There are an unfathomable and indefinite number of factors that will influence the future of the world’s largest country, the stability of its regime and the course of its foreign policy. Any exercise in foresight about Russia’s future is therefore bound to fall short of being comprehensive, and this paper is no exception. In order to nonetheless identify which factors are most influential, this paper identifies 35 factors that frequently recur in a broad range of studies on Russia’s potential futures. These factors can be divided into five categories: political, economic, societal, geopolitical, and war-related, although it is important to note that these categories and all factors are of course strongly interdependent.
To get a better idea of what factors are deemed more relevant than others for the future of Russia, the research team presented these factors to a group of sixteen Dutch and international experts. These experts engaged in both a quantitative assessment and a qualitative discussion on the different factors. In doing so, many insights could be drawn from factors on which there was a high degree of consensus about their importance or irrelevance, but also when there was significant disagreement. Based on the expert consultations and additional research, the following section outlines the factors that are deemed relevant in terms of their impact on Russia’s future and that serve as building blocks for the scenario framework.
Domestic political factors
It goes without saying that domestic political factors will play a decisive role in determining the future of Russia. While foresight should not overly focus on Vladimir Putin as an individual, the Russian regime has become highly personalized in comparison to the post-World War II Soviet Union.[5] As became evident from both the literature and the expert consultations, there is a broad agreement that what Putin will decide – or will be forced to accept – with regard to his position in the Kremlin will be of the utmost importance to the overall stability of the Russian regime. In April 2021, the Duma passed a law that allows Putin to run for two more terms, allowing him in theory to stay in office until 2036.[6]
However, so far it is unclear whether Putin will want or will be able to sit out those new terms, and not just because of his health.[7] Our survey results suggest that experts believe that the degree of consensus or disagreement within Russia’s ruling elite is almost as decisive for the political fate of Russia. Putin has followed an approach of ‘divide and rule’, ensuring that no single security actor has the monopoly on the use of force, that all these actors deeply distrust one another, and are accountable only to Putin personally. This has made the Russian regime vulnerable to internal disputes that could well turn violent.[8]
This particularly concerns the traditional ‘siloviki’ security actors, but also newly emerging players such as the Wagner Group and other private military companies.[9] Although many experts have downplayed the importance of these newly emerging security actors, as well as the possibility of a military coup, the Wagner mutiny has certainly shed a different light on this. Some argue that the actions of the Wagner leader Prigozhin – who has presumably died[10] – have not only revealed significant frictions among the Russian elites, but also a considerable weakening of Vladimir Putin’s personal authority and his carefully created power vertical.[11] Others instead consider that Wagner’s mutiny and the fatal consequences for its leadership was another opportunity for Putin to position himself as a strongman and further consolidate his power.[12]
After the mutiny by Prigozhin, Putin has decided to also have regional security forces to support governors in keeping the situation under control. However, it remains to be seen whether such forces could also turn into more independent actors. They do seem to be a centrifugal force in Russian politics, with the potential to further contribute to the decentralisation of the levers of power in Russia. Because of Putin’s strong personal role in these matters, it could easily contribute to fragmentation, once the current president leaves office.[13]
In any case, there seems to be a general agreement that if change does come to Russia, it is more likely to come from ‘above’ (or in response to internal infighting) than from ‘below’. After all, another crucial factor in the political fate of Putin and his regime is the repressive capacity of the state, which relies on both military and political instruments. As a result of ongoing repression, workshop participants considered a ‘colour revolution’ or any serious challenge to Putin’s regime coming from society as being highly unlikely. This notion is further strengthened by the work of Henry Hale, who argues that mass social unrest, as well as its political success, rather tends to be the result of splits within the ruling elite and succession struggles.[14] The lack of political engagement among the population will be explored further under the 'social factors' category, where it becomes evident that these factors scored notably low.[15] Nevertheless, the surveyed experts pointed out the possibility that the elite may exploit social discontent as a pretext to carry out and legitimize a power grab.[16]
More depressingly with regard to Russia’s democratic future, our experts scored the importance of Russia’s domestic opposition by far the lowest, reflecting the fragmented and weak character of the political opposition.[17] There was even less optimism concerning the potential for change lying in the field of civil society, which can be attributed in part, but not solely, to the current repressive climate. Even abroad, the Russian opposition and civil society appear to be relatively disorganized compared to the opposition of Belarus, for instance. However, experts and policymakers seem to disagree on the question whether it would make sense for Western governments to invest more actively in the numerous Russian émigrés in the West. Many of these émigrés come from the business elite and intelligentsia and could, according to optimists, form the organisational basis for a more democratic Russia in the long term.[18] However, there is consensus that, at least in the short term, the chances of Russia becoming a fully-fledged democracy are very low, and that, due to the heavy impact of years of authoritarian rule, Russia will most likely remain an authoritarian state for the foreseeable future – although it is important to note here that there are still many varieties within the category of authoritarian states.[19]
