NATO

The Alliance acknowledges that the primary responsibility to respond to hybrid threats or attacks rests with the targeted country. Nevertheless, “NATO is prepared to assist any Ally against hybrid threats as part of collective defence”, based on the decision of 2016 that hybrid actions against one or more Allies could lead to invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Although not publicly available, NATO has developed a strategy on its potential role in countering hybrid threats.[37] Potential contributions seem to be primarily of a deterrence nature (for example, by increased military presence as has been done after the Russian invasion of Ukraine) and through supporting non-NATO Allies and partner countries such as by sending hybrid support teams.[38] However, there is no consensus among the NATO member states on ‘how and when’ the Alliance should act in the hybrid domain. Some member states regard NATO action in this area as potentially provocative and escalatory. In their view, NATO should be called upon for high-end military tasks only, and not if the threats remain under the threshold of Article 5.[39]

Exactly for these reasons, the JEF offers an interesting format to act militarily in the grey conflict zone. NATO could profit from such a role, assuming that the JEF Lead Nation (or one or more PNs) keeps the North Atlantic Council (NAC) abreast of the situation and its activities in the hybrid domain. Sharing information with all NATO members is essential, in particular if the risk of the activation of Article 5 increases. It therefore remains of the utmost importance that the JEF has arrangements in place to transfer military command authority to NATO.[40] The JEF’s knowledge and experience, in particular through exercises, could also be shared with NATO as input for the implementation of the Alliance’s strategy for the hybrid domain. In case of a future use of hybrid response teams, NATO could share its expertise with the JEF.

Finally, the regional orientation of the JEF is of great interest to NATO for three reasons. First, the High North is developing into a new area of geopolitical tensions as the Arctic ice is quickly melting. As NATO-Russia relations are unlikely to return to normality in the foreseeable future, the Alliance will have to pay more attention to the High North. Secondly, once Finland and Sweden have joined NATO, the role of the JEF as a ‘gap filler’ – short of Article 5 activation – becomes a shared interest of all JEF Nations. Therefore, arrangements for transferring from JEF deployment to NATO command will be easier to be agreed upon, tested and implemented. Thirdly, Finnish and Swedish membership makes it possible to share NATO’s operational defence plans with the two countries, which will facilitate coordination with JEF planning and make the transitioning of command authority to the Alliance, when needed, somewhat easier.[41]

On the other hand, the growing political role of the JEF has also raised eyebrows within NATO countries that do not belong to the group of JEF Nations. Some Allies also fear that the JEF’s role in sub-threshold scenarios might lead to escalation, which could result in an Article 5 situation while non-JEF NATO members have had no say in the JEF’s involvement and actions from the onset. Moreover, in particular Eastern European Allies could view the JEF’s growing political role as an alternative to NATO – although institution-building is clearly not on the JEF’s agenda. However, these doubts concerning the JEF’s increasing political weight require a better strategic communication policy – for which the Lead Nation should be in charge, supported by the PNs as required.

EU

The EU’s wider set of responsibilities and tools makes the organisation better suited to play a bigger role in the hybrid domain in comparison to NATO. For that purpose, the EU already has different tools at its disposal, such as the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox and the Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Toolbox – the latter still being negotiated. The Strategic Compass, adopted by the European Council in March 2022, launched the development of an EU Hybrid Toolbox, which was finalised in December 2022. It can be described as a way of working within the EU to enhance coherence between the multitude of instruments that the EU and its member states have to offer in countering hybrid threats. Its aim is to ensure that in case of a hybrid attack, the EU can offer a well-informed, targeted and comprehensive response.[42] The initiative to use the Toolbox lies with the member states, but it can also be used to assist EU partner countries. In fact, the EU civilian CSDP mission to Moldova will encompass a counter-hybrid training and advice capacity.[43] The option of sending ‘stand-alone’ EU Hybrid Response Teams also exists.

The downside of the EU’s approach is that cross-sectoral coordination is required for a comprehensive response, which might be difficult and consumes a great deal of time. Focusing on specific tools, best suited for the hybrid threat that occurs, might be the best way forward.[44] The EU Hybrid Fusion Cell plays a central role in situational awareness which provides the basis for opting for the use of the appropriate tools. Another problem is the existence of different views among EU member states on the ambitions with regard to the development of the Hybrid Toolbox.[45]

The JEF could be important for the EU in a hybrid conflict situation, in particular with regard to providing information for the EU’s situational awareness. Information could be shared with the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, either directly or via the EU Military Staff, by the EU member states in the JEF and the lessons learned from exercises could also be shared. Vice versa, the EU could feed the JEF with its own information and experiences. Unfortunately, there is an important stumbling block: Brexit. Up until now, the JEF’s Lead Nation has made no arrangements with the EU in the context of security and defence. These are a prerequisite for cooperation and as long as London is not taking any initiative in this regard, the JEF’s cooperation with the EU will remain a dead letter. The UK Government led by Prime Minister Sunak might seek a practical solution for British cooperation with the EU in security and defence matters. In the near term, an informal dialogue between the JEF and the EU institutions is perfectly possible and should be pursued as knowledge about the EU and its role in the hybrid domain is more or less absent at the JEF Headquarters.[46]