Based on our expert survey and workshop discussions, we have combined the various factors of influence that determine the future of Russia into two aggregate variables. These internal and external factors have a relatively high impact, come with a rather great deal of uncertainty, and together form the foundation of a scenario matrix for the purpose of Western policymakers.
On the internal (x) axis, the key uncertainty is formulated as the degree of regime stability: the extent to which the regime currently headed by Putin can continue to govern Russia in its current form, either with or without him as president. This axis can range from complete regime continuity and regime stability, on the one hand, to regime discontinuity and regime instability, on the other.
On the external (y) axis, the key uncertainty is the degree of international isolation of the Russian Federation, in particular its relations with China and the West. This axis is complex, as Russia can either be completely internationally isolated as a pariah state, or fully reintegrated with the West – or it could be something in between, having a confrontational relationship with the West but building relatively good relations with China and other countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This is why workshop participants identified more than only one scenario in each of the quadrants. For the sake of brevity and readability the research team has refined these into six distinct scenarios that will be each discussed in turn.
Scenario 1: Reluctant reconciliation[72]
In this scenario, Russia has largely but not decisively lost the war in Ukraine. Faced with a series of increasingly humiliating battlefield defeats, a sharp economic downturn and an increase in domestic discontent, various factions in the Russian elite have temporarily joined forces to engineer a transition of power through a ‘palace coup’. Putin has disappeared and is presumed to be dead, as are some of his closest allies. The new Russian president makes Putin a scapegoat for all of Russia’s ills and embarks on a policy of ‘de-Putinization’, focusing predominantly on economic reforms and on consolidating power by purging Putin’s loyalists. It also launches limited reforms towards more democratisation and less repression to reduce domestic discontent.
Russia has signed a temporary, Chinese- and Turkish-brokered armistice with Ukraine under which it has agreed to cease active hostilities, to withdraw its troops from the Ukrainian mainland and to hand over certain commanders and cronies of Putin – but not Putin himself – to the ICC. China positions itself as the main architect and guarantor of the peace agreement and actively rejects Western sanctions against Russia. Instead, China proactively supports the new Russian leadership in rebuilding its economy. Economic relations between Russia and the West do not return to the level of before 24 February 2022, as some economic sanctions remain in place and the West will continue its search for alternative energy sources. Russia therefore continues its search for alternative outlets for its gas supplies, notably China, but also in other countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Although the new leadership nominally distances itself from the excesses of Putinism, it does not entirely reject Russia’s imperial past or authoritarian style of governance – nor its strategic interests in retaining influence in its ‘near abroad’. It agrees with the West to withdraw Russian troops from Transnistria, and nuclear weapons and intermediary-range missiles from Belarus and Kaliningrad, in exchange for a relaxation of the sanctions regime. It nonetheless retains its military presence on the heavily fortified Crimean peninsula, and offers to hold a UN- and OSCE-monitored ‘referendum’, with the intention to use the principle of self-determination to justify its continued occupation.
Ukraine vehemently rejects this. Together with the lack of substantial reparation payments, the ‘Crimean question’ obstructs a comprehensive peace agreement and full normalization of Ukrainian-Russian and West-Russian relations. Russia actively tries to drive wedges between Ukraine and the West. Both Russia and Ukraine keep building up their military and the risk of a new resumption of hostilities over Crimea remains substantial, but both parties feel it is in their interest to avoid a new war for now.
Policy implications
This scenario is particularly probable if the Russian invasion of Ukraine is unsuccessful, as a new Russian leadership will have a strong interest to triage the conflict and secure better relations with the West – which it will try to do so for the least concessions possible. In this case, domestic pressure in the West mounts to embark on some form of détente and rapprochement with Russia, including the lifting of some of the harshest economic sanctions in exchange for compliance with the ceasefire and a withdrawal from mainland Ukraine.
The cohesion and unity of NATO is strained as there is a profound lack of consensus on which criteria should be met before sanctions can be lifted and Russia can be reintegrated into the European security architecture. Eastern European allies, together with Ukraine, continue to push for a hard line against Russia and firmly object to any easing of sanctions until Crimea is liberated, all war criminals are brought to justice and reparation payments are paid in full. Several Western governments, most notably including the U.S., prefer to normalize relations with Russia in order to extricate themselves from the Ukrainian-Russian conflict – and to free their hands for a possible future confrontation with China and to avoid the emergence of a full-fledged Sino-Russian alliance.
