Energy security and green transition

Energy security is one of the key challenges for the region, as outlined in Chapter 4 (The water-energy-food nexus). With growing economies and populations, Central Asian countries face a rising energy demand in order to power their development. But the visible impact of climate change calls for a reduction of carbon emissions and a switch to clean energy sources.[153] Despite having fossil fuel reserves – namely Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – all countries are dependent on Russia for oil and gas imports, and often experience issues with power shortages and blackouts. Hydropower is the largest renewable energy source in the region and is abundant in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. However, it needs to be balanced with the issue of water availability for agriculture in downstream countries.[154]

Central Asia used to have a connected grid dating back to Soviet times, as outlined in Chapter 4 as well, but the power connections are not always functional. Sharing more electricity could be possible, but the infrastructure is aging and demands vast investments in upgrading the grid. Moreover, coal is still very prevalent, especially in Kazakhstan, exacerbating other problems related to climate change and air pollution.

EU possibilities for energy security cooperation

The EU has a strategic interest in supporting Central Asia in the energy sector in order to develop further alternatives to Russian oil and gas, to import green energy and CRM, and to mitigate the impact of climate change.[155] This has been a priority throughout the Union’s engagement, from the 1995 document on the EU’s Relations with the Newly Independent States of Central Asia onwards to the most recent strategy.[156]

Central Asia harbours many critical minerals that are essential for the energy transition and is expected to become a major global supplier.[157] Of the 30 CRM needed by the EU to power its green transition, Kazakhstan currently produces 19.[158] For some CRM, Central Asia has a large share of global reserves: manganese (38.6%), chromium (30.07%), lead (20%), zinc (12.6%), titanium (8.7%), aluminium/bauxite (5.8%), copper (5.3%), cobalt (5.3%), and molybdenum (5.2%)[159] – many of these are located in Kazakhstan.

The EU has already signed a Strategic Partnership MoU with Kazakhstan in November 2022[160] and with Uzbekistan in April 2024[161] to secure a diversified and sustainable supply chain of raw materials and refined materials. While Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have the resources, the EU has the technology and competences. Central Asian counterparts have the ambition to boost both extraction and processing capacity to develop a local industry and foster socio-economic development.[162]

In Central Asia, renewable energy sources (RES) are coming more in vogue. Despite being a gas producer, Uzbekistan has recently become more dependent on Russia to meet its internal demand. Because of long-term supply contracts with China, it has become more difficult to use gas domestically. In fact, to strengthen its energy security, the government recognises the need to invest in RES. Solar installations are visibly expanding in the country, especially in the capital Tashkent, with investments from Gulf countries and China.[163]

Kazakhstan is another example. As the EU moves towards the goal of Net Zero by 2050 it will reduce its oil demand; this will have consequences for Kazakhstan’s economy. In an EBRD scenario in which a global green transition takes place, Kazakhstan’s fiscal revenues are expected to fall by up to 40% in the next 20 years.[164] The country recognizes the need to diversify its economy and invest in other business models, such as green hydrogen and CRM.[165] EU member states like Germany and Sweden are already working towards developing a green hydrogen facility to boost domestic decarbonisation and facilitate exports to Europe.[166]

The region has a high potential for wind and solar power but needs large-scale public and private investments to materialise it. To encourage a greater involvement from the private sector, there is a need to improve the business climate through regulatory reforms. De-risking mechanisms and incentives are also crucial to attract the private sector. In Tajikistan, the EU is supporting the Roghun Dam (the substantial hydropower project discussed earlier in Chapter 4, The water-energy-food nexus), which is expected to be the tallest in the world and able to supply electricity to the entire region.[167] Financial support from the EU is conditional upon the reform of the energy sector, including an increase in electricity tariffs, which would contribute to attracting more investments. The role of the EU in energy projects differs from China in the sense that it guarantees respect for environmental standards and aims to foster greater regional cooperation, making it an attractive partner.

