Across the literature and within the expert workshop, there is a general agreement about the plausibility of the abovementioned scenarios, but not on their probability and preferability. This reflects not only the difficulty of providing foresight on Russia: as often is the case with scenario studies, it is entirely possible that a combination or variation of these scenarios unfold – or that they follow each other sequentially. This debate also reflects the underlying political, cultural, historical and geographical differences across the EU and NATO.
In general, the preferred scenario in the West is no. 1, ‘reluctant reconciliation’. While most of the experts in the literature and the workshop would prefer a non-violent, orderly change of regime towards a democratic Russia, they acknowledge that such a scenario is highly unlikely and that the West has very limited options to contribute to such an outcome. Opinions then begin to vary when discussing the preferability of the scenarios in the other quadrants and, by implication, on the type of policies that should be followed towards Russia.
Most Western Europeans and Americans tend to look at an instable or even potentially fragmenting Russian Federation from the lens of risk management. Politicians openly state that they want to bring Putin to justice, which in reality does mean that they prefer regime change – but then stress the ‘politically correct’ principle that “this is up to the Russian people”. They are worried about an imploding Russia due to the risks of large-scale instability and the dispersion of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. This implies a preference for strategies built around containment and isolation, but not towards active involvement in domestic affairs.
In Eastern Europe (including Poland, the Baltics and Ukraine), however, instability in Russia is perceived through the lens of reducing the security threat that Russia poses to them. They are cautious but less risk averse than Western Europe towards the risk of a dissolving Russia. They see regime change as required to bring a definitive end to the war but also to reduce the dangers emanating from Russia in the future. As such, a situation in which Russia is forced to concentrate on internal issues first and foremost, instead of threatening its neighbours, is considered to be desirable. Ukraine actively supports violent uprisings against the Kremlin and even the dissolution (or ‘decolonization’) of Russia, while Poland and the Baltics are less united in their assessment of the preference and probability of such scenarios. In the short term their preference would be to turn Russia into a globally isolated pariah state.
Although the views on a changing Russia differ between Western Europe and America on the one hand, and Eastern Europe on the other, in all cases the West should prepare for the best, for the worst and for the persistence of the status quo outcomes. This means developing “no regret options”, which would be useful in any of the six scenarios even if they may primarily be based on the assumption of regime continuity. In the case of regime change, a new range of options may emerge, depending on the kind of change taking place in Moscow. Furthermore, we should distinguish between medium-term options for the scenarios considered above – and policies aimed at the long-term, as developments may move in other directions and a more positive scenario of a more democratic and non-imperialistic Russia might eventually become an option.
The following three sets of recommendations provide such ‘no regret’ policy options that could now already be considered in case the various potential outcomes occur:
In case of regime stability (in the ‘China’s Propped-up Proxy’, ‘Fortress Russia’ and ‘the Empire Strikes Back’ scenarios)
In these scenarios there is a continued need for credible deterrence, but also for containment and efforts to reduce Russia's malign influence in neighbouring countries. This particularly concerns the security of Ukraine, but also other Eastern (and Central) European countries threatened by Russian aggression and interference. NATO allies and partners should be fully supported in strengthening resilience, both in the military-security sphere and in the financial, economic, and hybrid sphere.
There would also be a clear need to monitor closely any possible emerging divisions within the foreign and security policy elite in Moscow and/or between Russia and China. The West and China may also have a joint interest in preventing nuclear escalation and in preventing the spill-over of instability within the Russian Federation.
As a long-term option, the EU could be more welcoming to Russian opposition abroad and stimulate them to present a more unified platform with an agenda for a more democratic and non-imperialistic Russia.
Despite the bleak outlook of these scenarios, in its strategic communication the EU could nonetheless signal that there could again be a place for Russia in a renewed European security architecture – but only if and when Russia decides to return to the multilateral rules-based order, in particular with respect to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states.
In case of regime change (in the ‘Reluctant Reconciliation’, ‘Wild East’ and ‘Dissolution’ scenarios)
There should already be debates within NATO and the EU on under which conditions the West could re-engage with a new leadership. Which demands should a new leader fulfil before Russia can be reintegrated into the European security architecture? Should this include withdrawal from Ukraine, arms control, accountability, reparations, ‘de-Putinization’, respecting human rights inside Russia, withdrawal from Transnistria and Abkhazia, or all of the above and more? And how far are Western politicians willing to compromise with Russia on these conditions, given that a new Russian leadership may not acquiesce to all of the West’s core demands?
This discussion should include prioritizing within this list of conditions, as well as to what extent these are linked to a potential and gradual lifting of sanctions. Demands on accountability and reparations could for example be a priority after a mutually agreed ceasefire and could gain more traction in case of a regime change in Moscow. A full-scale ‘de-Putinization’ would depend on the new regime and could open up the possibility for the current opposition in exile to return and work on more fundamental change in Russia, including on a roadmap towards reconciliation with Ukraine in the longer term.
If a new regime would again respect the full range of obligations under international law and in the context of the OSCE, the West should be ready to re-engage and even support reforms inside Russia – but it should not repeat the mistake of the 1990s by doing so unconditionally.
In case of large-scale instability (in the ‘Dissolution’ and ‘Wild East’ scenarios)
The first priority should be to prevent or mitigate the spill-over effects of instability in Russia. This includes a potential influx of refugees, arms and organized crime. NATO and the EU could for example already now jointly develop contingency plans with regard to border security. In some more extreme situations of civil war, peacekeeping in the context of the UN or other multilateral formats might also have to be considered.
In terms of nuclear non-proliferation, Western countries led by the United States should already now develop or update their plans on how to manage Russia’s nuclear arsenal in case such scenarios unfold.
The West should also consider in advance how it would approach the possible recognition of new entities. It should reflect on whether or not it would do so in cooperation with China, based on a joint interest in preventing major instability and nuclear proliferation. It should also consider options on working with whoever is in power in Moscow in order to prevent major dissolution and civil war. The recognition of new entities might only be considered as a matter of last resort, once new entities fulfil the requirements of statehood and are willing to cooperate on the basis of international law – and if they adopt the obligations which the Federation had in its relations with the outside world.