The previous section discussed the Saudi response to the Arab uprisings and how a common threat perception fostered the emergence of a Saudi-Emirati axis. This section discusses the foreign policy tools that have been employed to mitigate and suppress the ‘triple threat’ (Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood and radical Islamists). Without claiming comprehensiveness, the discussion focuses on military intervention and strategic outreach, funding, use of religious networks and media.

Military intervention and strategic outreach

The use of oil and gas revenues for the purchase of high-tech military hardware by the GCC states has historically often been considered an ‘insurance’ policy to ensure the support of suppliers like the US and UK during a crisis.[56] However, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have recently become more willing to use the military capabilities acquired in this fashion in actual warfare in support of a more militarised foreign policy.[57] It is worth noting, however, that they have improved their military effectiveness at different speeds. Of the two, Saudi Arabia’s military improvements have been more limited. The 2009 border war against the Houthis – in which Saudi Arabia became involved in a conflict between the Yemeni government and the armed group / movement when the latter extended its insurgency into Saudi Arabia – showed the weaknesses of Saudi military power as Riyadh suffered significant losses.[58] This stimulated a military modernisation programme that was designed to upgrade Saudi military forces for deployment within the region to facilitate a more assertive foreign policy. Yet, by 2011 this programme was far from complete.

In contrast, UAE military modernisation goes back to the 1990s when the country started to participate in international operations. For example, the UAE contributed forces to peacekeeping missions in East Africa and Kosovo, and joined NATO operations in Afghanistan in 2008. On a parallel track, the UAE modernised its army and created an elite military force – the Presidential Guard. The members of this unit are considered among the best trained and equipped forces in the Arab world and have reportedly been commanded by a former senior Australian army officer, Mike Hindmarsh.[59] The Emirati leadership has also heavily invested in the upgrading of the country’s air force, which was on display during the NATO operation against Khaddafi in Libya in 2011.

The Saudi and Emirati military intervention in Bahrain in March 2011 during the Arab uprisings was the first occasion that their newly-established military capacities were put to a test of sorts. The intervention was relatively small though, with Saudi Arabia committing 1,000 forces and 150 vehicles to set up a military policy unit that was supported by 500 Emirati police officers. Operation Decisive Storm against the Houthis in Yemen has been of a different magnitude as it has been the most complex and largest military operation initiated by any of the Gulf monarchies. It was initiated after the Houthi’s seized the Yemeni capital Sana’a from the Saudi and Emirati-backed government in September 2014, issued a decree transferring all governing powers in Yemen from the Saudi-Emirati backed Yemeni government to the Houthi leadership in February 2015,[60] and Houthi forces advanced on the strategically important port of Aden in March 2015.[61] The last move triggered a request from the Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi to the GCC to intervene militarily in order to restore his government. Saudi Arabia and the UAE responded and led the military intervention. The operation has also been supported by Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar (until 2017), Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Senegal and Eritrea, which have contributed troops, fighter planes and naval forces. Meanwhile, the US, UK and France have provided logistical support, intelligence sharing and targeting assistance. Decisive Storm has relied heavily on air strikes and a naval blockade in a bid to leverage the coalition’s air superiority and control over the waterways. However, the UAE and Saudi Arabia suffered from a shortage of infantry that constrained their ability to make gains on the ground. In an effort to compensate for this, the coalition has employed significant numbers of locally recruited and trained forces while also benefiting from troop contributions from Sudan and Senegal. Furthermore, the UAE contracted 450 Colombian mercenaries. But even these forces proved inadequate to make sufficient territorial gains against the Houthis. As noted by Hokayem and Roberts, ‘neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE had the experience and expertise of Iran in overseeing and directing the operations of local militias with a small cadre of highly skilled personnel,’[62] making it hard to deploy auxiliary forces effectively.

Nevertheless, the Saudi and Emirati failure to defeat the Houthis in Yemen has not diminished the ambition of either country to play a leading role in the region through military force. Alongside joining the US-led coalition against Islamic State, Saudi Arabia also created the ‘Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition’ in December 2015. This military alliance, comprised of 34 Muslim countries (including Turkey and Qatar) agreed ‘to co-ordinate their efforts against extremists in Iraq, Libya, Egypt and Afghanistan’,[63] and established a joint operations centre in Riyadh. The alliance excluded Iran, Iraq and Syria in an effort to further isolate Saudi Arabia’s main rival and its allies. Two years after its founding, the alliance had however failed to take any decisive action due to different priorities among its member states. But it has provided Saudi Arabia with a platform to make inroads with poorer Asian and African countries as the organisation offers military and financial aid, equipment and expertise to combat violent extremist organisations.[64] The organisation establishes Saudi Arabia as a major player in the fight against extremism and as a crucial partner for global powers concerned about violent extremist organisations in the Islamic world.