The EU runs various projects within this context, such as the Sustainable Energy Connectivity in Central Asia (SECCA) as part of the Global Gateway Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy and Climate Change in Central Asia.[168] With a budget of almost seven million euros, SECCA aims to diversify the energy mix in the region towards a more sustainable balance.[169] With its advice, technology, and know-how regarding renewables and efficient energy usage, the EU has the ambition to help Central Asia use their natural resources to generate solar, wind, and hydroelectric power.[170]

However, due to the wide scope and relatively small budget of the Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy, and Climate in Central Asia, deep-rooted problems such as corruption and a lack of economic diversity, and the current dependence of Central Asian elites on fossil fuel and raw material revenues, this initiative is assessed as “mission impossible”.[171]

Moreover, Central Asian countries have an appetite to increase regional energy connectivity and trade. In fact, the region could strengthen its energy security by boosting cross-border interconnections and regional power trade. This would allow countries to reduce the dependency on Russia by harnessing the potential of domestic energy sources, especially RES.[172] To achieve that, there is a need to leverage investments in upgrading grid networks and harmonise market regulations for the energy trade. The EU is seen as an experienced actor with know-how and technology which could provide best practices and technical assistance.

Water management

Water availability is a key issue in Central Asia and is accelerated by the impact of climate change, as outlined in Chapter 4 (see The water-energy-food nexus). In the summer of 2023 Kazakhstan declared a state of emergency as the Caspian Sea had dropped to a critically low level, while Turkmenistan turned off fountains in the capital.

A year later, Kazakhstan was hit by severe floods which caused 117,000 people to evacuate.[173] In Uzbekistan, freshwater prices even doubled in some regions.[174] Water’s link to agriculture and hydropower production makes it essential for the region’s future food and energy security. Still, the region struggles to cooperate due to the weak institutional capacity of regional and national institutions as well as a lack of reliable data to inform decision-making.[175] With growing populations as well as climate variability, a sustainable use of transboundary water is already high on political agendas in the region.

Possibilities for EU-Central Asia water engagement

Water management is seen as an area where the EU could provide technical assistance and knowledge exchange. This is in line with the EU ambition to make Central Asian states more resilient against the consequences of climate change, which the region is already dealing with. Melting glaciers and decreased water flows in a region that already faces water scarcity will further impact the region, a challenge the EU aims to help Central Asia to overcome.[176]

Since 2009, the EU has participated in the Central Asia Water & Energy Program (CAWEP), a multi-donor trust fund in partnership with the World Bank, Switzerland and the UK. This initiative aims to enable regional cooperation by supporting the development of data-driven regional narratives, building institutional capacity and fostering investments that promote water and energy security.[177] Moreover, in November 2022 the EU launched the previously mentioned Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy and Climate Change with the EIB, the EBRD, and several member states. This initiative focuses on “developing an integrated regional power market, transboundary water governance, and the inclusion of climate change in the regional political dialogue on water, energy and the environment”.[178] The estimated value is €700 million, including €200 million from the EU budget.[179]

While the initiative focuses only on the five Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – the CAWEP also includes Afghanistan, a key actor to solve the water issues of the region (see Chapters 4 and 7). Broadening the engagement to involve Afghanistan while building trust among the six countries is a prerequisite to facilitate cooperation on water issues. Moreover, a sustainable and efficient use of water resources could ultimately help to mitigate border disputes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. It might also assist in strengthening confidence between the two parties and resolve previous disagreements.[180]

Another platform for cooperation is the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). Although it is a unique forum, it currently does not guarantee sufficient cooperation to reach its goal. The organisation has the potential to be reformed to expand cooperation in transboundary water management as well as energy connectivity. One of the problems in its operations, however, is that the IFAS head and secretariat rotate whenever the chairmanship rotates. So, whenever there is a new chair, the organisation needs to start again from scratch. To solve this issue, Central Asian states agree that the secretariat must reside in a set location and maintain an international non-rotating staff. Although this solution is supported, the exact location remains undecided.

Water management: Dutch expertise

Among the EU Member States, the Netherlands is a recognized world leader in water management and is interested in sharing its experience with the region. In 2023, for instance, the Netherlands and Tajikistan jointly hosted the UN Water Conference.[181] Moreover, in May 2024, during the visit of the former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte to Kazakhstan, the Netherlands signed two MoU’s with the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation of Kazakhstan aimed at strengthening water cooperation and facilitating research, innovation, and education.

On top of the exchange of experience in the regulation and use of floodwaters, the Netherlands pledged to provide training for specialists together with the IHE Delft Institute for Water Education.[182] Although the Netherlands is involved in the Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy, and Climate Change, little to no publicity has been given to its participation. For example, the Netherlands is not listed as a participant on the EU Capacity4dev website for the initiative,[183] nor is it mentioned in other related publications. Further collaboration in this initiative presents an opportunity to join forces with other European partners, such as Finland, France, Germany, and Italy. With the high reputation of European universities, more initiatives aimed at exchanging innovative technology and effective good governance can be leveraged by Europe as a worthy entry point in the region.

