-opt those efforts”.[219] The analysis recognises that “many times well-intentioned interventions become ineffective because they reinforce an equilibrium that sustains the outcome the intervention attempted to change. These situations can arise from interventions that do not take into account the existing power balance”.[220]

Relevant information for this report has been gathered through a mix of desk research and key informant interviews, conducted between July 2021 and January 2022. These consulted sources have included: media content (e.g., articles from Ethiopian and international media), both online and in physical archives; governmental documents (e.g., budget documents and data, government proclamations, policy documents, and material on the organisational structure of various ministries, etc.), retrieved both from online open-access sources and through interviews with policymakers; interviews with key informants from a diverse range of backgrounds (e.g., officials involved in relevant reform processes, academics following the developments in the country); and various open access online sources (e.g., Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project on riots and protests). Sources in both English and Amharic have been consulted.

Regardless of the efforts undertaken to cover the breadth and depth of Ethiopia’s transition, ongoing hostilities and travel restrictions due to COVID-19 have at times hindered fieldwork, and may have prevented certain groups of potential interviewees from responding. Additionally, it should be kept in mind that because hostilities and purges are ongoing, several respondents were reluctant to discuss topics related to political finance. Therefore, two points should be kept in mind: additional research might provide further insights; and the transition is still ongoing. Although the account presented in this report may highlight a number of aspects of the transition, it is impossible to present a comprehensive and final picture at this moment.

For further details, see: Clingendael. 2019. Our methodology for political-economy analysis, The Hague: Clingendael Institute.
Parks, T. and Cole, W. 2010. Political Settlements: Implications for International Development Policy and Practice, San Francisco: The Asia Foundation.
World Bank. 2017. World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law, Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 27.