The central policy dilemma in this scenario is to which extent and under which conditions any form of reconciliation and normalization of relations can be achieved with a new Russian leadership. A second dilemma is whether or not Ukraine could and should be admitted into NATO. Not just in case it does not have full control over all of its constitutional territory, but also considering whether a post-Putin Russia would be antagonized by the NATO admission of Ukraine, as this is widely seen as a security threat within Russian elite circles. A third dilemma relates to Russia’s broader geopolitical role vis-à-vis China and in particular whether or not the West would be willing to compromise towards its support for Ukraine in pursuit of other geopolitical aims, such as avoiding Russia becoming de facto vassalized by China (Scenario 2).
Scenario 2: China’s Propped-up Proxy
The war in Ukraine grinds on year after year. This happens at a lower level of intensity than it did in 2022-2023, but without a stable ceasefire. Neither side has the capacity to impose its will on the other and both feel that they can eventually win this war of attrition. There is no clear end to the protracted conflict in sight. Putin is eventually forced to step down due to his personal mismanagement of the war effort and in order to have ‘someone to blame’, but the regime itself prevails and a hardline successor is hand-picked by the security services. There is a brief period of political instability and uncertainty until the new leader consolidates control and secures political and financial backing from Beijing, in exchange for far-reaching economic concessions.
Russia de facto becomes a Chinese proxy and supplier of raw materials. Stabilizing Russia is in China’s interest, as it wants to prevent chaos at its borders and needs Russia for the supply of cheap natural resources to fuel its global competition against the West. China also finds Russia a convenient tool to distract and weaken the West while it pursues its other ambitions. Russia eventually becomes fully dependent on Chinese support, both to finance its war against Ukraine, to stave off default and to prop up its unpopular regime through increased repression. China effectively becomes to Russia what Russia at the moment has become to the Lukashenka regime in Belarus: an external guarantor of regime stability, despite profound domestic despondency.
Russian foreign trade becomes nearly entirely ‘yuanized’ as China offers Russia a conduit to both evade and mitigate the effect of Western sanctions. Both countries embark on far-reaching military co-operation. Beijing, among others, provides Russia with cheap credits, economic support and assistance in increasing its military-industrial production, in order to balance Western economic and military support to Ukraine.
Emboldened by Chinese support, Russia remains confrontational towards and isolated from the West and the risk of a new flare-up of the unresolved war with Ukraine remains imminent. The sanctions remain in force and are even tightened further, as it quickly becomes apparent that the new leadership does not intend to change course. Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations are frustrated by the war, something that Russia and China do not fail to utilize in their strategic communications. As economic weakness limits Russia’s ability to rebuild conventional military power, the country becomes more reliant on its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent and an emblem of its pretensions to great power status.
Policy implications
This scenario seems to be one of the more probable scenarios that have been identified; it represents a continuation of the current trend, in which Russia keeps fighting and steadily becomes more dependent on China. The primary dilemma in this scenario for the West is how to cope with Russia as a Chinese proxy, whereby the Kremlin and its long war in Ukraine both become tools that serve Chinese interests. A dependent Russia that provides China with a sheer limitless supply of heavily discounted natural gas, oil and other mineral and natural resources, as well as military technology and expertise, will strongly strengthen Beijing’s position in its global economic and military competition with the United States.
However, a problem with this scenario could be resistance at lower levels in Russia to becoming China’s junior partner and gradually running the risk of being turned into a Chinese vassal state. The key question here is what alternatives there are, which trade-offs the Russian elites would be willing to make for alternative scenarios, and to what extend the West would use this situation at some point as well.
The relationship at the highest level between Putin and Xi is highly personalized and there is some disappointment and resistance at other levels and among other groups within the elite – as well as quite a few frictions in the ‘friendship without boundaries’. Once Putin is gone, this could lead to increased uncertainty about the future of the relationship with some in the elite possibly preferring to reach some kind of understanding with the West instead of becoming totally dependent on Beijing. Although it would also be possible that this scenario unfolds while Putin remains in power, the variant in which Putin disappears from the scene has been chosen to allow policy-makers to prepare for this.
