As stated in the first chapter, hybrid threats occur almost daily but, in the case of conflict, will become more targeted and tailor-made. The JEF’s role in such a situation is to contribute to a wider set of responses by multiple actors at the national and international level. To bring order to this complicated landscape, the first section of this chapter lists the potential functions of the JEF in the hybrid domain without being exhaustive. The second section provides action points that the JEF should undertake to implement those functions.
JEF functions
The gap filler
In NATO, unanimity in the NAC is required to deploy forces.[47] In a crisis, short of an open armed attack that falls within the scope of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, a quick unanimous decision to deploy Allied forces is unlikely to be taken. Although Article 5 could also be activated in response to a hybrid attack[48], decision-making in the NAC on reactive military measures might even prove more cumbersome. Some PNs call this the ‘long NAC scenario’. In those situations, the JEF could act as a gap filler, because its deployment requires primarily a decision by the UK and those JEF partners that would want to join on that occasion. Others have labelled this as providing ‘reassurance’.[49] Such a deployment serves both the aim of deterring and responding to the crisis: it is a signal to the opponent that there is awareness about the threat and a willingness to act. It is essential that the JEF (the Lead Nation) keeps NATO informed throughout the planning and conduct of the JEF’s deployment, also to ensure a smooth transitioning to the Alliance’s command in case of the activation of Article 5. For that purpose, it is important that JEF and NATO operational contingency plans are closely coordinated. Being a ’gap filler’, the JEF should not be regarded as offering comparable security to what NATO does. Rather, the gap-filling function can be described as the ‘prepositioning’ of a first responder force before NATO takes over.[50] The development of the new NATO New Force Model with more regional focus could be a good anchor point for the JEF to develop contingency plans in concert with NATO. On the basis of a request by a JEF Nation, the JEF could set the right regional preconditions more quickly as long as SACEUR is (in)formally consulted to avoid the risk of an undesired escalatory effect.
Regional focus
Contrary to the NATO Response Force (NRF), the JEF is focused on one specific area: Northern Europe, including the High North, the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea region. Although these three areas have their distinctive features, instability in one of them is likely to have a profound effect on the other two. The geographical orientation of the JEF has advantages for selecting and earmarking the required forces, but it also brings benefits in the hybrid realm. The specific characteristics of these areas – topography, demographic characteristics, infrastructure and, last but not least, the existing policies and arrangements of the countries concerned – can be used for JEF activities, be it conceptual work or for putting practical tools in place, such as liaison with non-military actors. Maintaining this regional focus on Northern Europe “provides a natural incentive for its member states to cooperate and pursue a cohesive approach and common identity.”[51] The JEF’s regional focus on Northern Europe also fits well with the Alliance’s intention for a more regionally structured force posture.
Situational awareness
A direct pay-off of the regional focus is situational awareness and understanding. Naturally, the countries in Northern Europe have the best knowledge on the region and will therefore also be able to deliver the required information, insight and analysis on hybrid threats that are specifically targeted at one or more of them. The total defence concepts of the Scandinavian countries may help to have a more accurate situational awareness picture than solely based on military intelligence-gathering and analysis. Creating situational awareness is the starting point for building the overall picture of how threats are interlinked, how the response options should look like and what action might be needed, both regionally and thematically.[52]
Intelligence-sharing
Sharing intelligence between countries is a quid-pro-quo business, based on trust and experience. The JEF Nations have long-established relationships. This applies in particular to the Scandinavian countries, which are already working closely together on defence matters in the NORDEFCO format. The Netherlands and the UK both have historic ties with the region, including in the military sense (such as cold weather training by British and Dutch marines in northern Norway). The Baltic States have a shorter record of cooperation – after their re-established independence in the nineties – but have caught up at remarkable speed. The troop contributions to the enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic States by the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries and the UK have also resulted in close military ties between these troop contributors and the Baltic States. Thus, there is a trusted environment for detailed intelligence-sharing in the JEF-cooperation model.
Cyber and space
Two particular areas for deepening defence cooperation in the JEF context are cyber and space. Although these topics are high on the EU and NATO agendas, there is scope for regional arrangements as well. First, cyber defence is key to the JEF’s own functioning with its regional focus. Second, cyber defence cooperation between armed forces and non-military actors is more promising among the smaller group of JEF Nations than on a larger scale because the complexity becomes even greater in that case. Third, the offensive cyber capabilities of states are unlikely to be used in the context of the EU and NATO due to political and legal restrictions. They might be used in the JEF context or, at least, there is a better chance of their use – assuming there is a need and consensus to act in such a manner. After cyber, space has already been designated as a new military domain. The JEF context could serve as a catalyst for the common acquisition of commercially available space-based imagery and investing in related capabilities.
Whole-of-Government/Whole-of-Society Approach
National authorities and international organisations such as the EU and NATO are struggling with the complexity of connecting defence/military actors to non-military actors – the Whole-of-Government(WoG)/Whole-of-Society(WoS) approach. As stated in chapter 1, bureaucratic stove-piping and cultural resistance create stumbling blocks, which are hard to overcome. As a multinational coalition of like-minded nations, the JEF can act as a catalyst in developing military to non-military connectivity in the hybrid domain. This should not only apply to the governmental actors, but also to the private sector, including leading companies responsible for the provision of energy and key infrastructure. Practical experience with JEF exercises could be shared with other nations and brought to the table in NATO and the EU.