Either way, virtually all experts in our workshop agreed that Putin's successor is most likely to emerge from within the circles of the ruling (security) elite. The degree of elite consensus is crucial here, as there is no guarantee of unanimity regarding Putin's successor, nor that the process of power transition may proceed in an orderly fashion. Current infighting within and between individual security services and the armed forces, including on the conduct of the war, could contribute to further instability once Putin is gone. Some experts caution that the emergence of a power vacuum would be accompanied by significant instability and a further escalation of inter-elite conflicts. Others emphasized the elites' preference for stability and the preservation of the status quo, which will make them join forces and ensure a relatively smooth power transition to a new ruler who can continue authoritarian rule over Russia.[20]
Furthermore, the majority of our experts believe that any significant opposition to Putin's regime would likely arise from within the Moscow elites rather than the regional elites. Partly because of Putin's carefully created power system, it seems to be more advantageous for regional leaders to remain loyal to Putin. In addition, regional leaders lack both a substantial power base and the military means that would be needed to seriously challenge Putin's power.[21] However, regional elites, especially if backed up by their own (para)military forces, could become an important constituency for which elites in Moscow would compete for, in case splits occur in the capital.
The same applies to the mobilisation of Russia’s ethnic minorities, which neither the expert survey nor the literature sees as a fundamental challenge to the stability of the Russian Federation. Despite the existence and increase in inter-ethnic tensions and social discontent in some regions like Ingushetia, Chechnya, Dagestan, Yakutia, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan during the war, researchers have relativized the existence of serious secessionist movements, let alone the potential for secession within these regions.[22] In fact, support for the central authorities and Putin in particular is generally stronger in rural provinces or regions with large ethnic minorities.[23]
However, participants in our workshop did point out that, given the fact that Russia’s current centralized regime relies heavily on Putin’s persona and his power vertical, any potential successor would likely struggle to firmly consolidate power, at least in the short term. This could provide scope for small-scale reforms or a natural development towards a slightly more decentralized, federal Russia, which could perhaps form the starting point for the introduction of more political pluralism.[24] Yet, others stressed that the collapse of Putin's power vertical could shake up the overall composition of the federation and the relationship between different power centres to such an extent that it risks triggering a large-scale violent conflict between different military groups, including militias from regional leaders like Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov.[25]
Economic factors
Another important aspect to consider is the way in which the economic conditions in Russia will develop in the coming five years. After significant growth in the 2000s, Russia’s economy has stagnated and even begun to decay and has shown limited capabilities for recovery. This has been aggravated by the Covid-19 pandemic and the consequences of waging war in Ukraine, including newly imposed Western sanctions. Experts agree that macroeconomic stability in Russia is a key factor to monitor, which will be decisive for other economic factors, such as inflation rates, especially concerning food prices, employment opportunities for Russians, and the stability of the banking system. The exchange rate of the rouble to major international currencies such as the dollar, euro and renminbi, which has recently been dropping sharply, is also an important indicator in this regard.
However, the impact of the war and Western sanctions on Russia's macroeconomic stability is so far still relatively limited and allows the regime to continue its war efforts.[26] Even though Russian macroeconomic figures cannot be fully relied upon and estimates from Western sources vary, so far the Russian economy is nonetheless more resilient than most expected. According to the IMF’s forecasts, Russia’s economic growth in 2023 is greater than that of the eurozone,[27] and it has grown by 4.9% in the second quarter of 2023 due to oil income and government spending on war production.[28] This explains why, up until now, economic factors have posed little challenge to President Putin's regime.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the Russian economy is still in a precarious state, especially considering the downslide of the rouble by 30% since the beginning of the 2022 invasion,[29] and economic factors may potentially come into play in the long term.[30] Even if Russia is able to broadly maintain its macroeconomic stability, dynamic economic growth is not possible without access to Western capital markets and technology transfers, as well as domestic reforms. Hence, stagnation is arguably here to stay. Another factor that that will play a role in the even longer term, in a matter of decades, is the potential energy transition away from fossil fuels, which could potentially decimate Russian government revenues.