The war in Ukraine and the need for credible deterrence in Eastern Europe will also be a continuous drain on Western political and economic resources, as Ukraine will not be able to withstand a Chinese-supported Russia in the long term without sustained and large-scale Western support. The risk with this scenario is that it could still mutate into scenario 3: a gradual Russian victory over Ukraine. But at the same time, in a post-Putin scenario this could also lead to a renewed discussion within the foreign and security elites in Russia about relations with China and a preference for balancing or hedging with a more constructive relationship with the West. This would offer opportunities for the West to move in the direction of scenario 1, depending on the concessions that a post-Putin regime would be willing to offer.
Scenario 3: The Empire Strikes Back
After a shaky ceasefire, a decrease in economic and military Western support due to ‘Ukraine fatigue’ and shifting political landscapes and priorities, Russia rearms and resumes its full-scale attacks. NATO unity crumbles as a new isolationist U.S. president shifts the responsibility for support to Ukraine to European NATO allies – which are unable or unwilling to rise to the challenge. Russia eventually successfully leverages its demographic and economic superiority over Ukraine to gain the upper hand in a gruelling war of attrition. The West, China and Turkey eventually force Zelensky to accept what is seen in Ukrainian eyes as a humiliating and unfavourable armistice that leaves Russia in control of large parts of the south and east of Ukraine.
Despite Russia’s enormous losses for relatively limited territorial gains, Putin declares victory in the ‘fight against the collective West’ and gains a large boost in popularity – both within Russia and in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Russia has successfully shown that ‘might makes right’. The war has already brought (revisionist) autocratic Eurasian countries closer together, united by their desire to challenge the West and the influence of the U.S. dollar. Although we cannot yet speak of a “full-blown alliance of autocracies”, a Russian victory in Ukraine might “hasten the construction of a Fortress Eurasia”.[73] Strategic and economic cooperation between Russia and China had already further strengthened, but the Kremlin maintains enough leverage in this relationship to ensure that it does not become too dependent on Beijing.[74] Therefore, Russia is also investing in further strengthening (economic) cooperation with other BRICS countries.[75] Moreover, Russia continues to deepen its diplomatic, economic, and also military and security ties throughout the African continent and with some European partners as well.[76]
Relations with the West remain tense and the Western ‘containment policy’ and sanctions remain in place, but Russia manages to establish sufficient new economic and military partnerships to reinvigorate its economy and strengthen its military. Despite Putin’s age, his personal stature as a historic figure enables the regime to continue governing. He eventually orchestrates a smooth transition of power to a hand-picked successor who continues his aggressive policies of military threats and blackmail, not only towards Ukraine but also towards Armenia, Belarus and Moldova. As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has succeeded and the ‘Western bloc’ has weakened relative to the ‘Eurasiatic bloc’, China feels more confident to attack Taiwan, which means the chances of a Sino-American war in the western Pacific have significantly increased.[77]
Policy implications
In this low-probability but high-impact scenario, a fragmented and weakened West faces an increasingly assertive Russia and China and significantly loses influence in the rest of the world. With an emboldened and rearmed Russia right on its doorstep, Europe will have to invest significant resources to build up its own defence capabilities to deter future Russian aggression – especially if the U.S. continues an isolationist course. Europe will also have to come to terms with a destroyed, impoverished and vengeful Ukraine that will continue to try to resist Russia – and also blames the West for abandoning it. This sentiment of betrayal will also be deeply felt within the EU and NATO itself, especially in Central and Eastern European countries. This scenario particularly serves as a stark reminder of why the West is supporting Ukraine: not only to help the country defend its sovereignty against Russian aggression, but also to uphold the rules-based order, to deter future military aggression – and to preserve the unity of the Transatlantic alliance.
Scenario 4: Neo-Stalinist fortress Russia
In this scenario, Putin has resorted to the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine in order to deter further Ukrainian attempts to liberate the Crimean Peninsula or hit targets in Russia itself. In response, China, India and Brazil abandon their tacit support for Russia and the country becomes almost entirely isolated – with the exception of other outcasts such as North Korea. It might still manage to sell some of its natural resources at bargain prices. This would depend especially on China’s reaction in such a situation, which runs counter to China’s demands and threatens the role China would like to play as a benevolent Great Power in world affairs. If Beijing would not restrict itself to diplomatic condemnation but also establish other sanctions, including economic sanctions, Moscow would have to deal with almost total isolation and would have to become near-autarkic, also economically and financially.