Agriculture

Agriculture is a crucial economic sector for the countries in Central Asia in terms of output and employment. In 2019, data from the ADB show that agriculture accounted for 25.5% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in Uzbekistan, 19.2% in Tajikistan and 12.1% in Kyrgyzstan.[184] This sector faces growing challenges driven by changing climates and unpredictable market conditions. Water availability is a key issue, as well as the inefficient use thereof and the cultivation of water-thirsty crops such as cotton. The countries of the region are already struggling to secure water for agricultural production (see Chapter 4). Without a proper management of water resources, water levels are expected to decline, leading to more competition over limited resources.[185]

At the market level, unfair competition spurred by heavy subsidies and high import duties hinder the export competitiveness of agricultural products.[186] Wheat, for instance, is the main agricultural product and the most important for regional food security. In fact, it has historically been subject to heavy state intervention and land allocation.[187] Competition over the same products is a challenge among Central Asian countries which demands a targeted market research and division of crops based on competitive advantage. This would facilitate a more cohesive market where each country specializes in and exports specific crops, thereby leveraging the agricultural potential of the region.

In Central Asia, there is an interest in developing an industry of agricultural production and exports to Europe, such as by developing a food packaging industry as well as implementing standardisation and certification. Increasing the shares of processed agricultural products would also contribute to strengthening food security in the region. To achieve this, the countries want to learn and attract modern agricultural techniques and technologies, such as greenhouses. According to the World Bank, this would increase the region’s crop yields by over 20% by 2030, and by 50% by 2050.[188]

The EU has an interest in facilitating agricultural trade and contributing to Central Asian countries’ export diversification and sustainable growth. It is also perceived as a reliable actor with technical expertise and advanced technology. Historically, agriculture has been one of the most important sectors for the relationship between the Netherlands and Central Asian countries, as signalled by the presence of a Dutch Agriculture Attaché at the embassy in Astana, as well as early Dutch involvement in agricultural projects in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.

The Netherlands is the third largest exporter of agricultural produce in the world, accounting for 5.4% of world production, and is considered to be a technological leader in sustainable agriculture, greenhouses and seeds.[189] This makes the Netherlands a natural partner for Central Asian countries as it could transfer its agri-tech and provide technical assistance to improve the resilience of crops for export. Dutch universities, such as Wageningen University, are internationally recognised in agricultural sciences and are appealing to Central Asian students who would benefit from more exchange programmes or collaborations with local universities. Moreover, Central Asian countries need to abide by European standards to be able to export to the EU market and require training with regard to relevant EU regulations.

Connectivity and trade

From the second century BCE until the mid-15^th century, Central Asia was at the centre of the Silk Road that connected China to the Middle East and Europe. But as trade between Asia and Europe moved to the Ocean Route, and later to the Northern Corridor via Russia, Central Asia lost its key trading position.[190]

Recently, the region has regained its relevance for global trade routes and found itself in the spotlight once again. Since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in fact, there is growing attention to the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) – or the Middle Corridor – as an alternative trade route linking China to the EU via Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. Cargo transport volumes along this route had already increased by 88% in 2023.[191]

For the region, the TITR could be an opportunity to diversify trade markets and to expand the export range of products and services while spurring job creation. Currently, countries in Central Asia are among the least connected in the world.[192] Boosting connectivity is a priority for them as well as for the EU, which prioritizes the development of “functioning trade corridors” between Central Asia and Europe while “ensuring that connectivity develops in a sustainable, open, inclusive and rules-based way (...), creating a suitable environment for sustainable investment and a level playing field”.[193]

Yet, Central Asian countries diverge on their preferred transport route. While some prioritise the east-west connection, others prefer the north-south route.

Source: SWP, 2022
© 2025 Clingendael Institute – edited by Textcetera, The Hague

Kazakhstan is politically invested in realising the TITR. In November 2022, Kazakhstan signed a Roadmap together with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye listing priority investments.[194] Being a key transit country, it would greatly benefit from this project and realize its ambition to become a transport hub between Europe and Asia, while increasing its exports.[195] Moreover, the government sees it as a prospect to spur intraregional trade and facilitate the economic integration of Central Asia. Turkmenistan is also interested in the TITR but is less involved. Ashgabat is careful with balancing the need to expand export opportunities with its relations with Moscow, which is incentivizing Central Asian countries not to go towards Europe.