Meanwhile, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have enhanced their naval presence in the Indian Ocean / Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. They have also increased their influence over the main waterways that connect Asia and Europe and play a crucial role in China’s Belt and Road initiative as well as India’s ambitions in the Indian Ocean. The Royal Saudi Navy is larger in size than the Emirati navy, comprising 13,500 staff members. It currently operates six frigates, four corvettes, nine patrol crafts, 32 patrol boats, three minehunters, five amphibious landing crafts, and a replenishment oiler.[65] Saudi Arabia has sought to upgrade its navy to rival Iran and gain sufficient capability to counter the threat posed by Iranian submarines through the Saudi Naval Expansion Programme 2 (SNEP-2). This programme gathered momentum after Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman was promoted to the position of Commander of the Royal Navy in 2017. Through SNEP-2, the Royal Saudi Navy aims to acquire five corvettes and four Multi-Mission Surface Combatant Ships as well as new maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare aircrafts.[66] While SNEP-2 was initially focused on modernising Saudi’s eastern fleet in the Persian Gulf, Iran’s desire to develop offensive maritime capabilities through hybrid coercive organisations (such as the Houthis)[67] has increased the necessity to upgrade Saudi’s western fleet as well.

Geo-strategically, Riyadh acquired access to the Gulf of Aqaba after Egypt ceded the Tiran and Sanafir Islands to Saudi Arabia in 2016. As a result of its military intervention in Yemen, Riyadh also managed to impose its control over the ports of Midi in northwest Yemen and Ghayda in southeast Yemen, even though its major assault in 2018 failed to capture Hodeida (the principal Yemeni port on the Red Sea).[68] The Saudi attempt to gain control over the maritime routes went hand in hand with the launch of the ‘Red Sea alliance’ in January 2020, which includes Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen and Jordan.[69] Part of its purpose has been to isolate Iran, which used to have strong ties with Sudan before the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, but it has also served to make life more difficult for Turkey and Qatar as they attempted to make inroads with the new regime in Sudan and in Somalia where they have backed the federal government.[70]

The UAE commands only a small navy that comprises 2,500 personnel operating seven corvettes, 12 patrol crafts, 24 patrol boats, two minehunters, two amphibious landing ships, 17 landing crafts, two survey ships and one deck cargo ship.[71] In a bid to further its naval strength it ordered two French-built Gowind-class corvettes in 2019.[72] To complement its limited maritime resources, the UAE has also enhanced its military footprint by establishing and/or using military bases in the Horn of Africa for its intervention in Yemen and to protect the maritime routes in the region against piracy. As enabler, the UAE has cultivated relations with Eritrea and regional Somali leaders[73] that have allowed the establishment of the necessary naval outposts. Moreover, the UAE strategically used Yemen’s southern shore for its maritime ambitions on the back of its intervention in the country, especially the island of Socotra that is strategically located on the busy shipping lanes between Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. As the Emirati-backed separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) gained control of the island, the UAE leveraged its ties with the STC to establish a presence,[74] build a military base and establish a communications network.[75] Until its withdrawal in 2019, Abu Dhabi also exerted influence in other strategically located ports in southern Yemen such as Aden, Al-Mokha, Balhaf, Bir ’Ali and Mukalla.[76] It is also said to be involved in the construction of an airbase on the Yemeni island of Mayun that is strategically located in the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Such a base would help the UAE to monitor critical shipping lanes and project power directly in the strait.[77]

Financial support

Next to military intervention and alliance building, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have long used financial support to countries and non-state actors as another means to realise their foreign policy objectives. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the ruling families of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other Gulf states managed to vastly increase their revenues from hydrocarbon exports as they renegotiated their deals with major Western oil firms and enhanced their bargaining power by creating the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. In 1973, OPEC’s decision to raise the price of oil further augmented revenues. This enhanced their spending power and supported the establishment and expansion of state-controlled development agencies such as the Saudi Fund for Development (1974) and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (1971), which have provided development aid to poorer Arab states in the MENA-region as well as to countries in East Africa, and South and Southeast Asia.[78]