Despite its global pariah status the Russian regime could retain its grip on power at least in the short term, as it still has enough means to continue or further increase repression, and to keep its propaganda and the ‘besieged fortress’ narrative effective. However, the economy would contract sharply and Russian society would enter into survival mode, as it becomes ever more totalitarian and militarized.
Russia’s foreign policy continues its trends of paranoia, hostility and ‘active measures’ towards the West but also increasingly focuses on achieving autarky. However, it would have to abandon its rhetoric on a multipolar world order and a Russia as a proponent of Asia, Africa and South America.
Policy implications
Although this low-probability but high-impact scenario would not be considered very plausible by most experts, in particular regarding the possibility of Russia resorting to the use of nuclear weapons, a much more isolated Russia remains a distinct possibility. It is also a Ukrainian policy preference to make Russia a global ‘pariah state’, presumably as an intermediate step before regime change. This scenario would nonetheless imply that even China would have lost its leverage over Moscow, because Russia’s options have shrunk to regime survival and the prevention of a total defeat in Ukraine at all cost. Some may argue that China also depends on Russian energy resources and raw materials, although it has not become as strongly dependent on this as Europe, and does have other options available.
Most important for Beijing (and other states in the West as well) is to prevent a total collapse of Russia, which would lead to instability at its borders. In the meantime, Russia is useful for China in countering a unipolar world order and receiving energy at a discount. As long as an autarkic Russia would remain relatively stable, this would not run counter to China’s fundamental interests. An isolated Russia could in principle also open up possibilities for China and the West to cooperate in attempting to solve “the Russia question”.
Scenario 5: The Wild East
As the Russian army faces significant losses of territory, personnel and equipment in the ongoing war with Ukraine, dissatisfaction spreads amongst all the ranks of the Russian army. Due to the continued humiliation on the battlefield, Putin’s regime – which has increasingly relied on military action to justify its rule – loses legitimacy.[78] Following a particularly catastrophic defeat in Ukraine in which Russia’s military is routed and makes an unorganized withdrawal from southern and eastern Ukraine, Russia’s central authority weakens and a degree of ‘organized chaos’ ensues.
Since Putin had divided power among too many competing security actors with their private militaries, the lack of consensus among the elite means that the ‘power vertical’ quickly begins to crumble. Several private military companies, different branches of the security forces and regional actors such as Kadyrov throw their support and armed forces behind different factions. In addition, Ukraine actively supports rebel groups that fight against the Kremlin. A series of low-intensity armed conflicts and clashes break out across Russia. This does not completely turn into all-out civil war or dissolution as all sides understand that this would be harmful for everyone’s interests. Instead, power gravitates towards the regions as a new, weaker leader from one of the factions has to make a string of concessions to remain in power.
The brain drain has now become a more serious problem as even more people from the upper and middle class have fled the country. Longer-running socio-economic problems come to the forefront due to the destructive consequences of the war and the weakened repressive apparatus of the state. The economy crumbles in a situation reminiscent of the early ‘90s, and there are high levels of criminality.[79] Organized crime groups actively recruit traumatized war veterans with combat experience; they openly resort to force in order to seize control of economic assets. Virtually all major companies form their own PMCs to defend themselves or prey on their competitors.[80]
China is not actively supporting the new regime in Moscow, but instead ruthlessly exploits it by buying up key infrastructure. It also encroaches on several Russian regions in the Far East, which it sees as buffers against instability in the west of Russia. The foreign policy of Russia becomes subordinated to domestic concerns. The new leadership does not pursue reconciliation with the West nor with Ukraine, but also refrains from further aggression towards its neighbours – not due to a lack of will, but rather due to a lack of capacity.[81] It may make token concessions in exchange for economic bailouts in a highly transactional manner. Instead of military aggression or energy, Russia now exports organized crime to secure hard currency: it becomes a hotbed of cybercrime and trafficking in drugs, weapons and human beings.
