Hybrid conflicts

For the past few years, conflicts and wars have been increasingly moving away from a purely military nature, instead becoming increasingly hybrid in character. In warfare, adversaries have always tried to achieve their political-strategic goals through the application of a variety of different means, or so-called ‘instruments of power’. Traditionally, there are four instruments of power: diplomatic, information, military and economic. However, instruments of power have also changed over time, with three more novel instruments gaining relative importance: finance, intelligence and law enforcement. This has led to the transition from DIME to DIME-FIL.[2] Characteristic of these hybrid threats is that these instruments are very often used in a combined and synchronised manner to achieve the desired effects.[3] Examples of the more novel application of such means include, but are not limited to, cyberattacks, the spread of disinformation and election interference. These activities can be referred to as hybrid activities.

Furthermore, the potential targets of such activities have altered, with an increasing focus on targets in the non-military domain. For instance, hybrid activities might be directed at critical infrastructure, such as hospitals or underwater cables. Essential in this regard is that hybrid activities are often targeted at a state’s critical functions, which can be described as “activities or operations distributed across the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure (PMESII) spectrum which, if discontinued, could lead to a disruption of services that a working system […] depends on”.[4] Key in this regard is that the adversary will try to look for vulnerabilities in one or more of these dimensions, so that it is able to exploit these to achieve its goals. Unfortunately, the internet, social media and other technological improvements – which have so many positive applications – also offer tremendous scope for abuse, such as influencing election campaigns, spreading fake news and false images with a very high tempo.

Although there is still a great deal of debate on what ‘hybrid conflict’ exactly entails[5], there is a common understanding that it is in nature very complex and poses the necessary challenges for countries. The application of these methods can sow doubts among populations, thereby destabilising and undermining societies.[6] The severe complexity of hybrid conflicts stems partly from the different, non-traditional and non-military instruments that can be used simultaneously by the adversary, thereby posing a wide variety of possible threats as each vulnerability can easily be abused. In addition, adding to the complexity is the difficulty in detecting the hybrid activities’ origins, assessing their potential impact, their low visibility and the diversity of the actors involved in addressing these challenges. The latter is proving to be an exceptional challenge, as it requires countries to adjust the way in which they deal with security. These adjustments apply both to the way in which a country’s first security provider, the military, operates, as well as to how a country’s government expands the scope of the actors involved in addressing security matters.

A very recent example that demonstrates the complexity of contemporary conflicts is the war in Ukraine. At the beginning of the war, when Russia invaded its neighbouring country, Moscow applied hybrid methods in an attempt to destabilise Ukraine and create chaos in the country so that it could more easily take advantage of this to pursue its strategic objectives. Activities included espionage, cyberattacks and internet-based disinformation.[7] As a result, Ukraine’s cyber authority was quick to declare that Ukraine is fighting a war in the digital realm, in addition to the war on the ground.[8] As an example: already at the onset of the war, European officials who assisted Ukrainian refugees were targeted with malicious software, in an attempt to disrupt their efforts. Some question the degree of success of these activities, however. But it has not only been Russia that has increasingly made use of these tactics. As a counter-reaction to Russia’s hybrid activities, Ukraine made use of its rather open society through actively using the digital domain, including social media. For instance, Ukrainian authorities used social media and messaging apps to spread images of prisoners of war, including some being humiliated or intimidated – thereby violating the Geneva Conventions.[9] The fact that unconventional, hybrid means, as opposed to military means, are playing a relatively more important role than before demonstrates that conflicts and wars have increasingly gained a whole-of-society character.

The JEF’s record in the hybrid domain

The increasingly hybrid character of conflicts and warfare requires from the militaries around the world to adjust the way in which they operate and address the most pressing security matters. This also applies to existing military cooperation formats, like the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). The JEF (see box) is by its very nature a military cooperation format consisting of ten European countries, that was established in 2014 as one of NATO’s Framework Nations Concepts (FNC).[10] Although the JEF has been established as a NATO FNC formation, it is not a NATO-earmarked force. This allowed for participation by two non-NATO countries in 2014 (Finland, Sweden). The JEF can be deployed under the umbrella of NATO or other international organisations, but also as a stand-alone force directly deployed by the Lead Nation and one or more Participating Nations (PNs).

Through the FNC model, NATO encourages multinational groups within the Alliance to develop deployable capabilities, led by a ‘framework nation’. For the JEF, the ‘framework nation’ is the United Kingdom, which provides the necessary command and control structure through the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) in Northwood. The JEF was established as “a rapidly deployable force capable of conducting the full spectrum of operations, including high intensity operations”.[11] Given its composition, the JEF focusses its activities on Northern Europe, including the High North, the North Atlantic region and the Baltic Sea region.