Although Western economic sanctions are not aimed at regime change, this does call into question to what extent sanctions could potentially result in regime change in Russia – especially if they are not adhered to by a sizable share of the world economy.[31] Russia's international position appears to be crucial in determining whether the Russian economy can stay afloat: Russia needs international trading partners not only to circumvent sanctions, but especially to sell its oil, gas and other natural resources. This is closely linked to the further development of Russia’s relationship with, or dependence on, China, but also on the degree to which Russia manages to find a foothold in other Asian, South American, and African countries. This issue will be discussed further in the ‘international factors’ section.
As becomes clear from the results of our survey, experts unanimously consider oil and gas prices, which are in turn closely related to the rouble exchange rate, as the most crucial economic factor that will be pivotal to the stability and sustainability of the regime. It is responsible for a major part of the state budget and therefore crucial for the state to maintain its repressive machinery and to ‘buy off’ social discontent.[32] Moreover, there seems to be little indication that commodity prices are set to return to their high levels of the 2000s, when they played an important role in Russia's economic boom during Putin's first two terms in office.
However, several workshop participants did stress that this list of variables focused perhaps too much on macroeconomics, while the main economic factors might be more at the level of the microeconomics of individual households and companies. They emphasized that there is no clear-cut causal link in Russia between economic hardship, social unrest, and political mobilisation. The impact of economic factors also depends on the Kremlin’s dominance over the information space. This allows it to manipulate the public perception of the economic conditions by presenting a distorted, rosy picture of the state of the Russian economy.[33] This also explains the fact that support for the regime seems stronger in industrially depressed regions and rural provinces, although economic disparities between urban and poor, distant regions have further increased during the war.[34]
While economic factors alone may not be the decisive factor for political change, they may come into play when combined with broader political developments. Within the current political environment the Russian business elite is likely to remain silent, due to fears of losing their assets, freedom, or even their lives.[35] But in case Putin’s regime and its power structures collapse, it may create space for the business elite to push for economic sanctions downscaling and perhaps some reforms towards a liberal market economy, which could influence Russia’s future geopolitical direction and its stance towards the West.[36] At the same time past experience shows that economic liberalization does not necessarily guarantee a corresponding liberalization in politics.[37]
Societal factors
The third category pertains to social factors. Russia is grappling with various social issues that are pivotal in shaping its future. These include high mortality rates and low birth rates, as well as a substantial decline in the ethnic Russian population and a growing non-Russian population. The longer-term demographic pressure has intensified since the onset of the war, owing to a massive brain drain from critical sectors such as IT and a significant number of male casualties resulting from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[38]
Most social factors were nonetheless rated low or very low in the expert survey. It is essential to consider the dimension of time here: many experts noted that these factors will certainly transform Russian society in the long run. However, in the timeframe of the next five years most experts do not expect significant changes in Russian society. As mentioned earlier in the section on political factors, this is closely tied to the repressive capacity of the state: as long as it remains intact, few people will be willing to protest or openly criticize the regime. Among all social factors, there was one that clearly stood out above all others: the degree to which the Kremlin is able to retain control over the information space and push its narratives. This factor has a dual effect: it stifles criticism and genuinely influences the population's mindset.[39] The extent of success in this endeavour will also determine the willingness of Russians to protest and their perception of a 'social contract,' which experts generally deem relevant but only of moderate importance.
Continuity in Putin's relatively high approval ratings and the substantial support for the war in Ukraine among the Russian population can be seen as evidence of the effectiveness and persuasiveness of the Kremlin's media narratives.[40] It should nonetheless be noted that conducting reliable survey research in the increasingly repressive Russian context is a challenge in itself. The results might not always reflect what Russians genuinely believe. Several experts also stressed the importance of ideology in this regard: since the regime may no longer be able to legitimize its rule by providing material benefits to the population, it will instead try to legitimize its rule by defending Russia against imagined external threats and providing stability.