Concerns revolve around the long-term feasibility of the project, especially when the war in Ukraine will be over, and the question of who is going to pay for the infrastructure. Moreover, building a pipeline in the Caspian Sea seems difficult as Russia could veto the proposal, as happened with the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, which was objected to on environmental grounds.[196] And Turkmenistan is currently focussed on building the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline.[197]

For Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the TITR is considered to bring few opportunities to boost their exports. Their priority for connectivity lies in the north-south corridors towards Pakistan via the Trans-Afghan railway and towards Iran, allowing access to the open sea.[198] These corridors would open new opportunities for the region to trade with South Asia and the Middle East, and are favoured by Moscow. The EU is invested in supporting the operationalisation of the TITR as it has a strategic interest in diversifying away from the Northern corridor. Yet, the TITR could indirectly allow Moscow to further circumvent sanctions through Central Asian economies – something the EU is already highly concerned about.

Moreover, the TITR could reinforce China’s economic engagement and influence in the region, and could potentially increase the leverage of states along the TITR over the EU. Nevertheless, the benefits of deepening EU connections with Central Asia outweigh these risks. By providing regional connectivity opportunities, the EU could, in fact, position itself as a key player in the region and boost trade in energy, critical raw materials and agricultural products, among others.[199]

The EU has committed to raise 10 billion euros for TITR infrastructure investment as part of the Global Gateway. Moreover, it has announced an EU-funded Regional Transport Programme for 2025 to offer technical assistance.[200] Know-how and best practices on developing and managing ports are needed. The Netherlands is well placed to offer technical assistance because of its experience with the Port of Rotterdam, the biggest in Europe.

To maximise the benefits of the TITR, challenges related to both soft and hard infrastructure need to be addressed. The EBRD estimates that a cost of 18.5 billion euros is required to operationalise the corridor, demanding a mobilisation of both public and private capital to modernise port and railway infrastructure.[201] Moreover, there is a need to improve coordination and operational efficiency along the route to build trade potential. This requires establishing a cross-border institutional framework, harmonising trade standards and simplifying border procedures. Digitalisation is a key element that would enable greater transparency and efficiency.[202]

To expand the benefits of the TITR for the region, the EU could offer broader economic engagement allowing countries to participate in European value chains. This includes offering “favourable access to the EU market, through the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) or GSP+”.[203] Currently, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are beneficiaries while Tajikistan is negotiating this.[204] Moreover, support aimed at improving regulatory frameworks and business climate is key to attract private sector investments. Finally, on digital connectivity, the EU launched a Team Europe Initiative of 40 million euros to provide technical assistance for “the development of the countries’ governance in sectors including telecoms reform, cybersecurity, and personal data protection”.[205]

Education

In terms of people-to-people connectivity, a key priority for the EU in Central Asia is education. This has been the case since the first EU strategy for the region, which states that “Central Asia’s future will be shaped by its young people”.[206]

EU education policy towards Central Asia is primarily carried out through the Erasmus+ programme, which aims to improve the level of university education in the region. It does so by assisting universities to modernise in accordance with the Bologna process on higher education, as well as the Torino principles on vocational education and training.[207] Another more visible aspect of Erasmus+ is its exchange programmes. Between 2015 and 2019, there were 5,053 Central Asian students who studied in the EU and 2,342 students the other way around.[208] And to get Central Asian universities more involved in Erasmus, the EU used to have a regional education initiative for Central Asia.

Education is a clear example of an area in which all five Central Asian partners are interested in cooperating more closely with the EU. They would like to strengthen the ties between Central Asian universities and their European counterparts, for example by cooperating in research and organising more student exchange programmes. The high level of education in the EU is one of the valuable aspects the Union has to offer to the countries of Central Asia and would be very much in demand among students in the region.

This opens up possibilities for the EU to play a bigger role in Central Asia, which would also bring a strong positive impact on energy security and transition, water management, agriculture, and the other key sectors for cooperation as outlined in this report.

In practice, however, education has so far proved to be a challenging topic. While it has been on the agenda for a long time, the results of EU education assistance towards the region have been assessed as “below expectations, at times controversial, and has lacked visibility”.[209]

Various issues are at play, such as the generic approach of the EU in education assistance while Central Asia is a diverse region and differences between the five countries should be taken into account – from the cultures to histories, political systems, and more. Another issue is an underestimation of the “authoritarian and corrupt political context” of the region, which leads to diverging perspectives on the skills that should be promoted in higher education. For example, the Central Asian authorities tend not to be inclined to promote skills like critical thinking, which are labelled as “Western ideas”.[210]

The fundamental reforms in education that the EU is envisioning for the region at large, such as getting higher education in Central Asia in line with the Bologna process, are not effective due to such challenges. Observers have assessed that the EU should rather work more directly with targeted, nationally-oriented smaller projects.[211] Here one can think of internship programmes for Central Asian students at European companies or fellowship programmes in European countries for young Central Asian civil servants or civil society representatives.