However, with the shifting nature of security threats, military cooperation formats must look for how they can be of added value in the process of coping with these kinds of challenges. This also applies to the JEF, which is in search of its role in the hybrid domain. In July 2021, the JEF countries declared in their policy direction that it needs “to be able to respond effectively to competitors operating in the space below the threshold of conventional conflict”[12], thereby acknowledging the importance of the hybrid domain in contemporary warfare. Ever since then, the JEF seeks to gain a more active role in tackling hybrid threats. At the most recent JEF Leaders’ Meeting in Riga (Latvia) in December 2022, the JEF Nations reaffirmed their commitment to addressing hybrid threats by stating that they have agreed “to accelerate cooperation in tackling hybrid threats, with a focus on deterring and defending against threats to our shared subsea data and energy infrastructure”[13], most likely prompted by the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline in September 2022.

Moving beyond political statements, the JEF has tried to make headway in its objective to address hybrid threats. This progress primarily stems from JEF exercises. In particular the Joint Protector 21 and 22 exercises are of relevance here, as specific attention was devoted to the deployment and operation of the JEF in sub-threshold or grey zone situations. JEF exercises are usually military live exercises. The Joint Protector 21 exercise was a command-post exercise and did not include any military hardware. Rather, the exercise brought together approximately 500 people from the ten JEF Nations in an attempt to test the ability of the JEF Headquarters to provide the necessary command and control structures for when a sub-threshold crisis would emerge.[14] These kinds of exercises reap serious benefits as they show where the JEF already operates effectively and where there is still room for improvement. One of the main lessons of the Joint Protector 21 exercise was that for JEF to be able to successfully operate in sub-threshold situations, more and different non-military expertise is required at the headquarters. The exercise provided this expertise, which was claimed to be very useful, in particular as the military command was searching for answers to the dilemma of how to act and whom to contact on the civil side as Joint Protector 21 progressed.[15]

But a military cooperation format that increasingly has to operate in a non-traditional and non-military domain poses the necessary challenges, but can also bring about opportunities. These challenges and opportunities are set out below.

Challenges

The biggest challenge is the lack of consensus among the JEF Nations as to the extent to which the JEF should be involved outside the scope of the military domain. All JEF Nations regard the latter as the JEF’s core business and hence its strongest hand. However, PNs bordering Russia underline the added value of the JEF in its military role, while others show more willingness to explore the scope of what the JEF can contribute in the hybrid domain.[16] For that reason, it is of the utmost importance to define more clearly what role and functions the JEF could have in the hybrid domain (see chapter 3).

A military cooperation framework that seeks to be active in a non-military domain to safeguard security is in essence already a challenge in itself. Given the dynamic nature of hybrid threats, it is impossible for the military to address these kinds of threats by themselves. Considering that the methods used by adversaries are most likely of a non-military nature and that the targets are very often civilian lead one to conclude that addressing hybrid threats requires the involvement of actors that are different from solely the military. In essence, a Whole-of-Government (WoG) or even a Whole-of-Society (WoS) approach is necessary in order to be able to counter these threats. The required involvement of a broad range of actors, at least from various government departments, is acknowledged by the JEF, as can be derived from its policy direction which states that “the challenge of sub-threshold competition in particular may require bringing together the military instrument with other levers of government”[17]. This closely ties in with one of the primary lessons of the Joint Protector 21 exercise: that there is a need for the presence of non-military expertise at the headquarters in order to be able to effectively operate in the sub-threshold area.[18]

Moreover, as the hybrid domain is largely civilian in nature, it might be difficult for military cooperation frameworks to operate in this environment. This has partly to do with the fact that the military is not used to operating in such environments, but it mainly stems from the national legislative and regulatory limitations.[19] For example, in a country like the Netherlands, one of the three core tasks of the military is to support civilian authorities where necessary. But the room for manoeuvre is very restricted, especially when it comes to the privacy domain, in which the military finds its hands increasingly tied by legal restrictions.[20] Similarly, in a country like Norway the Constitution prescribes that the military is not allowed to act domestically other than in warfare and only in very exceptional cases. This is primarily the responsibility of the police forces. Considering that hybrid threats are very often targeted at a country’s national critical infrastructure, this makes it very difficult for the military to have a role.[21] Closely tied to this is the fact that the activities of a military cooperation framework, like the JEF, can easily be slowed down by bureaucratic tendencies, which is especially relevant with regard to addressing and countering hybrid threats involving a broad range of non-military actors. This becomes even more complicated when the different ministries involved are severely stove piped, making smooth cooperation among them extremely difficult, thereby also hindering effective and quick action by the JEF.

