One of the major effects of the Arab uprisings has been the emergence of a Saudi-Emirati axis – often associated with an ‘Arab fall’[1] – and the efforts of both countries to halt and reverse any moves towards democratic transition in the Arab world. While Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) initially backed the revolt in Libya against Muhammad Khaddafi, supported a political transition in Yemen that culminated in the ousting of Ali Abdullah Saleh and criticised the brutal crackdown of Assad in Syria, they were also instrumental in the crackdown on protests in Bahrain and supportive of Sisi’s military coup in Egypt. As time has progressed, their foreign policies have tended to support the forces of conservatism and status quo across the region, including in Libya, Yemen and Syria. The Saudi and Emirati governments have also supported numerous non-state groups across the region, including Salafists in Libya, Egypt and Yemen.

The motivations of the Saudi-Emirati axis centre on their desire to preserve the region’s Arab monarchies, maintain authoritarianism as the dominant form of governance, ensure Saudi/Emirati pre-eminence, prevent the rise of regional challengers such as Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood or Turkey, and defeat violent extremist organisations such as Islamic State and Al-Qaeda. It bears noting that Saudi and Emirati foreign policy objectives occasionally conflict with each other as each country sets different priorities based on variations in threat perception.[2]

In this report, I examine the drivers, dynamics and impact of the Saudi-Emirati axis and the crucial role it plays in shaping political transitions in the contemporary Middle East. As regional stability matters a great deal to the EU and its Member States, a deeper understanding of the national security policies of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including their ability to shape regional developments, will help European policy makers to upgrade their policies towards both countries.[3]

Section 1 of the report outlines the evolution of Saudi national security priorities since it is the senior partner of the axis. Section 2 examines the rise of the Saudi-Emirati axis in response to the pressures on the regional order unleashed by the Arab uprisings. Subsequently, Section 3 analyses the foreign policy tools employed by both countries to influence regional developments, focusing on military intervention and strategic outreach, financial support, religious networks, and the use of media outlets. Finally, Section 4 offers a reflection on the question of how successful the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia and the UAE is in terms of safeguarding its interests in the region – especially in terms of countering the ‘triple threat’ – while briefly examining the recent cracks that have started to appear in the axis as a result of divergent threat perceptions and growing economic competition.