Finally, the EU education focus in the region is very much on higher education. While this is good as a starting point, EU engagement can be just as important and needed in primary and secondary education.[212] After all, without access to proper primary and secondary education, young people in Central Asia cannot enter higher education that the EU is currently focussing on.[213]

Regional security

The countries of Central Asia face various shared security threats, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, extremism, radicalisation, and illegal migration. In line with this, making the region more secure and resilient is one of the longer-standing priorities of the EU in Central Asia.

The BOMCA programme for border management, mentioned in Chapter 9, is a practical example of these efforts. It is one of the “biggest and most successful EU flagship-projects” in the region.[214] Currently in its tenth phase since 2003 with a budget of over twenty million euros, BOMCA has the overall goal to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of border management in Central Asia and thereby to contribute to national and regional security and economic development.[215]

A second project through which the EU aims to make Central Asia more secure is the also aforementioned CADAP (see Chapter 9), which launched in 2003 and aims to help the countries of the region in lowering the demand for drugs, supporting preventative programmes, and enhancing the care that local drug users receive from public institutions.[216] The EU is interested in further cooperating with Central Asian states to combat organised crime, migrant smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal drug trafficking.[217] One programme that focuses on tackling transnational organised crime is the EU Action Against Drugs and Organised Crime (EU-ACT II), which is carried out by member states’ law enforcement authorities.[218]

The EU also funds the Law Enforcement in Central Asia (LEICA) project, which aims to aid Central Asian law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism in the region. This is done through strategic and operational exchanges between EU and Central Asian law enforcement, capacity building, and regional cooperation to combat terrorism-related problems.[219]

Through these programmes, the EU has had a positive effect on the border management systems and security in Central Asia. It has improved legislation in individual countries such as Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, for example, and in general has helped to better regulate and stabilize migration flows.[220]

Yet, there are several challenges regarding EU security projects in the region. On of these is that Central Asian governments tend to overstretch risks of radicalism and religious extremism in order to gain support.[221] Observers note that Central Asian governments consider radical Islam as one of the biggest security threats to their countries and the power of their regime, which causes them to be more repressive and crack down on religious movements in particular. While the fear of radicalization is legitimate, the EU should be aware of these underlying motivations and also focus on long-term, preventative measures against radicalization and marginalization that focus on root causes – improving the social-economic perspectives of the people of the region.[222] One such project undertaken by the EU in the past is its engagement with Kyrgyz civil society through the Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism (STRIVE) programme.[223]

While the EU is not willing to be a hard security actor in Central Asia, the EU and Central Asia’s shared security threats do offer a potential avenue for cooperation. The EU-Central Asia High-level Political and Security Dialogue meets regularly, most recently in June of last year in Brussels, for example, to discuss the security challenges that both the EU and Central Asia are dealing with.[224] More recently, the EU and the Netherlands organised a roundtable in Astana to address critical transnational threats that impact both the EU and Kazakhstan.[225]

Human rights, democracy, and the rule of law

One of the longer-standing interests of the EU in Central Asia is the promotion of human rights and democracy. In its latest strategy for the region, the EU argues that taking steps such as advancing the rule of law, bolstering the accountability of public institutions, and guaranteeing respect for human rights are “key conditions for the success of the sustainable development of Central Asia”.[226]

Moreover, these efforts are aimed at helping to attract foreign investments in Central Asia. The business climate in all countries of the region requires improvement and some European companies are hesitant to invest and transfer their technologies in this regard. In Tajikistan, for instance, predatory taxation, widespread corruption, and the state monopolisation of the market do not provide the right incentives to foreign investors. In fact, the Central Asian countries understand the need to strengthen their legal frameworks and make their business climates more transparent and predictable to attract investments from European companies.[227]

To bolster human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Central Asia, the EU supports governments in enhancing their legal capabilities and to reform their judicial and legal systems.[228] Another pathway is the annual EU – Central Asia Civil Society Forum, where a wide variety of civil society representatives of both regions are brought together to explore ways to become more involved in the local implementation of the EU Central Asia Strategy.[229]

