Open the geopolitical mapping in full-view mode

Over ten years ago, President Xi Jinping chose the Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan to announce the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for the first time. Speaking to students and staff about the great and poetic narratives of the ancient Silk Road, he argued that China and Central Asia needed to deepen their economic ties, cooperation, and development in modern times as well.[100]

This speech and the announcement of the BRI is symbolic of China’s re-engagement with Central Asia over the past two decades. Whereas China was rather absent in the region immediately after Central Asian countries gained independence, China has stepped up its ambition over the past few years. Its focus has shifted from a primary interest in establishing good relations, countering terrorist threats, and securing the borders with its Central Asian neighbours in the beginning towards taking up a leading role in the region – both in terms of economic investments and political ties.[101]

During the times of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire, connectivity in the region was designed to flow north-south. Now that China has stepped in, initiatives such as the BRI have increasingly connected the region from the west to the east. Through roads, railways, terminals, and pipelines that connect Europe and Asia, the BRI plays an important role in the Chinese approach and reach to the region.[102] One such project is the planned China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway that will offer a shorter route for cargo compared to the current routes through Russian territory.[103]

In terms of trade and investment, China has already replaced Russia as Central Asia's principal economic partner.[104] Last year, trade turnover between China and the Central Asian states amounted to 90 billion USD – twice as much as between the region and Russia.[105] The China-Central Asia Summit that took place in the same year resulted in more than three billion USD in Chinese investments – leading to a total value of 65 billion USD in Chinese investments.[106]

Chinese investments are quite visible in the region. Take Tajikistan for example, where the cities’ architecture has drastically changed over the past decade with many new buildings built by Chinese constructors, such as the new Parliament. Such “architectural marvels in Dushanbe stand as testament to China-Tajikistan friendship”, according to the Chinese State Council.[107] On the streets of Dushanbe, the roads are filled with Chinese electric taxis and Chinese brands of (electric) vehicles such as BYD and ZEEKR have seen an increase in their market shares – even though the infrastructure for electric vehicles is limited in the region.

Finally, Chinese cultural engagements have also strengthened, of which educational exchanges are a good example. China offers many opportunities for Central Asian students to study at Chinese universities, increasing China’s regional soft power. As students learn more about China through their studies abroad, they open up towards the country. As one interviewee in Bishkek indicated: quite a few students who went to China knew nothing about the country and even had Sinophobic ideas before leaving for the country – now they hold much more positive attitudes towards China and have even learned Mandarin.[108] This also makes elites in Central Asia less sceptical about the increasing Chinese engagement in the region. Some of them have perceived these to challenge both their political establishments and cultural models,[109] and are concerned about the treatment of Central Asian minorities in Chinese Xinjiang. Sinophobic sentiments are a Soviet legacy, stemming from the Sinophobic propaganda that followed after the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s.

Security interests

Not just Chinese economic engagement have grown over time – Chinese security interests in the region have done so too. As Central Asia is becoming an important Eurasian transit hub, as well as a BRI focal point, it becomes increasingly important for China to protect these interests and maintain stability in the region. In China’s view, possible threats include terrorism, potentially coming from Afghanistan or from Uyghur nationalists in Central Asia. This is in line with China’s policy of fighting the three evils: ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism.[110]

China has stepped up its security presence in the region. Between 2018 – 2023, China provided 32% of the weapons imports of Uzbekistan and 36% of Tajikistan (see figure 6),[111] and it has constructed military infrastructure in Tajikistan.[112] China also cooperates with Central Asian states in joint military exercises and trainings and assists with emergency management and law enforcement.[113] These initiatives primarily take place on a bilateral level between the Central Asian states and China.

Another aspect of the Chinese security presence in the region takes form in the shape of the SCO – a political, economic, and security partnership led by China of which all Central Asian republics are members, except for Turkmenistan. From its inception in 1996 as the Shanghai Five, the SCO engaged in various security-related issues. It helped for instance to establish the borders between the Central Asian states and China after the fall of the Soviet Union, organised military exercises, and functioned as a meeting platform for the security and defence elites of all member states.[114]

However, as Russia feared that China would gain too strong a position in the region, it focused its initiatives through the CSTO and prevented the SCO from taking on more responsibilities and turning into an organisation with substance. This led to the SCO becoming “little more than a talking club for leaders of friendly countries”.[115] As such, China now organises its security initiatives in Central Asia also outside the SCO, with formats that exclude Russia, such as its Global Security Initiative (GSI), the C5+China, and other bilateral or multilateral initiatives.[116]

Russia-China relations in Central Asia

Despite Russia’s systemic presence in the region, Moscow has not challenged more Chinese participation in Central Asian affairs. Whereas observers of the region had expected Sino-Russian conflict over a variety of issues, including energy, transport corridors, trade, and political and security influence, the two countries’ perspective of shaping an alternative to the liberal US-led order and their shared rivalry with the United States have ensured that these conflicts have not materialized. Russia is also likely to maintain its acceptance of China’s growing role in regional security, which is mainly driven by the Kremlin’s focus on reserving its military and intelligence resources for its war in Ukraine. Consequently, experts believe that Central Asia may become a testing ground for the two nations’ “no limits” partnership, aimed at reshaping the regional order – an agreement solidified just two days before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[117]