Despite the limitations of opinion polling in Russia, it is nevertheless interesting to observe how surveys in Russia indicate that a significant portion of the Russian population places trust in this narrative and, therefore, the so-called 'social contract'.[41] Moreover, the absence of public support for Putin during the recent Wagner mutiny could suggest that support for Putin among the population may not be as robust as previously assumed. Prigozhin’s actions have potentially also had repercussions for Putin's image among the Russian people, though opinions differ on whether these consequences were positive or negative for Putin.[42]
Another factor that relates to the importance of providing stability is the extent to which the Kremlin adapts to and (mis)manages environmental hazards such as the Covid-19 pandemic, earthquakes, forest fires, and climate-related disruptions.[43] However, this factor did not receive a high score in our survey. For most social factors, experts anticipate their increasing importance on the mid to long-term scale. This is not just because social and demographic developments tend to unfold slowly, but also because some experts believe that political conditions will rather be decisive. After the potential breakdown of Putin's regime, the instability accompanying a power vacuum may bring underlying social issues to the surface all at once.[44]
Even then, the question remains whether such a situation will lead to considerably more opposition from society. This is not only because the new regime will likely suppress it, but also because, as emphasized by many experts, the politically passive attitude of the Russian population is deeply ingrained.[45] Additionally, the regions experiencing the most socio-economic consequences of the war often demonstrate the most loyalty to the current regime.[46]
International factors
Most experts agree that the influence of international and geopolitical factors will be nearly as relevant as domestic political developments for Russia’s future in the next few years. Of particular significance is Russia's ‘pivot’ towards the East and South, above all towards China.[47] Among participating experts in this study there was near-consensus on the crucial role played by China, with regard to its relationship with Russia in general and its stance on the war in Ukraine in particular. If the Chinese regime decides to prop up Putin and his regime by providing economic or even military support, then the regime has a much greater chance of retaining power. However, the ‘friendship without limits’ with China certainly poses limitations for Putin's regime, risking further reliance on China in terms of its economy, its international position, and perhaps within other domains as well.[48]
It matters most what China wants to gain from this relationship, given its dominant role in the increasingly asymmetric Sino-Russian alliance. Despite Xi Jinping's relatively distant approach towards Russia’s war in Ukraine, preventing a decisive Russian defeat seems to be in China's strategic interest of countering Western dominance on the global stage.[49] China is also carefully observing how the West responds to armed aggression, which in turn influences Beijing’s decision-making regarding the future of Taiwan.[50] In turn, some experts believe that, as Russia’s economy and regime steadily weaken due to Russia’s failing war efforts, Russia will almost unavoidably become more reliant on China, potentially at the cost of a gradual loss of sovereignty and influence.[51] However, others have pointed out that, as the most important supplier of natural resources to China, Russia still has some leverage in this relationship. The Kremlin will still attempt to limit its reliance on China, as it recognizes the dangers this dependence pose to the strength of the Russian regime.[52] However, as a commodity supplier, Moscow’s hand is much weaker than China’s, since China can more easily diversify away from Russia than the other way around.