However, even though this topic is still a priority for the EU in theory, this no longer seems to be the case in practice. Today, the talk of the town in Brussels is all about energy and trade – not human rights and democracy. Stability in Central Asia is valued more highly than democracy, and so the European Union maintains cordial ties with the Central Asian governments in spite of their autocratic style of governance and regular human rights abuses.[230]

Tensions over EU democracy promotion or defence of human rights are not new. The EU's strategy towards Central Asia was, in practice, marked by a significant disconnect between the highly normative language of the EU and the rather self-interested actions back then, as observers noted: “democracy promotion was one of the top priority areas according to the EU Strategy towards Central Asia, but its implementation was characterized by a lack of effort and inconsistency”.[231] Amongst Kazakh elites, there are mixed feelings about this normative agenda of the EU. While most opinion influencers in Kazakhstan tend to widely recognise European values, others oppose the political and cultural aspects of these values.[232]

The current EU approach towards the region can be described as “principled pragmatism”, as outlined in the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy in 2016.[233] Whereas the EU is still guided by its long-term principles, it acts more pragmatically and accepts partners for what they are. In practice, this means the EU is balancing its principles and interests in Central Asia, which “has often come at the cost of human rights abuses and the consolidation of undemocratic regimes.”[234]

There used to be a lot of tensions and misunderstandings over values between the EU and the countries of Central Asia, but about a decade ago the governments of the region started to accept EU criticism while business was ongoing. More recently, the EU has in turn become more silent on human rights, democracy and the rule of law due to their renewed energy and trade interests. The granting of a new EPCA to Kyrgyzstan even though the country has clearly been moving into an authoritarian direction is a clear example of this.[235]

This leads to confusion amongst Central Asian partners. On the one hand, people in Central Asia who are fighting for democracy, human rights and the rule of law feel betrayed, while on the other hand, Central Asian governments realise that, apparently, these important values are no longer so important for the EU when economic and security interests come into play.[236]

When taking steps towards deepening the EU-Central Asia relationship, the EU should consider to increasingly do good governance and rule of law projects with Central Asia that are directly connected to energy (security) and other areas in which the countries of the region want to cooperate. Central Asian partners are formally still committed to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) human dimension, and these OSCE commitments could be a framework for doing so.

Regional cooperation

Central Asian countries face many challenges that are regional in nature, yet the countries are not ready to face them as a region. There is not enough trust among governments to share data about their water flows, for instance. In fact, building trust by bringing countries together in dialogues is a key step toward greater regionalisation.

Now there is more appetite among the countries of Central Asia to boost regional cooperation. Leaders understand that if they work as a region, they can pool their markets together and become more attractive to foreign investors. At the same time, they can reduce dependencies on third countries, like Russia. In areas such as energy, water and agriculture there is a huge potential to share resources and increase trade with third countries.[237]

Strengthening regional cooperation within Central Asia is one of the key objectives for the EU, based on rules-based cooperation. The EU argues that this will allow Central Asian states to better manage their interdependencies, strengthen their economic position and international influence, and uphold their identity and independence, amongst other things.[238]

One aspect of this is strengthening the Central Asian economies “to address the structural constraints which still limit the potential for trade and investment between the EU and Central Asia”, according to the EU strategy for Central Asia.[239] To achieve this, the EU aims to foster an open investment environment as well as a competitive private sector in the region. The EU supports the economic modernisation of the region and the integration of Central Asia into the international markets, of which accession to the World Trade Organisation is an element.[240]

During various of our interviews, interviewees noted that there is first a need for Central Asian countries to build a regional identity in order to cooperate better.[241] However, this is challenging because the five countries are not homogeneous amongst each other and neither fully homogenous within. Although there are shared elements in their history, religions, cultures, and worldviews that Central Asian countries could use to build such regional identity,[242] one may wonder if this is really a prerequisite for cooperation. The EU does not have a fully developed European identity either and neither did the European Coal and Steel Community, or other regional formats that could be an example for Central Asia, such as the Benelux cooperation between Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

Although the EU supports regionalisation in Central Asia and is considered to be a model for this as well, the region has a different history and socio-economic situation which demands a targeted approach to regionalisation based on local needs. For instance, formal institutionalisation is not seen as a “must” for Central Asian countries, where personal relationships are more crucial than institutions.[243] While the EU, with its extensive experience in fostering cooperation among countries with diverse cultures and histories, is a natural partner to support regionalisation, the success of regional integration in Central Asia ultimately hinges on the initiative and commitment of the Central Asian states. More dialogue aimed at building trust among the five countries as well as technical exchanges on best regional practices could be beneficial.