Open the geopolitical mapping in full-view mode

In August 2024, Central Asia’s energy ministers met in Astana for the “first” time.[39] On the agenda were collective projects, such as hydropower generation and Tajikistan’s ambition to once again join the Central Asian Integrated Power System (CAPS), an integrated power system through which Central Asian states could exchange electricity during Soviet times. Both issues are very topical at this point in time.

During Soviet times, the Central Asian republics would exchange electricity through a system that took the needs of all five republics into account. So, from spring onwards, upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would use the water flow to generate power in their hydro plants and to simultaneously allow the three downstream countries to irrigate their lands. In winter, the two upstream countries would collect the water and relied on the fossil energy generation of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

Today, this exchange no longer functions. After their independence, the Central Asian states started to disconnect from the system due to various disputes surrounding energy generation, transit, and water-sharing arrangements.[40] Instead of taking the needs of all of Central Asia into account in their national policies, national interests started to be paramount.

This meant that the upstream countries had to release the water streams in the winter as well, in order to generate enough power. This caused less water to be stored for release during the agricultural season, resulting in a reduced water flow toward the downstream countries during that season. An idea raised in the past was to allow the downstream countries to pay for increasing the water flow in the agricultural season, but the downstream states perceived this as a bizarre notion. As one interviewee argued: “Why would downstream countries pay upstream countries to let the water flow during the agricultural season? Imagine that the Netherlands would have to pay Switzerland for letting the rivers flow – I cannot imagine this happening.”[41]

There is a complex interplay of competing trade-offs among water, energy, and food security in Central Asia. While the region is rich in water and energy resources in general, both are scarce at national levels as they are unequally distributed.[43] The origins of the two biggest rivers in Central Asia, the Syr Darya and Amu Darya, can be traced back to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (and Afghanistan). These upstream countries possess the highest water reserves in the region. The main use (85%) of that water, on the other hand, takes place at their downstream neighbours – primarily for irrigation.[44] And while Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan have large reserves of oil, gas, and coal, their upstream neighbours are dependent on the further development of their hydropower generation without regional cooperation on water and energy.

Energy security is one of the main priorities for the Central Asian countries. For instance, Tajikistan’s flagship project, the Roghun Dam, has been in development for decades – starting in 1976 in the Soviet Union. From 2016 onwards it has gained a new impulse with various investments,[45] amongst others from the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Investment Bank (EIB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and Islamic Development Bank (IDB).

The aim of the Roghun Dam is to make Tajikistan the energy hub of Central Asia and to supply low-cost electricity for domestic demand and export. The World Bank estimates an average annual generation of 14,4 TWh, corresponding to about 70 percent of the current total generation in Tajikistan.[46] While the export of electricity to neighbouring countries could potentially lead to increased cooperation in Central Asia, the project has so far faced continued criticism from Uzbekistan.

Concerns include the dam’s possibility to seriously reduce the amount of water flowing into Uzbekistan, which puts its agricultural economy and food production at risk. But while the previous president of Uzbekistan, Karimov, fiercely opposed the project and threatened with the prospect of war, his successor Mirziyoyev agreed to buy electricity from Roghun.[47] Moreover, closer cooperation between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan could reduce the dam’s impact on downstream irrigation.[48]

Besides the trepidations from Uzbekistan, there are more widespread concerns over human rights, corruption, and the potential mismanagement of the dam. Multiple NGOs report that the Roghun Dam could displace over 40,000 people and report that the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (EISA) of the project does not meet the formal requirements.[49] There are also concerns about the high levels of corruption in Tajikistan, which could hinder the construction of the $6 billion project.[50]

Energy security is a priority in Kyrgyzstan as well: From 2013 onwards the country has been reviving its largest hydroelectric project, the Toktogul Dam, and has planned a series of other dams on the Naryn river.[51]

Another issue is the Soviet legacy of inefficient usage of the available water. It is estimated that the Central Asian states use 150% more water for irrigation than the recommended volume, and their irrigation systems are very inefficient and wasteful in delivering water to the fields.[52] In combination with the intense cultivation of cotton – a thirsty crop that requires a lot of water – this has had detrimental consequences for the Aral Sea in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Much of it has already been tapped away, leading to an environmental disaster and the disappearance of the Sea.[53]

An important regional institution is the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). This fund was established in 1993 by the five Central Asian heads of state in order to tackle the environmental crisis of the Aral Sea. IFAS’ main objectives include financing joint interstate environmental and scientific research programmes aimed at saving the Aral Sea and improving the socio-economic environmental issues of the region.[54]

During the Consultative Meeting of 2021, the Central Asian leaders discussed ways to improve IFAS’ organizational structure and legal framework. They recognized the importance of strengthening regional cooperation in mitigating the effects of climate change, as well as improving a rational use of water and energy resources.[55] International partners like the EU and the World Bank support these efforts as part of the Central Asia Water & Energy Program (CAWEP, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3).

However, some IFAS member states are reluctant to alter the status quo, and alternative suggestions for reform reflect different national interests.[56] In 2016, for instance, Kyrgyzstan decided to freeze its participation in IFAS due to diverging views.[57] This showcases the paramount need to address political tensions and limited trust to enable greater regional cooperation.