In the course of time, numerous Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have been established across the region to absorb balance of payments surpluses resulting from high oil prices. SWFs such as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the Investment Corporation of Dubai, and the Saudi Public Investment Fund have become major players within the global financial sector. While there was a drop in oil prices throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the post-2000 oil boom further boosted the spending power and financial reserves of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.[79] Their sizeable financial resources have been vital to ensure welfare support for their respective populations and maintain patronage systems to co-opt influential actors within society.[80] Furthermore, the ‘petrodollars’ acquired since the 1970s have also been crucial to the emergence of large business conglomerates in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Easy access to vast sums of capital enabled these organisations to become dominating forces in various sectors in the Middle East, such as finance, agriculture, real estate, transport and telecommunications – particularly in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Palestine. This gives the private sector in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which is closely connected to the ruling families, influence over the political economy in the region through investment decisions.[81]

The structural economic power exerted via these conglomerates is complemented by the financial means the Saudi and Emirati states have at their disposal. It is through the provision of financial support to governments in the region that they ‘buy’ foreign policy objectives. As noted by Adam Hanieh, ‘support has occurred in a multiplicity of forms, including development aid, bilateral investment flows, central bank deposits and the provision of subsidized oil and gas.’[82] Such financial support has been provided through the Gulf Cooperation Council to help the ruling families in Bahrain, Oman, Jordan and Morocco that have been grappling with budgetary pressures in the face of popular protest and oscillating oil prices. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were among the main contributors to a $20 billion GCC aid package that was approved by the organisation in March 2011 to improve housing and infrastructure in Oman and Bahrain and support the member-states that faced the fiercest protests during the Arab uprisings.[83]

But financial aid has also been extended to Arab monarchies such as Jordan and Morocco. The GCC provided $4 billion to Jordan in 2013 and 2014 to help it meet its budgetary expenditure. In 2018, Jordan received a new financial aid package of $2.5 billion from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait.[84] Support has also been provided to Morocco, a fellow monarchy with which Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries have long-standing ties.[85] Between 2012 and 2017, the country received $5 billion in economic aid from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar to help it weather the storm during the Arab uprisings.[86] However, increasing competition between the Saudi-Emirati alliance and the Turkish-Qatari relationship negatively affected Morocco’s ties with the Gulf monarchies. Rabat’s decision to abstain from the Saudi Arabia and UAE-led blockade of Qatar in 2017 and its strengthening of ties with Qatar in 2018 through the signing of multiple memoranda of understanding on trade, investment and finance strained its relationship with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The drift towards Qatar was encouraged by Morocco’s Islamist-oriented Justice and Development Party (PJD), whose ideology resonates with that of the Muslim Brotherhood and which has headed the Moroccan coalition government since 2011.[87] Nevertheless, Morocco’s normalisation with Israel in December 2020 and the PJD’s severe losses in the recent September 2021 parliamentary elections[88] are likely to return Rabat to the Saudi-Emirati orbit, at least to some extent.[89]

Gulf dollars have also been used to prevent Iran benefiting from regional turmoil and to contain the perceived Muslim Brotherhood threat. Shortly after the fall of the Mubarak regime, Saudi Arabia pledged $4 billion to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the army institution that was in control of the country during the transition period. This pledge was supplemented by Qatar and Kuwait, which offered another $3 billion to prevent a possible Egyptian drift towards Iran. However, ultimately the SCAF received only $2.3 billion in assistance.[90] Following the election of Morsi in 2012, Qatar stepped in and provided $8 billion – $7 billion in soft loans and $1 billion in grants.[91] Saudi Arabia deposited $1 billion in Egypt’s central bank during the Morsi presidency and a $500 million bond. But this support failed to prevent the erosion of foreign exchange reserves that triggered economic crisis. The UAE and Saudi Arabia joined forces after large-scale protests against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood erupted in Egypt in 2013. They supported the Egyptian military’s coup against the late president, and immediately backed the new government of General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi by providing crucial financial aid together with Kuwait. This aid consisted of long-term, low interest deposits that were placed within the Central Bank of Egypt from 2013 to 2017 by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait. The deposits helped Egypt to achieve a secure balance of payment position by early 2018.[92]

Alongside such support, grants and supplier credits for the import of petroleum products were offered to the Sisi administration. In the fiscal year 2013/14, budgetary support of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait in the form of grants and the provision of energy products amounted to $13.7 billion, more than 10 per cent of Egypt’s total fiscal expenditure that year (around $117 billion). After this uptick, as a result of the decline in global oil prices the value of the grants fell to $3.4 billion (around 3 per cent of total fiscal expenditure) in the next fiscal year, and further reduced to $200 million in 2015–2016 and $1 billion in 2016–2017.[93] This budgetary support has been supplemented by investment pledges. In 2015, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait each pledged $4 billion during the Egyptian Economic Development Conference (EEDC),[94] while in 2017 Saudi Arabia and Egypt agreed to a $10 billion deal to build a megacity in the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula as part of the huge Saudi Neom project.

