In order to understand the foreign policies enacted by the Saudi-Emirati axis, it is vital to look at the national security priorities of both countries and particularly those of Saudi Arabia as senior partner of the axis. Regime security has been a central preoccupation of the Saudi ruling family since the country gained independence[4] in 1932, with key challenges consisting of internal dissent, growing domestic religious militancy, and regional challengers seeking to project power on the Arabian Peninsula. Foreign policy has often been used as an instrument to serve the needs of the Al-Saud family in the domestic realm, while simultaneously responding to the threats and opportunities in the regional environment.

The threat of internal dissent and religious militancy

At the turn of the 21st century, one of the main concerns of the Saudi regime was growing discontent within the Kingdom. The regime had to respond to the high rate of population growth and declining prices of crude oil from the mid-1980s onwards, which reduced its ability to maintain previous levels of fiscal spending. This resulted in deteriorating social services and rising levels of unemployment, particularly among its youth.[5] The deteriorating economic and social situation provided a breeding ground for political dissent and religious militancy, which was also fostered by growing public unease with the US-Saudi alliance. This alliance had been central to the external security of the Kingdom since 1945, when the US committed itself to protect Saudi Arabia after American companies were given the rights to oil exploration and production in the country.[6] A key reason for the smouldering contention was the presence of non-Muslim US forces in Saudi Arabia following the first Gulf War from 1990–1991, highlighting the failure of the regime to protect the Muslim nation from the challenged posed by regional powers such as Iraq. This made the regime vulnerable to criticism by Saudi Islamists – assembled within the movement al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya – whose message particularly resonated among marginalised sections of the Saudi population. While the moderate faction of al-Sahwa used the US military presence to strengthen its call for political reform in order to check the power of the ruling Saud family and allow for more political participation, the movement’s more radical faction used it to call for violent action.[7] In 1996, Al-Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden, based in Afghanistan, called for a guerrilla campaign to oust US forces from Saudi soil.

This campaign commenced in May 2003, after many Al-Qaeda militants returned to Saudi Arabia following the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan. They aimed to expel the Americans from the Kingdom through a bombing campaign and expected to benefit from a surge of anti-Americanism in public opinion in the wake of the start of the ‘War on Terror’, the 2002 opening of the Guantanamo Bay facility and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. The Al-Qaeda campaign lasted for two years and left around 300 people dead.[8] It was eventually thwarted by counter measures taken by the Saudi government that undermined support for Al-Qaeda through information campaigns, religious re-education and rehabilitation programmes.[9] These measures were accompanied by a crackdown on militant activism based on intelligence, repressive policing methods and modern military technology. After two years, Al-Qaeda’s presence in the Kingdom was severely weakened.[10] Nevertheless, the reconstitution of Al-Qaeda in Yemen in 2008 and the subsequent merger of its Saudi and Yemeni branches under the banner of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continued to pose challenges to the internal security of Saudi Arabia.[11] In other words, domestic regime insecurity continues to play a significant role in Saudi foreign policy.

Countering a resurgent Iran

The start of Al Qaeda’s violent campaign in 2003 coincided with the rise of new regional challenges for Saudi Arabia. The Saudi leadership’s main concern was the rise of Iran as its chief regional rival. The US-led invasion of Iraq removed Saddam Hussein’s regime from power, and with it an important counter balance to Iranian regional influence. In the same year, Iran’s nuclear programme was discovered, which increased Saudi security concerns.[12]

These developments heightened the regional rivalry between both countries, which goes back to the 1979 Iranian revolution when the new Islamist leadership in Tehran – headed by Ayatollah Khomeini – launched rhetorical attacks on the Al Saud family, which threatened the leadership position in the Islamic world that it had claimed since the reign of King Faisal (1964–1975). Saudi claims to the position of ‘leader of the Islamic world’ rest on the twin-pillars of its role as guardian of the two holiest places of Islam – Mecca and Medina – and its efforts to diffuse its ultraconservative interpretation of Islam through financial means. Partly due to the religious fervour of the new Iranian leadership, Tehran started to claim the mantle of defender of the Islamic world for itself while also supporting Islamist groups in the Arab world and positioning itself as the main force of resistance against Israel and US dominance in the region. In particular, Iran stimulated Shi’a social mobilisation[13] in Arab countries such as Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Lebanon, who, as a result of the discrimination and increasing state repression they faced in the 1980s and 1990s, sought to improve their social position and initiate political change through religiously inspired movements. Iran provided material, logistical and ideological support to these movements, which challenged the security of several regimes across the region.[14] Examples include the founding in 1982 of hybrid coercive organisations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon[15] and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) in Iraq,[16] which today remain key power brokers in their respective countries. Iran also positioned itself as an opponent to the US-dominated regional order, putting it at odds with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which had been key American allies since 1945.[17]

The ties Iran established during the 1980s and 1990s enabled it to develop and nurture a diverse coalition of state and non-state actors that could challenge the regional status quo and push back against US dominance. The resistance gained further momentum in the wake of the second Palestinian intifada (2000), the US intervention in Afghanistan (2001) and, especially, in Iraq (2003). The last move, especially, galvanised the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’ –with Iran, Syria and Hezbollah at its core – as the toppling of Saddam Hussein enabled Iran to enhance its influence, benefiting from its ties with hybrid coercive organisations such as the SCIRI,[18] Asaib ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah.[19] These actors were further emboldened by popular support among Arab public opinion for Hezbollah and Hamas during their conflicts with Israel in respectively 2006 and 2008.[20]

The increase in support for Iran-supported actors weighed heavily on the minds of Saudi Arabia’s rulers who, in response, adopted a more assertive regional posture in a bid to roll back Iranian influence. The Kingdom cemented its own alliances with Egypt and Jordan,[21] and adopted a more assertive policy towards Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. In Lebanon, it became the main backer of the 14 March coalition that emerged after the 2005 assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, and opposed both Syria and Hezbollah.[22] Riyadh also used its media influence to bolster the coalition and provided financial support to Saad Hariri’s Future Movement,[23] contributing to its electoral victories in 2005 and 2009.[24] In Palestine, Saudi Arabia brokered the (ultimately unsuccessful) ‘Mecca Agreement’ between Hamas and Fatah in February 2007, which facilitated a unity government after a year of bitter fighting among both political factions. This was an attempt to bring Hamas back into the Saudi fold and decrease Iranian influence over the organisation. In Iraq, Saudi Arabia sought to isolate Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who was considered an Iranian client by the Saudi leadership. It funded his political rival Iyad Allawi during the latter’s campaign for the 2010 elections and encouraged him to form an alternative coalition government that did not contain al-Maliki’s State of Law Party.[25] Although Allawi’s Iraqiyya Party’s did win a few more seats than Maliki’s State of Law Party, he was not able to prevent Al-Maliki remaining in power as prime minister.[26]