The JEF’s composition and flexibility can be a virtue, but could also prove to be a vice. The so-called UK+ xPN format implies that JEF deployment is dependent on the UK’s willingness to act, as the lead nation always needs to provide its approval for and participation in JEF deployment. Correspondingly, the flexible nature of the JEF naturally implies that there are no binding commitments in place.[22] This lack of binding commitments also complicates military planning processes, as it is not known in advance which capabilities will be available to the JEF. Hence, there is a certain degree of uncertainty about the commitment of the JEF countries, arising from the non-binding nature of the JEF, which can prove to be a serious challenge.[23]

Finally, other NATO member states may have misperceptions about the role of the JEF, primarily with regard to its military functions, and perhaps influenced by the increasing political character of the JEF’s activities, in particular the growing number of Leaders’ Meetings (see chapter 3).[24] Such misperceptions should be countered, also as the JEF’s role in the hybrid domain might even raise more questions among non-JEF Allies.

Advantages

Despite the difficulties that might come along with a military cooperation format having to operate in a rather complex and unfamiliar domain, the JEF also has a number of advantages. One of the biggest claimed virtues of the JEF is its flexibility. As the JEF policy direction states, “the JEF is designed with flexibility at its heart”.[25] The deployment of the JEF does not require consensus among the ten JEF Nations. It is sufficient if the UK and one other PN agree to deployment, although it can be expected that the consent of all PNs might be preferred – also depending on the crisis at hand.[26] Nevertheless, this flexible format of deployment offers the opportunity of rapid action by the JEF in case of a crisis and serving as a first responder.[27] Hence, the JEF is an accessible format to be used for certain missions. This is particularly true in comparison to NATO where unanimity among all thirty Allies is required in order to be able to act. This is why some have bluntly stated that “the JEF can act while NATO is thinking”.[28]

In addition, the inherent flexibility of the JEF makes it very well equipped to respond to hybrid threats that fall under the threshold of NATO’s Article 5. In such cases NATO might not always be the answer, as it might struggle to respond to events that do not strictly fall within the scope of collective defence. Moreover, closely tied to this argument is that the smaller composition of the JEF and the fact that it is not bound by NATO or EU frameworks and regulations, leaves room for experimenting.[29] This particularly applies to potential responses by the JEF in the hybrid domain: as the JEF is not tied to the rules and procedures of either NATO or the EU, it has the manoeuvring space to explore possible response options, something which would be more difficult to agree upon in the larger NATO or EU frameworks. In the case of practical application: at the basis of such a response must lie a request for military support from one JEF Nation to other JEF Nations. This military support will be executed under the legal basis of other departments of state of the requesting country. In this case JEF serves as an additional regional responder to a below the threshold national crisis which ascends national capabilities.

Another important opportunity can be seen in light of the JEF as a ‘gap filler’.[30] This applies to multiple areas, both thematical as well as regional. At a thematical level, and as previously mentioned, NATO might not always be the best equipped to respond to hybrid activities. In such situations, the JEF might prove to be valuable in filling this gap. In addition, the geographical location of the ten JEF Nations means that they have, to a substantial extent, shared threat perceptions and thus aligned security interests. As a result, the JEF is uniquely focused on Northern Europe, a region that is becoming increasingly important and simultaneously increasingly contested – for example, due to rising geopolitical tensions in the Arctic. As the EU and NATO are organisations with a wide geographical scope due to their member states across Europe and beyond, more specific attention to regions like Northern Europe becomes increasingly difficult. This is partly due to the broader composition of these organisations, which leads to diverging security interests spread over multiple regions, making operations in specific regional areas more difficult.[31] Therefore, the JEF can fill “a hole in the security architecture of northern Europe between a national force and a NATO force”.[32] Furthermore, the JEF, with its mixed membership of EU/non-EU countries and – as long as Finland and Sweden have not formally joined the Alliance – of NATO/non-NATO nations offers a ‘security bridge’ connecting the gaps between the JEF Nations’ non-overlapping membership of both organisations.

Considering the JEF’s military nature, one of the most prominent virtues of the cooperation format is its potential deterrent effect. Throughout its operational period, the armed forces of the JEF Nations have worked together to deter adversaries, including Russia, from aggression in the Northern European region. This also includes actions in order to deter adversaries from using hybrid methods against the partner countries. According to a 2022 JEF Defence Ministerial Meeting statement, this is done through “a series of integrated military activities across our part of northern Europe – at sea, on land and in the air”[33]. To illustrate this: in March 2021, the JEF conducted maritime patrols in the Baltic Sea, including vessels from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the UK. The purpose of the patrols was to demonstrate the countries’ commitment to security and stability in the Balt ic Sea region.[34]

A final advantage of the JEF is that it provides a framework for advanced integration between the JEF Nations.[35] Strengthened integration would be a natural result of joint deployment, as the deployed forces would be prescribed to jointly operate with high levels of coordination. But even outside the context of deployment, the JEF offers the opportunity to strengthen integration levels and thus improve interoperability among the participating countries. This could for instance be the result of joint training, which allows the countries to practise the integration of their armed forces, which will eventually improve interoperability and cooperation when actual deployment occurs.[36]