Policy implications
The probability of this scenario is relatively high and some in Ukraine or Eastern Europe may even consider this a relatively desirable scenario – but it is certainly not a stable outcome. ‘The Wild East’ is reminiscent of the Russia of the 1990s: an unpredictable, unruly place that might not directly threaten its neighbours through military aggression or energy blackmail – but that nonetheless poses significant problems due to transnational organized crime, irregular migration and other knock-on effects of regional instability.
Russia’s weakness and dependency on external financial support and exports does pose opportunities to resolve a number of long-term problems, including the protracted conflicts around Russia. The key policy dilemma here that will also divide NATO is to what extent the West wants to re-engage to actually stabilize Russia – or how much it wants to further weaken Russia in order to avoid it from becoming a threat again in the future. The risk with this scenario is that it could easily mutate into scenario 6.
Scenario 6: Dissolution without a nuclear solution
The Russian military is not only defeated in Ukraine but also begins to collapse as mass desertions, surrenders and insurgencies spread like wildfire. Putin’s political legitimacy and the entire structure of his top-down power system are severely shaken. Putin is removed and his successor quickly signs a humiliating ceasefire agreement including far-reaching concessions and reparation payments that is sharply protested by nationalist factions as a betrayal of Russia’s core interests. A general sense of deep resentment against the central government spreads across the elites. The Russian economy is on the edge of meltdown. The disastrous consequences of the war, the high number of human losses and long-standing social issues give rise to social unrest.
The elite and the security forces – not only within the central Moscow Oblast, but also in the regions in the Far East and the Caucasus – begin to revolt and large-scale protests break out across Russia. Amidst such domestic turmoil, pre-existing regional and ethnic divisions intensify. Regional elites contest the way in which the Russian Federation is governed and demand decentralization and territorial autonomy.[82] Some first quietly and later openly conclude that the benefits of sovereignty surpass those of maintaining loyalty to Moscow.[83] Various subjects of the Federation declare independence and receive support from regional factions of the security forces, private military companies, and heavily armed organized crime groups.
Military attempts to quell these separatist movements result in armed conflict across Russia for a number of years. Ethnic and regional populations are mobilized to support the cause of greater autonomy, and the Kremlin’s violent attempts to subdue these revolts sparks broader resistance all across the Russian Federation. Once the hierarchy of power slowly but steadily splinters, some regions’ moves towards greater sovereignty sets off a chaotic chain reaction, in which their successes encourage other republics and regions to push for more autonomy or secession from the Russian Federation.[84] Some of the new republics amalgamate into new federal or confederal arrangements.[85] Some of these subjects become militarily supported and recognized by Ukraine and several other countries; several far east republics become recognized and de facto vassalized by China.
As the Russian military fractures, regional warlords swiftly seize nuclear assets and use them to deter the Kremlin in the rump state of Muscovy, which eventually has to acquiesce to the new reality. Some of the new states offer to trade in their nuclear weapons in exchange for recognition by China and the Western powers; others want to retain them but secure recognition by blackmailing the West with the threat of otherwise selling them to other states. Each entity forms its own foreign policy. Muscovy remains revisionist and deeply hostile towards the West, which it accuses of the ‘breaking up of Russia’. Several other entities opportunistically try to build new relations with Western or Asian partners.
Policy implications
This scenario is a quintessential ‘low probability, high-impact’ scenario. Most analysts agree that while there are indeed centrifugal forces at play inside the Russian Federation, the centripetal forces that keep it together are still stronger – including the common interest of most of the elite and the population to avoid the instability and loss of power and revenue that is accompanied by this scenario.
That does not mean it is impossible. In case it does materialize, the West will only have a short window of time to react to a rapidly unfolding series of events – and limited possibilities to shape the outcome. It will face a broad range of urgent and complex questions such as how to secure Russia’s nuclear arsenal; whether or not to recognize breakaway republics and whether or not to defend them from aggression by the rump state of Muscovy; and how to cope with the inevitable influx of refugees from the destructive conflicts that may well erupt across the territory of the former Russian Federation.
Interestingly, the fact that this scenario with its far-reaching and mind-bogglingly complex consequences exists by itself shapes the behaviour of both Russian and Western actors, which both largely want to avoid it from materializing. The exception are those in Ukraine or the West who instead call for the ‘decolonization of Russia’. Ironically, this scenario could even open up opportunities for cooperation between China and the West to stabilize the situation.