The extensive financial support provided since 2013 has given Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait significant leverage over the Egyptian government. In particular, the fact that Gulf deposits compose a large portion of Egypt’s foreign reserves gives the GCC creditors sway. The threat to withdraw these deposits could result in a fast depletion of Egypt’s foreign reserves, affecting its ‘ability to import goods, manage exchange rates, boost liquidity in case of crisis, and reducing Egypt’s ability to borrow money on international markets at reasonable rates.’[96] Since Sisi coming to power, Egypt has joined Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the economic blockade against Qatar and supported the Saudi-Emirati intervention in Yemen by committing naval and air forces. President Sisi also ratified a deal to hand over two islands in the Red Sea, Tiran and Sanafir, to Saudi Arabia despite significant domestic opposition. Nevertheless, extensive funding has not led to the unconditional satisfaction of Saudi and Emirati demands. Egypt resisted calls to commit ground forces in Yemen,[97] and has remained at odds with Saudi Arabia over the future of the Assad regime in Syria[98] – supporting instead the UAE’s push to reintegrate Syria into the regional diplomatic fold following the reopening of the Emirati embassy in Damascus in December 2018.[99]

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have also financed non-state actors to undercut the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood across the region. Saudi Arabia allegedly channelled money towards to the Salafist al-Nour party in Egypt during the 2011–2012 election campaigns, while the UAE backed the secular Nidaa Tounes party in Tunisia during the 2014 parliamentary elections to counter the rise of the Brotherhood-affiliated Ennahda party that has strong links with Qatar and Turkey.[100] However, the UAE’s tactic to marginalise Islamist forces in Tunisia did not pay off as Nidaa Tounes decided to form a coalition government with Ennahda. Since 2014, the UAE has decreased its aid and investment in Tunisia and signalled its support for the Free Destourian Party of Abir Moussi,[101] a party that has linked Ennahda to terrorism and seeks to exclude it from politics.[102] The UAE has therefore welcomed the decision of Tunisian President Kais Saied to sack Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi (who was backed by Ennahda) and suspend the parliament in which Ennahda was the largest faction. The UAE has been accused by Ennahda leader Ghannouchi of being behind Saied’s actions,[103] as side-lining Ennahda has made Tunisia further dependent on Emirati and Saudi financial support. The Tunisian government is currently in advanced discussions with Saudi Arabia and the UAE about a financial aid package as it tries to prevent a default on its debts.[104]

In Libya, the UAE and Saudi Arabia provided financial and material support for General Haftar’s campaign against political Islamists and his failed offensive to take Tripoli in May 2019. While the former has provided the bulk of support for Haftar’s campaign, the latter increased its aid following Turkey's intervention on the side of Libya's Government of National Accord in 2019 with troops and Syrian mercenaries.[105] The UAE’s role in Libya – conducting airstrikes through jets and drones to support Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), channelling Chadian and Sudanese fighters into the ranks of the LAAF,[106] and allegedly using Russian private military contractors to finance the recruitment of Russian mercenaries to fight at the side of Haftar[107] – has been particularly controversial. Finally, in Syria, Saudi Arabia stepped up its support to the moderate Free Syrian Army (FSA), an umbrella organisation of armed opposition forces, in late 2012 and early 2013. Under the reign of King Abdullah, the Saudis sought the downfall of the Assad regime in their regional struggle with Iran but wanted to avoid boosting jihadist organisations and factions tied to the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria that could pose an ideological threat.