Almost as important as the relationship between Russia and China will be the unity within the Western camp and the willingness of Western states to support Ukraine, both politically and militarily. This will have a crucial impact on the course of the war. The level of Western support greatly depends on the political situation in Washington, which is why this is considered as a separate factor in the survey.[53] Depending on how much longer the war will drag on, the 2024 U.S. elections, as well as the situation in Taiwan, will be critical in this regard.[54]
Moreover, this Western unity will remain important after the war, as Western countries will likely be involved during potential peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. An agreement and the eventual concessions made, as well as the penalties, reparations and demands for justice imposed on Russia during this negotiation process, will influence the future development of Russia’s politics and its attitude towards the West. The key challenge for Western governments will be how to hold a defeated Russia accountable for its war crimes and accommodate Ukraine's demands for justice and reparations – without inadvertently creating a dangerous breeding ground for instability and revanchism in Russia. The example of Weimar Germany is often used to illustrate this dilemma[55], as French President Emmanuel Macron did in his much-maligned call not to ‘humiliate’ Russia.[56]
That said, the future relationship between Russia and the West primarily depends on Russia's willingness to stabilize relations and make amends. Unfortunately, a fair number of authors have claimed that, even under a completely new leadership, a fundamental change in Russia’s foreign policy and its threat perception towards the West seems highly unlikely, as this hostility towards the West seems to be deeply ingrained among the elites and some parts of Russia’s population.[57] However, limited attempts towards reconciliation might be possible in a post-Putin and post-war Russia, driven by pragmatic considerations to mitigate China's dominance and reduce Western sanctions.[58]
Russia's interference in what it perceives to be its post-Soviet sphere of influence, as well as relations with countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, is also significant in this regard. Strengthening ties with these countries seems to be vital to the regime in order to prevent isolation, counter ongoing sanctions, and reduce dependency on China.[59] In fact, there is disagreement on the extent to which Russia is isolated today.[60] There does seem to be a consensus, however, that Russia has lost considerable influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. This is not just significant due to the strategic importance of these countries for Russia, but also because of the symbolic importance of these countries, which Moscow sees as belonging to its natural sphere of influence. As pointed out earlier, experts expect little change in Russia’s foreign policy orientation, hence Russia’s attempts to project its soft power and intervene in the post-Soviet states are likely to continue in the coming years, regardless of the strength of the regime.[61] In a clear but nonetheless worrying acknowledgment of the erosion of the multilateral rules-based order, one of the few factors that virtually all experts in this study agreed upon is the relative irrelevance of multilateral actors such as the UN in determining Russia’s future.[62]
Factors related to the war in Ukraine
Although the war in Ukraine is technically part of international factors, and virtually connected to every other factor discussed in this paper, we have methodologically chosen to survey a separate cluster of factors related to Russia’s war against Ukraine. The developments in – and the outcome of – this war will have a tremendous impact on the sustainability of the Russian government and Russia’s position on the international stage.
Both our expert panel as well as recent literature stress that the most influential factor in this regard is the degree of success or failure on the battlefield, which indeed correlates with the Kremlin’s choice of strategy and tactics. The longer the war will rage on, the more impact an eventual loss or win will have on the credibility of Putin and his regime associates, whose legitimacy has become increasingly dependent on military action over the years.[63] While criticism of military setbacks so far has not targeted Putin personally, there is continued disagreement between hardliners and those who advocate a more cautious approach. The struggle for supremacy between these pragmatist and hawkish groups will be one of the key political altercations in Russia, and is dependent on what happens on the battlefield.[64]
Not only would a total defeat in Ukraine pose a threat to Putin's regime, but continued humiliation on the battlefield, infighting among military leaders, and drone attacks on Moscow and Crimea may escalate infighting among elite factions or prompt a mass defection of officials who lose faith in Putin's ability to control the situation.[65] On the other hand, a string of military victories or an outcome of the war that would cement Russian gains would bolster the credibility of the regime. Many experts have pointed out that growing tensions within the Russian political and military elite, as evidenced by Prigozhin's mutiny, have made the possibility of another mutiny or intra-elite conflicts taking on a military dimension more likely.[66] The lack of explicit support for Putin from both military officers and officials during Prigozhin's march on Moscow is indicative of this.[67] Their wait-and-see attitude did not turn into action this time around, but if the perception arises among elites that Putin will fall, this could turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. And then, a system built on personal relations, distrust, and repression could suddenly collapse like a house of cards.
Interestingly, most experts who participated in this study agreed that the number of casualties in the war is actually not as important. It should be noted that this, again, depends on the time span: in the long term, the high number of casualties will certainly have an impact on the demographic composition of Russia.[68] However, in the short term, the high numbers of casualties do not seem to make a large difference to the stability of the regime, which can be explained by the importance of the factor of ‘perception’, which was emphasized by various experts and again closely linked to the narrative and ideology that would explain why Russia went to war in the first place.
A feeling of an existential threat could also reinforce the ‘besieged fortress’ mentality of the Russian population and strengthen support for the regime, at least in the short to medium term.[69] However, it remains uncertain how long the Kremlin's narrative will dominate, especially since important figures like the late Prigozhin have recently publicly challenged this narrative.[70] If alternative narratives gain traction among the broader public, it could lead to a decline in military morale or increased resistance to further conscription and mobilization efforts, which will certainly have an impact on Russia’s efforts on the battlefield.[71]
