Conclusions and recommendations | Countering hybrid threats

In 2014, the Joint Expeditionary Force was established by the Lead Nation (the UK) in the context of NATO’s Framework Nations Concept. Since then, it has developed into a flexible multinational military formation for first responder or initial-entry operations. All JEF Nations are located in the northern part of Europe. The regional focus of the JEF is one of its important advantages in terms of shared strategic interests, knowledge, experience, and operational capabilities. This will suit the new NATO New Force Model as regionalisation will become an important element of the adapted deterrence and defence posture of the Alliance. The approaching NATO membership of Finland and Sweden, both JEF Participating Nations (PNs), will not change the purpose or deployment options of the JEF. On the contrary, it makes the elaboration of the connectivity between the JEF and NATO’s collective defence plans easier.

On the other hand, the JEF offers a great deal of flexibility in terms of decision-making and deployment, as it is not dependent on the unanimity of all thirty NATO Allies. In particular in grey zone conflict situations – below the level of armed warfare – this can be a virtue. The JEF can be considered as a gap filler, sending a signal of military solidarity with the country or countries targeted by hybrid means. The Leaders’ and Ministerial Meetings of the JEF Nations also serve that purpose: in the first year of the war in Ukraine, statements and press interviews by political leaders have sent strong messages of solidarity and unity. Strategic communication by the JEF towards other NATO Allies should be improved in order to counter and prevent a misunderstanding and misperception of the JEF’s role and functions.

The priority given to the JEF’s role in the hybrid domain has turned out to be a formidable challenge. The most important problem seems to be that JEF Nations have diverging views on the added value and importance of the JEF role in contributing to countering hybrid threats. The closer PNs are located to Russia, the more they underline the key role of the JEF as a military first responder force. Another major challenge is how the JEF should interact with non-military actors that have the primary responsibility in addressing hybrid threats which are targeted, for example, against energy infrastructure, governmental institutions or private companies. Therefore, the issue is to define more precisely what the JEF’s role or, better, its functions could be in support of the leading actors in the Whole-of-Government and Whole-of-Society approaches, also with regard to the roles of NATO and the EU in the hybrid domain. A key area in which the JEF can play an important role is information and intelligence-sharing in order to optimise situational awareness on the character and nature of the hybrid threats at hand. The legal obstacles that come into play for the military having an information-gathering function need to be addressed by the PNs themselves, but in close coordination with each other. Sharing their national provisions might help to explore options for what the military will be allowed to do in situations below the threshold of warfare.

The Nord Stream incident and the Russian presence in the North Sea to explore locations of underwater cables have resulted in a new NATO priority, that is the protection of energy and communications infrastructure at sea. The JEF could play a supportive role, for example by acting as the lead formation on rotation with NATO’s Standing Naval Forces, either in the North Sea or Baltic Sea areas.

Recommendations

In order to strengthen the role of the JEF in the hybrid domain, all JEF Nations have an important responsibility. As previously stated, they have to closely engage with one another on many aspects of countering hybrid threats. This also applies to the Netherlands. Considering the available expertise in the Netherlands, the country could promote the following action points, also in order to improve its own expertise in the area of its armed forces’ role in countering hybrid threats:

Propose the development of a JEF mission statement on its role and functions in the hybrid domain in order to prevent misunderstanding, to recognise the primary role of non-military actors and to clarify what the JEF’s contribution can be.

Propose the exchange of Whole-of-Government (WoG) and Whole-of-Society (WoS) structures and arrangements in the JEF Nations in order to increase mutual understanding and to learn from each other’s experiences.

Use this information-exchange as input for developing an Inventory of WoG/WoS actors in the JEF Nations that can assist JEF planners and national liaison officers at JEF Headquarters.

Explore options for the temporary presence of civilian experts at JEF Headquarters in order to increase knowledge of other WoG/WoS actors and to contribute to the planning of exercises and other activities.

Suggest connecting the JEF’s agenda more closely to NATO, not only for synchronising military operational plans, but also to set up channels for sharing information when the JEF has to play an active role in hybrid conflict situations.

Aim for a structural dialogue between the JEF and the EU for a better understanding of the role of both actors in the hybrid domain.

Promote better strategic communication on the JEF’s role and functions in the hybrid domain in order to create a better understanding of the JEF’s added value by other NATO countries.

Together with other JEF Nations, explore the scope for exchanging information and for adjusting national legislation and rules that restrict the role of the military in gathering and sharing information in peacetime and grey zone conflict situations.