The difficulty in effectively channelling weapons to vetted factions within the loosely organised FSA, as well as the growing clout of radical Islamist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State, persuaded Saudi Arabia[108] to shift its support to Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam) in 2013. This organisation was headed by the late Zahran Alloush, the son of a Saudi cleric, and consisted of around 50 armed factions adhering to Salafi Islamism.[109] It was opposed to radical Islamic organisations such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State, but aimed at the establishment of an Islamic state with Sharia law as the main source of legislation.[110] In addition to combatting regime forces, it also sought to undermine the internationally recognised Syrian opposition (National Coalition) that Riyadh considered too close to the Muslim Brotherhood.[111] Saudi support to armed Salafist factions in Syria continued until 2016, when Riyadh reduced its funding as the prospects for an overthrow of the Assad regime dimmed after the fall of eastern Aleppo and after the US reduced its funding for the Syrian opposition.[112]

Religious networks

Saudi Arabian foreign policy consistently benefits from and promotes the Kingdom’s austere and conservative interpretation of Islam, often referred to as Wahhabism. This interpretation of Islam has helped the country to expand its influence in the Islamic world and cultivate local allies through a concerted proselytisation and expansionist drive[128] that started with the establishment of the Muslim World League in 1962. Various institutions linked to the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Da’wa and Guidance, have funded missionary work comprising the establishment of schools and mosques, the launch of TV stations, the distribution of Qur’ans, and the hosting of foreign students at religious universities in Saudi Arabia.[129] This helped establish transnational networks between the kingdom and the wider Islamic world and even beyond in order to ‘build, maintain and extend positions of religious authority, with a view to securing the capacity to speak in the name of Islam and to steer the future course of the Islamic tradition.’[130]

Missionary activities have enabled Riyadh to mobilise Islam to counterbalance ideological threats. In the 1950s and 1960s, these threats took the form of the Arab nationalism espoused by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Ba’ath party in Syria and Iraq – both of which opposed the Saudi alliance with the US and the monarchical basis of the Saudi regime.[131] Saudi-sponsored missionary activities increased after the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Religious influence proved useful to counter the revolutionary interpretation offered by the Islamist regime in Tehran, in which clerics played an active role in the political arena. The interpretation supported by Saudi Arabia centred around the principle of wali al-amr. According to this principle, opposition to political authority is prohibited even in when the rulers are tyrants.[132]

The religious networks funded by the Saudi state since the 1960s have helped the Kingdom boost its proclaimed status as a ‘leader of the Islamic world’[133] and counter Iranian claims. The Saudi-Iranian competition over the mantle of Islamic leadership has increased the salience of Sunni-Shi’a differences and helped to isolate Iran since most countries[134] in the Middle East are majority Sunni. However, the impact of transnational religious networks depend on local circumstances and are not always in full control of the Saudi state, which sometimes leads to unintended consequences. The global Salafi-Wahhabi movement that originates from the 1980s also includes radical factions that pose a threat to the Al Saud regime, such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State,[135] which criticise the Saudi alliance with the US. Meanwhile, some of the Salafists that initially benefited from Saudi funding deviated from the politically quietist interpretation propagated by Saudi Arabia by engaging more politically.[136] Examples of the latter are Salafist parties such as Hizb al-Nour in Egypt and al-Haraka al-Salafiyya in Kuwait.[137]

Despite the limitations of Saudi control over transnational religious networks, these networks have helped create Salafi constituencies in Yemen, Libya, Egypt, Kuwait, Syria and elsewhere that are sympathetic towards Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the exclusionary nature of the interpretation of Islam that Saudi state-funded institutions transmit abroad provides fertile grounds for sectarian rhetoric, especially against Shi’ites. Sectarianism is also usefully deployed to discredit the Iranian government, Hezbollah, and the Assad regime. Meanwhile, given their ideological differences, Salafist movements help to limit the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the religious sphere.

Media outlets

Saudi and Emirati-owned media outlets have also been used to build and amplify foreign policy support in the region, notably through pan-Arab news channels. The Gulf War of 1990–1991 and the intensive and unrestrained coverage of the war by CNN helped spur the establishment of the first pan-Arab commercial satellite station in 1991 when the Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) was launched in London by Waleed al-Ibrahim and Saleh Kamel, two Saudi businessmen with close ties to the Al-Saud ruling family. Five years later, Al-Jazeera, the first pan-Arab news satellite channel in the Arab world was founded. This channel, funded by the Qatari government, introduced a new style of television to a pan-Arab audience by discussing sensitive issues in the Arab world,[145] including criticism of the Gulf’s ruling families (with the exception of the ruling Al Thani family itself). Criticism of the Al-Saud family stung it into action and in 2002 led to the creation by MBC of Al-Arabiya to compete with Al-Jazeera.[146]