Legal issues
As legal mandates are often lacking for a military role in hybrid response activities, this topic has to be addressed in order to improve coordination with non-military actors and to allow the military to play their appropriate role. JEF Nations should exchange information on their national situation and share experiences and best practices in order to explore the potential for coordinated initiatives to address the issue of legislation. Naturally, all countries will remain responsible for their own legal arrangements, but it might help to learn how each of them deals with the challenges posed by legislation to be better prepared for situations of the JEF being tasked to conduct activities in response to hybrid threats. Once this exercise has produced results, the JEF Nations could bring the matter to the EU and NATO as input for discussions with all their member states. After all, when addressing the contribution of military EU and NATO activities in the grey conflict zone, the same legislation problems will arise.
Protection of sea-based energy and seabed cables
From the start, the JEF has had a strong naval component, although in recent years land and air capabilities have taken a more prominent place. Sea-based energy infrastructure (gas and oil rigs; offshore wind farms and their relay stations) and seabed cables (including for digital traffic) are vulnerable to sabotage and interference as practice has already shown (the Nord Stream cable; the Russian naval presence above underwater cables in the North Sea). The JEF could provide the framework for close cooperation between the activities of the JEF countries in this area by exchanging information and coordinating the availability of required capabilities as a key contribution to NATO’s wider efforts. The JEF could also serve as the frontrunner for establishing the necessary connections to non-military governmental and private actors in this field. In the absence of NATO forces to deter threats to sea-based energy and seabed cables, JEF naval assets could carry out the task.
JEF action points
The JEF Nations
The JEF Nations deliver the military building blocks for the JEF. In the same vein, they are the key players in connecting the JEF to non-military actors in case of hybrid conflict situations. Therefore, in the JEF context, the national efforts of the JEF Nations for WoG/WoS connectivity should be shared and updated systematically. Priority has to be given to the most likely areas and countries of JEF deployment. JEF Nations can learn from each other in order to optimise their national approaches as well as to harmonise their in-country WoG/WoS arrangements to the maximum extent possible. The existing network of national JEF Points of Contacts should be expanded to encompass WoG/WoS experts within their respective countries. Logically, JEF Headquarters should be informed about these national WoG/WoS networks. National liaison officers at JEF Headquarters continue to provide the link to the national authorities, also for hybrid matters.
Inventory of key WoG/WoS actors
In order to support a smooth interaction between the JEF Nations and the JEF Headquarters, an inventory of WoG/WoS actors should be developed. Such an inventory has to encompass both the governmental actors – at national, regional and local levels – as well as key private businesses in sectors that are potential targets for hybrid activities such as the energy, water management and ICT sectors. The inventory should be a living document, to be regularly checked and updated by the JEF Nations’ experts. JEF Nations should share their national lists with the JEF Headquarters and provide updates as required. The Inventory of key WoG/WoS actors will offer the JEF a guide to non-military actors in all countries which will speed up coordination and harmonise response actions in case a hybrid attack occurs in one of the JEF Nations and the JEF is called to assist in addressing the attack. National liaison officers at the JEF Headquarters could act as a point of contact with their national non-military actors. During JEF exercises, the inventory can be tested and should be adapted if required, based on the lessons learned.
Legal issues
A group of legal experts could be constituted in the JEF Nations’ network. The network should be used to exchange information on national legislation. The first issue to be discussed should be the national laws and rules for information-gathering, information analysis and information-sharing. The JEF Nations’ legal experts could even start to explore a set of principles and guidelines in this area. In a coordinated fashion the Ministries of Defence of the JEF Nations should investigate the potential for amending national legislation if this were to be required.
Non-military experts at JEF Headquarters
Another measure to improve the JEF’s preparedness for acting in the hybrid domain would be to incorporate non-military experts at the JEF Headquarters in Northwood, such as cyber specialists, police and law enforcement officers, and critical infrastructure experts. Such a next step would build on the work conducted by the ‘JEF Combined Interagency Task Force’, which has already brought military and non-military experts of the JEF Nations together.[53] At the JEF Headquarters, these civilian experts could assist in and provide advice on writing concepts, doctrine and exercise scenarios for the JEF’s hybrid response functions. They could remain at the headquarters on a temporary basis with the choice of expertise connected to the needs of the JEF Headquarters staff. Expertise in the transport, energy and other key infrastructure areas should be high on the list. These civilian experts would not have an operational function. The national military liaison officers would remain responsible for linking up with their national authorities who would provide the connectivity to non-military actors in capitals.
The Ministerial and Leaders’ Meetings
The war in Ukraine has been the trigger for stepping up JEF meetings at the political level. The JEF Defence Ministerial Meetings increased from two in 2021 to three 2022. Furthermore, on three occasions Leaders’ Meetings at the level of prime ministers have taken place in the same year.[54] Statements released after such gatherings have signalled to potential adversaries, first and foremost Russia, not only solidarity with Ukraine and a continued willingness to support the country but also the determination of the JEF Nations to deploy the JEF, if required, in order to protect their security against Russian threats. Strategic communication is a major task for the leaders’ format to counter hybrid threats by political signalling. These ‘strategic messages’ should preferably go hand in hand with concrete measures taken by the JEF Nations, including by non-military actors to signal WoG/WoS involvement. The JEF context could be used to improve cross-governmental cooperation in the hybrid domain, also by involving other ministers in meetings or table-top exercises as required. JEF deployment decisions should be accompanied by such strategic communication to deter and counter the hybrid threat activity.
Explaining the JEF
The risks connected to existing misperceptions about the role of the JEF, including in the hybrid domain, in other NATO countries require a strategic communication initiative of ‘explaining the JEF’. The UK as the lead nation has to play the central role, supported by the other PNs. Such a strategic communication initiative could encompass the composition of a clear narrative on the JEF’s role and its potential link to NATO. Briefings in various NATO (and EU) meetings should serve the same purpose. Another option would be to invite Defence Policy Directors and, later on, even the political leaders of other Allied countries to JEF meetings.