After the Arab uprisings, new major pan-Arab news channel emerged. In 2012, Sky News Arabia was established, which is 50 per cent owned by the Abu Dhabi Media Investment Corporation (UAE). This investment company is owned by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan, a full brother of the Crown Prince and de facto Emirati ruler, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, and a member of the so-called ‘Bani Fatima’. The other half of Sky News Arabia is owned by Sky group, formerly British-based but currently US-owned media conglomerate, Comcast.[147] In 2015, another newcomer, Al-Araby TV, based in London and funded by Qatar, was launched. In brief, ownership of the main pan-Arab channels is concentrated in the Gulf, which has enabled its ruling families to project influence by developing regional media narratives that support their foreign policies.[148]

There are, however, limitations to this approach and its effects. When the early protests in Tunisia broke out at the end of 2010, Al Jazeera played a key role in covering them and nurturing a broader narrative about a regional uprising that fostered the protest wave that emerged.[149] Its intensive coverage of the protests on the ground enabled it to become a primary source of news during the uprisings for a broad Arab audience.[150] But when its Qatari owners morphed the network into a partisan actor, it became identified with political Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia, losing much of its more objective appeal and influence in the process.[151] Saudi and Emirati-owned media outlets have typically manifested themselves as partisan actors from the outset. They campaigned openly for certain rebel groups in Libya and Syria and were sympathetic towards the military coup in Egypt. They also highlighted alleged Iranian meddling in Bahrain and Yemen[152] in a bid to enhance support for the Saudi and Emirati military interventions in both countries in 2011 and 2015. They also amplified anti-Qatari sentiments that widened the rift between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and the UAE following the overthrow of the Morsi government. The media offensive against Qatar was further intensified in May 2017 when regional media outlets such as Al Arabiya and Sky News Arabia disseminated grave accusations of Qatari funding for violent extremist groups in Syria and its collusion with Iran and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. This proved to be a prelude to the boycott of the country by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt on 5 June 2017.[153] Since then, Qatari opposition figures such as Sheikh Abdul Aziz Bin Khalifa Al-Thani (Emir Tamim’s uncle), Sheikh Saud bin Nasser Al-Thani and Khalid Al-Hail[154] have received significant attention in Saudi-owned media outlets in order to undermine the legitimacy of the Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim and exploit divisions in the ruling al-Thani family.[155]

Political discourse warfare also extends to the realm of social media where, through orchestrated campaigns, automated bots and influencers have promoted anti-Iranian and pro-Saudi tweets of Donald Trump, diffused sectarian rhetoric directed against Shi’ites, promoted criticism of Qatar, and praised Mohammed bin Salman.[156] While it is hard to attribute these campaigns to specific state or non-state actors,[157] they have compounded the messages spread by Saudi media outlets. Meanwhile, social media manipulation can also be used to shape narratives during events abroad. Haftar’s assault on Tripoli in May 2019 was accompanied by supportive messages from a network of more than 100 accounts that seemed to be linked to an entity supportive of Emirati interests.[158] Traces of social media manipulation were also visible in July 2021 when Tunisian President Kais Saied suspended parliament and sacked the prime minister. Influencers based in Saudi Arabia and the UAE engaged in concerted action to portray the event as a ‘Tunisian revolt against the Brotherhood’.[159]

Social media manipulation exists alongside the intimidation, harassment and surveillance of prominent activists and journalists, which deters people from criticising Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Over the years, both countries have invested significant resources in surveillance capabilities. This has enabled them to closely monitor social media use and break encryption on emails and voice IP.[160] At the same time, Saudi and Emirati security services have been linked to offensive operations targeting the devices of dissidents, activists and members of hostile governments in the region. The UAE particularly has developed sophisticated capabilities since it started its 2009 Project Raven to enhance its expertise in cybersecurity and warfare. It hired dozens of former US intelligence officials who used state-of-the-art cyber-espionage tools to hack into the phones and computers of Emirati dissidents, journalists critical of the UAE, militants in Yemen and officials of regional competitors and rivals, including Iran, Qatar and Turkey.[161] Saudi Arabia has also upgraded its offensive cyber capabilities, acquiring advanced malicious mobile phone spyware produced by the Israeli NSO Group to gain access to the phones of Saudi dissidents and journalists critical of Saudi Arabia.[162] These offensive cyber capabilities have also been employed against regional competitors of Saudi and Emirati outlets. In December 2020, the Guardian reported that the UAE and Saudi Arabia used spyware sold by the Israeli NSO Group to access the smartphones of journalists, producers and executives of the Qatari-owned Al Jazeera and Al Araby networks and to intimidate them.[163]